Research Note: Mapping Deviant Democracies during the Cold War
Online appendix
Indicators for three dichotomous measures of democracy-non-democracy
1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected
2. The legislature must be popularly elected
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place
Freedom House’s electoral democracies (Brownlee, 2009):
1. A competitive multiparty political system
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens
3. Regularly contested elections under a secure and secret ballot and the absence of massive outcome-changing fraud
4. Significant public assess of major political parties to the electorate through the media and open campaigning.
Polity IV (Doorenspleet, 2000):
1. At least one executive chosen by competitive popular elections (scoring 2 or 3 on ‘competitiveness of executive recruitment’).
2. All the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain an executive position through a regularized process (scoring 3 or 4 on ‘openness of executive recruitment’).
3. Alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena, such that oppositional activity is not restricted or suppressed (scoring 0, 3, 4 or 5 on ‘competitiveness of participation’).
4. There are at least substantial limitations on the exercise of executive power (scoring 4, 5, 6 or 7 on ‘constraints on the power of the chief executive’).
Bibliography
Alvarez, M., J. Cheibub, F. Limongi, and A. Przeworski (1996), ‘Classifying Political Regimes’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 529–546.
Doorenspleet, R. (2005), Democratic Transitions – Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Brownlee, J. (2009), ‘Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 515–532.
Cases sensitive to time periods:
Nigeria has 5 consecutive democracy years from 1979-1983, which are captured by a four year analysis. El Salvador is capture in one period of the 5 year analysis, but not in the 4 year analysis on Polity and CGV (captured if we change start of 4 year period). Guatemala is capture in one period of 5 year analysis, but not in the 4 year analysis on FH (captured if we change start of 4 year period). Peru is captured in two periods of the 5 year analysis, but only in one period in the 4 year analysis on Polity, CGV and FH (captured if we change start of 4 year period). Uganda is capture in one period in the 5 year analysis, but not in the 4 year analysis on Polity and CGV (captured if we change start of 4 year period). Nicaragua is capture in one period in the 5 year analysis, but not in the 4 year analysis on CGV (captured if we change start of 4 year period). Brazil and Uruguay’s four year of consecutive democracy is capture from 1985-1988 in 5 year analysis, but not in 4 year analysis (captured if we change start of 4 year period) on Polity, FH and CGV.
Table 1a. A cross-spatial logistic regression analysis of the effect of structural conditions on democracy (1975-1988).
1975-1979 / 1980-1984 / 1985-1988DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH
Geographic Diffusion / 0.054*** / 0.050*** / 0.082*** / 0.058** / 0.079*** / 0.075*** / 0.057** / 0.069*** / 0.068***
(0.016) / (0.016) / (0.020) / (0.021) / (0.019) / (0.019) / (0.019) / (0.018) / (0.018)
Modernization / 1.354*** / 1.479*** / 1.750*** / 0.890** / 1.072** / 1.193*** / 0.903** / 1.264*** / 1.129***
(0.333) / (0.367) / (0.422) / (0.294) / (0.360) / (0.356) / (0.309) / (0.370) / (0.337)
Resource
reliance / -0.281 / -0.174 / 0.471 / -0.811* / -0.834 / -0.957* / -1.350* / -1.411* / -1.353*
(0.717) / (0.680) / (0.880) / (0.633) / (0.700) / (0.701) / (0.627) / (0.662) / (0.651)
Ethnic Fractionalization / 1.050 / -0.001 / -1.795* / 0.487 / 0.063 / -0.971 / -0.751 / -0.502 / -0.534
(1.181) / (1.044) / (1.368) / (1.055) / (1.142) / (1.197) / (1.098) / (1.126) / (1.111)
Former British
colony / 0.362 / 0.943* / 0.787 / 0.214 / 1.250** / 0.393 / 0.415 / 1.057* / 0.479
(0.595) / (0.615) / (0.864) / (0.576) / (0.527) / (0.645) / (0.628) / (0.571) / (0.579)
Population
size / 0.523*** / 0.355* / 0.224 / 0.191 / 0.197 / 0.028 / 0.350* / 0.302* / 0.276*
(0.165) / (0.165) / (0.253) / (0.169) / (0.156) / (0.229) / (0.168) / (0.163) / (0.174)
Region / 0.125 / 0.336* / 0.346* / 0.037 / 0.249* / 0.093 / 0.103 / 0.285* / 0.237*
(0.174) / (0.179) / (0.230) / (0.159) / (0.184) / (0.182) / (0.169) / (0.193) / (0.183)
Constant / -7.423*** / -6.214*** / -5.622* / -3.909* / -5.249** / -2.615 / -5.104** / -5.933** / -5.311**
(1.909) / (1.831) / (2.552) / (2.067) / (2.055) / (2.355) / (1.959) / (2.059) / (2.018)
N / 125 / 125 / 125 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131
Pseudo R2
(Nagelkerke) / 0.516 / 0.511 / 0.649 / 0.456 / 0.516 / 0.589 / 0.532 / 0.569 / 0.567
Log pseudolikelihood / -48.382 / -49.354 / -34.733 / -57.536 / -53.675 / -45.821 / -53.814 / -50.426 / -50.583
Note: *P<0.1, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001. Unstandardized betacoefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-sided significance test.
Table 1b. A cross-spatial logistic regression analysis of the effect of structural conditions on democracy (1975-1986).
DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH
Geographic Diffusion / 0.066*** / 0.054*** / 0.087*** / 0.056** / 0.075*** / 0.095*** / 0.058*** / 0.070*** / 0.074***
(0.019) / (0.017) / (0.019) / (0.019) / (0.018) / (0.020) / (0.018) / (0.018) / (0.019)
Modernization / 1.553*** / 1.567*** / 1.754*** / 1.042*** / 1.105*** / 1.431*** / 0.806** / 1.123*** / 1.054**
(0.379) / (0.394) / (0.444) / (0.315) / (0.354) / (0.422) / (0.313) / (0.354) / (0.345)
Resource
reliance / -0.077 / -0.211 / 1.078 / -0.705 / -0.892 / -0.700 / -1.268* / -0.924* / -1.037*
(0.793) / (0.728) / (0.929) / (0.650) / (0.711) / (0.877) / (0.609) / (0.677) / (0.646)
Ethnic Fractionalization / -0.311 / -0.849 / -3.399** / 1.243 / 0.726 / -0.673 / -0.304 / 0.268 / -0.857
(1.233) / (1.064) / (1.227) / (1.112) / (1.127) / (1.365) / (1.134) / (1.112) / (1.123)
Former British
colony / 0.314 / 0.831 / 1.212 / 0.101 / 1.077* / 0.826 / 0.406 / 1.243** / 0.527
(0.798) / (0.740) / (0.976) / (0.599) / (0.542) / (0.768) / (0.605) / (0.531) / (0.606)
Population
size / 0.565** / 0.309* / 0.210 / 0.301* / 0.187 / 0.069 / 0.254* / 0.231* / 0.128
(0.189) / (0.188) / (0.280) / (0.174) / (0.152) / (0.259) / (0.157) / (0.157) / (0.197)
Region / 0.157 / 0.336* / 0.360* / 0.138 / 0.364* / 0.347* / 0.028 / 0.189 / 0.109
(0.200) / (0.192) / (0.258) / (0.170) / (0.189) / (0.214) / (0.156) / (0.178) / (0.179)
Constant / -7.924*** / -5.668** / -5.543* / -5.678** / -5.691** / -4.853* / -4.092* / -5.323** / -3.624*
(2.083) / (1.919) / (2.787) / (2.191) / (2.040) / (2.870) / (1.869) / (2.115) / (2.163)
N / 125 / 125 / 125 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131
Pseudo R2
(Nagelkerke) / 0.605 / 0.562 / 0.675 / 0.459 / 0.495 / 0.649 / 0.498 / 0.515 / 0.584
Log pseudolikelihood / -39.423 / -43.844 / -31.454 / -54.860 / -54.683 / -38.029 / -56.000 / -54.227 / -47.816
Note: *P<0.1, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001. Unstandardized betacoefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-sided significance test.
Table 1c. A cross-spatial logistic regression analysis of the effect of structural conditions on democracy (1977-1988).
DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH
Geographic Diffusion / 0.074*** / 0.086*** / 0.105*** / 0.063*** / 0.077*** / 0.076*** / 0.057** / 0.069*** / 0.068***
(0.017) / (0.019) / (0.022) / (0.018) / (0.018) / (0.019) / (0.019) / (0.018) / (0.018)
Modernization / 1.091*** / 1.234*** / 1.512*** / 0.866** / 1.028** / 1.171*** / 0.903** / 1.264*** / 1.129***
(0.323) / (0.389) / (0.417) / (0.309) / (0.356) / (0.364) / (0.309) / (0.370) / (0.337)
Resource
reliance / -0.670 / -0.571 / -0.383 / -0.721 / -0.737 / -0.956* / -1.350* / -1.411* / -1.353*
(0.724) / (0.726) / (0.929) / (0.639) / (0.680) / (0.683) / (0.627) / (0.662) / (0.651)
Ethnic Fractionalization / 1.493 / 0.340 / -0.930 / 0.112 / -0.453 / -1.341 / -0.751 / -0.502 / -0.534
(1.195) / (1.116) / (1.387) / (1.093) / (1.130) / (1.214) / (1.098) / (1.126) / (1.111)
Former British
colony / 0.106 / 1.182* / 0.849 / 0.135 / 1.166* / 0.508 / 0.415 / 1.057* / 0.479
(0.586) / (0.583) / (0.778) / (0.580) / (0.514) / (0.637) / (0.628) / (0.571) / (0.579)
Population
size / 0.455** / 0.301* / 0.249 / 0.174 / 0.176 / 0.022 / 0.350* / 0.302* / 0.276*
(0.167) / (0.148) / (0.235) / (0.175) / (0.155) / (0.221) / (0.168) / (0.163) / (0.174)
Region / 0.205 / 0.506** / 0.416* / 0.013 / 0.207 / 0.075 / 0.103 / 0.285* / 0.237*
(0.179) / (0.203) / (0.231) / (0.158) / (0.182) / (0.185) / (0.169) / (0.193) / (0.183)
Constant / -7.639*** / -7.195*** / -6.637** / -3.624* / -4.643** / -2.361 / -5.104** / -5.933** / -5.311**
(2.023) / (1.886) / (2.543) / (2.011) / (1.974) / (2.237) / (1.959) / (2.059) / (2.018)
N / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131 / 131
Pseudo R2
(Nagelkerke) / 0.528 / 0.552 / 0.674 / 0.489 / 0.525 / 0.598 / 0.532 / 0.569 / 0.567
Log pseudolikelihood / -49.346 / -49.336 / -35.344 / -54.600 / -52.430 / -45.094 / -53.814 / -50.426 / -50.583
Note: *P<0.1, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001. Unstandardized betacoefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-sided significance test.
Table 1d. A cross-spatial logistic regression analysis of the effect of structural conditions on democracy (1975-1986). Muslim included except for FH-measure from 1975-1982.
DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH / DD / Polity / FH
Geographic Diffusion / 0.062*** / 0.053*** / 0.068*** / 0.049** / 0.070*** / 0.090*** / 0.051** / 0.062*** / 0.065***
(0.017) / (0.015) / (0.017) / (0.018) / (0.017) / (0.022) / (0.018) / (0.017) / (0.018)
Modernization / 1.385*** / 1.528*** / 1.654** / 0.872** / 0.979** / 1.284** / 0.662* / 1.019** / 0.867**
(0.368) / (0.385) / (0.580) / (0.317) / (0.350) / (0.537) / (0.320) / (0.350) / (0.368)
Resource
reliance / -1.003 / -0.258 / 2.987* / -1.760* / -1.166* / 0.665 / -1.440* / -1.124* / -2.673*
(1.080) / (0.886) / (1.367) / (0.804) / (0.723) / (1.182) / (0.734) / (0.691) / (1.239)
Muslim / 0.323 / -0.109 / -0.128 / -0.452 / -0.860* / -0.532 / -0.378
(1.052) / (0.919) / (0.687) / (0.753) / (0.665) / (0.726) / (0.756)
Ethnic Fractionalization / -0.594 / -0.903 / -4.736** / 0.974 / 0.548 / -1.707 / -0.565 / 0.062 / -1.454
(1.336) / (1.148) / (1.544) / (1.086) / (1.092) / (1.547) / (1.168) / (1.102) / (1.207)
Former British
colony / 0.443 / 0.880 / 2.231* / 0.334 / 1.291* / 1.549* / 0.625 / 1.451** / 0.889*
(0.813) / (0.806) / (1.281) / (0.656) / (0.630) / (1.099) / (0.628) / (0.542) / (0.668)
Population
size / 0.534** / 0.303* / 0.126 / 0.275* / 0.177 / -0.012 / 0.252* / 0.228* / 0.111
(0.194) / (0.188) / (0.309) / (0.176) / (0.148) / (0.291) / (0.159) / (0.153) / (0.190)
Region / 0.139 / 0.325* / 0.183 / 0.104 / 0.318* / 0.219 / -0.019 / 0.133 / 0.019
(0.194) / (0.195) / (0.219) / (0.160) / (0.181) / (0.200) / (0.154) / (0.172) / (0.172)
Constant / -7.293*** / -5.497** / -3.292 / -4.895* / -5.119** / -3.010 / -3.475* / -4.711* / -2.476
(2.166) / (1.983) / (2.930) / (2.160) / (1.979) / (2.819) / (1.836) / (2.112) / (1.970)
N / 125 / 125 / 86 / 131 / 131 / 92 / 131 / 131 / 131
Pseudo R2
(Nagelkerke) / 0.613 / 0.563 / 0.697 / 0.501 / 0.518 / 0.652 / 0.528 / 0.534 / 0.640
Log pseudolikelihood / -38.768 / -43.783 / -25.285 / -51.914 / -52.979 / -31.377 / -53.652 / -52.757 / -43.089
Note: *P<0.1, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001. Unstandardized betacoefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-sided significance test.
Table 3. Preemptive list of deviant democracies from 1975-1988 in 4, 5, and 7 year periods. Countries with residual above 1.0 and democratic score on DD, Polity or FH.
Country / Period / DD / Polity / Freedom HouseArgentina / 1983-1986 / 0,86 / 1,11 / 0,98
Bolivia / 1982-1988 / 1,58 / 2,06 / 1,80*
1983-1986 / 1,47 / 1,84 / 1,87
1985-1988 / 1,58 / 1,96 / 1,70
Botswana / 1975-1978 / -0,15* / 2,83 / 4,25
1975-1979 / -0,21* / 2,49 / 3,99
1975-1981 / -0,23* / 2,12 / 3,62
1977-1980 / -0,25* / 1,68 / 3,07
1979-1982 / -0,30* / 1,69 / 2,72
1980-1984 / -0,42* / 1,55 / 2,38
1981-1984 / -0,40* / 1,59 / 2,24
1982-1988 / -0,45* / 1,60 / 2,39
1983-1986 / -0,42* / 1,87 / 2,52
1985-1988 / -0,45* / 1,72 / 2,09
Colombia / 1975-1978 / 1,77 / 2,52 / 2,97
1975-1979 / 1,46 / 2,07 / 2,57
1975-1981 / 1,44 / 2,12 / 2,31
1977-1980 / 1,63 / 2,46 / 2,91
1979-1982 / 1,52 / 2,09 / 2,71
1980-1984 / 1,30 / 1,59 / 1,86
1981-1984 / 0,99 / 1,21 / 1,44
1982-1988 / 1,10 / 1,30 / 1,35
1983-1986 / 1,28 / 1,24 / 1,32
1985-1988 / 1,33 / 1,56 / 1,38
Costa Rica / 1975-1978 / 2,51 / 2,28 / 2,65
1975-1979 / 2,35 / 2,39 / 2,33
1975-1981 / 2,33 / 2,34 / 1,82
1977-1980 / 2,45 / 2,62 / 2,48
1979-1982 / 2,22 / 2,39 / 2,40
1980-1984 / 1,70 / 2,21 / 1,57
1981-1984 / 1,72 / 2,20 / 1,62
1982-1988 / 2,02 / 2,68 / 2,02
1983-1986 / 1,84 / 2,65 / 2,04
1985-1988 / 1,57 / 1,96 / 1,71
Cyprus / 1981-1984 / 1,12 / 0,59 / 0,57
1983-1986 / 1,08 / 0,76 / 0,78
1983-1986̽ / 1,08 / 0,76 / 0,78