#3-235

Memorandum for Admiral King

June 26, 1942 [Washington, D.C.]

Secret

Subject: Offensive Operations in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas.

I have just gone over your memorandum of June 25th on the above subject, and while I have not had a sufficient opportunity to study your proposals, it appears that there is only one important point of difference in our views, and that relates to command.1

Your directive states that a Task Force under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, will execute the operation. In my opinion this is neither a logical arrangement in accordance with the principles we have adopted for joint action, nor is it a practical method for directing the operation.

At best such an operation, involving combined land, sea and air action, is extremely difficult of coordination. Furthermore, the fact that the Naval vessels and, therefore, Naval command largely operate under radio silence, adds a complication of almost unsurmountable command difficulties. I think I fully realize the concern you and the commander of the Pacific Fleet are bound to feel regarding the employment and the hazards involved for the Naval surface craft concerned, especially if under Army direction. However, I think this phase of the matter is not too difficult to control since directions from the United States Chief of Staff can confirm or decide on arrangements which define the general manner of employment of the Naval forces, particularly as to the waters in which they are to be engaged. The operation involves approaches to fixed objectives, which permits of control to a degree not practicable in our operations off Midway.

While your directive gives the immediate objective as the Santa Cruz Islands, reports from the Commanding General at Efate indicate that we have operators already in those islands. The major locality involved in the operation, is in the Southwest Pacific area. The ultimate objectives, New Guinea and New Britain, are also in that area. General MacArthur is in command of the area concerned, air, ground and naval. The affair will require the use of land-based aviation and of occupying troops, both of which are under General MacArthur. Furthermore, the British operation to the west of Australia must also be coordinated as to time and as to the use of land-based air with the operation to the eastward. General MacArthur is the only Commander in a position to effect this coordination.

To me this situation presents a perfect opportunity to demonstrate our adopted principles for the employment of unity of command. We should not be bound by lines drawn on a map. However, the operation in question is almost entirely in the Southwest Pacific area and is designed to add to the security of that area. General MacArthur and his staff and commanders, which include Admiral Leary,2 have been in this area for months. They have developed sources of information in the Islands, they have been reconnoitering the objective areas constantly and have been studying and making plans for such an operation. Presumably they must have the fullest obtainable knowledge of their theater, and should have a better understanding of conditions than can be translated into reports. To my mind, it would be most unfortunate to bring in another commander at this time to carry out this operation.3

Document Copy Text Source: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Executive File 8, Book 5, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Document Format: Typed memorandum.

1. King had written that it was "urgent . . . that we lose no time in taking the initiative" in the South Pacific. He proposed that a task force under the command of Admiral Nimitz commence offensive operations August 1 or shortly thereafter. The immediate objective would be to seize positions in the Santa Cruz and Solomon islands with the ultimate objective of occupying eastern New Guinea and New Britain. MacArthur's role would be to supply land-based aircraft and ships and submarines from his naval contingent to support Nimitz's task force; to stage a diversion, with the aid of the British Eastern Fleet, by invading the island of Timor, where some Australian and Dutch units continued to operate; and to provide the permanent occupation garrisons for Nimitz's conquests in the Southwest Pacific Area. (King Memorandum to the Chief of Staff with enclosed proposed dispatch, June 25, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 8, Book 5].) On the clash of army-navy plans in this area, see Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 8–16.

2. Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary (U.S.N. A., 1905) was commander of the United States Navy's Southwest Pacific Forces, "MacArthur's Navy.” He had been appointed commander of the Anzac Forces, the combined naval forces of the Australian-New Zealand area, in February 1942; the Anzac Forces were absorbed by the Southwest Pacific Forces in April.

3. In reply, King insisted that Admiral Nimitz should command the operations. After the amphibious phase, "movement over into the area and continued control of the area" would be under the command of General MacArthur, with the movement supported by the Pacific Fleet. King insisted that the initial South Pacific operations would be amphibious and naval in character and that the Southwest Pacific Area bases would be able to furnish little support at first. "Any designation of command set-up must be made with a view to the successful accomplishment of the objective," King concluded. "With this in mind, and recognizing that the operations in Europe were primarily of a land character, I recommended to you that the Army exercise unity of command for the projected operations that were to take place in that area. In this case it is inevitable that practically all the forces used in the first instance will be furnished and mounted in the South Pacific Area and will be amphibious and naval in character. (The nearest base from which bombers can participate from Australia is about 975 miles away). The primary consideration is the immediate initiation of these operations. I think it is important that this be done even if no support of Army forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is made available." (King Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, June 26, 1942, NA/RG 165 [OPD, 381 SWPA 1942–45].) For a continuation of the discussion, see Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #3-236 [3: 254].

Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 252–254.