Submission Guidelines Are Posted to the GCC Web Site

Submission guidelines are posted to the GCC Web site: http://www.ecu.edu/cs-acad/gcc/index.cfm

1.  Course prefix and number: 2. Date:

1. 

2. 

3.  Requested action:

X / New Course
Revision of Active Course
Revision & Unbanking of a Banked Course
Renumbering of an Existing Course from
from / # / to / #
Required / X / Elective

4.  Method(s) of delivery (check all boxes that apply for both current/proposed and expected future delivery methods within the next three years):

Current or Expected

Proposed Delivery Future Delivery

Method(s): Method(s):

X / On-campus (face to face) / X
Distance Course (face to face off campus)
Online (delivery of 50% or more of the instruction is offered online)

5.  Justification (must cite accreditation and/or assessment by the graduate faculty) for new course or course revision or course renumbering:

The graduate faculty of the Department of Economics identified a societal need for PhD graduates with advanced analytic and technical skills necessary for analysis, mitigation, management and regulation of risk—both environmental and financial. This requires an understanding of the underlying individual decision maker and firm behavior and their interaction within market and nonmarket settings. Theoretical modeling and empirical analysis complete the picture and allow for the identification of effective public policy and regulation. This doctoral program is unique within the state of North Carolina because it emphasizes risk modeling and analysis over a broad scope of applications that range from financial markets to natural hazards. Students with training from this program will be well equipped to qualify for high level positions within Federal and State Agencies that deal with natural hazards and regulation of risk, as well as businesses for management and mitigation of risk.
The assessment process of the Economics Graduate Faculty has determined that a course that develops the theory and applied research methods for resource and environmental economics would enhance the proposed doctoral program and strengthen the environmental risk and hazards component of the program of study.

6.  Course description exactly as it should appear in the next catalog:

8540. Environmental and Resource Economics (3) P: ECON 8112, 8310. Advanced economic theory of environmental management and policy, treatment of externalities, market and non-market approaches to environmental improvement, sustainable use of resources and non-renewable resources, and economics of climate change.

7.  If this is a course revision, briefly describe the requested change:

n/a

8.  Course credit:

Lecture Hours / 3 / Weekly / OR / Per Term / Credit Hours / 3 / s.h.
Lab / Weekly / OR / Per Term / Credit Hours / s.h.
Studio / Weekly / OR / Per Term / Credit Hours / s.h.
Practicum / Weekly / OR / Per Term / Credit Hours / s.h.
Internship / Weekly / OR / Per Term / Credit Hours / s.h.
Other (e.g., independent study) Please explain. / s.h.
Total Credit Hours / 3 / s.h.
8

9.  Anticipated annual student enrollment:

10.  Changes in degree hours of your programs:

Degree(s)/Program(s) / Changes in Degree Hours
PhD/Economics / N/A

11.  Affected degrees or academic programs, other than your programs:

Degree(s)/Program(s) / Changes in Degree Hours

12.  Overlapping or duplication with affected units or programs:

X / Not applicable
Documentation of notification to the affected academic degree programs is attached.

13.  Council for Teacher Education (CTE) approval (for courses affecting teacher education):

X / Not applicable
Applicable and CTE has given their approval.

14.  University Service-Learning Committee (USLC) approval:

X / Not applicable
Applicable and USLC has given their approval.

15.  Statements of support:

a. Staff

X / Current staff is adequate
Additional staff is needed (describe needs in the box below):

b. Facilities

X / Current facilities are adequate
Additional facilities are needed (describe needs in the box below):

c. Library

X / Initial library resources are adequate
Initial resources are needed (in the box below, give a brief explanation and an estimate for the cost of acquisition of required initial resources):

d. Unit computer resources

X / Unit computer resources are adequate
Additional unit computer resources are needed (in the box below, give a brief explanation and an estimate for the cost of acquisition):

e. ITCS resources

X / ITCS resources are not needed
The following ITCS resources are needed (put a check beside each need):
Mainframe computer system
Statistical services
Network connections
Computer lab for students
Software
Approval from the Director of ITCS attached

16.  Course information (see: Graduate Curriculum and Program Development Manual for instructions):

a. Textbook(s) and/or readings: author(s), name, publication date, publisher, and city/state/country. Include ISBN (when applicable).

Textbooks
Hanley, N., J.F. Shogren & B. White. (1996). Environmental Economics in Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baumol, W.J. & W.E. Oates. (1988). The Theory of Environmental Policy, (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, A.M. (1993). The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and Methods. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Articles
Bird, P. (1987). The Transferability and Depletability of Externalities. J. Environmental Economics and Management (14, pp. 54-57).
Buchanan, J., and Tullock, G. (1975). Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Control versus Taxes. American Economic Review. (65, pp. 139-147).
Cabe, R., & Herriges, J. (1992). The Regulation of Non-point Source Pollution under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information. J. Environ. Econom. Management. (22, pp. 134-146).
Cropper, M., Evans, W., Berardi, S., Ducla-Soares, M., & Portney, P. (1992). The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision-Making. Journal of Political Economy (100, pp. 175-197).
Cropper, M.L., & Oates, W.E. (1992) “Environmental Economics: A Survey.” J. of Economic Literature, vol. XXX: (pp. 675-740).
Kaplow, L. & Shavell, S. (1994). Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior. Journal of Political Economy. (102, pp. 583-606).
Kwerel, E. (1977). To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control. Review of Economic Studies, 44: (pp. 595-601).
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Chapters 1.1-2.2.
Langpap, C., and Wu, J. (2004). Voluntary Conservation of Endangered Species: When Does No Regulatory Assurance Mean No Conservation? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47: (pp. 435-57).
Lewis, T. (1996). Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits are Privately Known. Rand Journal of Economics 27: (pp. 819-847).
Montgomery, D. (1972). Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs. Journal of Economic Theory (5, pp. 395-418).
Oates, W., Portney, P. & McGartland, A. (1989). The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting. American Economic Review (79, pp.1233-42).
Polasky, S., and Doremus, H. (1998). When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Incomplete Information. J. Environ. Econom. Management 35(1): (pp. 22-47).
Segerson, K. (1988). Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control. J. Environ. Econom. Management. (15, pp. 87-98).
Segerson, K., & Miceli, T.J. (1998). Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection? J. Environmental Economics and Management (2, pp. 109-130).
Segerson, K., & Wu, J. (2006). Voluntary Approaches to Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-Best Outcomes through the Use of Threats. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51: (pp. 165-184).
Shibuta, H., & J. Winrich. (1983). Control of Pollution when the Offended Defend Themselves. Economica (50: pp.425-437).
Spulber, D. (1985). Effluent Regulation and Long-Run Optimality. J. Environmental Economics and Management (12: pp. 103-116).
Spulber, D. (1988). Optimal Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Public Economics (35: pp.163-181).
Swierzbinski, J.E. (1994). Guilty until Proven Innocent – Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement. J. Environ. Econom. Management. (27, pp.127-146).
Weitzman, M.L. (1974) Prices vs. Quantities. Rev. Econom. Studies 41: (pp.477-91).
Wu, J. (2006). Environmental Amenities, Urban Sprawl, and Community Characteristics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 52: (pp. 527-547).
Wu, J. (2000). Input Substitution and Pollution Control Under Uncertainty and Firm Heterogeneity. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2(2): (pp. 273-288).
Wu, J. (2000). Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Programs. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82: (pp.979-992).
Wu, J. (2007). Urban Sprawl and Community Transformation. Working paper.
Wu, J., Adams, R.M., Zilberman, D., & Babcock, B.A. (2000). Targeting Resource Conservation Expenditure. Choices.
Wu, J. & Babcock, B.A. (1996). Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78: (pp. 935-45).
Wu, J. & Babcock, B.A. (1999). The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs. Mandatory Environmental Regulation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 37: (pp. 158-175).
Wu, J. & Babcock, B.A. (2001). “Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution.” Environmental and Resource Economics 18(2) (pp. 173-192).
Wu, J., & Boggess, W. (1999). The Optimal Allocation of Conservation Fund. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37: (pp. 302-321).
Wu, J., Mapp, H.P., & Bernard, D. (1996). Integrating Economic and Physical Models for Analyzing Water Quality Impacts of Agricultural Policies in the High Plains.” Review of Agricultural Economics 18 (pp. 353-372).
Wu, J., & Plantinga, A.J. (2003). “The Influence of Public Open Space Policies on Urban Spatial Structure.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 46: (pp. 288-309).
Wu, J., Zilberman, D., & Babcock. B.A. (2001). “Environmental and Distributional Effects of Conservation Targeting Strategies.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 41: (pp. 333-350).

b. Course objectives for the course (student – centered, behavioral focus)

Upon completion of this course, students will be able to:
·  Apply the tools of economic analysis to study environmental issues.
·  Examine the impacts of uncertainty and information asymmetry on the choice of policy instruments for regulating externalities.
·  Measure non-market benefits of environmental amenities.

c. Course topic outline

·  Overview of Environmental Economics
·  Externalities and Environmental Policy Instruments I: Complete Information
·  Tradable Permits
·  Incentive-Based Approaches for Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection2.
·  Externalities and Environmental Policy Instruments II: Incomplete Information
- Instrument Choice Under Uncertainty
·  Non-Point Source Pollution
·  Monitoring and Enforcement
·  Environmental Regulation in Practice
·  The Choice of Policy Instruments in Practice
·  Voluntary vs. Mandatory Approaches for Environmental Protection
·  Spatial Modeling and the Economics of Land Use

d. List of course assignments, weighting of each assignment, and grading/evaluation system for determining a grade

·  Exam I = 30%
·  Exam II = 30%
·  Paper = 40%
Grading System:
A – Outstanding; B – Satisfactory; C – Insufficient; F – Failing.

6

Revised 04-06-11 and posted fall of 2011