The Economic Morals of the Jesuits Revisited:
Alejandro Chafuen vs. Leonard Lessius, SJ on Property Rights
Fr. Stephen C. Rowntree, SJ
Associate Professor of Philosophy
LoyolaUniversity
New Orleans
14th Annual World Forum
Colleagues in Jesuit Business Education
International Association of Jesuit Business Schools
Business and Education in an Era of Globalization:
The Jesuit Position
July 20-23, 2008
I assume that as faculty members and administrators at Jesuit business schools you might be interested in the economic thinking of the early Jesuits. It seems to have been quite different than current thinking, which is focused on social justice and reflexively opposed to “neo-liberal” capitalism. In fact early Jesuits are interpreted to have been defenders of the nascent capitalism of the late 15th and early 16th centuries.
Thus the Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek’s claim: “It would seem that H.M. Robertson…hardly exaggerates when he writes ‘It would not be difficult to claim that the religion which favored the spirit of capitalism was Jesuitry, not Calvinism.’”[1] Or Michael Novak’ assertion introducing a work on late-Scholastic economics:
Chafuen helps us to see that by the end of the 17th century, the common teachings of the Spanish late-Scholastics had already established many of the rudimentary presuppositions we now take to be “liberal” or capitalist. That this is true concerning private property will not come as much of a surprise.[2]
James Brodrick, SJ, the great English historian of the early Society of Jesuits and the early Jesuits was provoked by D.M. Robertson’s work to write The Economic Morals of the Jesuits.[3] I have been similarly provoked by these recent readings of the late-Scholastics, including my Jesuit brothers,[4] who are counted successors of the SalamancaSchool.[5]
At first I was annoyed, even angered by these claims. But annoyance eventually gave way to curiosity. What had my brothers Leonard Lessius and Luis Molina, among the late Scholastics, taught on economic matters? Catholic political economy, as I had learned it from Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891) to Pope John Paul II was commonly presented as a doctrine. But it occurred to me that just as systematic theology had been enormously enriched by a return to its sources (both before and after Vatican II), so might Catholic social teaching on economics.
To return to the sources of Catholic social teaching identifies a vast project. Large parts of it have been done by historians and economists, for example John Noonan, Raymond de Roover, Joseph Schumpeter, Barry Gordon,[6] but is relatively unknown by most writing about Catholic social teaching, with the exception of critics.
In this paper I intend to do one small piece of what would have to be a much larger project to be an adequate discussion of early Jesuit economic thinking. I will test Chaufen’s reading of scholastic teaching on property rights against Leonard Lessius’ texts on property. I have chosen property because an essential feature of a classical liberal or capitalist economic order is the central place of private property, especially private ownership of the means of production, and individuals’ freedom to exchange their property and labor with others. I have chosen Chaufen because his treatment of property is clear and concise, and endorsedby Michael Novak whose views defending capitalism in terms of Catholic social teaching are fairly widely known. I have chosen Lessius because English translations of some of his most important texts are now available, as well as the original Latin texts.[7]
I will conclude that Chafuen’s claim to find a “liberal” view of property rights in the Late-Scholastics is mistaken. The Late-Scholastics view of such rights subordinates them to “the common good,” a not uncontroversial notion, but one far removed from most versions of liberalism, which find liberty, not the good of all humans as humans, to be central. I will further suggest that today provision for the needy, an essential qualification of property rights for the Scholastic tradition, may best be realized, especially in economically developed societies, by granting needy persons legal entitlements to what they need (e.g. food, clothing, shelter, medical care, income). Such welfare entitlements are not absolutely contrary to liberal principles. However, they are vehemently opposed by the libertarian interpreters of classical liberalism.
I. The Common Good and Property: Dominium, Use, Private Ownership
Chaufen draws attention to the primacy of Aquinas’s treatment of property for the Late-scholastics. Most of these authors’ writings on economics, including property are to be found in their commentaries on the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologica, which treats the virtues, especially the virtue of justice. It is under this virtue that Aquinas (and his commentators) discuss the issue of property. Chafuen correctly observes that both Aquinas and commentators gave arguments for the justice of private ownership. He rather badly oversimplifies, however, when he claims that private ownership is a requirement of both eternal and natural law: “Continuing the Thomistic tradition, the late Scholastics ascribed great importance to the justification of private property, stating that it derives from both eternal and natural law” (43).
Aquinas’ views are much more subtle, much more nuanced than Chafuen understands. For Aquinas, as well as for Lessius property cannot be understood apart from God the creator. God created the material world to be used by human being to sustain their physical lives. Since God is the creator of the material world, God is its ultimate owner. But he has created it and given it to humans to use to support themselves. Thus use and ownership can be distinguished. In Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1 Aquinas argues that use of material things is natural to human beings, and this is the sense in which “dominion” over natural things is natural. Aquinas takes the question of private property to be a separate one.
In a similar way, Lessius holds the fullest example of dominion is God’s dominion over all of creation, including God’s rule over spiritual creatures, which Lessius divides into a right to govern his subjects, and a right of property to dispose as He wishes (Lib. 2 Cap. 3, Dub. 1, 16). In discussing dominion, Lessius observes that not only God, but other rational creatures could exercise it (Lib. 2, Cap. 4, Dub. 1, 23) Such dominion could be held by a public person, or in common, as well as by a private person. Lessius treats the varieties of dominion at great length (in two chapters with thirty-two dubitationes covering seventeen double-columned pages) before discussingthe division of things into private property which he treats in Book II, chap. 5, Dubitatio 1.
As we noted Aquinas separates the question of the possession of material goods, for which he uses the Latin term “dominium,” from the question of private ownership. He agrees that such dominium in the sense of the use of things is natural to humans and argues this in II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1. In Art. 2 he raises the question “whether it is legitimate for individual men to possess anything as their own” (“utrum liceat alicui rem aliquam propriam possidere”). He answers in the affirmative, in spite of the truth that by natural law all things are common. His response draws on the condemnation as heretics of the so-called “Apostolici,” who denied the legitimacy of private ownership. In developing his defense of private ownership, Aquinas draws a distinction between two competences concerning materials things that belong to humans: one is the power to care for and to distribute them (“unum est potestas procurandi and dispensandi”). To exercise this power private property is not only morally allowed, but required. The three reasons Aquinas gives are drawn from Aristotle[8]:
First, because each person takes more trouble to care for something that is his sole responsibility than what is held in common or by many—for in such a case each individual shirks the work and leaves the responsibility to somebody else, which is what happens when too many officials are involved.[9]
Second, because human affairs are more efficiently organized if each person has his own responsibility to discharge; there would be chaos if everybody cared for everything.[10]
Third, because me live together in greater peace when where everyone is content with his task. We do, in fact, notice that quarrels often break out amongst menwho hold things in common without distinction.[11]
Lessius begins his treatment of private property in Book II, Caput 5 (Dubitatio 1) by assuming that property has been divided. That property has been in fact divided is shown by Genesis which refers to the property of the descendents of Adam, and after the Flood, the property of Noah’s descendents. To the question of how this division was done, he answers by taking possession (or occupying and using) (“occupatione”) and by lot (“sortitione”) in cases of conflicting claims to the same property.[12]
Dubitatio 2 asks whether this division of powers of ownership was done licitly and whether it was adapted to humans’ condition. In contrast to Aquinas who mentions nothing of the Fall, Lessius and other late-scholastics including Molina and Suarez distinguish the time before the Fall and after. Before the Fall private ownership did not exist. Humans were so few in number and nature’s provisions so abundant that there was always enough available to fully meet everyone’s needs. Private property had no point in these conditions of great abundance. It was after the Fall that private ownership was instituted. Lessius reads the reasons Aquinas, following Aristotle, gave for private property as characteristics of humans’ fallen condition.Thus Lessius responds “after sin this division of property rights was not only licit, but advantageous to humans.”[13] He goes on to mention the same sorts of reasons Aquinas gives and makes specific reference to Aristotle.[14]
For both Aquinas and Lessius the institution of private property is something beyond what natural law prescribes, but not necessarily contrary to it. However,God’s original purpose to provide for all must still be fulfilled. Hence another competence(in addition to the procuring and dispensing which justifies private ownership)is that of using and managing. This power must be exercised “in the interests of all, so that he [an owner] is ready to share with others in cases of necessity.”[15]
Chafuen recognizes the distinction between ownership and use (“ownership is not exactly the use of a thing”), but goes on to deny that the late-Scholastics held that ownership of goods should be private, but their use common.[16] This of course is precisely what Aquinas held as we have seen: private ownership, but common use, in the sense of sharing with those in need. One fundamentally distorts the defense of private property if one does not see that it is subordinated to God’s overall purpose of providing for humans’ materials needs.
Lessius follows Aquinas exactly in this matter. In defending private property as consonant with the natural law, he responds to the Fathers who objected: “No one should say, ‘This is mine, this is my property, because all should be common.’” This is the same objection Aquinas responds to. Lessius writes: “So much did the Fathers wish that no one ought to claim something as his own without being prepared when it should be necessary to share it with another; on that account in cases of necessity, everything should become common[17]
II. Ownership of Natural Resources
A major difference between Chafuen and Lessius concerns the treatment of what Chafuen calls “underground property.” Chafuen notes that the common scholastic opinion held that finding a buried treasure established ownership of it. He concludes from the treatment of buried treasure that mineral deposits belong to the owner of the land under which they lie. He quotes several authors to this effect. The inference from a finder of treasure acquiring ownership to a land owner having rights to mineral deposits seems obviously mistaken. The analogy suggests that the discovering of these deposits establishes ownership of them.[18]
On the basis of his understanding of the scholastics’ arguments, Chafuen implies that the laws of those countries which distinguish between surface property and underground property (for example by making the public the owner of subsurface minerals under private property) are contrary to natural law. The actual texts he cites show rather that ownership of minerals was a disputed question. This should not be surprising since the more specific the ownership question, the less natural law alone resolves it one way rather than another. Since the scholastics considered the establishment of private property rights a matter of the jus gentium, and not natural law, we should not be surprised that further specification of property rights are made by positive legislation and will vary, even vary significantly.
Lessius also discusses the question of ownership of minerals. He observes that in addition to wild animals, which initially belong to no one, stones, gems, amber, and coral, and so forth also are not owned. The finder acquires ownership. Lessius grants the difficulty of deciding about minerals. However, he asserts it to be “quite probable,” that these also initially belong to no one. Thus he disagrees with those Chafuen cites who attribute ownership of minerals to the owner of the land under which they lie. He argues on the basis of the practice of those rulers who sell rights to mining such minerals, or grant private concessions to search for them, even in privately owned fields. Rulers typically also are paid royalties on the value of the minerals mined. The owner of the land must, however, be compensated for the damage to his property.[19] Lessius assumes such public ownership to be just and hence disagrees that subsurface deposits belong to the owner of the surface land. Lessius observes further: “If someone has mined gold or silver in a field owned by someone else, even against the owner’s will, he is not required to restore the gold to the owner, but only to compensate for damages caused.”[20]Lessius answers the objection an owner might make to public ownership of subsurface deposits by calling attention to the great value of deposits of gold and silver and claims that “nature itself seems to have placed them to be used for the common good, not for the benefit of private individuals...”[21]
The appeal to the common good is one of the most obvious features of the scholastics’ overall approach to social ethics. Aristotle assumed that the question of whether property should be common or private was an open one for any polity, and that property arrangements should be decided on the basis of what best promoted the common good. As we have seen, he argued on the basis of practical concerns, among which were that private property is better cared for, that private owners have incentives to make the most productive use of their property, and that private ownership prevents conflicts likely were property to have remained common. So too do our scholastic authors. Lessius’ treatment of ownership of silver and gold deposits appeals to what will best promote the common good. He assumes that public needs take priority over private when deciding to whom nature’s bounty of valuable mineral deposits should belong. Particular rights are allocated in order to promote the common good.
Individuals are not in general conceived to have rights they can appeal to against the claims made in the name of the common good. In this the scholastics operate in a different framework from that of liberal social ethics. For all liberal thinkers take it is a fundamental principle that individuals have rights which governments must protect and promote. If they do not, they thereby lose their legitimacy and may rightfully be resisted and replaced.[22]
III. Limits on Rights to Private Property: Necessity
A similar way in which the common good (understood to include everyone’s good) takes priority over individual rights can be seen in the principle that in cases of necessity everything is common. Chafuen’s first edition omits this topic completely.
As we noted, Lessius refers to this in his basic defense of private property. The same principle is central to Aquinas’s treatment also. The treatment of property rights in the face of another’s desperate need shows the contingent, limited, and relative character of ownership rights for both Aquinasand Lessius. Aquinas’s Art. 7 of Q66 treats the question: “is theft justifiable in cases of necessity?” The answer implied in ordinary language terms is yes. But Aquinas does not say this. He reasons that since the purpose of property rights is to better achieve God’s purposes for created material goods, whenever property rights would frustrate this purpose as they would for one in desperate need, private property becomes common once again. The person who takes what she needs to survive has not technically stolen because in this instance her need abrogates, as it were, the owner’s rights.
As the “Sed contra” notes: “in the case of necessity, every thing is common. Therefore a person who takes somebody else’s property which necessity has made common again so far as he is concerned does not commit theft.” The “Respondeo” explains the subordinate role of humanly established property rights in view of God’s overall purposes (“natural or divine law”):