2009
Phase II Capability Development
Table of Contents
Table of Contents 2
0 LEGEND 4
0.1 Colour Code Guide 4
0.2 Terminology 4
0.3 Categories 5
1 PROCESS 6
1.1 Towards Real Capabilities-Based Planning 6
1.2 Towards a Better Balance between Analysis and Logrolling 8
1.3 Placing Capabilities in a Systemic Context 9
1.4 Tensions between Marginal and Systemic Planning 11
1.5 Tension between Sequential/Linear and Spiral Capability Generation 13
1.6 Presence or Absence of Capability Taxonomies 18
1.7 The Use of Time Epochs 21
1.8 Balance across Time Horizons 23
1.9 The Use of Simulation throughout the Entire Process 24
2 STRUCTURE 26
2.1 Institutionalising Capability Development 26
2.2 Wedding Industry into Capability Generation 28
2.3 Structuring Perspectives on the Future 30
2.4 The Evolution of Risk Management 31
3 TOOLS 33
3.1 Analytical Support and Scale of Effort [Process] 33
3.2 A Shared Toolkit for Analysis (Bottom-up/Top-down + Lateral) 33
3.3 Sense and Non-Sense of Taxonomies 34
3.4 Task Lists 35
3.5 [Capability] Balance of Investments 37
3.6 Service Orientated vs. Joint Orientated Capabilities 38
3.7 Capability Integration 40
3.8 Specifying Assumptions 42
3.9 Partition Scheme Trends 42
3.10 The Use of Models and Toolkits to Aid Prioritization 45
3.11 Centrality of Scenarios 46
3.12 Specificity of Scenarios 47
3.13 High Level Concept Development 49
3.14 Scenario Analysis Tools 51
3.15 Capability Gap Analysis 53
3.16 The Scope of Capability Audits 55
4 SUBSTANCE 58
4.1 Towards a Broader Definition of ‘Capability’ 58
4.2 Degrees of Transparency 60
4.3 CBP Has to Be Able to Divest as Well as Invest 61
4.4 Capabilities as Effect-Generators 62
4.5 The Final Deliverable – A Capability Plan 64
4.6 Bridging the Divide between Defence Staff’s and the OA Community 67
4.7 Operationalising Forward Resiliency 67
4.8 Forward Resiliency: Indigenous Frameworks 69
5 Bibliography 70
0 LEGEND
0.1 Colour Code Guide
A subjective interpretation of a high quality or attributeA subjective interpretation of a moderate quality or attribute
A subjective interpretation of a low quality or attribute
A subjective interpretation that the quality or attribute is non applicable or beyond assessment.
0.2 Terminology
Buy-in
The act of stakeholder analysis and/or consensus building for a particular 'point of interest' (POI).
Transparency of outcome
The visibility of the results ("output") of a particular 'point of interest' (POI) related to capability development.
Transparency of process
A subjective assessment on the visibility of the process behind a 'point of interest' (POI) related to capability development.
Scale of effort
A subjective assessment on the perceived strain on resource (human, monetary, time investment) that are need to bring about a 'point of interest' related to capability development.
* A scale of effort attribute marked in red denotes a high degree of effort is probably needed. An assessment of green means that the scale of effort for a particular POI may be achieved with a relatively high level of efficiency.
Traceability
A subjective assessment on the clarity of linkages in the decision making process behind a point of interest.
Adaptiveness
A subjective assessment how a particular point of interest may facilitate or impede strategic adaptiveness .
0.3 Categories
In order to categorise each Point of Interest, we adopt the metaphor of an assembly line. In this respect, each POI falls under one of four categories:
Process
Denotes how Defence goes about making the decisions it does when translating policy into capability. For example , the sequencing of events or the underlying logic motivating its judgements.
Tools
POI’s under the Tools category are those illustrating the specific methodologies or assets used by Defence to generate capability. As such, they can be material or analytical in nature.
Structure
POI’s under the Structure category are those which illustrate either the beaurocratic organization or conceptual models of functioning which are used to frame the capability generation process.
Substance
POI’s under the Substance category are Points of Interest which highlight specific outputs that the Process, Tools, and Structures of Defence have rendered from its capability generation process.
1 PROCESS
1.1 Towards Real Capabilities-Based Planning
Most of the referents have now accepted Capabilities-Based Planning as the pre-eminent philosophy and model for defence planning in general, and capability generation in particular. The essence of CBP is to identify what needs to be done and to derive capabilities (rather than merely weapon systems) from that. This capability derivation process should ideally take place within a transparent and traceable analytical framework that also fully incorporates resource constraints.
A number of CBP tools are now starting to appear (especially in TTCP countries[1] and in France). But the actual toolsuite that a genuine CBP approach requires has not reached anything like full maturity in any of the studied countries (and we feel confident in adding Canada and even the United States in this list). Nevertheless, the adoption of CBP is starting to have an impact on defence planning at both the strategic and operational levels. These implications are slowly but steadily starting to manifest themselves in virtually every facet of capability generation: the organisational structures built to accomplish it, the tools developed to translate policy aims into capabilities, and the very substance of defence planning outcomes (although on this last point, it has to be acnkowledged that CBP has so far also not led to the recalibration of actual capability development and/or acquisition that one might have expected).
Buy-in / Transparency of Outcome / Transparency of Process / Scale of Effort / Traceability / Adaptiveness1.1.1 Example
For example, both Australia’s Capability Development Manual and the UK’s Capability Management Handbook adopt the tenets of Capabilities Based Planning as a core philosophy that guides their respective capability generation processes. While each nation has their own idiosyncratic version of CBP, there are correlations between them and a generic CBP model as demonstrated by The Technical Cooperation Programme.
1.1.2 Excerpt
1.1.2.1 A Universal Capabilities-Based Planning Model[2]
1.2 Towards a Better Balance between Analysis and Logrolling[3]
Traditionally, defence planning in many countries consisted of a process of give-and-take between the various stakeholders in which political ‘horsetrading’ (and institutional ‘weight’) played a bigger role in outcomes than the underlying analytical arguments. Increasingly, the relative importance of these two important components is becoming more balanced. Professional military judgment remains at the heart of the defence planning effort, but it is increasingly being captured and made transparent in the analytics of the CBP models. Yet all participants in this process remain acutely aware of these models’ limitations, and of the pitfalls an over-reliance on such tools may engender.
Buy-in / Transparency of Outcome / Transparency of Process / Scale of Effort / Traceability / Adaptiveness1.2.1 Example
While the ADF relies heavily on modelling and Operational Analysis, professional military judgement defines the problem space for OA, and is essential to maintaining situational awareness of the current and projected capability portfolios. Non quantifiable military judgements are core elements at various stages in Australia’s Defence Capability Update (for example, Force Options Testing and Workshops conducted at the General Officer level) and is the backbone of the Defence Capability Strategy.
1.2.2 Excerpt
1.2.2.1 Australian Defence Simulation Office, Filling the OA Capability Gap Pg 2
....capability staff are military SME, not OA experts. This is to say that it is not the role of the capability staff to conduct OA studies, but to define them. To support this role, desk officers require simple, easy to use tools that draw together relevant information, identify the important issues, and define the problem space for more detailed studies. The requirements of the modern desk officer represents a change from the OA support traditionally provided by organisations such as DSTO. Timeliness, relevancy and objectivity are the modern priorities, not mathematical accuracy, fidelity or systems performance.
1.2.2.2 Australian Defence Capability Development Manual Pg 16
Defence Capability Strategy.
The Defence Capability Strategy (DCS) sets the vision for the transformation of Defence capability. It is set 10-15 years hence (out to just beyond the DCP) and sets out the capability goals along with explanations of how they will be met from within available resources. While it refers to the impact across all FIC, it specifically explains how the DCP is linked to strategic guidance. As the capstone capability planning document, it provides the vision of how Defence capability is being developed and identifies the planned capability solutions in response to the capability goals. It meets the Kinnaird requirement for a document that details what capabilities will be acquired, retained or disposed of into the future. The DCS is endorsed by the Defence Capability and Investment Committee (DCIC) and updated annually to reflect the outcomes of the Defence Capability Update (DCU).
1.2.2.3 Australian Defence Capability Development Manual Pg 17
The Defence Capability Update consists of the following key activities:
Force Options Testing
FOT uses professional judgement to assess the likely performance of the ADF;
Key Defence Asset Review
The Key Defence Assets Review (KDAR) examines the accuracy of current Useful Life and Planned Withdrawal Date records of key Defence assets. Key Defence assets are those assets that contribute to the delivery of combat effect and have a replacement value in excess of $50 million as well as those assets that have particular strategic, operational or political significance. The KDAR also identifies necessary asset upgrades or replacements for consideration in the development of DCS and the DCP;
1 Star Workshop
Following the completed analysis of FOT results and incorporating inputs from the KDAR, a workshop is conducted consisting of stakeholders at the 1-star level. The purpose of the workshop is to decide on the priority in which capability studies will be progressed and assign responsibility for these studies. This workshop also filters the remaining recommendations from FOT and refers them to the 2 star workshop; and
2 Star Workshop
Stakeholders at the 2-star level and chaired by CCDG meet following the 1 star workshop. The purpose of this workshop is to accept or amend the recommendations from the 1 star workshop and to consider any additional ICDS or program changes that have been proposed by other means. Following this workshop, alternate draft DCPs will be considered and, where appropriate, exposed to industry and CDAF. A draft updated DCS will also be produced.]
1.2.2.4 Formalizing Proposed Capabilities in the ADF’s Defence Capability Plan[4]
1.3 Placing Capabilities in a Systemic Context
Traditionally, capabilities (typically defined in a platform- and service-centric way) were identified and developed within existing ‘stovepipes’ (e.g. a particular service, or ‘the acquisition community’). The ‘stovepipe’ took ‘ownership’ of a capability, sometimes even at the expense of any explicit link to the Defence organization’s conception of how that capability contributes to the larger, systemic effort. A universal desire among the referents is to avoid such ad hoc capability ‘stacking’ and to ensure that any new capability contributes to an integrated delivery system, strengthening synergies while avoiding redundancies.
Buy-in / Transparency of Outcome / Transparency of Process / Scale of Effort / Traceability / Adaptiveness1.3.1 Example
While both the United Kingdom and Australia have intensely complex decision making processes, the UK approach appears to be centred on delivering a capability not as an isolated product resulting from a highly regulated process, but rather as a product who’s real contribution to Defence is the augmentation of what is know as Defence Lines of Development (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine and Concepts, Organisation, Information and Concepts) AKA ‘TEPID-OIL’.
1.3.2 Excerpt
1.3.2.1 From Defence Policy to Delivery Projects[5]
At each transition, trades can be made which may affect the requirement through the performance, cost, and delivery timescale perspectives of a programme, across all DLoD.
1.3.2.2 United Kingdom, Defence Capability Management Handbook Pg 7
Defence Policy to Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs)
Defence Policy is represented by a set of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) which provide the envelope within which force structure and capability are resourced. This activity is led by MOD central staff in D Pol Planning and D Force Development and is largely outside the Acquisition Process.
Defence Planning Assumptions to Military Capabilities. The Defence Planning Assumptions are translated, through Concept Development, High Level Operational Analysis (HLOA) and Military Judgement, into a set of capabilities that are required in order to achieve the desired effects and campaign outcomes. This is a core activity for the ECC, working with MOD central policy staff, and a key part of the acquisition process.
Military Capabilities to Force Groupings. Each Military Capability can be delivered through different mixes of platforms, force elements and force enablers. This activity identifies the optimum balance of Force Groupings[6]. It is a core activity for the ECC, led by DECs and supported by Capability Management Groups (CPG) and described in Capability Management Strategies.
Force Groupings to Lines of Development. To deliver the required capability, each Force Grouping needs to be integrated across all DLODs, and also delivered in a way that draws on opportunities afforded by new technologies and is coherent with industrial capacity. This is the primary activity of ECC hosted Capability Planning Groups (CPG) who manage their Force Groupings using Capability Management Plans. Each DLOD owner is responsible for ensuring coherency within their own DLOD area.
Line of Development to Project. Decisions made in the Capability Planning Process will result in specific projects being initiated in the relevant lines of development. For capability changes that are predominantly equipment focused, the ECC will act as the project sponsor, with the project being managed by the appropriate IPT under the guidance of the relevant DE&S 2* Cluster Lead. Where projects are not equipment focused, then project leadership will normally come under the appropriate TLB.
Project to Contract. For equipment-focused projects, the IPT is responsible for managing the contracts and commercial relationships with suppliers. For non-equipment projects, the DLOD owner is normally responsible for managing the project.
At each of these transitions, decisions can be made which affect the requirement, cost, and delivery timescale of projects in all DLODs, and hence the ability to deliver improved military capability.