After Action Report Exercise Northern Exposure 2016
Michigan National Guard
Consequence Management Command Post Exercise
NORTHERN EXPOSURE 16
After Action Report
27 July 2016
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After Action Report Exercise Northern Exposure 2016
Administrative Handling Instructions
1. The title of this document is “Exercise Northern Exposure 2016– After Action Report
2. The information gathered in this AAR is “Unclassified.”
3. Points of Contact:
Exercise Director
LTC Ravindra Wagh
Assistant Chief of Staff – G5 Plans and Exercises
Michigan Army National Guard
3411 N. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906-2934
(517) 481-8375 (office)
Assistant Exercise Director
MSG Ronald Baldwin
G5 NCOIC
Michigan Army National Guard
3411 N. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906-2934
(616) 309-8780 (cell)
Exercise Controller / Support Chief
Mr. Mike Bridges, CTR
G5 Project Manager
Michigan Army National Guard
3411 N. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48906-2934
(616) 309-8780 (cell)
Director/Unit Points of Contact are located in Appendix E on Page 38
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Handling Instructions Unclassified MIARNG
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Contents
Administrative Handling Instructions 1
Contents 3
Executive Summary 5
Section 1: Exercise Overview 7
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary….…………………………………………………………..10
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities………………………………………………………………..15
3.1: Capabilities Exercised ….……………………………….…………………………….15
3.2: Training Objectives Exercised by Staff...….………………………..…………….17
3.2.1 J1 Personnel Training Objectives Exercised….…………………..…………….17
3.2.2 J3/5/7 Operations Training Objectives Exercised….……………..…………….22
3.2.1 J4 Logistics Training Objectives Exercised………………………..…………….25
3.2.1 J6 Communications Training Objectives Exercised….……….…..…………….28
Section 4: Staff Observations…………. …………………………………………….…….…….31
4.1. J1/Personnel Notes ……………………………………………………………………31 4.2. J2/ Intelligence ………………………….……………………………………………...33
4.3. J4 /Logistics/Sustainment Notes ...... ………………………………………………33
4.3. J3/5/7 Operations Notes …………...... ………………………………………………42
4.4. J6/ Communications Notes ...………………………………………………………… 42
4.5. State Surgeon Notes ...... ………………………………………………...………… 43
Section 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..45
Appendix A: Improvement Plan 46
Appendix B: Lessons Learned 48
Appendix C: Exercise Events Summary Table 49
Appendix D: Acronyms 52
Appendix E: Directory………………………...……….……………………………………………..56
Appendix F: Msel/Rfa Timeline...……………………….……….…………………………………..57
Appendix G: J3/5/7 AAR Comments…………………….……….…………………………………..58
Appendix H: Unresolved Discussion NE15………….……….……………………………………69
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U Unclassified MIARNG
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Executive Summary
The Executive Summary provides a brief overview of the exercise, best practices, and strengths demonstrated during the exercise, and areas that require improvement.From 09 to 12 June 2016, the Michigan Army National Guard (MING) conducted Exercise Northern Exposure 2016 (NE16) to increase MING understanding and efficiency in staff coordination, battle tracking and anticipating resources while conducting Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in a domestic operating environment. The NE16 scenario focused on consequence management of a Cyber induced Power Grid Attack in FEMA Region V with 36 Requests For Assistance (RFA) Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) injects occurring over a four day period.
The exercise was designed to focus on the Joint Forces Headquarter-Michigan (JFHQ Staff) and confirm the viability of existing plans and standard operating procedures (SOP). Instrumental to the execution of NE16 was the full participation from the MING Joint Operations Center and Joint Forces Headquarter-Michigan staff. Additionally, the exercise included elements 46 Military Police Command, 177 Military Police Brigade, 272 Regional Support Group and 51 Civil Support Team.
The key successes of NE16 are the following: increased understanding of how MING resources can be applied to a disaster response situation; military and civilian personnel planned the exercise well; the exercise was realistic; staff processes improved throughout the exercise and gaps were identified in plans and standard operating procedures.
Significant areas of improvement became evident during NE16. Those areas include: the need for more/additional collective staff training, refined All Hazards Plan and specific SOPs and pre-determined reporting formats.
NE16 provided a realistic training opportunity for both Traditional and Full-Time Michigan National Guardsmen. Its many successes are attributed to a deliberate and methodic planning process. While there were areas of improvement identified, team work and professionalism highlighted the many challenges during the exercise.
Major Strengths
The major strengths identified during this exercise are as follows:
· The exercise was realistic
· Increased understanding of the RFA process and the collective staff effort in a disaster response situation
· Great care was in preparing the exercise and providing a realistic simulation of a DSCA event
· Inter-Staff personnel worked well together in a demanding and dynamic training environment
Primary Areas for Improvement
Throughout the exercise, several opportunities for improvement were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:
Capability / Area of Improvement / RecommendationsPlanning / · Need for more/additional collective DCSA Training at JFHQ &JTF Levels / · Conduct an annual Northern Exposure exercise
· Select units conduct at least one DSCA-partner agency training event annually
Operational Coordination / · Understanding of MING capabilities
· Need additional understanding of capabilities, equipment, systems, and protocol / · MING hosts an annual MING capability conference for State & Municipal emergency managers
· MING publishes a “capabilities” brief and distributes to State & Local emergency managers through MSP-EMHS
Intelligence and Data Sharing / · Establishment of a State COP and continuity of systems
· Refine AHP and Reporting Requirements in every Directorate / ü Consider MCIMS upgrade from incident/event tracking platform to a Knowledge Management platform
ü Require MING Battalion and above echelons to train/certify personnel on MCIMS
Operational Communication / · Need additional understanding of capabilities, equipment, systems, and protocol / ü Employ the Joint Incident Site Communication Capability (JISCC) at incident command or critical branch operations location
Consider the exchange of liaisons between military and partner agencies at the IC/Battalion level and above
Section 1: Exercise Overview
Exercise Details
Exercise Name
Northern Exposure 16
Type of Exercise
NORTHERN EXPOSURE 16 is a MING CBRN consequence management exercise conducted from 09-16 June 2016 throughout Michigan focused on the State, Regional,
Exercise Start Date
09 June 2016
Exercise End Date
12 June 2016
Duration
4 Days
Location
Joint Forces Headquarters-Michigan, 3411 N. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd, Lansing, MI
Scenario Type
Cyber Attack induced Regional Power Outage/Disruption
Sponsors and Participants
The Adjutant General – Michigan
Land Component Commander, Michigan
Joint Forces Headquarters –Michigan
Chief of Staff
Director, G3 Operations
Director J1 Personnel
Director G4 Logistics
Director G6 Communications
G2 Intelligence
G5 Plans and Exercises
G8 Budget
JAG
SAO
SSO
Air National Guard Headquarters– Michigan
46 Military Police Command
177 Military Police Brigade
272 Regional Support Group
51 Civil Support Team
Team Watson- Contractor
Number of Participants 203
· Military Participants: 152
· Military Role Players: 35
· Civilian Exercise Control Personnel: 15
Exercise Intent
· Purpose: Train and prepare the readiness of Michigan National Guard JFHQ Staff to provide support to civil authorities in a realistic constructive and simulated training environment.
· Key Tasks:
o Improve the readiness of MING staff to provide capability and support for State civil support missions
o Increase MING interagency understanding and cooperation through incorporation of Military and Civilian Federal, State and Local partners
o Exercise MING Dual Status Commander and JTF Staff in employment of State (SAD/Title 32) and Federal (Title 10) forces during a complex catastrophe
· End State: MING Staff successfully reacts to a catastrophic event and provides immediate response to support civil authorities within deployment timelines.
Exercise Objectives
ü Train MING readiness to conduct mission command of forces in a multi-phased, dual-status DSCA operation
o Stand-up of JFHQ-MI and JTF
o Transition operational lead from JFHQ-MI to JTF
o Conduct formal Transfer of Authority within established timelines.
o Apply phased approach to immediate response while conducting three JFHQ Staff transitions by conducting shift changes over four days of extended operations.
ü Coordinate and facilitate integration of Federal, State, and Local capabilities with MING throughout the duration of the exercise
o Exercise the incorporation of MING units into the National Response Framework and National Incident Management System
o Coordinate with and support a Unified Command at State level
ü Maintain and report status of deploying assets, to include In Transit Visibility (ITV), as part of the ability to effectively command and control forces as they arrive and operate in the established Operations Area
ü Integrate MING Cyber Network Defense Team into Commercial, State and Federal response to a targeted denial of services (NE17 Objective)
Core Capabilities Exercised during NE16
Core Capability / DefinitionIntelligence and Information Sharing / Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning threats
Operational Communications / Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations
Operational
Coordination / Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
Planning / Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.
Threats and Hazard Identification / Identify the threats and hazards that occur in the geographic area; determine the frequency and magnitude; and incorporate this into analysis and planning processes so as to clearly understand the needs of a community or entity.
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary
Exercise Design (Power Disruption/Outage Scenario, Michigan)
Fig 1. FEMA Region V Power Outage MAP
Daily Exercise Themes
• 09 JUN 16: Widespread power outages, hundreds trapped in elevators, high incidence of traffic accidents, businesses closed, LE and EMS services overtaxed, communications degraded
• 10 JUN 16: Gangs exploit situation, loot businesses rob residents. SEOC processes many RFAs, realization that outage will last several weeks, Disaster Declaration issued, shelters open
• 11 JUN 16: National Guard fully engaged, Wellness Checks, volunteers assist in neighborhoods, some water flowing due to backup power systems
• 12 JUN 16: TIC/TIM incidents south of Chicago, IL….MI Commodities flow increases - FEMA contracts and Walmart, Meijer, Kroger donated supplies, NG support to Detroit PD has positive effect
Fig 2. Staff Operations
Exercise Timeline
Fig 3. Overview of exercise timeline
Developing the Exercise Environment
Fig 4. Exercise Environment
Mission Timeline for NE16
The scenario is a regional power outage resulting from a cyber-attack on the MISO power Grid within FEMA Region V on or about 081100JUN16.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities
This section of the report reviews the performance of the exercised capabilities, activities, and tasks. In this section, observations are organized by venue and associated activities. The capabilities linked to the exercise objectives of Northern Exposure 16 are listed in Section 1 of this document. Capabilities were exercised by corresponding venue. Each activity is followed by related observations, which may include references, analysis, and recommendations.
3.1 Capabilities Exercised
Capability Summary: All Core Capabilities during NE16, were exercised and confirmed either through leader evaluations, observations, participant feedback or combination of the three methods. This summary reflects the four Core Capabilities that were most suggested areas in need of improvement.
EXERCISED CORE CAPABILITIESIntelligence and Information Sharing / Area For Improvement
Operational Communications / Area For Improvement
Operational Coordination / Area For Improvement
Planning / Area For Improvement
Threats and Hazard
Identification / Strength
ISSUES: Throughout the exercise, four Capabilities stood out as Areas for Improvement. These areas were identified through Participant Feedback and Leader Observation, Areas identified for improvement are discussed in general terms and may or may include multiple organizations. Areas that are
Exercise Design
Identified as a Strength in the above table are not addressed below and addressed elsewhere.
DISCUSSION:
1. Operational Coordination: Anecdotal observation identified concerns in the area of Operational Coordination. Repeatedly it was identified that across all exercise participants that a lack of understanding policies plans and procedures hampered the coordination process.
2. Operational Communications: Communication was degraded by two primary factors; Conversion from Traditional War fighting Task Organization to DSCA Task Organization, the Command Relationships in the DSCA Operation of lead to confusion of roles and responsibilities, with both units and staff at the operational and tactical level; a variety of equipment and procedures created confusion. Access to a common platform for both Full Time and Traditional Soldiers caused issues maintaining an accurate COP and staff estimates.
3. Intelligence and Information Sharing: Concerns to the timeliness and accuracy of information was being passed along information throughout the exercise. This was largely attributed to the inability to provide a Common Operating Picture (COP) or maintain awareness in remote (Future) operational areas. Many problems experienced during the exercise were directly attributed to lack of COP, Information Management issues caused by lack of access, training and definitive systems used.
4. Planning: Anecdotal observation suggest that more Senior Leader involvement in the planning process and MSEL scripting would have been beneficial to the success of the Exercise. A rehearsal in addition to the Table Top Exercise (TTX) would have accelerated the learning curve during the first 8 hours of the exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Operational Coordination: More time needs to be allocated during drill to address operational coordination. This can only be achieved through deliberate and coordinated collaboration. Dates to be identified and participants committed to the exercise in order to provide proper understanding of each objectives.
2. Operational Communications: Participants need to identify systems, equipment and communication procedures in advance of the exercise and planners need to work with system operators prior to an event. Additional coordination and information sharing is required to reduce issues caused by the varying differences in terms and acronyms.
3. Intelligence and Information Sharing: Establishing a common IM/KM site and ensuring that end users in the organization are fully trained will go a long way to closing the information gap. Recommend that IM/KM training be initiated during the Initial Planning Meeting.
4. Planning: Continue to refine All Hazards Plan & Provide collective JFHQ training for DSCA Missions. Planning at the initial phase of the exercise was hampered by the Staff’s understanding of the All Hazards Plan. While the All Hazards Plan does require refinement the collective staff’s failure to understand JFHQ’s role and was hampered across all staff areas