Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont

Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont

Memorandum of 26th December

The memorandum of the 26th of December includes certain criteria that the Cabinet wanted Castlereagh to fulfil, additional instructions and a memorandum for Maritime Peace.[1] The memorandum, written by Castlereagh, finalised the aims of the Cabinet after six weeks of ministerial conference.[2] This is a key document to this study as it outlines what the aims of the British government were at the start of 1814, and Castlereagh would continually refer to these aims in his subsequent correspondences. The memorandum states the aims of the British government in relation to both shared continental peace and security, and securities specific to Britain herself. It also helps contextualise the thought process of the Cabinet, and how they perceived the situation in Europe.

The first aim of the British government relates to securing its superiority as an international superpower. Put simply the Cabinet desired the restriction of French maritime power ‘within due bounds by the effectual establishment of Holland, the Peninsula, and Italy in security and independence’.[3] Evidently improving the maritime security of Britain, by weakening a competitor, helps to ensurethe financial and commercial hegemony of the country.The enclosure of a separate memorandum for Maritime Peace helps to reiterate the importance of this securing this aim.[4] Webster believes it can be considered as part of the overall document, and that it was probably of more interest to some of the ministers than the details of the continental settlement.[5]

The details of the continental settlement was of utmost importance to Castlereagh however, who would have to secure certain territories to ensure British security and maritime freedom. The memorandum instructs that Britain must obtain the ‘absolute exclusion of France from any establishment on the Scheldt, and especially Antwerp’; secure Holland with ‘a barrier under the House of Orange’ including Antwerp; and that Spain and Portugal be ‘independent under their legitimate sovereigns’ with a guaranteed protection against future French attack.[6] These aims were achievable but the barrier for Holland would require sacrifice, particularly as the allies had accorded Napoleon territories in Belgium at this point of their peace negotiations.[7]

The Cabinet appreciated this, and Castlereagh is instructed to state that Britain ‘is willing to purchase it by a double sacrifice, by cession to both Holland and France.’[8]Although the document states that this objective is ‘most deeply interesting to all the Allies’, the exclusion of the French Navy from this region would benefit Britain above all others.[9]Similarly the memorandum of Maritime Peace also states that British colonial concessions were for the ‘welfare of the continent’ and that they would not retain colonies ‘for their mere commercial value’.[10] The Cabinet perceived themselves as the ‘lynch pin’ of the continental alliance, and therefore felt that they appeared ‘moderate and unselfish’.[11]

The memorandum is in fact selfish in relation to their allies. The most significant multilateral aim of the British government outlined in this memorandum is for a continued alliance after the war that includes ‘defensive engagements with mutual obligations’ to resist future French expansion.[12]Indeed the document stipulates that any concessions could be withdrawn if France was not duly reduced to her ancient limits.[13] This objective may be difficult to achieve though, particularly as a peace had not yet been agreed with France, or indeed Napoleon. The memorandum therefore offers an insight into the Cabinet’s perception of themselves in relation to foreign affairs. The document is precise on territorial arrangements that effect British maritime and continental security, and they expect these to be satisfied. As Webster and subsequently Nicholson have observed, the memorandum indicates that British aims may be unrealistic and based on inadequate information on the main objectives of the other allies.[14]

The memorandum includes the British aims for the settlement arrangements of Italy and Germany for example, but these are ‘not made conditions sine quibus non’.[15] There is a lack of understanding of how contentious these issues may become. The cabinet accords Castlereagh powers of mediation over the German settlement, but this is a vague instruction. The British government had a ‘tradition of isolation’, and their interest clearly did not extend to areas that didn’t directly affect British security.[16]This naivety is significant and helps to support the view, expressed in chapter three; that Castlereagh’s greater perspective of these territorial issues illustrate that he consistently acted to ensure the securities of Holland and the Low Countries. The focus of the ministers appears to concentrate on their wider international hegemony, and how they are perceived at home rather than on the continent. Indeed the memorandum states that securing the freedom of Spain and Holland ‘may justify to the British public and the allies so great an exertion on the part of Great Britain’.[17]

Despite this, the memorandum is essential to understanding the aims of the British government at the end of 1813. The primary instructions for Castlereagh were to safeguard the Scheldt and Antwerp, to secure Holland as a barrier and to emancipate Spain and Portugal from French influence. Identifying these aims is crucial to analysing Castlereagh’s actions and evaluating to what extent these aims remained his priority during his time on the continent.

The aims of the British government were not confined to this memorandum though, and it is worth highlighting why these were omitted from Castlereagh’s instructions.

The memorandum, for instance, does not include any instructions in negotiating an agreed abolishment of the slave trade. Organised pressure from figures like Wilberforce, and a British public ‘fanatically determined’ for France to give up the salve trade meant that it was a central aim of Lord Liverpool’s cabinet.[18] That said, historians have argued that the cabinet viewed this as separate and more complicated issue.[19]This issue was not Castlereagh’s responsibility alone, and others were important in securing this.[20] It may be for this reason that he is not entrusted with this aim explicitly in the memorandum, and it unlike the other aims it cannot be treated as his personal responsibility.

Another noteworthy omission from Castlereagh’s instructions is over the dethronement of Napoleon, which was another imperative desire of his cabinet and the British public.[21]The British government and Castlereagh could not stipulate over this in the memorandum however, and the terms of peace yet to be agreed.[22] This would become an area of contention though and will be discussed in chapter two, as France’s future monarch became central to the negotiations of the Peace of Paris.[23]Thus, upon his departure to Basle to meet the Austrian Foreign Minister, Prince Metternich, in early 1814, the foreign secretary already knew the three central aims of his government, outlined in the memorandum of December.[24] By March 1814 Castlereagh orchestrated an opportunity to secure the majority of his government’s wishes, whilst adhering closely to the instructions of the memorandum, at Chaumont. This achievement amounted to nothing short of a ‘diplomatic coup.’[25]

The maritime rights secured at Langres protocol

The Treaty of Chaumont

The Treaty of Chaumont, signed on March 9 1814, assured many of Britain’s primary objectives at a point when allied victory was practically assured.[26] The treaty was significant for three reasons. It ensured the continued commitment of each party to the alliance against France, at a point when Castlereagh seriously feared its disintegration.[27] Next the terms of the treaty and its context in the war meant that the allies could escape from frustrating and complicated negotiations for peace with Napoleon’s minister Caulaincourt at Châtillon. Finally, and most significantly for Castlereagh, the treaty fortified Britain’s position amongst the allies and made them indispensable to the coalition.[28]The treaty, and its importance to securing British aims, has been modern historians collectively, who describe it as one of Castlereagh’s grandest achievement.[29]

A copy of the Treaty, and its three secret articles are enclosed in a letter from Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool on March 10 1814, where the foreign secretary asserts in confidence that the treaty ‘will have the most decisive and beneficial influence’ in the allied union against France.[30]The first two parts of the Treaty, ‘TraitéDefensif’ and ‘Traitéd’Alliance’, essentially agree the continued support of the alliance by Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia in the war against France.[31]Article XVI in the treaty of defence concerns the duration of the alliance against France, and this is the first instance where Castlereagh secures on of the aims outlined in the memorandum of December 26 1813.[32] As Bew translates, the articles states that the Defensive Alliance has been agreed for a period of twenty years that intends to ‘maintain the equilibrium of Europe’, ensure the independence of its states, and prevent the invasions which for ‘so many years have desolated the World’.[33] This agreement between the allies secured one of the Cabinet’s most desired aims, and Castlereagh therefore can be rightly credited for obtaining it.

Castlereagh also managed to secure most of his government’s territorial aims in the ‘Articles Séparéset Secrets’.[34]The agreement secures the independence of Spain and Switzerland, within their ‘ancienneslimites’, with the former ruled by Bourbon Ferdinand VII.[35]Castlereagh therefore had effectively secured the independence of the peninsula states ‘under their legitimate sovereigns’, which is outlined as one of the key aims of the memorandum of 26 December.[36] Less importantly;Italy would become an arrangement of independent states, and a confederated Germany would be created.[37]These did still align with his instructions however, and can be considered as a success. The secret articles also indicate that Castlereagh ensured the independence of Holland under the Prince of Orange; a key security for his government.[38] This success, however, must be quantified in relation to the concessions and fiscal reimbursement that he agreed to.

The despatch of the 10 March 1814 additionally includes a ‘Most Secret’ letter to Lord Liverpool, where Castlereagh explains the financial memorandum attached to the Treaty of Chaumont.[39] As Castlereagh writes, the treaty necessitated considerable subsidiaries on Britain’s behalf, paying a total of five million pounds to her allies in order to continue the war with France.[40]Britain would additionally supply 150,000 troops to the war effort.[41] This was considerably more than the other allied parties, and even Castlereagh remarks, in a letter to Mr. Hamilton, that Britain effectively supplies 300,000 men after paying the financial subsidiary, which is equal to the combined total of Prussia, Russia and Austria.[42] The substantial commitment is believed to secure the agreement over the Holland settlement, and the reasons for Britain’s extra financial burden.[43]In this note Castlereagh requests that Liverpool quickly puts this before parliament so that the treaty can be ratified.[44] The Finance Accounts for Great Britain and Ireland for the financial year that ‘ended 5th Jan 1815’, indicate that Britain paid Austria and Prussia £972,222, and Russia £1.25 million and £500,000 for their fleet, thereby honouring the Chaumont agreement.[45] Thus, Castlereagh, gained the support of parliament for this sacrifice, and guaranteed Britain’s most important territorial security in Europe.

The foreign minister’s jubilance at the Treat of Chaumont is evident, as he writes to Liverpool that he feels he has ‘exceeded’ his instructions in relation to financial subsidiary.[46]Castlereagh ensured a ‘precaution’ that Britain can choose to honour the treaty in ‘either men or money.’[47] Here, Castlereagh’s appreciation of British public opinion can be observed, as he allowed his government to choose to substitute money for manpower if public and parliamentary opinion resisted military involvement in the war. The treaty as also meant that Britain arrived at the negotiation ‘table as an equal combatant.’[48] This is a significant moment in the course of the war and for the negotiations, particularly with faltering agreements at Châtillon, and Castlereagh illustrates its significance to Britain in a letter to the under-secretary of the foreign office, William Hamilton.[49]

This letter is less formal than Castlereagh’s despatches to Liverpool or Bathurst, and can therefore be seen to be a better reflection of his sentiments.‘My treaty’ Castlereagh writes that he ‘was determined not to play second fiddle’ at Chaumont, and trusts that the British subsidiaries will end doubt that Britain has less claim to ‘have an opinion on continental matters’.[50] Interestingly, Castlereagh’s feelings indicate that he must have felt that Britain had an inadequate claim to discuss the terms of peace prior to this. For that reason Castlereagh did excel himself at Chaumont, securing British influence in future negotiations when his fellow Cabinet ministers were ignorant of their stock falling in the alliance.[51] In securing this, and the three key terms of the memorandum, Castlereagh had, as he put it, negotiated ‘an extraordinary display of power’ on behalf of his government.[52]

Consequently these despatches support the notion that Castlereagh adhered to his instructions during his first months of negotiation, and that he was ‘content to safeguard Great Britain’s immediate interests’ at Chaumont.[53] The letter to Hamilton of the same day suggests that he was extremely satisfied with the achievement. One must also consider the signals for future issues in the negotiations, as although the Treaty of Chaumont outlines an agreement for a confederated Germany, there is no mention of Poland. Chapman argues that this was a missed opportunity for Tsar Alexander to secure Russia’s territorial desires in Poland.[54] Castlereagh’s attitudes towards this issue will be discussed in chapter three, but it is worth noting this omission because it may reflect the foresight of Castlereagh to avoid this issue when securing Britain’s primary aims, or his naivety of the magnitude of this problem.

Overall Castlereagh’s actions at Chaumont amount to a diplomatic triumph. He succeeded in restoring the alliance and the pursuit of peace, something that Metternich had actively threatened to abandon through frustration at Châtillon.[55]Castlereagh’s work to secure plans to protect Holland, and to liberate the peninsula states of Bonaparte rule was also approved by his government. A letter from Earl Bathurst to Castlereagh, 19 March 1814, confirms this approval and instructs Castlereagh’s next actions.[56] Bathurst states that the Prince Regent ‘entirely approves’ of the treaty and will immediately prepare the necessary ratifications.[57]The war secretary also indicates the indignation of the Prince Regent towards France and Caulaincourt, and that any continued delay in the negotiations at Châtillon will result in Britain rescinding its colonial offerings to France.[58]Britain’s current position on the continent, already made stronger through Castlereagh’s actions at Chaumont, had improved immeasurably after the allies captured Laon and Napoleon retreated behind the Aisne river on the 9th March.[59]Britain therefore could afford to be more forceful, and Castlereagh’s next objective was to secure the peace with France as an important member of the allied powers.

[1]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[2]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 65.

[3]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[4]Memorandum for Maritime Peace, Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[5] C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921), n.1 p.123.

[6]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[7]?

[8]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[9]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[10]Memorandum for Maritime Peace, Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[11] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.68

[12]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[13]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[14] Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 14: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68.

[15]Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 16.

[16]Wright, ‘A World Restored, Kissinger’, pp. 953-54

[17]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[18] Reich, ‘The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna’, p. 129: W. Hinde, Castlereagh (London, 1981), p. 216

[19] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68: RiechThe Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna’, p. 129.

[20]wELLINGTON

[21] Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 18.

[22]

[23] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 86-91: Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 36-7

[24]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[25]Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 208.

[26]Derry, Castlereagh, p. 209.

[27] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 70.

[28]Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p. 502.

[29] Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 32: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 81: Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 208: Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p. 501.

[30] Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, Foreign Office: General Correspondences before 1906: Continent Conferences (henceforth F.O. Cont. Con.), TNA, FO 92/3.

[31] Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[32] Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[33]Bew, Castlereagh, p. 370.

[34] Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[35] Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[36]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[37] Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[38] Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[39]Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

[40]Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.