Peace and Security Initiative Policy Paper

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Executive Summary

Stopping the growth and spread of deadly nuclear weapons and keeping them out of the hands of terrorist groups, is one of today’s most critical national and global security challenges. To address this challenge effectively, we need to use every tool available, including time-tested strategies of prevention and international cooperation, sensibly updated.

The more we do to control the spread of nuclear weapons in the first, the less likely it is that we and our allies will need to use military force in response to a crisis.
Getting serious about prevention is one of the smartest investments we can make in our own and others’ security.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have brought new energy to U.S. and international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. Protecting the U.S. from catastrophic terrorist attacks requires working with the other countries in an active and expansive global partnership to prevent the spread of these weapons.

Terrorists are working hard to acquire nuclear weapons. For example, in 1999, Osama bin Laden called acquiring these weapons a “religious duty.”
It takes only a few kilograms of plutonium or highly enriched uranium—the essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb—to build a nuclear weapon. In Russia alone, the Cold War legacy of the Soviet Union left approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads and enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 60,000 more bombs.

The hardest part for a terrorist seeking to make a nuclear weapon is obtaining nuclear bomb making materials. At the same time, securing these materials one of the easiest and least expensive steps for the U.S. and allied countries to defend against.

Once the theft of weapons or materials has occurred, the U.S.’s subsequent lines of defense against an act of nuclear terrorism are much weaker and less effective.
Although the most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorists from obtaining these weapons is to secure nuclear weapons and materials wherever they are, nuclear materials are secured currently at a slower pace after 9/11 than before.
If securing weapons and materials was made a priority in deed, not just rhetoric, the timelines for the threat-reduction programs could be drastically reduced, with much of the work being completed in half the time or sooner.

By working with other countries, we can effectively deny terrorists the materials they need to make even a crude nuclear device. The pace of this important work must be accelerated and the scope expanded.

Although many of the basic policies to combat terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are in place, policies alone are not enough to prevent catastrophic terrorism from occurring.
The U.S. needs rapid and effective action to actually secure nuclear materials globally.

With a strong and sustained U.S. involvement in cooperative international efforts to secure, reduce, and as possible eliminate nuclear weapons and materials, we could make real progress on controlling the spread of deadly weapons and keeping them out of the hands of terrorists. The U.S. – and the rest of the world – would be safer as a result.

The Challenge

Terrorists are working hard to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1999, Osama bin Laden called acquiring these weapons a “religious duty.” There is no doubt that if terrorists acquire these nuclear weapons or nuclear bomb making materials, they will seek to use them. In the post-9/11 era, a new kind of terrorism is emerging. It is one that may usher in escalating violence in an effort to kill large numbers of innocent people. A major challenge to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons or materials that can be used in such an attack is the lack of a cohesive global framework for dealing with non-sovereign entities. Such a global framework could serve the role of sealing the gaps in existing international criminal compliance and enforcement agreements. International law prohibits states from developing and transferring nuclear weapons, but it does not integrate crucial aspects of enforcement: authorizing police and law enforcement, providing assistance to states to draft domestic legislation, training personnel, etc.

It takes only a few kilograms of plutonium or highly enriched uranium—the essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb—to build a nuclear device. Yet there are hundreds of tons of these materials located in numerous poorly secured facilities in many countries around the world. In Russia alone, the Cold War legacy of the Soviet Union left approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads and enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 60,000 more bombs. Additionally, there are now tens of thousands of former Soviet scientists with weapons expertise whose jobs either no longer exist or are no longer assured. Finally, in more than 40 countries around the world, there are over 100 research reactors with highly enriched uranium. Too many of these are inadequately secured and vulnerable to theft.

The hardest part for a terrorist seeking to make a nuclear weapon is obtaining these materials. Acquiring nuclear material—or obtaining a working warhead—is the most challenging step for the terrorist. At the same time, it is one of the easiest and least expensive steps for the U.S. and allied countries to defend against. However, once a theft of weapons and materials has occurred, the U.S.’s subsequent lines of defense against an act of nuclear terrorism are much weaker and less effective. Because it is difficult, costly, and generally observable to produce nuclear weapons and/or materials, terrorists will most likely try to obtain them through illicit purchase or theft of existing stockpiles.

Clearly, the most effective and least expensive way to prevent acts of catastrophic terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials wherever they are. Recognizing this, the U.S. and Russia came together over the last decade and through activities carried out under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program they have made significant progress in securing vulnerable weapons and materials in Russia and the newly independent former Soviet-states.

Yet, after almost a decade of work, less than a quarter of the planned security improvements for Russian nuclear material facilities have been put in place, with an even smaller percentage of security upgrades installed for Russian warhead storage sites. Nuclear materials are currently secured at a slower pace after 9/11 than before. At the current pace, it will take an additional 13 years to complete comprehensive security upgrades for these materials. If it were made a priority by both governments, the timelines for the threat-reduction programs could be drastically reduced, with much of the work being completed in half the time or sooner. By working with other countries, we can effectively deny terrorists the materials they need to make even a crude nuclear device. The pace of this important work must be accelerated and the scope expanded.

The Opportunity

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have brought new energy to U.S. and international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. Protecting the U.S. from catastrophic terrorist attacks requires working with the other countries in an active and expansive global partnership to prevent the spread of these weapons.

At the end of the Cold War, many Americans had assumed that the threat from nuclear weapons had been effectively eliminated. While threats from these weapons remained a serious concern for some policy-makers and analysts, there was insufficient public engagement on these threats. As a result, the U.S. government did not provide adequate resources to some of the most important tools developed to limit the spread of the world’s deadliest weapons.

With new concerns about terrorism, as well as revelations about possible nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, public awareness of the threat from these weapons has been revived. Concerns about terrorism have led policy makers to consider new support for policies addressing the spread of nuclear weapons as a critical part of counterterrorism. This new focus on terrorism – and its ensuing mandates from international bodies – can help build a coherent and sustained program of action to reduce the spread of these weapons.

The global nature of these threats requires that the U.S. work towards enhanced international cooperation and proactive measures. Only a comprehensive approach to ending the spread of nuclear weapons can succeed. Fortunately, there is a new U.S. mandate for building global solutions that will prevent terrorists from acquiring these deadly weapons..

On the international level, shared global concerns for the terrorist threat have forged new levels of cooperation. A new counter-terrorism mandate, adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, is a good example of the growing global partnership to prevent new terrorist attacks. Resolution 1373 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (known by its acronym: the CTC). The Counter-Terrorism Committee has a record of considerable accomplishment in promoting international cooperation, raising awareness of complex issues related to international security, promoting new regional programs, collecting information, and encouraging compliance through multiple diplomatic strategies.

The U.N. Counter-Terrorism program, by addressing international security issues in a cooperative framework (with support from every U.N. member state) is a smart model for encouraging nations to comply with international mandates. This approach helps to encourage focus on non-state actors, as well as states that enable or facilitate terrorist activity as sovereign entities. Its success to-date illustrates how cooperation works and underscores that the effort to stop global terror depends on the nations of the world working together in partnership.

Current U.S. Policy

Many of the basic policies to combat terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are in place. From multilateral agreements like the Nonproliferation Treaty to bilateral actions such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to the 2002 National Security Strategy, policies exist to comprehensively address efforts by terrorists to acquire the world’s deadliest weapons.

Policies alone, however, are not enough to prevent catastrophic terrorism from occurring. What is essential is that these policies be turned into actions. The U.S. needs rapid and effective action to actually secure nuclear materials globally. What is missing from our current governmental practices—in the U.S. and elsewhere—is effective, rapid action. Specifically:

The lack of high-level political attention to these efforts have deprived them from making rapid progress;
The U.S. response to terrorism has focused disproportionately on killing terrorists and potential terrorist allies, rather than working with other nations to implement strategies for securing nuclear weapons, materials, expertise, etc.;
Low-level technical and bureaucratic differences have tied up important programs (e.g., certification/presidential waiver; liability issues, etc.) and high level attention has been lacking;
Budgets have been lacking in some key areas, such as bio threat reduction;
Global partnership efforts established by the “Group of Eight” (the world’s major industrial democracies), have not been well coordinated, and many pledges remain unfulfilled;
Although the U.S. government announced in May 2004 the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), it is not universal and instead defines very narrowly areas of interest. This program remains under-funded and too narrow in scope.

It is also important to keep in mind that the challenge of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a long-term endeavor. In the U.S., we need to move beyond rhetoric, and make these issues a priority in deed. We must also provide greater financial resources needed to accelerate action and to ensure a long-term focus on preventing terrorists from ever acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear bomb making materials.

Suggested Actions

The President should:

Treat this issue as a real priority in deed rather than just rhetoric.
Appoint a senior official working in the White House and with direct access to the president, who is responsible for leading and coordinating all international nuclear, chemical, and biological threat-reduction programs. This official should have the authority needed to overcome bureaucratic and funding obstacles as quickly as possible;
Encourage other participants in the Group of Eight (the eight major industrial democracies) global partnership to fulfill their funding commitments, pushing to increase the Global Partnership funding target beyond $20 billion, and extend the Global Partnership to target countries for assistance beyond Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union;
Seek direct U.S.–Russian presidential engagement on threat reduction policy issues, especially on issues such as access, liability, and taxation that cut across threat-reduction programs; and,
Create a mechanism for biannual meetings between high-level U.S. and Russian officials to assess threat-reduction efforts and troubleshoot implementation difficulties.

The U.S. Government should:

Work with Russia to develop a comprehensive plan to place all excess U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads in secure, jointly monitored storage areas;
Work to help Russia accelerate the demilitarization of its vast chemical stockpile and strengthen the security of all chemical weapon stocks in the interim;
Lead efforts to strengthen the Group of Eight partnership—not just increasing financial contributions, but also building a process that ensures that the greatest nuclear, as well as chemical and biological risks are addressed first; and,
Work with the other nations of the world to accelerate efforts to consolidate and secure weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide.

The U.S. Congress should:

Provide the president with a permanent authority to waive certification requirements allowing Russia to receive U.S. cooperative threat reduction funding, including permanent chemical weapons cooperative threat reduction waiver authority OR eliminate the certification process altogether.
Provide $5-10M in funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency for their terrorism efforts
Provide $3M for non-profit work to evaluate the implementation of threat reduction programs

The Group of Eight should:

Accelerate efforts to consolidate and secure nuclear materials.

The U.N. should:

Support the ongoing work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee; and
Support Resolution 1540, requiring all countries to prohibit terrorist and other non-state actors from obtaining nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by:
Promoting and strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other relevant arms control measures (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, etc.);
Building a parallel norm-based structure that would increase states’ capacity to act, and include states, such as Israel and India, that remain outside the NPT; and
Focusing on non-state aspects of the proliferation threat that the NPT does not adequately address.

Peace and Security Initiative Policy Paper

Executive Summary

The Opportunity

Current U.S. Policy

Suggested Actions

Further Reading