PLAiNs AC 1
Alex Zimmermann
Sanctions
I affirm. [RESOLVED: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.]
Morgan, et al[1] define economic sanctions in ’09 as
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset includes 888 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target. The current version of the dataset covers the 1971–2000 time period.1 For our purposes, economic sanctions are defined as: actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies. By definition, a sanction must (1) involve one or more sender states and a target state, and (2) be implemented by the sender In order to change the behavior of the target state. By this, we mean that for actions taken to limit an economic relationship to be considered sanctions, they must be accompanied by a demand that the target change some aspect of its behavior. These demands can be for changes in economic policies (e.g. tariffs or other trade behavior) as well as for changes in political, military, or any other type of behavior.2 Actions taken by states that restrict economic relations with other countries for solely domestic economic policy reasons (e.g. restrictions based on consumer safety or environmental standards) therefore do not qualify as sanctions. Sanctions may take many forms, including actions such as tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, asset freezes, aid cuts, and blockades. For the purposes of this dataset, all sanctions cases may include only one target state. If a sender state(s) makes threats against multiple targets, a new case is created for each individual target.
I value MORALITY, [defined as The quality of an action which renders it good; the conformity of an act to the accepted standard of right[2],] because ought implies a moral obligation.[3]
Even if people are rationally ends in themselves, morality demands we minimize harm to persons. David Cummiskey[4] writes,
By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant’s principle is “rational nature exists as an end-in-itself” (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the[ir] unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value” that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of ethics. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we many never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many.
Thus, the standard is minimizing human suffering. Prefer this standard for (two) additional reasons.
First, primary ethical concerns must be with how one determines what is right and wrong within a given system. A system of ethics that claims there are side constraints but can give no rational basis for why one thing and not another should be a side constraint ought to be rejected. However, all ethical appeals that are based to how to distinguish between good and bad collapse into a generic rights protection. For example, murder, even in a deontological sense, is only wrong because it deprives people of life. However, this rights protection standard can only imply an evaluation of an action’s consequences because all ethical theories are therefore merely based off the effect they have on human rights.
Second, the resource-allocating nature of the state means government action is evaluated through its consequences. Sunstein and Vermeule[5] explain,
In our view, both the argument from causation and the argument from intention go wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy 38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government. The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference [because]. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act. Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action—for example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.
Means-based duties conflict and paralyze action. Rights claims come from so many different areas that policymakers must weigh the risk of costs and benefits. Absolute rights claims paralyze action because government cannot make a decision based on changing individual circumstances or when first duties conflict.
*Thus, all actors in the international arena have a proactive moral obligation to minimize harm to persons even if refusing to do so allows them to express a pre-existing or means-based obligation. All other external moral rules have no value because they have no effect on rights.
The affirmative does not have the burden to defend the benefits of a prohibition on every individual sanction. Rather, if a world prohibiting sanctions is preferable to a world with current sanctions, you affirm. Thus, if the advantages of repealing one or more specific sanctions are net beneficial to the status quo, you affirm.
The thesis of the affirmative is that sanctions are counterproductive and only harm the people they are designed to help.
CONTENTION ONE IS NORTH KOREA:
Economic sanctions are destabilizing North Korea, which will cause the regime to lose control over its nuclear weapons and allow them to fall into the hands of terrorist groups and newly proliferating nations. Bruce Klinger[6] writes on April 7:
Yet there is another North Korean threat for which Washington must prepare: instability in the country's leadership. The planned succession from the ailing Kim Jong-il to his third son faces many challenges and may not be successful. Because the young son lacks thegravitasof his father, there is the potential for a power struggle among challengers within the senior party and military leadership. The issue of succession is especially worrisome in view of recent indications that deteriorating economic conditions, exacerbated by the tightening noose of international sanctions, and rising civil unrest in response to draconian attacks against free-market activity could create a tinderbox of instability. If the situation became so dire as to bring about the collapse of the regime, it could lead to North Korea's loss of control over its nuclear weapons, greater risk of rogue elements selling weapons of mass destruction to other rogue governments and terrorist groups, fighting among competing factions, economic turmoil, and humanitarian disaster. Under such circumstances, China or South Korea might feel compelled to send troops into North Korea to stabilize the country, raising the potential for miscalculation and armed confrontation. Moreover, even a smooth leadership transition would put diplomatic efforts to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons on hold. It is unlikely that Pyongyang would trade away its nuclear weapons when it feels weakened by leadership transition. The North Korean regime has shown remarkable resilience over the past 15 years, belying repeated predictions of its imminent demise. However, there is now a growing sense that a combination of stresses is pushing Pyongyang closer to the tipping point. Like storm clouds on the horizon, the implications of leadership transition are significant and unpredictable. Kim's sudden death or incapacitation could trigger events culminating in a cataclysmic security challenge for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The potential for turmoil in a nation with nuclear weapons must therefore be a top priority for the U.S. and its allies. The Obama Administration should develop military, political, and economic contingency plans for a wide range of scenarios. The U.S. should integrate its plans with those of South Korea and Japan and initiate discussions with China and Russia. Discussions among scholars from these countries ("track two" dialogues) could be used to augment government efforts.
Finally, terrorists equipped with nuclear weapons would be a threat to global stability. David Krieger[7] explains:
With a nuclear weapon at their disposal, the coercive leverage of a terrorist or revolutionary group is multiplied enormously. Terrorists could threaten the destruction of any number of key targets, including a nation’s capital city, a major dam, or a nuclear power generating station. Nuclear threats against any of these targets could cause wide- spread panic and intense pressure on the government to accede to terrorist demands. The government involved would be in the difficult position of not knowing with certainty whether the terrorists were bluffing. One wonders how much risk a government would take if the terrorists publicly presented a credible description and photographs of their nuclear weapon and a small sample of special nuclear material. As a matter of policy, the U.S. government re- fuses to negotiate for the release of Americans who have been kid- napped. Would it adopt a similar no-negotiation policy for the "release" of Americans who were in effect being held hostage by a nuclear bomb threat to New York or Chicago? Nuclear terrorists would have the advantage of choosing whether or not to identify themselves for publicity purposes. But even while identifying themselves, they could remain unlocatable and thus untargetable for retaliation. This, of course, nullifies the basic premise of deterrence theory, namely that a nuclear attack can be prevented by fear of retaliation. Clearly, if terrorists cannot be located, they have no need to fear retaliation, and thus deterrence in this context becomes meaningless. Further, some terrorists may be assumed to be so alienated that they would not be deterred even if located and certain to die if they carried out their threat. Of course, a nuclear bomb could be detonated remotely, even in another city, by telephone signal.
And, nuclear weapons in emerging nuclear powers are most likely to result in deadly accidents, especially when unsecured. Scott Sagan[8] explains,
Waltz asked: why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than the old ones? The evidence of the number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War suggests that there would be reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new proliferant states even if their safety difficulties were "only" as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers. Unfortunately, there are also at least six reasons to expect that new nuclear states will face much greater risks of nuclear accidents. First, some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational and financial resources to produce even minimal mechanical safety devices and safe weapons design features. Although all countries may start with "crude nuclear arsenals," in Waltz's terms, the weapons of poorer states will likely be more crude, and will remain so for a longer period of time. Evidence for this prediction can be found in the case of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, as UN inspectors discovered soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb [design]-it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off-even while sitting on the workbench. "It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it," one inspector says, adding: "I wouldn't want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk."99 Second, the "opaque" nature of nuclear proliferation in the contemporary world exacerbates nuclear weapons safety problems. Fearing the international diplomatic consequences of a public crossing of the nuclear threshold, most new proliferants have developed weapons capabilities in a covert manner.' Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea fit this pattern. There are, however, both organizational and technical reasons to believe that - this opaque path to nuclear weapons status is inherently less safe: the tighter compartmentalization of such programs means that there is likely to be less thorough monitoring of safety efforts; the lack of public debate about nuclear issues in such states increases the likelihood that military organizational interests will not be challenged; and the inability to have full-scale nuclear weapons tests will inhibit safety design efforts.