Short survey to appraise the social situation in the Kapital'naya mine.
1. Characteristics of the Enteprise
This is the largest mine in Kuzbass, in terms of the numbers of miners employed. The basi technico-economic indices are as follows: it extracts two million tons of coal a year. The mine produces high value coal, and above all coking coal. The seam is at a depth of 700 metres, which is fairly deep for Kuzbass.
The present situation of the mine is not very successful. The five month extraction plan has only been 68% fulfilled. The lag in tunneling in May amounted to 3,000 linear metres. Besides this pay rose all five months. In May the average pay exceeded the planned level by 6% and amounted to 19552 roubles.
In the financial sphere an extremely negative situation developed. According to the figures of the economic section of the mine in the middle of June the mine owed 411 million roubles to its suppliers and contractors. At the same time other enterprises and organisations owed the mine 276 million roubles.
The immediate economic problem of the mine is the establishment of a new accounting price for coal. The concern meets in July to establish the price to the mean - roughly 580 roubles a ton, at the same time as, according to the reckoning of the mine, it ought to be at least 840 roubles a ton.
Besides, it should be pointed out that Kapitalnaya is the only large enterprise in the town of Osinniki. For this reason the mine has a very large housing fund, it supports the majority of kindergartens in the town, finances the health service, etc. All this inevitably affects the economic position of the mine, increasing the prime cost of coal.
The workers' committee in the mine sprang up in the first days of the 1989 strike. According to the workers in the mine the workers' committee has always been active. In 1991 the mine went on strike later than others (in the 20s of March), that is about ten days after others. This is explained by the fact that in the mine there were good prospects, `the coal came', so that it would be a pity to stop work. The strike was conducted under a strict regime, the minimum of people were allowed down the mine. The mine came out of the strike a week after the others. In the opinion of the majority of the management the strike inflicted so much damage that it has noe been able to recover to this day.
2. The Position of the Administration.
There have been major changes in the administration in the course of the last year. Above all this is related to the change of director. The collective expressed its disatisfaction with teh previous director, and he was forced to leave. Various reasonse are given for his departure. But they all come down to one, the main instigators of his departure were the leaders of the workers' and trade union committee. The former director of the mine, who had headed it for many years, was invited to replace him. Despite the director's large experience of the work and knowledge of the collective, he turned out to be quite dependent on the workers' and trade union committee that had invited him. This absolutely undermined the authority of the administration. The same thing also happened in several sections of the mine.
One of the most serious problems which the managers of the mine run into at every level is the confrontation with social organisations (workers' and trade union committees). This is manifested in the fact that these organisations often restrict teh activity of the administration, and quite simply obstruct them. For example, in such matters as the dismissal of workers, setting the level of earnings of ITR and managers, the admission of new specialists etc. The most important arguments which the workers committee puts up against the administration seem to be, first, the managers' mutual protection and, second, the professional incompetence and lack of conscientiousness of the management and specialists.
The reaction of middle management to the position of the workers' and trade union committees is simple: they see it only as a destructive force. Among the managers the wish to limit their sphere of activity is articulated very precisely, to get back for themselves the former amount of power and authority. First of all authority in relation to punishments and dismissal of workers for breaches of discipline. The present situation is such that many attempts of shop chiefs to punish absentees or lazy workers are not only restrained, but are completely prevented. Decisions to dismiss workers or to transform them to lower paid work are rejected. In this situation it is inevitable that there is a real worsening of discipline. Many actions that were previously considered to be offences are no longer consider as such by many workers (leaving the mine early, individual absenteeism). The manager who tries to struggle against this risks finding himself dismissed on the initiative of the collective. However, he may also be dismissed for other reasons, for example, temporary reduction of earnings in teh shop.
In this situation many managers significantly reduced the level of demands on their subordinates. The only support for managers of any rank that remains is their personal authority. This allows some of them to maintain a good level of work and discipline. But even among these `successful' managers teh sense of uneasiness and uncertainty is very great. Unfortunately, practically all the managers see the basic path to normalisation, through restricting the activity of the workers' and trade union committee, and thus through the restoration of their administrative rights, that is in fact they demand the restoration of the managerial situation that existed previously.
It is difficult to call such a position progresive and constructive. First of all, because neither in their written nor in their oral answers did any of the managers have any ideas about the transformation of the economic mechanism of the enteprise. Privatisation was considered by the managers to be impossible, and internal self-financing of subdivisions was also not well understood. The only step which was considered to be realistic was to leave membership of the concern and to exist as a separate state enterprise.
However, this step was simply not related to internal changes. As a matter of fact the managers of the mine (especially middle managers) hope for a recoil backwards.
In this situation a strengthening of conflict is inevitable. The defensive functions of the workers' and trade union committee will strengthen (especially in the face of growing economic difficulties). Their interference in management will grow more, the more the present economic model of the enterprise is maintained. The situation will periodically sharpen and then calm down, but the general worsening of the situation in the enterprise is inevitable. The creation of a professional organisation to defend the rights of ITR and managers is very likely.
Thus, one can confidently assert that teh anticipated `recoil' will not come about. A new organisational and economic model is essential, which will took into account the real situation of all groups of workers and allowed them to balance their mutual relationships.
3. Role of social organisations.
As in the majority of Kuzbass mines the workers' committee was first created in 1989. Resistance to teh administration of the enterprise developed from the first days, which persists to these days. Relationships sharpened to the limit at one moment, then calmed down at another. The last sharpening (in the autumn of 1991) was related to the fact that the administration charged members of the workers' committee with absenteeism and decided to sack them. The collective judged this decision to be unlawful and simultaneously expressed its dissatisfaction with the director and he had to leave. The new director was invited by the workers committee.
There is an interesting detail related to the mechanism of election of the workers' committee. In the mine the workers committees are elected by a shift meeting, that is by workers of various sections, coming together by shift. There are 200-300 people at these meetings, which last for betwen 10 minutes and one hour, every one or two months. The workers' committees report back through these meetings. The initiative for conducting these shift meetings belongs to the workers committee. The most important functions of the workers' committee seem to be defensive. Any worker, with any complaint may go to the workers' committee and receive assistance. The specific feature of this is that those who appeal to the workers' committee are those who are already aggrieved. People, who hope for a `peaceful' resolution of their problems resolve them through the administration or through the trade union. It must be said that far from all grievances are submitted to the workers' committee. Some people consider that the go there is useless. Moreover, this channel is available only for workers. ITR do not use this channel, even when their rights have been significantly violated, although in the workers' committee there is much talk of its `readiness to cooperate with all those who work in the mine'.
The other important function is the participation of the workers committee in the work of the organs of collective management. The director's conference, meetings of the profkom, meetings of the enterprise council - all are attended by representatives of the workers committee, who participate actively. Their main role is an oppositional one. Practically any proposal af teh administration is subjected to super-critical examination on the part of the workers' committee. It is not excluded that such super-criticism leads to the rejection of sound ideas.
Thus, the workers' committee concentrated its efforts on work with those who were aggrieved and in opposition in the management organs. This is rather a narrow approach and the majority of workers have a confused idea of what the workers' committee is engaged in.
The trade union committee in its present form was put together in the course of the last year. The leading positions are held by people sharing the perspectives of the workers movement, and this leads the trade union also to take an oppositional role in relation to the administration. It is interesting to observe that this trade union functions as that same state trade union which traditionally serves on the side of management. As a consequence of this there is no NPG cell. The structure of the trade union is normal. There are primary groups (shop committees) in all sub-divisions. There is a representative of the shop committee in all sections of the shop. The section meetings and mine conference are the basic organs, which elect the trade union organs.
The principal functions of the trade union committee are the following:
1) distribution of goods, holidays, housing, kindergarten places etc.
2) Consideration and approval of administration decisions about punishments, dismissals and incentives for mine workers.
3) work in the collegial organs of management of the enteprise
4) questions of maintenance of the social infrastructure, support for veterans, invalids etc.
Some of the functions are fulfilled by lower organs (shop committees, for example distribute goods). Other functions are basically concentrated in the mine committee - punishments and dismissals, participation in management. Finally, such functions as maintenance of the infrastructure are carried out with the administration.
It has already been said repeatedly that the social organisations are in conflict with the administration. To be more accurate, with the administrative body, not with the director. The most important argument is the careless and unskilled work of the administration and specialists. First of all, because nobody takes responsibility for blunders, accidents, injuries and deaths. The mutual protection existing among the managers, in the opinion of representatives of the workers' committee, leads to this lack of responsibility. Worst of all, the managers are very often accused of pilfering materials and abuse of departmental position.
The managers are not in a position to refute these arguments, since every argument is corroborated with concrete evidence. The difference is that the workers' opposition considers the system, through which this whole totality of `sin' will be reproduced, to be discredited. But the managers prefer to understand every event as objective and not really to confuse weak or dishonest managers with skilled and honest people. But just as moral and personal superiority is found on the side of the opposition, so the authority of the managers falls all the more.
In addition to the aspects considered it is worth considering one more moment, social protection. Both the trade union and workers' committees take the position of unconditional support the workers in any conflicts with the administration. In fact, the collective is split: on the one hand, are hired labourers, on the other the givers of work. But alongside this, the director was invited by a resolution of the workers, while all the managers are at the moment still members of this trade union. In practice this split is not formalised organisationally. The directoral and management bodies are not ready for such a situation, they are waiting for the trade union to become the assistant of the administration. The abandonment of such functions by the trade union as the resolution of conflicts in the sphere of work, and failure to participate in the organisation and operational management of production irritates many managers. Together with which, the major orientation to the protection of workers means the limiting and even the liquidation of the whole body of rights which up to now were those of the managers (disciplinary punishments, sacking etc) and this also increases their irritation and increases conflict.
4. Conflicts
The biggest conflict, as is traditional in the mines, is that between workers and ITR. The scale of this conflict grew, and it absorbed all other conflicts. I have spoken about the reasons for these conflicts above. Here I will discuss the consequences, which accompanies this resistance. First of all, this problem of the breach of labour and production discipline. The dissatisfaction of the trade union with the managers, does not allow them in full measure to implement disciplinary punishments. Many punishments (with the exeption of the most obvious and necessary) are considered as attacks of the chief on the workers. However, the workers also do not neglect chances to `put it over' on the managers in any disciplinary hearing. Thus in the collective there is literally a `disciplinary war'.
The following types of conflict - `barter', i.e. related to the distribution of consumption goods. It should be noted that the assortment of them is fairly big. From foodstuffs to cars, Several conflicts are related to the proportionate distribution between basic and subsidiary workers in teh shop, between workers and ITR, between productive and non-productive divisions. These conflicts are fairly easily resolved through various management organs: the trade union, soviet of the enterprise, etc. The other series of distribution conflicts, are more prevalent and more frequent, related to the immediate distribution of goods.
The principles of distribution are determined independently by each shop, so that in some situations goods are distributed in turn, in others by lots, in a third by turn, but taking account of length of service, etc. Such diversity gave rise, and constantly gives rise, to disatisfaction on the part of those who feel left out.
The other theme of conflict, which may not be so striking and widespread, is the clashes between extracting, construction (?) and auxiliary shops. The situation of extracting shops is privileged. They receive goods first, and the largest volume. In the extracting shops, on the strength of their great prosperity, the situation is quieter and there are fewer breaches of discipline.
The construction shops are more restless and conflictual. Finally, the most conflictual and complex situation is in the maintenance shops. Here are the least qualified workers and ITR, those who are not needed by teh basic shops are thrown out here. Therefore the sense of being secondary is widespread amongst the workers in these shops.
The last type of conflict, is related to conflict between staff and line ITR (managers and specialists). It has already been said that teh whole body of engineers today has reduced and in many cases lose its leadership role. But the staff ITR determinedly try to get themselves a reputation as `lads'. They have no relation to the unstable production work, they do not go down the mine, their work is not seen and is not understood by many. Finally, their earnings are fixed, which many are unhappy about. All this provides teh grounds for considering them less important, in comparison with the line ITR, about whom it can be said that `at least they have some use for production'.
5. Basic Conclusion
The basic situation in the collective can be assessed as negative. First of all because there is a very high level of conflict int he collective. The administration has in fact let go of `the reins of government'. The old management model, based on administrative methods and on the strength of dependence on higher organs (concerns), does not work. The contemporary efforts of the administration are directed to holding onto and even restoring this model. This is to neglect two features: the disappearance (or weakening) of the managerial role of higher organisations, and the changed role of the workers. The concern is today not the only supplier of materials and equipment. Almost all of these functions have been transferred to the mine. That even applies to the sale of coal. The workers aare also no longer an obedient uneducated mass, able to carry out any order from above. Nothing new has come to replace the mechanism of administrative ordering people about. So the workers through their organisations not only defend themselves, but also interfere in the process of management of production. Because up to now, the work of creating a new mechanism of management has not begun the existing conflict will only worsen and intensify.