1. INTENTIONAL TORTS AGAINST PERSONS
  2. BATTERY:
  3. Harmful or offensive contact w/a person resulting from an act that is intended to cause π or a 3rd person to:
  4. (a) Suffer a contact, OR
  5. (b) Suffer apprehension that such contact is imminent (i.e. an intent to commit an Assault).
  6. Requirements:
  7. Act: must be of the actor’s will (volitional movement of the actor’s body).
  8. Intent: π must show that  intended to cause a touch – (intent to do harm or malice are not necessary) OR that π was substantially certain that a touch would occur from his act.
  9. Consent: π must not have consented to the touch.
  10. Harmful or Offensive Touching:  must have inflicted a harmful or offensive touch to the π’s person or something closely associated. There must be some form of physical contact.
  11. π does not have to have actual awareness of the touching.
  12. Touching extends to personal effects of π - clothing, something π is holding etc.
  13. Once it is established that  intended the battery and the battery occurs, Δ is liable for ANY CONSEQUENCES which ensue – reasonably foreseeable or not.
  14. Causation: harmful or offensive touching must be the direct result or indirect result of the ’s actions (if a totally independent force causes injury, then  not liable).

Vosburg v. Putney: π and  were sitting next to each other in school. During class  kicked π slightly below his knee – π did not feel it. π was overcome with pain where he was kicked. π was ill as a result of the injury and eventually π lost the use of his leg. Earlier that year, π received an injury on the same leg, which was now “healing up and drying down”. The medical experts testified the kick to the leg was the exciting cause of the π’s injury. Crt. Held for π b/c act didn’t happen on the playground where implied consent, but was intentional. (∆ would not have been liable). Example of battery w/o assault b/c π did not know he was going to be hit.

 is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act regardless of whether he could have or not foreseen the harm. The  takes his victim as he finds him.

Leichtman v. WVW Jacor communications.: Radio hosts con anti-smoking guy onto show and blow smoke on him. P found it offensive and sued for battery. Radio hosts LIABLE for battery b/c smoke (particulate matter) made physical contact with P which was offensive and unwanted.

Morgan v. Loyacomo: P purchased clothing and left store. D yanked bag away from P, thinking she stole. P sued for battery. Offensive contact with anything connected to his person, if rude and insolent, is sufficient for battery. LIABLE.

  1. ASSAULT:
  2. Intentionally putting a person in reasonable apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.
  3. Requirements:
  4. Act: The act must be volitional movement. Words alone are NOT enough.
  5. Under the RST/RTT: Assault requires (1) Intention to cause a battery (imminent contact) (2) make someone think that he is going to suffer a battery and (3) the person has to think that you will commit a battery (apprehension of imminent battery – this must be reasonable).
  6. Intent: Must intend to inflict harmful or offensive touching (intent to cause a battery), or put a reasonable person in imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive touching.
  7. Like battery, intent to do harm or bear malice is not required.
  8. Apprehension: π must have been put in apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive touch. (fear is not required – look to Restatement).
  9. Interest being protected under assault is π’s freedom from apprehension of the contact, thus assault can exist even if no contact occurs – i.e. battery and assault are mutually exclusive although they often occur together!
  10. Causation: Apprehension must be caused by ’s act or something the  set in motion.

Brower v. Ackerley – the billboard case

The plaintiff received several phone calls that became threatening to him

the calls were traced to the defendant’s home. Brower sued for assault (among other things) because the calls caused him feelings of panic and terror. NO LIABILITY. Ruling: the phone calls did not constitute imminent harm because the defendant was not in a position to immediately reach and touch the plaintiff.

Bennight v. Western Auto Supply – the bat warehouse case

D forced P to work in the bat-infested warehouse at the back of the store. She protested this, fearing the bats. P was attacked by bats and sued D for assault. LIABILE. Ruling: By intentionally forcing Mrs. Bennight to work in the unsafe conditions, the defendants must be liable for an assault. It was an invasion of her person, and they placed her where she had unreasonable apprehension of bodily harm

Langford v. Shu – the mongoose case

D showed P a box and said her husband had sent something for the kids. D said the animal inside would not harm her if she took a look. One of the children released the spring holding the box closed and a furry thing flew up from the box. P was scared and fell over. P sued for assault. LIABLE. Ruling: D intended to show her the box and play the prank and P had reason to think her bodily safety was at risk

Newell v. Whitcher – the blind tutor case

a blind woman tutored some children on the piano. She spent the night at her employer’s home after the lessons. D (kids’ father) entered her room at night and propositioned her. She rebuffed the man and asked him to leave…he left. She sued him for assault. LIABLE. Ruling: He intended to make inappropriate advances on her, and his actions were threatening enough to cause her to be afraid.

II.INTENTIONAL TORTS AGAINST PROPERTY

  1. TRESPASS
  2. Occurs either when (1) Δ intentionally enters π’s land, w/o permission (2) Δ remains on π’s land w/o the right to be there, even is he entered rightfully; or (3) Δ puts an object on (or refuses to remove an object) π’s land w/o permission. REQUIRES ACTUAL ENTRY ON THE LAND.
  3. Liability: trespassers are held civilly liable for the consequences which directly flowed from their unauthorized acts. Even if they cause physical harm. Even if no real damage done by the trespass, the law infers some damage and awards Nominal Damages.
  4. Intent: Trespass only refers to the intentional interference with π’s interest in property. The intent controlling = intent to complete the physical act and not the intent to cause injurious consequences.
  5. Particles and Gases: if Δ knowingly causes objects, including particles and gases, to enter π’s land, this is a trespass. (i.e. a factory emitting soot – even if the intention is in good or bad faith, they know it has to go somewhere). For invisible gases – this is an Intangible Trespass and thus is a nuisance action. Trespass not allowed for cases where there is no visible or tangible trespass to physical property. Damage must be shown!
  6. Air Space: This is technically a trespass but allowable at certain altitudes where it does not interfere with P’s use and enjoyment of his land.

quare clausum fregit = trespass to land, “broke the close”, the writ called upon the defendant to explain his entering the property

trespass de bonis asportatis = “of good carried away”, writ for interference with or damage to property

Desnick v. ABC: Reporters took concealed cameras and microphones into the Desnick Eye Center posing as patients seeking eye exams. The footage they collected was aired on an ABC television program. The clinic (plaintiff/appellee) sued for the tort of trespass stating they would not have consented to the entry and actions of the reporters if they had made their true purpose known. LIABLE. Ruling: while fraudulent in how they represented themselves, the reporters entered a open public store, did not break any confidentiality rules, and did not disrupt the decorum of the clinic. Therefore, their action was not trespass.

Accidental Intrusion

-a person who intentionally enters another’s land even by mistaken belief of law or fact is still liable for trespass

-He could mistakenly believe he:

  • Is in possession of the land or entitled to it
  • Or has the consent of the possessor or a third person with the power to provide consent
  • Or has some other privilege to enter or remain on the land
Non-liability for Accident Intrusions

an unintentional and non-negligent entry onto private land, or causing a third thing to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability even if the entry harms the owner.

  1. TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
  2. Any intentional interference with a person’s use or possession of a chattel (short of conversion).  only has to pay damages, not the full value of the property as  would under conversion.
  3. Loss of Possession: If P loses possession of his chattel at any time, recovery is still allowed even if the chattel is returned unharmed. The interference with the possession doesn’t have to be evil or good but intended.
  4. Main difference between trespass to land and trespass to chattel is that under trespass to land you must show actual damage.
  5. CONVERSION
  6. An intentional interference with P’s possession or ownership of property that is so substantial that D should be required to pay the property’s full value (unlike trespass to chattels where you pay for damages only). Traditional rule – does NOT apply to intangibles
  7. Mistake: Taking by mistake may be considered a conversion. All that is required in INTENT to take possession
  8. Forced Sale Damages: Damages are FORCED SALE DAMAGES where D is required to pay the fair market value of the converted goods and not just the amount of use or damage incurred. For innocent converters some jurisdictions relax the forced sale requirement and they only pay for damages. The converter gets to keep the goods after payment of forced sale damages – they essentially but it!
  9. Difference Between Conversion and Trespass to Chattel: Several factors used including (1) duration of D’s dominion over the property (2) D’s good or bad faith (3) the harm done to the property (4) the inconvenience caused to P.
  10. Intentional destruction or other damage to its physical condition is liable for conversion. Defendant used the plaintiff’s object in a way that interfered with the plaintiff’s right to the use of his goods.
  11. In a suit for replevin, the plaintiff DOES WANT the property returned. Replevin and conversion basically ask for two different results from the same conduct

Armory v. Delamirie (1722)

Plaintiff found a jewel stashed in a chimney. He gave to his superiors and then wanted it back…they wouldn’t give it to him. He sued for its recovery. The court found he was not the true owner and had no absolute right to it, but had more of a right to it than the others.

Moore v. Regents of the University of California: P went to UCLA medical ctr. after diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia. His physician, D, removed his spleen to save his life. Ds knew of the value of P’s cells and devised a plan to acquire them but didn’t tell P. Ds later established a cell line using P’s cells and Regents applied for a patent on the line. With the assistance of Regents, D negotiated agreements for the line’s commercial use. Crt. held for Ds and found no conversion but for P on the breach of fiduciary duty, disclosure, and lack of informed consent. Human biological materials don’t = personal property. They exist in a class of their own (sui generis). Also detriment to the medical research industry would be great if conversion held against Ds.

III.EMOTIONAL HARMS

  1. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
  2. The intentional infliction of a confinement. Designed to protect freedom. There must be (1) causation and (2) An intent to confine (evil or malicious intent is not required). P must show that D either intended to confine him or at least knew with substantial certainty that P would be confined by D’s actions. False imprisonment cannot be committed by reckless or negligent acts!
  3. Confinement: P is within certain limits, not that she is prevented from entering certain places. P must also be aware of the confinement or must suffer some actual harm.
  4. Means Used: FI may be carried out by direct physical means but also by threats or by the assertion of legal authority.
  5. Physical Force; The confinement can occur by threat of physical force no matter the strength of D (i.e. a 70 year old man v. a 20 something year old man with muscles).
  6. Legal Authority: Does not have to be real as long as P reasonably believes that D has legal authority over him

Petersen v. Sorlein: plaintiff was a college student at Moorhead College and joined a religious group called The Way. Family hired a guy to pick up the plaintiff and to bring her home for “deprogramming” but after two weeks she had a police car take her back to the group. Minnesota SC affirmed the decision on appeal. When someone acts under the conviction that the judgmental capacity of another party (here an adult child) is impaired, then any limitations placed on the child’s mobility does no constitute deprivations of personal liberty.

CITIZEN’S ARREST

-actions that are in excess of the authority granted to private citizens can amount to false imprisonment

-the ability to make a citizen’s arrest is covered by statutes in most states (must be a felony), but in some states this power is governed by common law.

Shoplifters

-shoplifting is usually a misdemeanor

-most states have passed statutes giving shop owners privilege to detain suspected shoplifters without liability even if their suspicions are found to be untrue

-the shop owner can only detain a person for a reasonable amount of time and must hold him in a reasonable manner

if there is more than one person in the store when a necklace was stolen, within reason, you can keep them all because there is equal suspicion of theft.

Melton v. LaCalamito – the U-haul case

A guy returns the leased U-Haul truck to a dealer. The dealer sees pads that look like the ones used by U-Haul and demands that the plaintiff return them. the defendant calls the police and makes statements that (the jury later decides) influence the officer’s decision to arrest the plaintiff. He is held for several hours – until they believe his story and his evidence for private ownership of the pads

Baggett v. National Bank and Trust Co. – the human shield case

A man walked into a bank (the defendants) and filled out a deposit slip. He handed it to the bank teller, not noticing the back had “this is a stek up” written on the back of the slip. The police arrested him and brought him back to the bank where the teller identified him as the man who gave her the slip. He sued for false imprisonment but summary judgment was given to the defendants. Ruling: the bank employees acted in good faith and gave requested information to the police, and the bank made no request for the police to hold him. So, the bank cannot be held liable for any false imprisonment charges.

  1. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (IIED) - OUTRAGE
  2. Intentional or reckless infliction, by extreme and outrageous conduct, of severe emotional or mental distress, even in the absence of physical harm.
  3. Requirements:A plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must allege that (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional and reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous and intolerable; (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiff's distress was severe.
  4. There can be IIED even when there is no threat of bodily threat or contact. But unlike assault that requires an imminent apprehension, IIED can constitute a delayed threat.
  5. Bystannder Rule / Third Persons: Distinction between immediate family and others:
  6. A family member, who is present at the time, can use IIED whether or not bodily harm was caused
  7. Any other person, who is present at the time, can use IIED but must ALSO have bodily harm.

Muratore v. M/s Scotia Prince – the cruise ship gorilla case: P said she did not want her picture taken and the crew took a picture of her rear end. The picture was displayed in a public area, with a gorilla head placed over her head. Crew taunted her and P spent much of her trip in her cabin to avoid the crew. She sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. LIABLE. Ruling: conduct was outrageous because P had shown discomfort in having her picture taken there is a connection between their behavior and the plaintiff’s emotional distress.

Roberts v. Saylor– the 1st screaming doctor case

P had surgery twice – the first time by another doctor, the second time by the defendant. D got angry and yelled at P. Later P had another surgery at the same place, and was confronted by D (after the patient had taken pre-op medication) saying “I don’t like you”. P sued for outrageous behavior that caused her emotional harm. NO LIABILITY. Ruling: D’s insults and actions did not violate the bounds of decency.

Greer v. Medders – the 2nd screaming doctor case

P was upset when his doctor, Medders, did not check on him after surgery and called his office to complain. Medders got very angry and yelled at the plaintiff and his wife, causing the wife to cry and the plaintiff to get upset. P sued. Remanded for re-trial with jury. Ruling: we can’t by law dismiss the notion that D’s insults and hostility toward P were sufficiently distressing enough to hold him liable.