Death Knell for Democracy?: Civil-Military Relations in 2013 Egypt and 1991 Algeria
The July 2013 coup that ousted Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi should not come as a surprise. In fact, the Arab Spring highlighted the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Through a comparative examination of the relationship between the military, Islamists, and politicians in Egypt in 2013 and in Algeria in 1991, we ask: What will democratization look like in a post-Arab Spring Middle East?
Both Egypt and Algeria are excellent case studies to examine the interplay between the military, politicians and society. This relationship is one of continued conflict, so to help identify the necessary factors for democratic consolidation, one can use the civil-military relations literature to best delineate what conflict and cooperation will look like in a post-Arab Spring Middle East. Democracy in the Middle East will not occur rapidly; in fact, the military in both Egypt and Algeria have ensured a transition that respects the status-quo instead of liberalization.
Paul E. Lenze, Jr., Ph.D.
Department of Politics & International Affairs
Northern Arizona University
PO Box 15036
Flagstaff, AZ 86011-5036
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PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S CONSENT
Nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops short, falters and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a program. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness—Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (1963, p. 203)
Above all, military role expansion and military coups are politically driven processes; by the same token, the achievement of civilian supremacy over the military must be politically led. Military establishments do not seize power from successful and legitimate civilian regimes. They intervene in politics…when civilian politicians are weak and divided, and when their divisions and manifest failures of governance have generated a vacuum of authority—Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (1996, xxix).
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On July 1, 2013, Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi was given 48 hours to resign after months of violence engulfed Egypt. The coup by Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was the culmination of a year of conflict between the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party—the Freedom and Justice Party. Conflict between the military and politicians effectively began after the momentous events of January 2011. The Egyptian military formed an institution, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to guide Egypt’s transition to democracy; however, once the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won and Morsi took office, Morsi appointed MB loyalists and replaced the head of the SCAF Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi with a pious Muslim general whom Morsi felt would assist in Morsi’s Islamist agenda for Egypt.
As protests increased throughout the country and Morsi excluded his political opponents, the Egyptian military, as defender of Egyptian nationalism, stepped in. With Al-Sisi’s recent announcement that he will be running for president in the upcoming elections in May 2014, the democratic transition is threatened and history tells us that conflict is likely to increase.
To help understand why the military has dominated the democratic transition process, this paper argues that conflict is the result of institutional structure, actor’s choices, and international support, which are endemic to the Middle East resulting in the endurance of authoritarianism.
First, an overview of civil-military relations in Egypt and Algeria will be presented, highlighting the positions of each major actor during the 2011-2013 period in Egypt and the 1991-2 period in Algeria. The December 26, 1991 parliamentary election saw the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) win 181 out of 232 seats in the first round. However, the Army forced then-President Chadli Bendjedid to resign and the remaining rounds of the elections were cancelled. A five-member committee, the High State Council (HCE), ruled the country until new elections could be held. New elections were not immediately held; instead, the military sought to improve its control of Algeria’s institutions, but not before the country was engulfed in civil war until 1998.
Third, the influence of the international actors, such as the US, Soviet Union/Russia, and IMF will highlight the importance of economics in the democratization process of Egypt and Algeria. More specifically, foreign aid and loans precipitated attempts at liberalization inciting conflict within the country and allowing the military to consolidate its control. Finally, a comparison of Egypt and Algeria will highlight the continuing presence the military will have in the failure of the democratic transition process moving forward, as both militaries use the established institutional structure to preserve their interests and limit political participation to not be seen as losing the title of defender of nationalism.
Democratic Transitions in the Middle East
Why have democratic transitions and consolidations not happened in the Middle East? In a special edition of the journal Comparative Politics, Eva Bellin did a survey of 21 states of the Middle East and found that the failure of democratization in the region is a result of a lack of a strong civil society, a lack of market economies, adequate income and literacy levels, a lack of democratic neighbors (with the exception of Turkey), and a lack of democratic culture (Bellin 2004: 141). By no means is the Middle East without these features; the problem is that they are continually repressed by the state. Specifically, she argues that these Middle Eastern states’ coercive capacity is fostering robust authoritarianism and prohibiting a transition to democracy. (Bellin 2004: 143). What does the state’s coercive capacity look like? Essentially, the answer lies in the strength of the state and the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion. Bellin quotes Theda Skocpol (1979), “If the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, ‘value incoherence,’ and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects” (Bellin 2004: 143). The strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus, Bellin continues, “distinguish[es] among cases of successful revolution, revolutionary warfare and nonoccurrence” and could be applied to democratic transitions to see if the state’s coercive apparatus had the will or capacity to crush the democratic process (Bellin 2004: 143).
Since the 1950s and 1960s, regimes in the Middle East were studied for a number of reasons; namely, debates on the causes and consequences of military coups, modernization, and early studies of nationalism and postcolonial state building. However, since the 1980s, scholarship on the Middle East has been marginalized within the study of developing countries and, even more, in the broader field of comparative politics (Posusney 2004, 127). The literature during the 80s and early 90s was influenced by the successful democratic transitions occurring throughout Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America but studying cases that symbolized the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East were “almost completely absent from the most important works on political transitions, including those that explicitly focus on the developing world” (Posusney 2004, 127).
The endurance of authoritarianism is the subject of a book by Council on Foreign Relations scholar Steven Cook (2007) entitled Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey. The author examines the Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish militaries use of democracy as a façade to prolong their rule. Each state has used, according to Cook (2007), “A democratic façade of elections, parliaments, opposition press, and the ostensible guarantee of basic freedoms and rights in these countries’ constitutions [to] . . . provide dedicated counter-elites (in the present cases Islamists) the opportunity to advance their agendas” (x). Although, at the first sign of success by the Islamists, the military regimes step in to nullify the results. Cook argues this pathological pattern of including and excluding Islamists reflects the stability of these regimes (x). To best understand why democratization has not taken hold in the Middle East, Cook highlights the relationship between what he calls the military enclave of military elites and civilian politicians in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey and proscribes what external actors could do to influence this relationship.
For Cook (2007), the military is an organization with varied interests and because of its “high modernist” nature it is the only institution with the necessary skills needed for modernization (15). There are a hierarchy of interests—lesser-order interests, core-parochial and institutional interests, and existential interests—which influence the military’s relationship with civilian elites. Encroachment on these interests by civilian elites are met with varied responses by the military enclave, especially if the military’s core interests relating to the economy, foreign and security policy, the political and state apparatus, and nationalism are infringed upon. These are considered core interests because:
1) For military elites, economic independence is the best way to achieve economic development;
2) The military is an institution in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey where the formulation and execution of security policy remains the sole province of the officer corps;
3) The military enclaves have embedded within these political systems various means of control and have demonstrated that protecting the integrity of these tools is of primary importance;
4) The military uses nationalist narratives to depict officers as the vanguards of a struggle against colonialism, external aggression, and the realization of the ‘national will’ (Cook 2007, 18-28).
Furthermore, a democratic façade is established that allows the military to “rule but not govern” as the military uses “the presence of pseudo- or quasi democratic institutions allow[ing] authoritarian leaders to claim that they are living up to their oft-invoked principles about democratic governance with practice” (Cook 2007, 134-5). In describing the Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish cases, Cook (2007) highlights the friction between Islamists and the military and says that predicting precisely when a military will exert its influence is difficult. Ultimately, the author is defining the unfolding battle over control of state institutions in the Middle East and the persistence of authoritarianism in the region.
Stephen I. King (2009) explains the wide ranging outcomes of openings in authoritarian regimes by grouping these outcomes into five variables: 1) There are macro-structural level variables influencing regime outcomes, such as economic development, national culture, and international forces; 2) At the domestic level, there are social groups defined by socioeconomic position and changes in the balance of power among them; 3) Institutional level examines formal domestic organizations and their rules and procedures. This includes political parties, the military, and state bureaucracies; 4) A social-group level encompasses social movements, ideological factions within the military, regime hard-liners and soft-liners, and moderate and maximalist oppositions; and 5), the leadership level examines elite choices (18-19). Put simply, King argues that a structural and actor based approach best explains the democratic and authoritarian outcomes of political transitions. Through an examination of policies, ruling coalitions, political institutions, and legitimacy in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia, King (2009) examine the reconfigured authoritarian rule on the welfare of millions of citizens of the Middle East and North Africa.
Accordingly, this paper will examine the influence of actor-based and structure based approaches that have influenced the civil-military relations between politicians, the military, and society in 2013 Egypt and 1991-2 Algeria. Understanding the similarities and differences between these states will help in understanding the democratic transition process and the influence the international community has had in the endurance of authoritarianism.
Civil-Military Relations in Egypt
The Egyptian military’s involvement in politics dates back to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in July 1952. Nasser championed Pan-Arabism, which advocated Arab unity through the use of socialist principles, alliances, and, to a lesser extent, economic cooperation, among the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa with explicit backing by the Soviet Union. Nasser and the Free Officers developed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to run the country. Members of the officer corps were appointed to senior positions in the bureaucracy and the public sector to assist the RCC in implementing Nasser’s revolution. It was a revolution in name only, as Nasser overhauled the entire political system by emasculating all political parties, tried and imprisoned key politicians, and created a new constitution, which established a new presidential system (Osman 2010, 44-5). As Ibrahim A. Karawan (2011) notes, “Often the president also assumed the posts of prime minister, commander of the army, head of the National Security Council, ruling party chief, and chairman of the judiciary” (44). Put simply, the Egyptian president’s power derives from the support of the military.
The development of Egypt’s new institutions was met with repeated criticism from the Left, who saw Nasser and his colleagues as exchanging one imperial relationship with the British for another with the US (Cook 2011, 52). The other main challenge came from the Right in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood was initially established as a religious outreach association, or da’wa, “that aimed to cultivate pious and committed Muslims through preaching, social services, and spreading religious commitment and integrity by example” (Rosefsky Wickham 2011, 92). The Brotherhood became a countrywide political movement heavily involved in Egypt’s struggle for independence and as a voice for Egypt’s disenfranchised advocating for a religious state and sharia law (Osman 2010, 82). In short, the political challenges from the Left & Right would characterize the next sixty years of struggle over the central ideological and organizing principles of Egyptian state and society:
Although the Officers rigged Egypt’s institutions to serve their interests, they were never able to embed in the minds of Egyptians a set of ideas around this political order. The Officers’ distinct lack of ideological convictions or anything but the most rudimentary guiding principles made them vulnerable to other political forces selling more comprehensive, emotionally and materially satisfying notions of what Egyptian society and politics should look like. The consequence was a seemingly never-ending political conflict between the defenders of the political system the Free Officers founded and their opponents that produced no small amount of political alienation, economic dislocations and—at times—violence.