Foreign and Military Policy
*anti-appeasement / The worldview adopted by elites in the United States after the failure to avoid conflict with Adolf Hitler by granting ever-greater territorial concessions. This view, which supports the containment of aggressive world powers, was the policy followed by the United States to prevent expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II through a network of defensive alliances in Europe and Asia. Its adherents have welcomed the collapse of the iron curtain but remain wary of Soviet military power. See also containment.*Cold War / A term that refers to the post-World War II struggle between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its allies). A cold war is distinguished from a hot or shooting war.
*containment / The policy proposed by George Kennan which advocated that the United States prevent Soviet expansion through counterforce and subsequently became the basis of the anti-appeasement worldview. See also anti-appeasement.
*cost overruns / A situation that applies to the purchase of big-ticket military hardware in which actual costs greatly exceed estimated costs.
disengagement view / The worldview adopted by elite in the United States as a result of the U.S. military defeat in Vietnam. Its advocates believe that the United States should avoid extending its military commitments overseas as the world’s police force. Critics refer to this as new isolationism.
*domino theory / An analogy used by President Eisenhower to justify giving aid to South Vietnam to prevent it, and thus its southeast Asian neighbors, from being taken over by communists.
*gold plating / The tendency of the military to ask for everything at once in procuring a new weapon.
*human rights / A worldview that maintains the rights of every human being should be protected. This worldview is particularly concerned to prevent genocide and other war crimes.
intelligence oversight / The requirement that the CIA notify the House and Senate intelligence committees of all intelligence activities, including covert actions. However, the committees do not have authority to disapprove such actions.
*iron curtain / A phrase used by Winston Churchill to refer to the political barrier, maintained by the Soviet Union, to constrain and control travel and communication between Eastern and Western Europe.
*isolationism / The worldview adopted by elites in the United States after World War I, which held that the United States should avoid alliances with other countries.
Joint Chiefs of Staff / A committee consisting of the uniformed heads of each military service, plus a chair and a (nonvoting) vice chair appointed by the president. Since 1986, the chair has been designated the president’s principal military adviser in an effort to give him more influence over the Joint Chiefs.
Joint Staff / The staff providing assistance to the Joint Chiefs, consisting of several hundred officers from each of the four services who draw up plans for various military contingencies. Since 1986, the chair of the Joint Chiefs exercises control over the staff. The secretary of defense ensures that officers assigned to this staff are promoted at the same rate as officers whose careers are spent entirely with their own service.
*military-industrial complex / The supposedly unified political bloc consisting of the Defense Department and the industries that build military weapons.
National Security Act / A statute passed in 1947 which created the Department of Defense, headed by a civilian secretary of defense. The secretaries of the army, the air force, and the navy as well as the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are under the authority of the secretary of defense.
National Security Council / A committee created by statute to coordinate the foreign policy establishment. The council is chaired by the president, and its membership includes the vice president and the secretaries of defense and state. By custom, the director of the CIA and the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also serve. The NSC staff is headed by the national security adviser (NSA). The council’s purpose is to present the president with a balanced account of the views of the major government agencies on national security issues, to facilitate presidential decision-making, and to oversee implementation of the decisions.
rallying round the flag / The tendency for a president’s level of public approval to increase after a foreign crisis, whether force is used or not. A high level of support, however, exists only during the early stages of an international crisis; it may deteriorate if the crisis is protracted.
service / Any one of the three branches of the United States military—army, navy (including Marine Corps), and air force. Each is headed by a civilian secretary responsible for purchasing, auditing, congressional relations, and public affairs. A military chief oversees the discipline and training of the uniformed forces in that branch and represents his or her service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In war time, the Coast Guard is also considered a service and is part of the Defense Department; in peacetime, it is located in the Transportation Department.
sole sourcing / The purchasing of weapons without competition that takes away the manufacturer’s incentive to control costs.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) / A controversial weapons system, popularly called Star Wars, proposed by President Reagan. The program envisions building a system that would intercept enemy missiles before they could reach the United States.
two presidencies / The thesis of presidential power formulated by Aaron Wildavsky which concludes that the president is weak and closely checked by Congress in domestic affairs but is quite powerful in foreign affairs.
War Powers Act / A law passed in 1973 which aimed to restrict the president’s ability to use military force. Its key provision is that the president must remove troops within sixty days of their introduction into a hostile situation unless Congress declares war or authorizes an extension of the commitment. No president has acknowledged the constitutionality of the act, and certain provisions involving legislative vetoes may in fact be void.
*worldviews / A comprehensive picture of the critical problems facing the United States in the world and of the appropriate and inappropriate ways of responding to these problems. Also referred to as paradigms.
Discussion Questions
1.What about foreign policy issues today? Can you think of any cases in which our policy was harmed by open debate? Can you think of any cases in which our policy was harmed by being made in secret and where open debate would have produced a better policy? What about (a) granting China Most Favored National Status as a trading partner; (b) the war in the Persian Gulf; (c) troop for U.N. peacekeeping? (d) the invasion of Afghanistan? How much of the policy-making in each of these circumstances was done in secret? Was there a good reason for secrecy, or was secrecy used as a means of evading the Constitution?
2.If the Constitution does not make the president clearly dominant in foreign affairs, how has the president managed to exert so much power? Could Congress be dominant if it wanted to? Does Congress fail to exercise power (a) for policy reasons (unified leadership is needed and Congress knows that it cannot provide it); (b) for institutional reasons (the president has access to better information than does Congress); or (c) for political reasons (Congress members do not profit politically from tackling foreign policy issues)?
3.On what basis have most people judged whether the president’s powers are too extensive or too limited? Does the same go for domestic affairs?
4.What role has the Supreme Court played in foreign policy? How does this compare to the role it has played in civil rights or in business regulation?
5.How are foreign affairs more politically profitable for the president than domestic affairs? Does this suggest that the president will allot too much attention to foreign affairs relative to domestic affairs? Does this suggest that the president is at a disadvantage in dealing with foreign leaders who need not worry about public opinion in their nations?
6.Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution to curtail presidential power in the area of war-making. Can the president still act without prior congressional approval? Doesn’t the War Powers Act make legal what was once probably not so—the ability of the president to act without consulting Congress? How does the War Powers Resolution apply to nuclear war?
7.Each element of the War Powers Act has its problematic aspects. What requirements would be most likely to be set aside by a president intent on functioning as a commander-in-chief? What requirements would a Congress be most likely to insist be observed, in order to sustain its role in making foreign and military policy?
81.Why would members of Congress have voted against the War Powers Act and, later, in support of the presidential veto?
9.The Supreme Court has ruled that the legislative veto is unconstitutional and presidents have consequently maintained that the core of the War Powers Act is therefore nullified. Does the War Powers Act involve a legislative veto? What alternative arrangements may be set in place, so that the Congress and the president properly balance their respective war powers?
20.Does the War Powers Act actually expand the president’s power, by allowing the commander-in-chief to act until explicitly stopped by the Congress?
31.Should the United States purchase weapons manufactured by other countries if these weapons prove superior and cheaper?
14.Each branch of the military purchases its own weapons systems, which sometimes leads to problems. For example, because the army and navy had incompatible communications systems, during the Grenada invasion a soldier was forced to use his AT&T calling card to call the Navy Department to direct off-shore naval fire. Should the services be required to purchase the same merchandise when feasible? What reasons exist for not doing so?
13.What does it mean to say that decisions about the allocation of the military budget are incremental? Why have efforts to engage in rational planning and substantial reallocations of resources often failed? Hasn’t this succeeded in addressing the base closures issue?
14.How does Congress differ from the president as a maker of defense policy? To which branch would we look for rational planning? For representation of various and diverse interests? For representation of public opinion? For technical expertise in evaluating weapons systems?
15.The text says that military officers “naturally” want the best new weapons that modern technology can devise. What constraints need to be imposed on these desires, given other governmental priorities and budgetary constraints?