CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has proposed a framework for evaluating the neighborhood development process. Extending Putnam et al.’s (1993) concept of social capital, it would be possible to conceptualize people-place ties. The first step in this conceptualization is to consider both people and place as resources or assets. Fields such as organizational behavior, strategic management, and organizational management have offered valuable insights into resource-based approach to strategy formulation of firms. Drawing from theories of organizational management, the neighborhood is conceived as a ‘firm’ with specific ‘resources’ and ‘capabilities’. Comparative advantages of neighborhoods in this approach include locations and/or people-based skills. Consistent with such view, this research has shown that depending on their particular potentials (people- or place-oriented) communities adopt different revitalization approaches.
While policy analysis conveniently prefers success/failure dichotomy as a basis for evaluating neighborhood conditions, this research has used a different method. It is essential to interpret the findings of this study in the context of an understanding that prompted it. This understanding does not view needy communities -- as discussed earlier -- in general and the study areas in particular, as cases of success vs. failure (though such dichotomy seems quite convenient). Instead, the research has captured the nuances among the neighborhoods in terms of how their Work Plans were developed, how decisions were made, how these decisions entailed short-term and/or long-term outcomes. In essence, such variation has helped to examine how these neighborhoods have jump-started.
The results of the dissertation show stark differences among the LANI neighborhoods in terms of one’s expectation of their performances from the outset. The fact that No Ho Arts District has undeniably proven to be a success story seems almost self-explanatory, in that, the people are certainly in charge and they trust their leaders. It has leveraged several projects within relatively short period of time; it has enjoyed strong technical and political leadership; it is blessed with comparative locational advantage that enables it to focus on goals and objectives consistent with those advantages, i.e., an arts and entertainment district; and finally, its physical improvements are highly visible.
This formerly deteriorating and economically challenged community has undoubtedly accomplished a lot in a short time and from what it seems the development will sustain. Part of such expectation, which has become common knowledge and appeals equally to professionals, community activists, and policymakers. More or less similar conditions apply to Sun Valley and Boyle Heights and Leimert Park.
They both have come a long way from what characterized them not too long ago as blighted communities. In the case of Leimert Park however, expectations were greater than achievements. Leimert Park as an affluent African American community with its unique history and location -- surrounded by other affluent communities -- did not quite meet the high expectation LANI officials and others had originally anticipated. The problem was that Leimert Park overcame its “structural holes” relatively late and that caused some delay in the implementation and leveraging process. Currently however, Liemert Park has been able to offset its rather late jump starting by entering into the “financial nexus” stage as evidenced by the presence of the CRA and other public or private agencies. This community has been able to leverage $600,000 in cash for the completion of its community park project and few other projects are underway within the scope of its ‘vision’ as an African American cultural village.
Though LANI communities faced different challenges from the beginning, they shared similar problems including social stigmas and an inadequate level of economic activity, transit-dependency, and essentially detachment from the mainstream economy. But conditions have improved significantly in some of the LANI neighborhoods including No Ho Arts District, Boyle Heights, Sun Valley, and Leimert Park. Sun Valley and Boyle Heights, and Leimert Park for example, have established new positive identities on a par with their current levels of economic activities; they have successfully managed to enter the ‘bridging capital’. They have also mobilized their resources effectively in order to leverage additional funds; and finally they are blessed with strong leadership. Indeed one ought not to underestimate the tenacity and pervasiveness of various challenges these communities have been facing. For example, the industrial character of both Sun Valley and Boyle Heights and the stigmas of South Central and East Los Angeles in Vermont Square, Jefferson Park, Leimert Park, and Boyle Heights created serious impediments against improving pedestrian friendly communities. Physical and social challenges in most of these communities enhanced the misgivings about whether they jump-starting, from the outset.
The question is how to evaluate neighborhoods within the framework of their resources and capabilities? A normative framework based on a success/failure dichotomy would perhaps issue a death verdict against where accomplishments have not been visible (at least in the short-term). Although evaluation based on success/failure dichotomy has its own justification it might engender misleading results and implications. Why might such results be misleading? For one thing, initial neighborhood resources and capabilities matter. The LANI neighborhoods varied widely in terms of their initial economic, physical, and social resources or assets. As stated before, it is useful to view neighborhoods in terms of their resources or assets rather than the needs they might have. Secondly, it is also important to distinguish between neighborhoods’ social, physical, or institutional resources and assets vis-à-vis their capabilities –- capacity to perform specific types of activity or task -- to practice community development.[1] Where one takes into account communities’ potentials, the other views how the implementation of their objectives enables them to take advantage of those potentials. Lillian Burkenheim’s description of “inspiring” vs. “enabling” has similar connotations.[2] This is the point of departure between a need-based view of community development as opposed to an asset-based or resource-based view.
Previous chapters touched upon some of the fundamental differences between these two types of strategies. But one might also question the idea that different initial resource conditions constitute adequate grounds for misinterpretation of results. In fact, one might argue that that is what justifies making decisions in favor of or against investments on particular neighborhoods.
IMPLICATIONS
The empirical part of this dissertation attempted to capture the variations among communities in their revitalization strategies. For example, No Ho Arts District took advantage of both its people- as well as its place-based resource. Ken Banks, the project manager at No Ho was not only a local leader with clear business acumen, but he also had deep roots in the community. These qualities are the essence of what Granovetter (1974) calls “weak ties.” Establishing weak ties through establishing neighborhood-wide and outside neighborhood contacts enabled No Ho community leadership to both complete the implementation of its short-term projects and also make proper arrangements to leverage its resources with other agencies, i.e., the CRA.
Similarly, Sun Valley benefited greatly from strong leadership who established “weak ties” within and outside the neighborhood as a result of which additional in-kind and in-cash donations were provided for the implementation phase. Other communities including Vermont Square or Virgil Village for example did not could not take advantage of these opportunities due to lack of strong and effective leadership among other things. It can be argued that various types of neighborhood resources—in this case people and place—mediate the redevelopment efforts. Dense social capital stock reinforces physical capital and locatioanl comparative advantages reinforce social capital, or at least they will not cause unexpected consequences, as was the case with Highland Park or to some extent with Vermont Square. Hence, people and place as part of a network-like continuum, interact and affect each other. This research highlights two different points: first that communities vary in terms of their internal resources. For example, some communities have abundant stocks of social capital.
Considering people and place as part of local resource networks offers a wide array of possibilities and capabilities both as a policymaking tool and from the point of view of theorizing community development. As discussed earlier, policies based on people/place distinction typically fail to capture the complexity and the richness of the communities they tried to revitalize. This failure partly owes to what some call the “intangible resource” of communities, i.e., social capital. As the essence of local human associations, social capital plays a crucial role in involving residents in the revitalization process. However, as the results of this research suggest, it accounts for part of the ‘network-like’ structure that ties people to their places. In other words, a comprehensive, resource-based view of community development ought to integrate social capital with physical capital.
The analysis of the LANI communities brings two major points to light: one, that social capital by itself does not necessarily provide adequate grounds for (long-term) capacity building. Second, place as location could have both positive and negative impacts on social capital, and that is why studies that focus on the synergies between the two variables are necessary.
Regarding the first point, certain LANI communities with abundant stock of social capital rooted in strong local associations or what Putnam calls ‘bonding capital’ have not been successful in capacity-building. The Vermont Square community is a case in point. As discussed in Chapter 6, negative images associated with location have hindered capacity-building. Conversely however, there were neighborhoods with significant physical capital stock, i.e., Highland Park that failed to adequately capitalize on their local historical strength because they lacked in critical mass of social capital as ‘bonding capital’. Different LANI neighborhoods represented variations of the components of local resources; some had a critical mass of both types of capital while other neighborhoods were poor on both accounts. The question is how did these variations of local assets influence the community development process in these neighborhoods?
Three explicit patterns of redevelopment emerged from the LANI communities. These patterns imply different types of linkages between social capital and physical capital. The first pattern emerged from communities with marginal stock of social or physical capital (structural holes).[3] Here the LANI-led place improvements have intensified instead of ameliorating the existing sociocultural or ethnic chasms in the area. Inadequate stock of social capital in Highland Park for example, has had a negative impact on the whole revitalization process. Furthermore, reflecting the historical class and ethnic divisions in the neighborhood, distinct physical and geographic boundaries have accentuated the sociocultural gaps among various ethnic and minority groups in the neighborhood. Virgil Village has faced similar conflicts. The inadequacy of social capital in this community has hampered the decision-making process by widening the gap between the residents and local businessmen. In both cases, the interaction between social and physical characteristics has magnified differences between purpose and action.
The second pattern in LANI neighborhoods illustrated that a well-balanced stock of social capital and/or physical capital is promising. Jefferson Corridor, Vermont Square, Leimert Park, and to a lesser extent Vermont Square are cases in point. A relatively strong sense of territoriality has noticeably strengthened and reinforced social capital in Jefferson Corridor and in Leimert Park. These areas exemplify how physical capital can in some significant way induce social capital. A strong presence of physical capital in Leimert Park has positively affected its social capital accumulation by guiding the residents and businessmen to concentrate on shared vision based on the potentials of place. The strong image of “an African American cultural center” thanks to a distinct history and robust physical planning manifested in a strong sense of place has helped focus decisions toward the shared vision.[4] Similarly, Jefferson Corridor shows how a strong sense of territoriality shared by residents can positively affect social cohesion. Though in its early stages, the symptoms of long-term social involvement in community development has started to emerge in Jefferson Corridor, a community once plagued by violence, drug dealers, and graffiti.
Contrary to what some have argued social capital in and of itself is inadequate to guarantee long-term sustainable community development as observed in Vermont Square. This community has shown a different impact of physical capital on social capital. The existing level of social support or the “bonding capital” in Vermont Square has proven to be insufficient to offset the negative externalities associated with the stigma of South Central Los Angeles. The perception of Vermont Square as a part of South Central Los Angeles has negatively influenced the efforts to revitalize the community in the face of its rather strong and passionate leadership and social capital.
The third type of pattern observed in LANI areas concerns neighborhoods with a critical mass of both social capital and physical capital, e.g., North Hollywood and Boyle Heights. Both communities benefited immensely from their high levels of social capital. The Chambers of Commerce in both neighborhoods guided the revitalization efforts all along.
Rooted in their communities, local leadership has assumed an active role in keeping the residents involved during the redevelopment process. Furthermore, as distinct locations both neighborhoods possessed positive physical potentials. Combining commercial and economic activities along its Main Street, No Ho Arts District had for long been the central business district (CBD) to the area. Boyle Heights also had a legacy of a location with strong Latino cultural character. Taking advantage of their physical as well as their social capital stocks, both neighborhoods used the LANI catalytic improvements to make strong, short-term visible impacts and by doing so kept the residents involved in the planning and decision-making process. Sun Valley on the other hand, turned out to be a special case because it was able to sustain its redevelopment efforts notwithstanding neither impressive stocks of physical nor social capital. That is to say that initially, Sun Valley had perhaps been facing more difficult challenges than other LANI communities. As a place for example, Sun Valley did not quite have the characteristics of a residential neighborhood, i.e., narrow streets, clear and legible boundaries and so on. However, thanks to its strong technical and political leadership and its chamber of commerce, Sun Valley has sustained its community building efforts.
The patterns that have emerged from the LANI efforts have major implications for a resource-based approach to community development. These implications suggest that with respect to the level of resources -- both tangible and intangible -- a community has at its disposal, it would be possible to locate it along a continuum with three distinct stages: consensus-building, image-building, and capacity-building. These stages embody the conceptualization of people and place as networks discussed earlier.
The LANI experience has two broad policy implications. These implications caution against two possible faulty options:
1)HELPING ‘THE WRONG’ NEIGHBORHOOD;
2)HELPING NEIGHBORHOOD ‘THE WRONG’ WAY. Briefly, while the first point suggests assistance should be given to neighborhoods with certain level of physical and social capital already in place, the second suggests such help should only be rendered when consensus-building as the basis for community involvement and collective action is within reach. Policies that used to squatter national or local government resources in various forms, i.e., the urban renewal projects irrespective of community assets were less likely to sustain as the history of public policy has shown.
1)HELPING THE WRONG NEIGHBORHOOD
One of the fundamental policy questions arising from this research was whether or how much the initial condition of a neighborhood matters in predicting its future economic growth trajectory; and if it does, in what way? The original LANI board members and decision-makers took this question into consideration five years ago, when they decided to target eight Los Angeles communities that seemed promising for revitalization. The initial selection criteria at the time had implicitly revolved around a resource-based approach rather than a need-based view.
In hindsight, the LANI experience lends itself to two types of conclusions: one, that neighborhoods with greater social and physical resources leveraged additional dollars and showed signs of capacity-building by joining public/private partnerships or entering the ‘financial nexus’ stage. Conversely, neighborhoods with less community resources either lagged behind the first group but showed potential for future capacity-building or demonstrated inadequate grounds for consensus-building. The former type suggests that catalytic projects and programs such as LANI are more likely to jump-start neighborhoods with an existing critical mass of community (social and physical) assets. Hence, investments on areas with little or no social/physical capital might not turn the neighborhoods around unless efforts are made toward consensus-building and image-building (as a catalyst). Neighborhoods such as No Ho Arts District, Sun Valley, Leimert Park, and Boyle Heights made such efforts.