Project Proposal Submitted by ZOA to the Dutch Embassy Ethiopia
October 2012
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Table of Contents
Project Summary
Introduction
Context Analysis
The Problem (Statement)
Strategies / Methodologies
Implementation Plan
Beneficiaries
Outcomes Outputs and Activities
Sustainability
Institutional Capabilities and Organizational Track Record
Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation
Management
Appendix A: Logical Framework
Appendix B: Illustrative Three Year Activity Implementation Plan
Project Summary
Project Title / Enhancing Peace, Stability, and Poverty Reduction along the Ethiopia-South Sudan BorderProject Location /
Target Groups / Internally Displaced Communities and their hosting communities in Akobo and Wantowa Woredas of Gambella Regional State, Ethiopia
Implementation Period / 1. November 2012 – 30. October 2015
Total Budget (€) / 800,000
Year1: Year 2: Year3:
Beneficiaries / All population of Wantawo and Akobo Woredas:
around 50,000 persons (about 8,300 households).
Overall Objective / To enhance stability and security as preconditions for people to rebuild their lives and strengthen their livelihood strategies.
Main Outputs /
- Increased level of implementation of local peace agreements, decreased dowry levels and increased mutual respect and cooperation (including cross-border cooperation) in various projects among the tribes and clans living in the targeted areas of Gambella, with special attention for the role of women and of youth.
- Inclusive improved food security through increased availability and optimal andcollaborative use of available livelihood resources and increased services among the various tribes and clans living in the targeted areas of Gambella, with special attention for the role of women and of youth.
Main Contact Persons / Maureen Graybill (Country Director)
Tigest Tejiwe (Program Advisor)
Address / ZOA Ethiopia
P.O. Box 9494
Addis Ababa
Tel: +251 113 724 555
Fax: +251 113 206 618
Introduction
ZOA, an international, Dutch non-governmental organization, has provided assistance to people affected by natural disasters and conflict since 1973. Based in the Netherlands, ZOA is operational in 15 countries over three continents. In Ethiopia, ZOA has been operational since 1996, providing Livelihood, Environment, and Emergency Relief related activities to Refugee, Internally Displaced and hosting communities.
In Gambella Region, ZOA focuses on livelihoods and peace building amongst refugees and hosting communities since 1993. Currently ZOA is engaged in agricultural activities with IDPs in Itang and Therpam, aiming to improve farmer’s household income; and a carbon off-setting project linked with environmental as well as livelihood benefits with the community in Bonga. With the community in question for the intervention of this proposal, ZOA has been engaged in Emergency Relief, and thus already has established good working relations with the government in Gambella as well as at Woreda level in Akobo and Wantawo and also with the local community leaders and leaders of the churches, all of whom ZOA has been working with over the past years.
ZOA sees its interventions in a region as a programme, rather than a project approach; hence aiming for long terms objectives and corresponding strategies for a defined community in a specific geographic area, on the basis of sound analysis of context, needs and actors. Hence, any projects and funds introduced to fit within the wider direction and relevance of that specific programme. Accordingly, this project fits within ZOA’s already existing Programme for Wantowa and Akobo, allowing ZOA to expand the existing programme in scope and breadth[1]
As already indicated with the name of this proposal, the communities and conflicts being addressed with this intervention are beyond the Ethiopian context, but are related and interlinked with S. Sudan. Hence initiatives taken by ZOA are both on the Ethiopian as well as S. Sudanese side, with ZOA Ethiopia carrying out activities on the Ethiopian side and ZOA S.Sudan on the S.Sudanese side. Therefore ZOA sees this project as a contribution to a wider “Cross- Border” Initiative.
Stretches of the Ethiopia – South Sudan border are sensitive areas with long experience of cross-borderinteraction both in terms of offering refuge to war-affected communities as well as a base forwarring parties to train and mount operations. Due to lack of effective governance in the border areaan uncontrolled flow and proliferation of small arms could take place. This contributed to themilitarization of more radical elements amongst the various ethnic groups in the area such as theNuer, Murle and Anyuak. These border areas are characterized by a general sense of insecurity whichhas not only rendered local population at the will of armed militias and bandits but has also seriouslyundermined their food systems (human security).Yet this border area holds important economic potential both for the local population and the Ethiopianand South Sudan central governments with its rich dry season grazing grounds, gold and oil, and goodpotential to develop commercial farms along the rivers (see further in P3 contextual analysis). Eachpotential use though has its averse side as it competes with other uses of these same livelihoodresources, especially water resources, grazing areas and land for agriculture. Accordingly, this intervention is seen to fit within the Security and Rule of Law Strategyof the Dutch Government.
Context Analysis
The Gambella-Jonglei border zone is home to several Nilotic ethnic groups: the (agro)pastoralistJikany Nuer, Lou Nuer, Murle and the sedentary agriculturalist Anyuak who have conflicts as follows:
· Lou Nuer – Jikany Nuer
· Jikany Nuer - Anyuak
· Murle – Lou Nuer, Jikany Nuer
Conflicts are mostly about access to grazing land and water resources and about cattle raids andrevenge raids. The conflicts all result in severe disruption of livelihoods, poverty, hunger and death. A
common feature is currently the hugenumbers of displaced people, at both sides of the border,causing further tensions and making livelihood perspectives even worse. Most of the IDPs live inspontaneously erected settlements or live with relatives. Others live in camps, for instance in Boma(Jonglei). Most of them cannot positively cope with the hardships they face and resort to destructivecoping mechanism, such as going hungry, not treating diseases, selling productive assets and takingchildren from schools.
Contextual Analysis Ethiopia Side
The Western part of Gambella Region in Ethiopia, bordering Jonglei and Upper Nile States of SouthSudan, has rich dry season grazing grounds which have attracted thousands of Jikany Nuer fromEastern Upper Nile and more recently Lou Nuer from Jonglei with their herds. The rich gold depositsand substantial oil reserves – extending from the oil reserves in South Sudan Upper Nile and JongleiStates - have been attracting the interest of the central government. The large-scale land acquisitionsfor commercial farms along with river basin management have great potential for increasedagricultural productivity, but at the same time threaten downstream the dry season water availabilityfor the herds on which pastoralist communities depend for their livelihoods and survival. The Anyuaks grow sorghum, maize and tend their vegetable gardens on the fertile banks of Gambella’s many
streams and rivers, but are more and more loosing their traditional grounds: in the east to foreigninvestors who lease land for commercial farming and in the west to the Nuer who use the land forgrazing.
Presently over forty thousand Jikany Nuer are living in Gambella's western Woredas of Wantawo andAkobo, with the Jikany Gaaguang in Wantawo Woreda and the Jikany Gajiok mainly in AkoboWoreda. Only a small group of an estimated three thousand Anyuak remain settled along the banks ofrivers and streams along the eastern border of Akobo Woreda, during the last decennia pushed awayfrom other areas by the Nuer, who competed with them over access and control over water resources,cultivation areas and dry season grazing grounds. In the western part of the Akobo Woreda one alsofinds an estimated five thousand31 Lou Nuer who a few years ago fled into Ethiopia escaping formviolence in Jonglei State following a series of violent clashes with the Murle. The Lou Nuer in turn
forced over ten thousand Jikany Gajiok to flee from Akobo into Wantawo Woreda. This happened asthe Jikany Nuer had recently been disarmed by the Ethiopian Government, while the Lou Nuer areheavily armed.
People move cross border and local markets function cross border. In the future on the Ethiopian sidethe market is expected to grow, with road construction being planned and big farms being developed.Because of the breakdown of services on the Ethiopian Akobo side, people from there also cross theborder to the South Sudan side to look for services. For instance, they attend the health clinics at theSudanese side and children go to school in Sudan.
Local Government Administrations between Gambella and Jonglei have good contacts with oneanother and reached agreements about return of Lou Nuer from Ethiopia to South Sudan, a returnwhich actually is partially taking place, thus increasing the possibilities for the Jikany Gajiok IDPs in Wantawo to return back to Akobo.
Contextual Analysis South Sudan Side
On the Sudanese side of the border live in the Jonglei State: the Lou Nuer in Akobo County and thenorthern part of Ponchalla, the Murle in Pibor County and part of Akobo and the Anyuak in thesouthern part of Ponchalla County.
Conflicts over access to grazing land and watering resources are plenty, further increased by cattleraids and revenge raids. From the side of the Murle the raids often are accompanied by abduction ofchildren and sometimes women. The general belief holds that this is related to a low fertility rateamong the Murle, probably related to sexually transmitted infections. These cattle raids are atraditional phenomenon where men prove their manhood by raiding, traditionally encouraged to that bywomen.
In the Jonglei State (South Sudan) the dowry amounts have raised a lot over the last few years,making it very difficult for young men to marry, which in turn has contributed to an increase in cattleraiding. Another cause of increased large scale and heavily armed cattle raiding is raiding for abusiness, selling immediately off to livestock markets.
In 2011 inter-communal violence, mainly between the Nuer and the Murle, claimed 1,100 lives inJonglei. This fighting is mainly performed by youth militia, without clear influence of the tribal seniorleadership. The Nuer youth militia go under the name ‘White Army’. This ‘White Army’ (or armies) isnot a permanent army, but consists of incidental combinations of armed groups of Lou Nuer youth,joined by youth from Jikany Nuer and Gawaar Nuer and some Dinka. They are heavily armed and areable to group tens of thousands youth. This White Army presently has put as its goal to ‘stop the Murleraids’.
The Murle contend they are discriminated against, sidelined for development projects and underrepresentedin the political sphere. At state government level, they say representatives are given littlepower or money to improve things, and that the authorities often describe the Murle as "pests" or a"nuisance". Underdevelopment is considered a conflict driver. The Murle mass devastation and some80,000 heads of cattle raided from Murle areas in January 2012 have left tens of thousands homeless.
The Murle–Lou Nuer conflict in Jonglei State is indicative of how tribal and political dynamics areintertwined in the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement in South Sudan. Both parties in the conflict received support from outside groups. The Murle had been armed by theKhartoum government and had created a Murle ‘self-defence’ militia, the Pibor Defence Forces, toprotect Murle assets and territory from the SPLA. The Lou Nuer received weapons from both theSudan Armed Forces –SAF (Sudan) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army –SPLA (now SouthSudan) at different times during the civil war. The South Sudan Armed Forces are now establishing a buffer zone north of Pibor to discouragefurther fighting between the Murle and Lou Nuer communities.
The above situation is very much linked to the cross-border movement of people, livestock, militiasand weapons, in connection with a weak government presence and building on traditional conflicts. Therefore only a cross-border approach can bring about positive changes for South Sudan as well as
Ethiopia.
The Problem (Statement)
The human security of the people living in the Gambella-Jonglei border zone is heavily affected byfrequent fierce fighting, mainly caused by cattle raiding accompanied by abduction of women andchildren, and fighting about access to water and grazing areas, aggravated by political dynamics. Thearea is further affected by a breakdown of inter-tribal conflict management traditions, a disconnectbetween raiding groups of young people and the elders of their tribes, a generally poor food securityand a very limited presence of state structures.
The conflicts at both sides of the border are sustained, not by a lack of willingness to change per se,but by a number of factors which can be positively influenced:
- Insufficient capacity of organisations relevant for conflict transformation; peace building and positive community change. There is clear willingness, at local but also at higher levels (see below under programme objectives) to turn away from conflict thinking and behaviour, but positive initiatives are not consistently followed through, communication on results is flawed and monitoring mechanisms are poor. A specific issue in this context is the lack of capacities to reestablish and strengthen traditional by laws, regulating dowry systems, settlement procedures for conflicts, access to grazing land, access and use of fishing waters, etc.
- Insufficient mechanisms creating concrete peace benefits (or dividends). People, especially youth, from all conflicting clans and tribes have shown their readiness to disengage from risky cattle raiding and other forms of violence in favour of concrete and quickly rewarding activities. Youth from different tribes have even successfully engaged in corporate cash for work activities (explained further below). However, such opportunities are rare, badly reported and not expanded. As a result, people from different tribes and clans experience too little win-to-all situations andeasily resort to divisive action, including cattle raiding and revenge attacks.
- A lack of basic services and marketing opportunities. The poor coverage of health and education services prevent people to positively plan their future and to look beyond the traditional mechanisms of violence and retaliations.
The lack of vocational skills and markets prevent them to think of non-traditional ways ofaccessing food and income. Even people who recently returned from the refugee camps in Kenya,especially the young, who have no history of cattle raiding and related violence, sometimes –though still exceptionally – join their friends, simply because they do not see other opportunities tomake a living and to gain acceptance by the home communities.
Strategies / Methodologies
The conflict analysis identifies two highly interlinked causes to the continued and increasingly violentconflicts in the region. They are: competition for limited resources based on poorly managed /supported in-migration, poor resource management, a lack of livelihoods opportunities outside ofsubsistence agro-pastoralism particularly for youth, and a poor capacity to mitigate or prevent violencedue to the population of increasingly disenfranchised youth, a breakdown in traditional leadership, andrelatively weak links between civil society and government mitigation/prevention structures. Violencedoes not only arise as a result of the interplay of the two broad causes, but also because of a cycle of
violence and revenge that is now instilled in Akobo and across the border with South Sudan broughtabout by the history of violent conflict.
The theory of change for the Hope and Recovery on the Ethiopia–South Sudan Border Program
(HRESSB), developed to address the two primary causes of violence, is:
If the capacity to prevent and mitigate violent conflict is increased in the border region, in thecontext of lessened competition for livelihoods resources, built upon a platform of re-establishedsocial services and infrastructure, then there will be a decrease in violent conflict as well as in therisks of new violent conflicts.
The three necessary elements of this strategy are:
- The capacity to prevent and mitigate violent conflict is increased
Both attitudinal and institutional dimensions of the conflict will be addressed to sustainably increasecapacity. Because of the history of violence, Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer, both individually and asgroups, have developed a strong sense of group vs. other. Facilitating a process built upon the theoryof Common Complex Identities33, individual Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer and their leaders will develop agreater understanding of shared values/similarities and shared effects of violent conflict across ethnicgroups. Once common complex identities are established, individuals and key stakeholders will be in aposition to approach common problems constructively, something that is currently not possible.
HRESSB will provide a framework for key stakeholders both in local government and the Lou Nuerand Jikany Nuer ethnic groups to develop a process to plan for and achieve mutual goals such asnegotiating local peace agreements, putting in place early warning systems for potential conflict, anddeveloping and engaging in mutually acceptable approaches to conflict mitigation.
- Lessened competition for livelihoods resources
While common complex identities provide societal space for conflict mitigation and prevention to takeplace, they do not directly address the reality of too many people vying for too few resources. Buildingupon common complex identities and constructive engagement around peace building and conflictmitigation, HRESSB will work with both individuals and key stakeholders across conflicting groups atthe local level to develop community-designed and driven land, water, and fisheries managementagreements. Traditional and government leaders and key stakeholders will combine forces to put inplace contingency planning, thereby decreasing the destructive effects of conflicts on resources. And,following planning with youth and other groups, livelihoods opportunities, will be increased through the