Topic A: Civil War in Yemen

Security Council

By: Nick Rose

Introduction

A relatively recent conflict, the Yemeni Civil War is rooted mostly in political conflict and religious differencces, and has very little to do with underlying ethnic conflicts. Ansar Allah follows Shia Islam, contrary to the promoted state religion of Sunni Islam. The first signs of conflict showed when Ansar Allah, more popularly known as the Houthis, or the Houthi Insurgency, a group with deep ties and origins in the northern mountainous regions of Yemen geopolitically known as the Saada Governorate, begun a grassroots insurgency against the recognized Yemeni government in 2004, and their activity varied throughout the 2000's with multiple negotiations and ceasefires failing to take hold andmake any promising change on either side. The conflict went from local to regionally widespread when the attacks heated up in 2009, drawing in Saudi Arabia to restore the Yemeni government to control in the region, and in 2010, when a ceasefire was signed between the belligerent parties, the Saudi government temporarily withdrew their influence from the conflict. The ceasefire at first looked like vital steps towards peace in Yemen, but during the spread of the Yemeni revolution in 2011, the Houthis, along with other groups in Yemen, called for and supported the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. As President Saleh was preparing to leave the office, the Houthis attacked the Yemeni village of Dammaj in their home region, something they viewed as a vital step to forming an autonomous Sa’dah. Later, in another act of political prowess, they boycotted the 2012 Yemeni election, which resulted in the election of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (right) for two years, although they did participate in the National Dialogue Conference, although it ended in failure for them when President Hadi’s term in the office of president for another year. Contemporarily, the fighting in Northern Yemen continued between the Houthis and local Sunni tribes and spread to other neighboring governorates, including the Sana’a governorate, which held the capital of Yemen, Sana’a in the summer of 2014. After weeks of increasingly violent protests, the boiling issues between the Houthis and the Yemeni government finally came to blows when they clashed with the Yemeni military inside the capital city of Sana’a. The fighting lasted only a few days, but resulted in the Houthi insurgents taking control of the Yemeni capital. Hadi was finally forced to the negotiating table by this brazen act, and the Houthis proposed a ceasefire in which most of the Yemeni government members resigned, giving the Houthis massive and unprecedented amounts of control and influence over the national government. In early 2015, the Houthis, enraged by a proposal to split the country into six federal regions, Houthi militants stormed the presidential compound and prompted a resignation of President Hadi along with his ministers. The Houthis then announced that a Revolutionary committee would govern the country. Hadi, however, escaped his captors and fled to the town of Aden, where he announced that the Houthi takeover was an illegitimate coup, and proceeded to declare himself still the constitutional president and rightful Head of State of Yemen. The previous president, Saleh, sided with the Houthis, calling on Hadi to go into exile.

External Allegiances and Allegations of Influence

Due to sharing a common sect of Islam, the standing Yemeni government, along with major Saudi information and press outlets, have accused the Houthis of acting as a proxy insurgency for the nation of Iran, and the United States government along with the Saudi government have accused the Iranian government of supplying weapons and training to the Houthis, both the Houthis, and the Iranian Government have denied any connections. The African nation of Eritrea has also been accused of using its relatively close geography to aid Iran and the Houthis by funneling military materiel into Yemen, which was declared “groundless” by the Eritrean Government. Meanwhile, the Yemeni Government has enjoyed extensive support from the United States and Saudi Arabian governments by channeling money and materiel into Yemen in support of the standing government (Although the Pentagon has reported that hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment has gone unaccounted for), as well as the United States funneling a portion of its massive Unmanned Arial Drone (UAV) capabilities into fighting Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Pentagon reports as of 2016, more than 240 Al-Qaeda militants have been killed by UAV strikes, (Although the in the past year airstrikes have stepped up significantly under the Trump administration, and are predicted to have killed at least that many in this year alone) including two of their most prominent local leaders, Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi (Left), and Ibrahim al-Rubeish (Right). The local Persian Gulf monarchies have also expressed significant support for the Yemeni government in the form of financial aid, public declarations of friendship, and public and international declarations of support.

The use of mercenaries has become widespread within the Yemeni Civil War, and it is estimated that several thousand Saudi Arabian mercenaries, as well as several American and British mercenary groups, are operating in the region in the aid of the Yemeni Government, the effectiveness or deployment regions of these mercenaries is not widely known and is not public information.

The Arab League

The Arab League, as an internationally body, has very clearly taken up support of the standing Sunni Yemeni government. There was a multilateral agreement in the Arab League to create a multinational voluntary joint force, described by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi described the event as “The Arab leaders deciding to agree on the principle of a joint Arab force.” But, as a generalization, in recent history Arabian nations have not have had a good history with multinational operations or joint armies due to deep-rooted tribal, ethnic, and religious differences and rivalries. In the 1967 Arab invasion of Israel, the breakdown between the Arab nations was critical to their defeat, even though their objectives, described by former Egyptian President Gamal Nasser as “The destruction of Israel,” were aligned. It has also been stated by analysts that it is unlikely that all 22 nations will contribute forces, nonetheless Egyptian officials have been quoted by the Associated Press as saying that the force will comprise of some “40,000 soldiers, supported by warplanes, naval vessels and light armor.” This, although for other regions of the world it may seem like little, the Arab League has had an objective to form a join force since its creation 65 years ago. The Arab League, as statements have shown, is very optimistic about the prospect of victory after the formation of the joint forces, proclaiming that until all Shia and Houthi rebels “withdraw and surrender their weapons,” they will continue fighting.

Guided Questions

  1. Is/has your nation been directly affected by the violence in the region?
  2. What actions has your nation taken to resolve the conflict?
  3. Does your nation have any active mercenaries in the region? How may this affect your nation’s policy on the war?
  4. What interests/assets/investments does your nation have in the region?
  5. What relationship does your nation have to the Arab League and how may this affect your policy on the war?

Bibliography

Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

My name is Nick Rose and I am in the 12th grade at Pedro Menendez High

School or PMHS for short. I am also in FBLA at the school. This is my fourth year participating in Model UN. I will be a chair at OCMUNC, or Old City Model United Nations XV. Some of you will have me as a Security Council chair, so be prepared.

The topics for this council include the situations in Venezuela, Burundi, and Yemen, mainly regarding civil conflict for various reasons. I chose the Yemeni civil war for the reason that it is an incredibly complex conflict and one that will require immediate action and multilateral action. This is my fourth and final year, so I have experienced many types of council as both a delegate and a chair. I expect this council to be the best one yet, so I am optimistic and I have high hopes. I am excitedto see what will come of the council and I look forward to it. If you have any questions, comments, or concerns fell free to contact my Secretary General at .

- Nick Rose

Letter from the Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

My name is Elizabeth Upton and I am the current Secretary General of this dear ole conference, OCMUNC, and the club at Pedro Menendez High School. This is my second year as Secretary General, my fourth year in the club and sadly, my last. I am a senior in IB, and if any of you are in IB as well, you know the pain. I also work at chipotle, and NO, we don’t have E Coli. It’s the fifteenth year of OCMUNC! Making it the third oldest in the state of Florida, and older than a few of our members.

The topics for this year’s conference are significant in many ways, mainly because of the turmoil they have caused/ will cause throughout the world. Candy grams, the OG, are coming back again this year, proceeds dedicated to the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), which intertwines with our topic of Animal Poaching in our UNODC council. Although I know you guys don’t particularly enjoy spending the night before conference writing position papers, they are highly recommended but not required. This conference is going to be the best OCMUNC yet!! If you have any questions, concerns, or just want a new snap buddy, feel free to contact me at .

Peace out girl scouts, see you all at OCMUNC!!

- Elizabeth Upton