Mr Peter Collingbourne
26 February 2010
Dear Mr Collingbourne,
Freedom of Information requests (our refs. 10676 and 11863: Contract Summaries Publication - Thales and CSC
I am writing further to our responses to your requests of 28 November 2008 and 12 May 2009, and in relation to my recent letter dated 12 February in which you asked for copies of documents relating to contracts with Thales and CSC to support the National Identity Service.
Contract summaries in relation to Thales and CSC have now been published and are available on the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) website at . Due to the sheer size of the documents in question, it is not possible to send them to you in electronic form, but you have indicated that you are content to access them from the website. Some of the information that was contained in the documents is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, and therefore has been withheld, as further explained below.
After careful consideration we have decided that some of the information in the two contracts is exempt from disclosure under the following sections of the Act:
- Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters;
- Section 24(1) - National security;
- Section 31(1)(a) – Law enforcement;
- Section 40(2) - Personal information; and
- Section 43(2) - Commercial interests.
Section 23(1) provides that information supplied by, or relating to, the bodies dealing with security matters is exempt from disclosure. Section 23(1) provides an absolute exemption as defined in section 2(3) of the Act, and, as such, no further consideration is required.
Section 40(2) provides that information is exempt from disclosure if it constitutes personal data and if one of the conditions in section 40(3) is satisfied. In this case, the relevant condition is that at section 40(3) (a) (i) – namely that disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. Section 40(2) provides an absolute exemption where it relies on this condition.
Section 24(1) provides that information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt if exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Some of the information in the two contracts falls within this exemption because it relates to information which, if disclosed, could impact on the security and integrity of the information held and the services delivered under the National Identity Service.
Section 31(1) (a) provides that information is exempt if its disclosure would, or would be likely to; prejudice the prevention or detection of crime. Some of the information in the two contracts falls within this exemption because it relates to measures taken to ensure that criminal activities, such as relating to terrorism, immigration offences, fraud and computer misuse, cannot be perpetrated, and/or can be detected, in relation to the information held and the services delivered under the National Identity Service. Further, disclosure would also mean that the National identity Service’s role in providing a reliable way of proving and verifying the identity of individuals, and therefore the prevention of identity related crime, would be undermined.
Section 43(2) provides that information is exempt if its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person. Some of the information in the two contracts falls within this exemption because it relates to information which relates to the suppliers’ prices and pricing models, demonstrates their risk profiles,discloses their negotiated positions in key commercial areas and reveals their operating models. Disclosure would, or would likely to put these companies at a disadvantage in relation to futureICT procurements and as such would prejudice their commercial interests. Similarly, some of the information has been exempt under section 43(2) because it would disclose IPS’s negotiating positions in key commercial areas. Again, this would prejudice IPS in relation to future ICT procurements.
The exemptions in sections 24(1), 31(1) (a) and 43(2) are qualified exemptions and so subject to a public interest test. Arguments for and against disclosure in terms of the public interest, with the reasons for our conclusion, are set out in the attached Annex.
If you remain dissatisfied with this response, you may ask for a further internal review of our handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the following address, quoting references 10676 and 11863:
Information Access Team
Home Office
Ground Floor, SeacoleBuilding
2 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DF
E-mail:
Alternatively, you have the right of complaint to the Information Commissioner at the following address:
The Information Commissioner
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire SK9 5AF
Yours sincerely,
Bill Crothers
Executive Director, CIO & Commercial
Annex:Public interest test
Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are subject to a public interest test (PIT). This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in favour of withholding the information, or the considerations for and against the requirement to say whether the information requested is held or not. We must carry out a PIT where we are considering using any of the qualified exemptions in response to a request for information.
The ‘public interest’ is not the same as what interests the public. In carrying out a PIT we consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is released or not. The ‘right to know’ must be balanced against the need to enable effective government and to serve the best interests of the public.
The FOI Act is ‘applicant blind’. This means that we cannot, and do not, ask about the motives of anyone who asks for information. In providing a response to one person, we are expressing a willingness to provide the same response to anyone, including those who might represent a threat to the UK.
In this response we have used three qualified exemptions, namely those provided by sections 24(1), 31(1) (a) and 43(2). The public interest arguments in each case are considered below.
Section 24(1) (National security)
Considerations in favour of disclosing the information
There is a general public interest in disclosure and the fact that openness in government increases public trust in, and engagement with, the government. In relation to the work undertaken by IPS, the disclosure of some information could enhance the openness of government and help the public understand the efforts targeted at ensuring the security and integrity of information held and the services delivered under the National Identity Scheme and that the correct requirements have been imposed on the suppliers.It is also in the public interest to be assured that government assets are properly protected.
Considerations in favour withholding the information
However, the information relevant to your request concerns detailed information about the contractual requirements relating to how the various components of the services should be provided and protected, and the suppliers’ proposals for building and running the various systems and delivering other services. We consider that release of this information would provide individuals and/or groups seeking to target the information held and services provided under the National Identity Scheme. In addition, if the integrity of the National Identity Service’s systems and processes is compromised, its role in providing a reliable way of proving and verifying the identity of individuals and therefore assisting to prevent acts that may be detrimental to the national security interests, would be undermined. We have determined that safeguarding national security interests is of paramount importance and that in all circumstances of the case it is our opinion that the public interest clearly favours the non-disclosure of information covered by section 24(1).
We conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information.
Section 31(1) (a) (Law enforcement)
Considerations in favour of disclosing the information
There is a general public interest in increasing the public awareness of the steps taken to ensure that requirements in relation to the security and operationas underpinning the contracts for services to be delivered under the National Identity service are robust. In particular matters in relation to the protection of information and systems, there is a public interest in ensuring that resources have been correctly deployed and requirements properly articulated, taking into account the nature of the services that will be delivered under the National Identity Service, and its role in preventing offences. Disclosure could assist in the public understanding into the resources available to counter potential threats to UK citizens, helping to ensure informed public debate. Disclosure of this type of information also demonstrates openness, transparency and accountability in how resources are used in preventing and detecting offences.
Considerations in favour withholding the information
Some of the information in the two contracts relates in detail to the security and operational requirements. We consider that release of this information would provide individuals or groups to with the opportunity to target the systems and processes that underpin the National Identity Services. Disclosure could lead to offences such as terrorism, illegal immigration, fraud and computer misuse being perpetrated, or could mean that such offences could not be detected. In addition disclosure could affect the integrity of the National Identity Service’s role in providing a reliable way of proving and verifying the identity of individuals, and therefore the ability to prevent identity related crime, would be undermined.
We conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information.
Section 43(2) (Commercial interests)
Considerations in favour of disclosing the information
There is a general public interest in being open about the commercial arrangements which Government departments enter into, particularly high value, long term contracts. This can serve to demonstrate that departments have in place effective procedures for letting commercial contracts and that public money is not wasted.
Considerations in favour withholding the information
Some of the information in the contracts relates to information on prices, pricing models, risk profiles, operating models, negotiated positions on key commercial areas such as insurance and limits of liability. We consider that its release would prejudice the ability of the parties in relation to future commercial contract negotiations, which would not be in the public interest. The information would provide the suppliers’ competitors with information that could be used to put the suppliers at a disadvantage in future ICT procurements, i.e. by undercutting prices and replicating business models. In addition, it would mean that potential customers would be aware in advance of the supplier’s prices, risk profiles and previously negotiated positions which would put the suppliers at a disadvantage when negotiating future contracts. It would not be in the public interest for major suppliers to government to be put at such a disadvantage, or for the suppliers’ relationship with IPS to be subject to detriment. In addition disclosure could deter other suppliers from contracting with government departments, which would reduce the scope for government departments to obtain value for money and the right expertise in future procurements.
Similarly, should its negotiated positions be disclosed, IPS would be put at a disadvantage in relation to future procurements to support the National Identity Service or other ICT procurements. It would not be in the public interest for a government department to be placed at such a disadvantage when negotiating contracts.
We conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in withholding the information.
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