Russia’s Afghanistan Debate: Managing Fear of and in the West
By Andrei P. Tsygankov[1]
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 60, no. 6, November–December 2013, pp. 29–41
1. Introduction
The Kremlin’s attitude toward the West has influenced Russia’s Afghanistan policy. Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West combines elements of both cooperation and assertiveness, and that combination is found in Russia-West relations from Europe to Middle East. Russia has assisted the United States and Europe in Afghanistan by providing airspace and over-land transportation, as well as authorizing joint counter-narcotics operations. The Kremlin has also approved NATO’s use of an airport in Ulyanovsk as a transit point for moving soldiers and cargo to and from Afghanistan.[2] However, Russia’s political class has been divided over cooperation with the Western nations due to phobias over the West’s intentions in the region. In the view of the former Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin, the Western alliance remains driven by fear of Russia. "No matter what Russia may be – imperial, communist or democratic – theysee us with the same eyes as they did in the previous centuries."[3] Rogozin went as far as to propose blocking the alliance supply routes to Afghanistan should the West refuse to alleviate Russia’s concerns over deployment of U.S. ballistic missile defenses in Europe.[4] The more recent U.S.-Russia tensions over the Magnitsky Act also have potential to jeopardize the cooperation over Afghanistan.[5]
The Russian-Western mistrust persists due to historical and cultural developments. The constructivist theory of international relations assists us in understanding the two sides’ relationship by pointing to the significance of “the other” in the process of forming self-identity.[6]Both Russia and the West feel uneasy about each other’s intentions. Allies for only the brief period of the Second World War and enemies for almost half a century, the two sides cannot overcome some of the old perceptions and stereotypes of viewing each other as potentially dangerous. Although scholars frequently view human actions as if they were designed to meet rationally determined objectives, it is beliefs and emotions that define what is a “good” and “virtuous” course of action vis-à-vis the relevant other.[7]The post-Cold War imbalance of power served to exacerbate the problem of Russian-Western mistrust. That the United States emerged as the world’s superpower removed some of the older constraints for acting on perceived fears of Russia.[8]Russia too mistrusted the West, the difference being that Russia’s undermined capabilities dictated a defensive, rather than a hegemonic response.[9]
Our understanding of the future extent and durability of Russia’s cooperation depends on how accurately we interpret the meaning of the Kremlin’s actions. In attempting to uncover such meaning, the paper explores the national and international context of Russia’s policy toward Afghanistan. I ask why, despite the traditionally strong mistrust in the West’s intentions, Russia has chosen to cooperate on Afghanistan. Should Russia’s actions be interpreted as signaling the Kremlin’s ability to manage its phobias of the West and develop a stronger cooperation over multiple issues? Or do Russia’s fears remain unchallenged and its actions conceal a desire to win time and prepare for a renewed competition with the Western nations? By seeking to understand Russia’s perception, I study the interplay of ideas on three related levels: state-based, society-based, and international. By focusing on how officials themselves justify their policies and how these policies are then perceived in broader social and international settings, we have an opportunity to develop a better understanding of a particular state action, as well as tentatively assess the chances of this action’s success or failure.[10]
While focusing on Russia-West relations over Afghanistan, I recognize that the West does not fully determine Russia’s relations with Afghanistan and that Russia has its own priorities vis-à-vis the country. In addition to counter-terrorism, these priorities include struggle with narco-traffic and strengthening economic and cultural ties. My main contention is that Russia’s cooperation over Afghanistan rests on shaky domestic foundations with political elites’ overall wariness regarding the West’s international objectives. Such cooperation became possible due to efforts by some segments within Russia’s political class to reach out to the Western nations and the West’s policy of active engagement. President Barak Obama’s policy to “reset” relations with Russia became critically important for such cooperation to develop. The actions by the West, Russia’s significant Other in the constructivist sense, assisted Moscow in managing Russia’s traditionally strong mistrust in of the Western nations. However, Russia’s political class remains ambivalent and the engagement may only survive and be extended to other security areas if the West continues to act in a manner that is viewed by Moscow as respectful of its interests in the region.
This paper is organized in five sections. The next section reviews Russia’s Afghanistan diplomacy by identifying its evolution before and after the arrival of President Dmitri Medvedev who emphasized the need for a renewed cooperation with Western nations. After recording state actions, I proceed to their interpretation in the national and international context. The next three section seek to establish the official meaning of Russia’s actions and document their reception in national and international settings. The final section summarizes the analysis, offers a comparison to other relevant cases, and draws lessons for policy.
2. Russia’s Afghanistan Diplomacy
Russia’s Afghanistan diplomacy has been marked by three related developments: a growing cooperation with NATO on counter-terrorist strategies; signals of concerns and criticisms regarding the West’s intentions and behavior in Afghanistan; and steady development of Moscow’s own relations with Kabul.
Growing Cooperation with NATO
Russia’s cooperation with the West on Afghanistan begun soon after September 11, 2001.[11] President Vladimir Putin was among the first to call President George W. Bush to express his support and pledge important resources to help America in its fight Putin offered America broad support for operations in Afghanistan that included intelligence sharing, opening Russian airspace to relief missions, taking part in search-and-rescue operations, rallying Central Asian countries to the American cause, and arming anti-Taliban forces inside Afghanistan.
The cooperation continued after the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003, despite Russia’s decision to oppose the war. In December 2005, Russia and NATO agreed to a program to train narcotics control officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia to help stem the increased flow of drugs from the region.[12]October 2010 marked the first serious instance of counter-narcotics cooperation with the two countries successfully conducting an operation that destroyed more than 2,000 pounds of heroin.[13]In April 2008, Russia opened a transport corridor through its territory for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions. In July 2009, during a summit meeting in Moscow, Russia agreed to U.S. military fly-overs with 4,500 flights per year. Although NATO initially relied mainly on the Pakistani route, by the end of 2011 more than 50% of the international force’s logistics took place via the Northern Distribution Network through Russia and Central Asia.
The two sides also cooperated on military supplies for Afghanistan. In January 2010, Russia and NATO formally resumed military ties after the interruption stemming from Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008, when Russian Chief of Staff held talks with NATO counterpart.[14] In 2011, the United States agreed to purchase 21 military helicopters from Russia to be supplied to Afghanistan.[15] The Kremlin also approved the transit of Afghanistan bound armored vehicles.[16] Finally, in March 2012, Russia agreed to NATO’s proposal to use an airport in Ulyanovsk as a transit point for moving soldiers and “non lethal” supplies to and from Afghanistan. Ulyanovsk is a city in the Volga region, the birthplace of Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, and a stronghold of Russian communists. The Vostochnyi airport was developed for the Soviet-era Buran space shuttle project. It remains one of the best airfields in the country and can process up to 30 NATO cargo flights a day.[17]
Criticisms of the West
Despite the growing cooperation with NATO, Russia has been critical of the alliance’s strategies in Afghanistan. The Kremlin’s criticisms have concerned three areas: NATO plans to maintain military bases in the region, the lack of cooperation with regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and overall priorities in counter-terrorist operation.
The issue of Western military presence came into the spotlight soon after Russia withdrew its objections to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s decision to grant NATO’s request for cooperation. When Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated in October 2003 that Russia expectedWestern withdrawal from the regionimmediately after completion of the Afghanistan mission,[18] the feeling had already been widely shared within the political establishment. State Duma factions, the media and the general public reacted critically to the American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Retired generals, including one of Yeltsin’s former defense ministers published a series of “open letters”, accusing Putin of “selling out” the country and “betraying” the nation’s vital interests. Federal Border Guard Service head Konstantin Totski issued a typical statement maintaining that if U.S. forces remain in Central Asia after the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, “we are unlikely to remain friends.”[19]
That feeling of insecurity was partly sustained by West’s own actions and statements. For instance, in early 2011, the United States made public its plan to develop several military bases in Afghanistan “on a long term basis.” The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted by asking “Why will Afghanistan need the military bases of the United States if the terrorist threat will no longer be relevant?” And given that "until recently, Kabul and Washington have been assuring the international community that all foreign armed forces would be removed from the Afghan territory before the end of 2014.”[20] In October 2012 Nikolay Korchunov, Russia's acting ambassador to NATO threatened that Russia will stop cooperating over Afghanistan after 2014 if the alliance acts without United Nations Security Council authorization for its training mission in the country.[21]
The second line of criticism involved NATO’s decision not to grant Russia’s requests to cooperate with CSTO on development of a joint counter-terrorist policies and assessment of threat.[22]The Secretary-General of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha on several occasions called for cooperation with NATO on Afghan drug trafficking, terrorism and other issues, yet without eliciting any response.[23] The Kremlin also sought to counter NATO’s presence in the region by engaging in several activities. In addition to gaining a basing right in Kyrgyzstan, Russia coordinated with China perception of the alliance and future policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[24] Russia also pressured Kyrgyzstan not to renew its military agreement with the United States.[25] Along the same lines, the Kremlin wanted to consolidate its military presence by constructing a new antiterrorism center under CSTO auspices in the southern part of the country.[26]In Tajikistan, Moscow negotiated a re-deployment of 6,000 troops to patrol the border with Afghanistan in exchange for promise to rearm the Tajik army.
Finally, Russia grew increasingly critical of the Western strategies of stabilizing Afghanistan. In particular, the Kremlin did not approve of NATO’s attempts to engage in negotiations with the Taliban. By citing the Taliban’s narrow ethnic base and past violent practices, Russia’s officials frequently referred to NATO’s negotiations as leading to “a Pashtunization” of Afghanistan. In addition, the Kremlin was very critical of the West’s lack of attention to the growing threat of narcotics. Western officials such as U.S. war commander General Stanley A. McChrystal explained that they did not want to deprive Afghan peasants of income and that their priorities in stabilizing the country included training its army and security forces.[27] In Moscow’s perception such attitude was precisely responsible for the sharp growth of opium and its trafficking from the country to Russia and other regions.[28] In particular, the Head of State Anti-Drugs Service Victor Ivanov pointed to “distinct correlation between the dynamics of militarization and an increase in drugs production in Afghanistan”.[29]
Relations with Kabul
Partly out of frustration with Western policies and partly out of desire to strengthen ties with a neighbor, the Kremlin launched its own policy in Afghanistan.
Russia’s relations with the country begun to improve soon after removal of Taliban from power. Already in May 2002, Foreign Minister Igor’ Ivanov visited Afghanistan. In August 2007, Russia cancelled $10 billion of debt to Afghanistan left from the Soviet era. During the next year, economic relations boomed and trade rose from $70 million in 2007 to $180 million in 2008 with Afghanistan’s imports from Russia comprising 90% of the total.[30]
Since 2010, Russia’s policies in the region became more independent and were occasionally at odds with those of NATO and the United States. At the time when the White House expressed its frustration with Hamid Karzai and engaged in negotiations with Taliban, Russia insisted that Karzai was the only legitimate leader worthy of support. In November 2010, Moscow hosted his visit by promising political support and donating 20,000 Kalashnikov rifles to Afghanistan Interior Ministry. In 2011, by embarking on series of infrastructural and housing projects, Russia described its ties with the former foe as the best in 20 years.[31]In May 2011, the Kremlin also hosted a three-day visit by Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari with the two sides expressing agreement that Afghanistan’s peace process should be driven by internal, rather than external, forces.[32] In addition, the Russians stepped up their consultations with India, another key country in the region.[33]
3. The Official Meaning
How should we interpret Russia’s seemingly contradictory position? Is the Kremlin signaling its desire to deepen cooperation with the West or is Russia merely avoid complicating its relations with NATO? This section offers an interpretation of Russia’s behavior and addresses possible objections to it.
Seeking Equal Cooperation
Russia seeks to deepen cooperation with NATO without jeopardizing its own interests in the region. The Kremlin’s central message is to be: “we are fully prepared to cooperate on equal terms, but will resort to balancing tactics if such equality is not respected by the West.” The Russians associate equal cooperation with reciprocity and mutual recognition of interests. In particular, they want more cooperation in fighting proliferation of narcotics, conducting training and exercises jointly with CSTO and SCO, and supporting the central government of Afghanistan.
In numerous statements by Russia’s officials, the desire to deepen cooperation with NATO has been made clear. Such desire is justified by a potential destabilization of the region, should the U.S. and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. In 2007, the Foreign Ministry report “A Review of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy” stated, “if the Afghan campaign ends in failure and the U.S. and NATO leave, the Central Asian countries and Russia will be left face to face with the consequences of the aggravated Afghan problem, primarily the drug and terrorist threat, with an upsurge of fundamentalist sentiments and the destabilization of the region.”[34] In June 2008, Russia’s representative at NATO Dmitry Rogozin criticized the alliance’s strategy in Afghanistan, yet stated that “We are ready to continue helping, because if NATO admits defeat in the future … this may lead to a strengthened enemy [Islamic extremism], emboldened by success, standing on the threshold of our home.”[35] In 2010, writing in New York Timesformer commanderof the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan General Boris Gromov and Dmitry Rogozin stated Russia’s position: “A ‘successful end’ to the operation in Afghanistan will not come simply with the death of Osama bin Laden. The minimum that we require from NATO is consolidating a stable political regime in the country and preventing Talibanization of the entire region.”[36]Indeed, with the passing of time Russia became so worried about possible destabilization after NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan that high-ranking Moscow officials insisted on the alliance’s completing its mission of before leaving.[37]
The Russians have also argued that the cooperation with NATO may only be effective if the alliance respects the other side’s view. According to them, the alternative is not merely the destabilization of Afghanistan, but destruction of NATO as an organization. As Gromov and Rogozin warned, “If the alliance does not accomplish its task, the mutual commitments of its 28 member-states would be undermined and the alliance would lose its moral foundation and raison d’être. … Withdrawal without victory might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.”[38] The Russians indicated that without changing its approach NATO will increasingly confront problems in Afghanistan. The Kremlin signaled preparedness to exploit Western vulnerability by launching an independent strategy in the region and even threatening to block the alliance supply routes.[39]