Australian Defence Policy: Old Methods and New Threats?

Australia and the Asia-PacificR. James Ferguson © 2006

Week 5:

Australian Defence Policy: Old Methods and New Threats?

Topics: -

1. Introduction: A Regional Advantage?

2. From The British Empire to the US-Alliance as Security Guarantee

3. Towards Self-Reliance in the Regional Setting

4. The Critiques of Defence In Depth - An Aggressive Posture?

5. Revising Defence Roles Through 1996-2006

6. Defence Industries and Acquisitions for the 21st Century

7. Points of View: Risks of the Current Defence Posture

8. Bibliography and Further Resources

1. Introduction: A Regional Advantage?

A nation's participation in war and the way its conceives of its security have a direct impact on its foreign policy, its wider international relations, and upon its identity. Changes in defence policy, in particular, are often responses to, or causes for, major adaptations in the international system, or in regional priorities. In this lecture, we will focus on the 'facts' of Australia's defence posture, capabilities and doctrine from the 1990s until 2006, with a brief mention of how this has emerged over the last century. It must be stressed that security and defence involve much broader issues than just military capability. Issues of transnational policing and 'peace support' roles, political use of defence policy to gain international support, and national identity politics and perceptions of Australia overseas are some of the overlapping 'grey' areas that have emerged in the last five years (DFAT 2003).

During the 1980s Australia had a full time force of some 70,000 personnel, supported by approx. 28,000 reservists. As of 1995, the total active force was 51,100 (23,700 in the army), with 38,250 reserves (Chipman 1995). As of 1998, the active force was 57,400, with general reserves of 33,650 (Chipman 1998). In 1999, the total active force was based on 55,200 persons, with 27,730 reserves (Chipman 2000). This number was trimmed down to 51,500 by 2000, but it rose again through 2003-2005 to approximately 52,872 active personnel with some 20,800 reserves, of which 4,200 form a 'High Readiness' pool that can be drawn upon (Kerr 2006; Chipman 2004; Chipman 2005). This includes a Special Operations Command with a special operations headquarters, 1 SAS regiment, 2 commando battalions (1 reserve), and 1 ‘incident response’ regiment (Chipman 2005; see further below). Through 2010 it is planned that the regular army might increase by 1,500, and switch to a new 'hardening and networking' plan for the mobilise battlefield, a process that may cost up to $1.6 billion (Walters 2005; Department of Defence 2005).

Through 1999-2005 there has been a major upward revision of defence spending, force structure and levels, in part due the serious load of peace-keeping operations in East Timor, then in reaction to the terrorism threat at the global, regional and national level, and to deployments in Iraq whose budgetary cost for 2005 was $445 million (Thomson 2005). Increases of 3% per year in defence spending have been confirmed for that period by the government, with defence spending for new acquisitions guaranteed up to 2010, while from 2006 the government has decided to 'continue the 3 per cent real growth for a further five years out to 2015-16' (Gittins 2006). Likewise, roles in UN mandated peacekeeping or regional peace-support tasks (East Timor, and ‘permissive intervention’ in the Solomon Islands, future extended operations in southern Afghanistan to soon come under NATO command) and coalition operations (Iraq) have suggested that these overseas operations will be a major component of ongoing tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Thus through early-to-mid 2006 Australia had approximately 2,000 troops deployed in East Timor, a peak force 1,400 in Iraq which dropped to around 700, while over 300 troops and personnel are operational in southern Afghanistan with a further 240 troops to be sent later in 2006 as part of 'Operation Slipper' (Dutter 2006; Walters 2006;

These realities have also forced a major expansion of intelligence agencies, plus a call for a restructuring of how they operate. There is also theoretical interaction among these different roles: it has been argued that weak or failed states might become a haven for international criminal and terrorist activities, e.g. operating out of states in turmoil, e.g. Afghanistan and Somalia (see Menkhaus 2004). On this view, there is a strong need to international states to intervene in such cases (as in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, see lectures 2-3). Likewise, there has been a recent effort to link military and peacekeeping operations into a wider regional cooperation that can sustain ‘peacekeeping capacity’, but this approach has only begun to be applied in relations among NATO, Europe, Russia, China, South America and some early efforts in Africa (Cottey & Forster 2004). It has yet to be systematically applied in the Asia-Pacific region. It has also been argued that any army force that is deployed will need to be supported by strong air and naval forces, entailing the ongoing modernisation of most weapons platforms through 2006-2020 (see further below).

The Australian force retains a relatively small personnel base, in the absence of either conscription or near universal 'national service' (as experienced in Switzerland, Singapore, or South Korea for example). Through 1999-2000, the Howard government began a review process that led to a white paper in 2000 (a white paper is major policy document) which has signalled a partly revised conception of how the military should be used, with a further serious update in 2003, plus annual reports (see resources below). In part, this has been in response to the crises in Indonesia, East Timor, the 'global' threat of terrorism, Coalition activities with the US and UK, and combined with an updated off-shore coast-guard surveillance ability and efforts to better control of fisheries in Australia's EEZ (exclusive economic zone). However, former Defence Minister Robert Hill had stated through 2005 that there was no need for a new defence white paper since the strategic setting has not fundamentally changed, but with another Defence Update issued in December 2005 (Walters 2005; in 2006 Brendan Nelson became Defence Minister). The key conclusions of the 2005 update included a focus on: -

* Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences of state fragility and failure remain the most immediate strategic challenges for Australia.

* The ADF needs to confront current international security issues such as terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan whilst helping build capabilities in South East Asia.

* The ADF will continue to be called on to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, civil emergency response, offshore evacuation and peacekeeping capabilities on an ongoing and often short-notice basis.

* Continuing strategic complexity and uncertainty means that we need to build a balanced Defence Force that is versatile, robust, joint and integrated.

* Defence industry is critical to meeting the ADF's capability needs and the Government is committed to policies that will build an internationally competitive Defence industry to support, sustain and upgrade Defence assets. (

At around 1.9% through the mid-1990s till 2005 (3% in the late 1980s) of GDP, Australia defence spending was also quite moderate (compared with approx. 5% for the US and in real terms, with similar adjusted figures for China), but in regional terms (Southeast Asia) it was by far the largest program in economic terms (Malaysia spent $US2.47 billion and Indonesia $US2.5 billion on defence in 2005, Chipman 2005). Defence expenditure in 1994 for Australia was AU$10.22 billion (Chipman 1995), with a slight drop in following years. Through 2000-2005, however, the defence budget has increased, in part due to perceived regional instability, but also due to the need to purchase a new generation of high-tech equipment. It was $14.3 billion in 2001, 14.6 billion in 2002, and increased slightly again in 2003 (Chipman 2003), with an operational annual operational budget of approx. $16-17.5 billion for 2003-2005 (Chipman 2005; Thomson 2005; Department of Defence 2003). On this basis, defence was one of the few areas of government spending that was allowed serious increases from 2001, indicating its heightened importance in Australian national policy. The Howard government estimated that with growth in economy of above 3%, it was possible for these increases to be contained at around 1.9% of GDP through to the year 2010, with earlier plans to limit annual total spending to around $18 billion (Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force; Department of Defence 2003b, p31). The defence budget remains in general terms more than three times that of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From the 1990s onwards in national terms Australia's budget remains by far the largest within the Southeast Asian zone, e.g. Singapore spent US$5.57 on defence in 2005 (Chipman 2005; Ball & Kerr 1996, p48). For 2006-2007 defence spending could go as high as $19.6 billion (Gittins 2006; Walter 2006).

This level has been maintained in part to address extended peace-keeping, alliance and security roles, but also to allow the ongoing purchase a new round of weapons technology (‘weapons platforms’) including new mobile artillery (Cotterill 2005a), armed reconnaissance helicopters (22 Tiger helicopters from Eurocopter, based on French and German designs and worth a total of $1.2 billion, Sheed 2004), replacement fighter aircraft (the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter), new in-air re-fuelling tankers, AWACS, and Air Warfare Destroyers with anti-missile systems through 2008-2020. In part, these purchases support new initiatives through 2005-2006: -

• Considering options for heavy airlift capabilities to supplement the medium lift C-130 J Hercules aircraft.
• Increasing the size and capability of the Australian Army through the 10-year plan for the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA).
• Reinforcing Australia's counter-terrorism efforts with changes to the Defence Act which strengthen the ADF's powers to help civil authorities during periods of national emergency.
• Further tightening export controls to ensure that Australian materials and technologies do not contribute to WMD proliferation.
• Engaging private sector partners for Defence to increase efficiencies in logistic support to operations. ( see further Department of Defence 2005)

The counterbalance to Australia's small force structure has been the reliance on 'force multipliers', i.e. modern technology, aircraft, ships, new weapons systems, surveillance systems etc., to ensure that small numbers of personnel can still be very effective. The head of this force during the 1980-1990s was 75 FA-18 fighter aircraft (then approximately twice ASEAN's advanced fighters), and 21 F-111C long range strike aircraft, augmented by some 15 extra F-111Gs to ensure the long-life viability of this part of the Australia's air-defence, at the cost of some $150 million (see Wrigley 1994; Stephens 1996. Approx. 70 FA-18s are currently operational and are being upgraded with new systems until the new fighter is available). These forces combined give Australia a definite advantage in regional fighter and strike forces. Yet it may become harder in the long-term to retain this regional strategic advantage. Southeast Asian airforces are going through some modernisation, e.g. a variety of F-16s, MiG29s, and SU-27s for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, the last of which has the most modern Southeast Asian Force (Chipman 2004; Stephens 1996, p47). However, this is not a real arms race due to high levels of security cooperation in the region, and no major state in East Asia that might be postulated as a realistic invading enemy (China may fit the role of regional competitor, depending on long term trends, see lecture 4). But it must also be noted that most ASEAN nations are concerned more with internal security issues, and that military expenditure 'is not to balance any major power or counter any major regional threat' (Mak 1995, p22). The ASEAN Regional Forum was partly used to ensure that regional spending would not become destabilising (Mak 1995, p22). Furthermore, through the 1990s regular airpower conferences including ASEAN states and Australia and New Zealand have been held in Darwin to clarify potential areas of cooperation and reduce misunderstandings (see Water & Lax, 1994). Likewise, ASEAN itself through 2003-2006 is debating the formulation of a more formal Security Community through 2012, a trend that would further reduce inter-national tensions (Xinhua 2003; Kyodo News 2003; see lecture 6).

Australian naval forces are also oriented towards an ability to interdict forces away from the Australian coast, with an emphasis on missile frigates, ANZAC frigates, and quiet, conventional submarines to take on these roles. These will be augmented by new anti-missile systems on three Air Warfare Destroyers in the next decade (Cotterill 2006). The standing army had a northern orientation, with small components ready for relatively rapid deployment, but with the least prepared reserves taking months to be fully battle-ready. Through 1999-2006 this orientation came under new challenges. The Australian Navy found itself in sustained operations to interdict ‘boat people’ in western and northern waters, a task which led to controversies about the turning back of immigrant boats towards Indonesia, the rescue of non-documented arrivals from sinking boats, and the high cost in using major naval vessels in these policing roles. This has led to some calls for the creation of an independent coast guard, or at least the purchase of new small vessels for this role without undermining the existing navy budget. At present coastal surveillance has been extended through the use of private contractors that coordinate their coastal monitoring (Coastwatch), contract worths some $900 million (Ferguson 2005d) with the Navy and Airforce, while two new patrol boats have been ordered to patrol oil and gas infrastructure in the northwest shelf (Thomson 2005). Through 2006, there has been an upgrade of the facilities of Surveillance Australia, which has a 12 year coastwatch contract, using light aircraft which will in future be augmented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and increased satellite abilities, in part to increase interception of illegal fishing, with some 35 'illegal' boats being spotted on a daily basis (Dodd 2006).

From 1999, Australian soldiers and support units have found themselves in extended peacekeeping and peace-making roles, while elite units have been involved in search and destroy, ground reconnaissance and security protection operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has led to a 2004-2006 debate as to whether the direct defence of Australia remains the ADF's major role, or whether new extended global roles are now their major focus. Extended deployments overseas beyond the region would require a different type of army and defence structure (Dibb 2005),an issue which will need to further refining through 2006 (Borgu 2005).

There are several major factors to note about Australia's defence orientation: -

1. An ongoing difficulty in defining a set enemy or direct threat from a given nation state (with the exception of World War II), combined with a nagging sense of vulnerability and, in the past, fear of invasion 'from the north'. Yet post-1975, there has been a general shift in the region from '"threat-driven" defence calculation to one that is uncertainty-based (Mak 1995, p22). This theme of preparing for uncertainties, not threats, was reiterated in Paul Dibb's review of Australia's Defence: 'There is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population.' (Dibb 1986, p4). This has then shifted to dispersed operations in the relation to the war terror, in regional activities in the 'arc of instability' (see lectures 2-3), and support of wider global roles with allies or in multilateral operations.

1. Likewise, threat's such as international terrorism can strike at widely different targets and interests regionally and globally, once again making defence planning problematic. International terrorism has emerged as a major threat, but also with high degrees of uncertainty as to possible targets, time of attack, organisations involved, and possible head-quarters or operational bases. As we have seen (week 4), this makes pre-emption, deterrence, and defence planning highly difficult. It has also boosted the importance and problem of reliable, fast, and unpoliticised intelligence (see below). Likewise, regardless of the number of successful detections and arrests, it only takes one major attack for to succeed for terrorists to be seen to achieve their goals to some degree (Lewis 2003, p45). Overall, an extra $1.1 billion dollars have funded a package of new domestic security measures through 2004-2005 (Thomson 2005). Total expenditure on such threats has been in the order of $5 billion since 2001, with ASIO stating that at least 1 terrorist attack on Australian interests has been aborted each year (Walters 2005b). It has been argued that although Al Qa'ida has been weakened since 2001, that new, independent terrorist groups, now highly security conscious, might become operational in Southeast Asia (Walters 2005b) as well as South Asia and the Middle East.

1. In spite of being a small to medium power in traditional military terms, Australian troops have been regularly deployed overseas. This has continued recently in support of U.S./Alliance activities, or in UN operations (in the 1990s, Australian troops were involved in UN operations in Cambodia, Cyprus, Egypt, Middle East, Rwanda and East Timor), and newer coalition operations (Afghanistan, Iraq). In the past, of course, Australia fought overseas, often in support of Britain or other allies (the Boer War, World War I, most of World War II, the Malayan emergency, the Korean War, operations in Borneo during the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia 1963-1965, the Vietnam War). Australia through the 1990s was regularly involved with joint operations and training exercises with Southeast Asian neighbours, though often these were hosted in Australia (see Ball & Kerr 1996). Likewise, Australia is engaged in fairly wide ranging air and naval patrols of sections the Indian and Pacific Oceans, using P-3C Orion aircraft, some operating out of Butterworth airforce base in Malaysia (Ball & Kerr 1996). From December 1997, the Howard government formally shifted Australian defence thinking to a wider regional posture, rather than just focusing on Australia and its immediate environment, through a new Strategic Policy. Through 2001-2006 this trend of overseas engagement has deepened with the view that new security threats, in cooperation with partners, should be met wherever they occur, a policy which leads to further global engagement. This sparked some regional concerns, e.g. in Malaysia, Indonesia and PRC, of Australia becoming too assertive within the Southeast Asia region, but overall recent Australian efforts in East Timor and the Solomon Islands through 2005-2006 have been accepted as efforts at stabilising ‘fragile’ states.

1. From late 1996 a range of signals indicated some emphasis on regional engagement with both north-east and south-east Asia. By June 1996 a virtual web of security arrangements (Greenlees 1997a, p1) had been brokered with regional states. This was perhaps not surprising in relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines, but political-military dialogue was also been commenced with South Korea, China and Vietnam. The trouble with this plan was that although it aimed at regional stabilisation, it placed a much larger burden on the Australian armed forces to be able to operate overseas, as well as to defend Australian territory and air/sea approaches. Through 1999-2001 this regional engagement was somewhat reduced (especially with Indonesia), was re-engaged in part through 2002-2006, this time on the basis of anti-terrorism efforts (especially with Indonesia and in the future possibly with the Philippines), as well as region wide efforts to reduce money laundering and related funding flows to terrorist groups, e.g. via the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. Events through 1999-2006 have demonstrated the real costs and benefits of regional engagement, both financially and in terms of sustained impact of foreign affairs and the need for long term engagement in wider regional agenda. It also required a better equipped and trained army with 'hardened capabilities' for working in hostile environments overseas (Department of Defence 2005).

1. Through 2001-2006, Australia began to view the Indo-Pacific in terms not just of positive trade flows and institution building, but began to speak of ‘regions of disorder’ centred on flash-points such as North Korea and Taiwan, as well as the identification of a range of transnational threats that needed better management and increased cooperation among nations: -

Globalisation, with its vastly expanded flows of trade, finance and people, has created more opportunities for transnational crime, including the illegal movement of drugs, people and arms. The scale of these flows is immense and can overwhelm the capabilities of many nations. It is estimated, for example, that four million people are smuggled each year across borders, earning people smugglers between $14 billion and $20 billion. This flow puts enormous pressure on the policing and other resources of receiving and transit countries. Modern, transnational criminal networks have become more flexible and are exploiting the advances of communications technology. Transnational crime will demand greater international cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence, border and financial controls, blurring the line between international and domestic security. Building effective police, legal and other networks with other countries, particularly in Australia's region, will be crucial for dealing with organised crime in Australia. It will be important, too, to focus the work of international organisations on transnational problems with which national governments, acting alone, cannot always deal. (DFAT 2003, Chapter 2)