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Invention, Innovation, Industrialization and the Role of the State
Aaron Ray
Cesar Chavez High School
Washington, DC
2008 NEH Seminar for School Teachers
Interpretations of the Industrial revolution in Britain
The role of invention and innovation in the Industrial Revolution in Britain presents important considerations for policy makers today. States in the 21st century are faced with whether and how to respond to the challenges of globalization and international competition. Lessons from the 18th and 19th centuries can inform how these modern economic and political forces can and should be addressed via public policy. This essay will address a number of questions. First, what are inventions and innovations and how are they related to industrial progress? Second, what role did invention and innovation play in the growth and especially the decline of British industry? And third, can states manage these forces to maintain their competitiveness?
Particularly important common elements of the Industrial Revolution, such as continual industrial transformations and the current globalization of national economies, are directly related to the role played by the invention and innovation of new technology. An enduring question of industrialization is the degree to which states can facilitate, encourage or control the flow of invention and innovation. Britain’s experience in this area can be informative for modern states faced with the challenges of industrial transformation. In order to better understand the potential states have to manage the processes of invention and innovation, we will first examine the distinction between the two. We will then take stock of the role of invention and innovation in the first period of British industrialization and their role in the decline of British industry at the end of the 19th century. We will finally make some preliminary comments about the relevance of this inquiry for modern policy makers.
Joel Mokyr, in Lever of Riches, distinguishes between invention and innovation. An invention is “defined as an increment in the set of the total technological knowledge of a given society” (Mokyr, p. 10). An innovation involves “disseminating the techniques used by producers at the cutting edge of knowledge” (Mokyr, p. 10). In summary, invention is the creation of new knowledge while innovation is the application of that knowledge in industry. Mokyr goes one to establish their essential complementarities in industrial societies: “invention and innovation are complements… But in the long run, technologically creative societies must be both inventive and innovative” (Mokyr, p. 10). Creative societies must both create new knowledge and apply that knowledge to production. Those societies that invent without innovating will see the fruits of their labour exploited elsewhere. Those that innovate without invention will be at the mercy of inventors abroad to determine the pace of progress.
Maxine Berg, writing about industrialization in Britain, illuminates this distinction between invention and innovation and its importance to economic historians. “Economic historians now draw a distinction between those factors affecting the invention of techniques from those affecting diffusion or innovation. They concede that the springs of invention lie beyond the limits of economic theory, but believe diffusion to lie firmly within its grasp” (Berg, p. 171). This suggests that economic theory cannot adequately explain what gives rise to invention, i.e. the creation of new technology, but can attempt to explain how and why that technology is diffused throughout an industry. That economic theory cannot adequately explain the springs of invention leads one to ask whether policy makers can encourage and/or facilitate invention. If so, and if invention is crucial for industrial competitiveness, one can then rightly expect policy makers to seek to take steps to encourage invention in hopes of ensuring continued competitiveness. The degree to which policy makers can manage the flow of invention is an open point to which we will return.
T.S. Ashton explored the role of invention in the initial development of industry in Britain and one way that states can seek to manage innovation. Ashton betrays his liberal economic position by stating that “the state came to play a less active… part in affairs” and that “legislative impediments to enterprise [were] removed” (Ashton, p. 2). His scepticism toward state intervention in the marketplace continues with a lukewarm endorsement of the role of patent law in promoting invention and innovation. He writes that the patent system “gave security to the inventor, but it allowed some privileged positions to be maintained for an undue length of time, and it was sometimes used to block the way to new contrivance” (Ashton, p. 10). Whether or not patents are effective, Ashton later addresses the relationship between invention and scientific research and education. He argues that “Invention, again, is more likely to arise in a community that sets store by things of the mind than in one that seeks only material ends. The stream of English scientific thought… was one of the main tributaries of the industrial revolution” (Ashton, p. 12). Ashton clearly believes that while state intervention in the form of patent protection may not facilitate innovation, a strong educational tradition is essential. He might be willing though to leave the development of such a tradition to private hands rather than governmental action.
The connection between invention and education is not an inconsequential one when one considers Eric Hobsbawm’s argument that the decline of the British industrial economy in the late 19th century was due to a lack of international industry competitiveness. Hobsbawm suggests that “since the Industrial Revolution, the transformation of industry has become continuous… [and] because the earlier phase of industrialism had been unusually and visibly archaic… Britain, as a pioneer, apparently remained wedded to this archaic pattern, while other and newer industrial economies did not” (Hobsbawm, p. 150). He goes on to characterize the development of this ‘second’ Industrial Revolution as one in which the roles of science and technology become increasingly prominent: “The major technical advances of the second half of the nineteenth century were therefore essentially scientific; that is to say they required at the very least some knowledge of recent developments in pure science for original inventions” (Hobsbawm, p. 151). Therefore, in order for an economy to be competitive in this second phase of industrialization it must be, as Mokyr argues, both inventive and innovative. Hobsbawm lays the decline of British economy at the feet of an antiquated educational system. He writes that “clearly, the British did not adapt to new circumstances. They could have done so… [but] for the virtual absence of university education and the feebleness of formal technological training” (Hobsbawm, 160). Hobsbawm, like Ashton, recognizes the importance of education in facilitating invention. Unlike Ashton, Hobsbawm seems to believe that more extensive state intervention in the creation of a system of higher education would have benefited Britain’s industrial competitiveness.
Hobsbawm is not alone in addressing the role of education in the Industrial Revolution. Kenneth Morgan outlines the development, particularly of elementary education, as one of the chief social developments of the time. He writes that “both central and local authorities began to appreciate that increasing educational provision and literacy would help urban and industrial society to function more effectively” (Morgan, p. 48). He goes on to discuss the various forms of educational delivery developed in the early 19th century, including the introduction of state sponsored elementary education in 1833. It is important though to consider his words carefully. First, the discussion focuses on primary education. Such education is surely important and possibly democratizing, but likely not sufficient to facilitate high-level scientific research. Second, the asserted function to be served by this educational system was the effective functioning of society, not the development of a research base that could facilitate industrial progress through invention. Morgan writes of this emphasis on social order more strongly: “Only by instructing children… could the working classes be contained” (Morgan, p. 48). With this controlling function of education taking precedence, it is not surprising that, as Hobsbawm writes, by the early 20th century there was a lack of emphasis on university education. He compares the number of university students in Britain in 1913 (9,000) with those in Germany (60,000). He states specifically that “Germany produced three thousand graduate engineers per year while in England and Whales only 350 graduated in all branches of science, technology and mathematics with first- and second-class honors” (Hobsbawm, p. 160). Britain declined, his argument goes, as least in part because of a lack of invention, hindered by a lack of advanced education and research. He goes on to again assert the wilfulness of the British decline: “Britain then failed to adapt to new conditions, not because she could not, but because she did not wish to” (Hobsbawm, p. 160). It is this point, the wilfulness of the British decline, which we will examine in light of current challenges facing policy makers.
Hobsbawm creates a dichotomy facing policy makers in light of the challenges of industrialization: either Britain failed because she could not adapt to new conditions, or she failed because she could have adapted but chose not to. This dichotomy is tidy, but obscures the complexity facing states when presented with policy choices.
The first premise of Hobsbawm’s dichotomy is that Britain recognized the problem. In order to choose not to act, one must have been aware of the possibility of action. Often, when faced with the complexities of life, both states and individuals are not aware of the circumstances in which they are acting. If Britain did not see the decline coming, nor that it was tied to lack of university education, one cannot hold her responsible for failing to act. We can look back on the widespread use of coal-fired furnaces to create steam power during the Industrial Revolution as the beginning of the climate change crisis. But we cannot hold 18th century Britain responsible for not curbing carbon emissions for she did not know what she was releasing into the atmosphere, or what the consequences might be.
The second assumption in the dichotomy is that once Britain recognized the circumstances, she could have acted in response to them. Even if policy makers are aware of the problem, numerous obstacles might prevent effective action. First, one might not know what kind of action to take. Britain may have seen the decline coming, but not connected it to a lack of university education. Clear solutions do not always present themselves to policy makers or individuals facing difficult decisions. Second, even if policy makers are aware of what the best solution may be, they may lack the capability to achieve it. Britain may have been aware that creating a university system rivalling Germany or the US was necessary to remain competitive, but lacked the ability, through lack of resources, to create such a system. Third, although the solution to a particular problem may be clear and the resources available, policy makers are often stymied by a lack of political will to achieve the desired reform. The best policies often do not become law due to powerful political, social or economic interests that stand in the way of reform. Would, though it might have been possible, the established educational interests in Britain at the time allowed for massive expansion of higher education, particularly focused on scientific and technical research?
Mokyr reminded us that invention leads to innovation which leads to technological progress and that all of these components are necessary to development. The same can be said for policy makers facing the challenges of a modern globalizing and technologically advanced economy. They must recognize the circumstances, ascertain the best course of action, and have the resources to effectively follow that course and the political will to achieve its implementation. Without each of these factors, one cannot say that the state has wilfully chosen to succeed or fail. As we reflect on the experience of Britain during industrialization or the current challenges facing policy makers, it is helpful to remain aware of the complex course the must be navigated in the creation of effective policy.
Bibliography
Aston, T.S. The Industrial Revolution: 1760-1830. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997.
Berg, Maxine. The Age of Manufactures 1700-1820: Industry, innovation and work in Britain. 2nd Ed. London: Routledge. 1994.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Industry and Empire: The Birth of the Industrial Revolution. New York: The New Press, 1999.
Mokyr, Joel. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Morgan, Kenneth. The Birth of Industrial Britain: Social Change, 1750-1850. Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited. 2004.