Disobedience and Fear of War

Disobedience and fear of war

British isolationism

The British government informed Castlereagh of their growing concern regarding the polish issue in a despatch from Liverpool on the 28th October 1814. In this letter Liverpool orders the foreign secretary to refrain from challenging Russia on the Polish issue, pointing to the fact that Britain had more pressing priorities.[1] To reiterate this sentiment in the British cabinet, the Prime Minister enclosed a memorandum, written by Vansittart, that highlights what the consequences of Castlereagh’s continued action might be.[2]The instructions carried significant weight because Castlereagh played a more reserved role at the Congress hereafter.[3] Castlereagh accepts his instructions, in a letter to Liverpool on 11thNovember, and explains to his superior that his actions were borne out of a continued desire to secure Britain’s principle aims for the congress.[4]

Liverpool informs Castlereagh that it is ‘the impression of our other colleagues…that we have done enough on the question of Poland’, with the reasoning that because of the Russian position ‘no agreement respecting Poland can now be either creditable or satisfactory.’[5]This view is substantiated in Vansittart’s memorandum, which commends Castlereagh attempts to support ‘the endeavours of Austria and Prussia’, but contends that ultimately Britain had now ‘fully performed all that could be expected’ from her.[6]Of the cabinet ministers, Vansittart was Castlereagh’s biggest critic, and had a reputation supporting isolationist policy in Europe.[7]That said Castlereagh’s failure thus far in negotiating with the Tsar also clearly resulted in a loss of faith from supporters such as Liverpool and Bathurst, especially asthe cabinet were preoccupied with the protracted war with America.[8]

The strain of the Anglo-American War is one of the reasons for withdrawing from the Polish discussions asserts Liverpool; who writes that continued aggravation ofRussia might result in their support of the American cause.[9]The Vansittart memorandum instructs Castlereagh ‘to avoid irritating Russia’, as it may be regarded in Europe that Britain act out of ‘jealousy to Russia.’[10]The cabinets biggest concern is that Castlereagh’s actions may cause Russia cause them to reintroduce the question of maritime rights to the congress, and therefore possibly surrender their primary achievement.[11] This despatch illustrates that the government wanted to preserve Britain’s international position by following an imperialist and maritime foreign policy. Thus they substantiate Schroeder’s view that Britain’s policy, particularly after Napoleon’s defeat, was to become the leading hegemonic power ahead of Russia.[12]As discussed in the first two chapters, Castlereagh had essentially ensured all Britain’s main securities by the Peace of Paris, and his superiors feared that these could be jeopardised by Castlereagh’s resistance to Russia over Poland.

Conversely these letters indicate that the British government took a simplified view of the Polish issue. SasasLiverpool writes that Britain ‘should withdraw ourselves from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for points on which we have a more immediate and direct interest.’[13] Similarly Vansittart argues that the future of Poland is ‘of no great political importance to us anyway.’[14] Here, as Castlereagh points out in his letter to Liverpool on 11thNovember, is where a greaterunderstandingof the consequences is required.[15] Castlereagh explains that he too was induced ‘to undervalue the importance attached by the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets to the polish question’; until it became clear, because of Alexander’s position, that the battleground for ‘negotiation would then turn upon Saxony.’[16]The future of Germany, as outlined in the memorandum of 26th December, was of secondary importance to the cabinet.[17]

The reality of the Saxon issue would have implications to Britain, however, and Castlereagh is at pains to explain this to Liverpool. If Prussia absorbed all of Saxony to compensate for the Polish settlement, there was a possibility that a German League would cover and potential ‘expose’ the Low Countries.[18]Thus, as Castlereagh, argues; by consequence the Polish issue could affect the security of Holland and the Low Countries, which amounts to a ‘particular interest’ of the British government.[19]This observation is of paramount importance, as it illustrates that although Castlereagh’s perceptions of the Polish issue differed greatly to his cabinet, he still believed that his actions were necessary to cement the securities he had achieved earlier in 1814. It suggests that Castlereagh was the only member of the British government, with the exception of Wellington who he had notified of these consequencesalready, that appreciated that these negotiations would have an effect on securing British aims.

Nevertheless the British government, as Liverpool’s despatch of 25th October illuminates, felt that Castlereagh had become embroiled in these negotiations and that required orders of restraint. Castlereagh even states that he became ‘more involved than I should have permitted myself.’[20] Perhaps, as Dallas argues, he became so central to the negotiations that he did not know how to retreat from the crisis.[21]Significantly Castlereagh ends his correspondence with a warning that the peace ‘which we have so dearly purchased, will be of short duration.’[22] War was not an option for Great Britain, and the government duly issued Castlereagh with his sternest instructions to date.

Alexander’s demands in Poland had created a deadlock in the negotiations by the 21st November.[23] The strain this put on the Saxon negotiations has already been made clear. Bathurst wrote to Castlereagh on the 27th November to inform him of the sentiments of the Prince Regent, who ‘cannot contemplate the present state of Europe.’[24]The War secretary relays that the Prince Regent ‘deeply laments the course which the discussions at Vienna have taken respecting Poland’, and ‘entirely approves of the firm and decided manner’ in which Castlereagh has attempted to resist Russian aggrandisement.[25]Insert quoteThe tone of Bathurst’s message seems to convey that the Prince Regent, who had a close relationship with Castlereagh, understood the difficulty of Castlereagh’s position at Vienna.[26]George was also a European at heart and would have supported Castlereagh’s efforts until war threatened.[27]

For this reason the remainder of his message is all the more compelling. Bathurst paraphrases that His Royal Highness has ‘the most serious apprehensions of the consequences which would result from the renewal of war on the Continent under present circumstances.’[28] The significance is that even those who share Castlereagh’s view for Europe, and appreciate his position in the negotiations, are now ordering him to withdraw from the Polish and Saxon issues. Bathurst’s final message, on behalf of the Prince Regent, is to explain the expectation that Castlereagh will aim ‘to prevent, by all the means in your power, so great an evil’ as war.[29]

These correspondenceillustrate that Castlereagh had lost the confidence of his government to reach a settlement over the Polish issue, and thus ordered him to withdraw from the negotiations. Castlereaghadmits himself that he became too heavily involved and was endeavouring to achieve the ‘establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe’ that seemed an impossibility.[30] From the end of November Castlereagh had to endeavour to prevent European war to follow his government wishes. Circumstance dictated the opportunity to continue to preserve British interests, with an entirely different course of action. Alexander had relinquished leader status by double-dealing over Poland, and subsequently lost Austrian trust.[31]By the middle of December Castlereagh understood that Poland was lost but that he still had an opportunity to save Saxony.[32] In order to achieve this he would have to deliberately disregarded his instructions of his government, and threaten war against Russia and Prussia.

The Defensive Alliance January 1815

Castlereagh’s resistance to Prussian desires in Saxony came after Prussia had deserted Britain in their attempts to object to Russian plans for Poland; this action coincidently aligned with British public opinion, which had favoured Saxon independence since November.[33]Talleyrand sufficiently enraged the Prussians with two notes on 19th and 26th December where he insisted that the dethronement of the Saxon king undermined traditional principles of legitimacy.[34] On the 29th December Hardenberg threatened war.[35] Castlereagh wrote to Liverpool on the 1st January explaining these volatile developments, and indicates his plans to resist their demands.[36]

Castlereagh reports that the language of the Prussians ‘is very warlike, and strongly against yielding any part of Saxony, and that Humboldt actually refuses ‘to discuss such alternatives as might be proposed.’[37]Prussia had supported Russian plans for Poland, and therefore would expect reciprocal support over Saxony, which explains their threatening attitude.[38] The Prussians certainly gave the impression that they were prepared to go to war over this issue. The letter supports this and Castlereagh reports that the Prussians were ‘organising their army for the field…and are employed in fortifying Dresden’, and from this point onwards the Prussian Cabinet regard that an opposition to their annexation of Saxony ‘as tantamount to a declaration of war.’[39]

Although the British public desired an independent Saxony, this was subordinate to the priority to avoid war, and Castlereagh was well aware of the ‘impossibility’ for European hostilities from Bathurst’s letter of 27th November.[40]The foreign secretary, as he endeavoured to do throughout the continental negotiations, still explains to Liverpool how these new developments could affect British securities. In this case the military occupation of Saxony and presence ‘on the left bank of the Rhine has been extremely vexatious of late towards the Prince of Orange’s government.’[41] The security of Holland was therefore endangered by Prussian militarisation and Castlereagh felt that this was a sufficient danger to ignore his instructions from London.[42] Castlereagh indicates that it was impossible to abate the Prussians on this issue and informs Liverpool that he plans ‘concert with the French and Austrian plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Defensive Alliance.’[43] Thus Castlereagh had, for the first time since leaving Britain, deliberately flouted the orders of his government.

An alliance between Britain, France and Austria against Prussia and Russia was signed on the 3rd January 1815, with the invitation for the United Netherlands, Hannover and Bavaria invited to accede.[44] The third article of the treaty ‘provided that an attack upon Hanover or the Low Countries would be regarded as an attack on Great Britain’ and the other signatories would support military resistance to Prussian aggression in these territories.[45]There are two significances of this agreement. First Castlereagh had ignored his orders to avoid war at all costs.[46] Second, as the third article states, Castlereagh’s actions had ultimately safeguarded Britain’s primary concern in Europe that the cabinet had outlined a year earlier. Castlereagh specifically indicates on the 1st January that he sought an alliance ‘confined within the strict necessity of this extraordinary case.’[47]This illustrates an appreciation that this related specifically to Prussian militarisation and that it would not have wider consequences.

There is some contention to who should be accorded credit for the Defensive Alliance of 3rd January, and Nicholson credits Talleyrand for this security.[48]Duff cooperKissinger however criticises historians for exaggerating Talleyrand’s role.[49] Indeed Castlereagh writes that he planned to consult the other parties ‘as an act of imperative duty.’[50]Both Hinde and Thomspon credit the foreign secretary for this tripartite alliance.[51] Castlereagh certainly had a central role to play, and undeniably defied the wishes of the Prince Regent, Liverpool and his government. Castlereagh was fortunate though, and his actions did not receive the negative reaction one might assume. Castlereagh writes to Liverpool on 5th January 1815, stating ‘I have every reason to hope that the alarm of war is over.’[52]The treaty frightened Alexander, who knew that his military were exhausted from the war with Napoleon, and he subsequently betrayed Prussia.[53]Prussia, as Castlereagh writes, then sought compromise and agreed to discuss ‘a suitable modification of the Saxon question.’[54]

Castlereagh’s actions did not persuade the British government to the course of action taken, but Castlereagh does allude to what did; ‘our pacification with America.’[55]

As it transpired an Anglo-American peace was also signed on the 3rd January.[56]The relief of this extended war meant that Castlereagh’s actions were praised by Bathurst, and later approved by the Prime Minister.[57]Metternich formally agreed the terms for the Saxon and Polish settlements on 28thJanuary.[58]The difficult issues had been resolved, and Castlereagh had had a varying degree of influence in this process. Liverpool, facing considerable pressure from the Whigs and the Radicals over British foreign policy, required Castlereagh’s presence before parliament assembled in February.[59] Castlereagh’s duties at the Congress of Vienna were completed, and although he actively defied the wishes of his government and threatened war in his penultimate month, his letters indicated that his priority was always to ensure that British aims were achieved. In the end the Polish and Saxon issues were resolved fortuitously, with Castlereagh consistently acting to achieve British aims until the last.

[1] Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, (ed.) by his son The Duke of Wellington (London, 1872) (henceforth W. S. D.), Harvard University Library Online (henceforth HUL), v. IX, p.382.

[2] Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[3]Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 103 : Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.

[4]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[5]Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[6] Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[7]Bew, Castlereagh, p.330.

[8]Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.

[9]Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[10] Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[11] Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[12]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 534.

[13]Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[14] Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

[15]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[16]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[17]Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

[18]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[19]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[20]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[21]Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.

[22]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[23]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 173.

[24]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[25]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[26]Bew, Castlereagh, p. 469.

[27]Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 458.

[28]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[29]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[30]Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

[31]Marcham, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 340.

[32]Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 225.

[33]Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 107-8.

[34]Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 177.

[35]ibid.

[36]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[37]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[38]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 528.

[39]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[40]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[41]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[42]Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226.

[43]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[44]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.

[45]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 178.

[46]Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.

[47]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[48]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.

[49] Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna, p. 267.

[50]Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.

[51]Hinde, Castlereagh,p. 226: Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.

[52]Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.

[53]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.

[54]Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.

[55]Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.

[56]Hinde, Castlereagh,p. 226.

[57]Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.

[58]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.

[59]Derry, Castlereagh, p. 173