Die Kognitivität Des Glaubens in Bolzanos Religionsphilosophie Bezogen Auf Die Realismusdebatte

Justification and Context

Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik, Ljubljana

The general drive in epistemology is to deliver necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge with the use of exceptionless general epistemic principles. There is another way, however, to approach the phenomenon of knowledge – by particularistic beautiful patterns. David Lewis in his paper „Elusive Knowledge” provides a nice contextual epistemology. We also think that contextualism is the right way to go and that the epistemic context plays an important role in our endeavors to gain knowledge. But, we disagree with Lewis on two points of his account, namely that we can talk of knowledge without justification and that a set of exceptionless rules determines relevant alternatives. We retain the overall notion of knowledge as justified true belief and try to work out a contextualist account of knowledge within this notion, at the same time pointing to an alternative, particularistic view on relevance and relevant alternatives. We briefly sketch our proposal building upon the distinction between the local and global justification and we put forward some suggestions how this approach tackles skeptical scenarios, the lottery problem and Gettier cases.

1. The definition based account of knowledge

For a long time, and in diverse ways, one has tried to deliver a story of knowledge by definitory means. Here is the definition of knowledge:

Kap =def p Bap Jap

where a is for a subject, p is for a given proposition and K, B,J respectively figure for operators of knowledge, belief and justification. Subject S will know that p in the case p is true, S happens to believe p and there is a proper justificatory route leading to this belief.

The definition of knowledge was provided by Plato in an informal manner. But it was only with the explicit definition of knowledge in analytic epistemology, such as it is furnished above, that the chase for an ultimate assessment of conditions for knowledge was really open. One has witnessed the spelling out of each imaginable proposal to capture conditions for knowledge, the chase proceeding over all possible counterexamples to the definition of knowledge. A case in point is the Gettier counterexample showing the possibility of justified true belief failing to result in knowledge.

The definition-based approach to knowledge tried to deliver necessary and sufficient conditions. It also proceeds by the usage of general exceptionless principles for determining knowledge. This certainly has enriched epistemology and it has provided a wide and rich range of ways to look at knowledge. But on the other hand, it seems perhaps time to conclude that all the excellent minds preoccupied to find a definition of knowledge have failed to deliver because they were operating on the basis of a false presupposition: that there is a possible account of knowledge by the means of a definition providing necessary and sufficient conditions on the basis of exceptionless general principles.

Perhaps the nature of knowledge simply resists definitions. Definitions would provide a generalist pattern, where knowledge would be specified for a whole range of cases. If the lesson of the definition-based account’s failure is taken to heart, then it may finally happen that there is no generalist pattern around to take care of knowledge.

Some signs point in the direction that we should free ourselves of general patterns. There is the shift from the naturalized epistemology towards an interest in a priori forms of knowledge and in intuition. Virtue epistemology also aims at knowledge as something that escapes the approach by usage of exceptionless generalities.

One proposal is to mellow the pressure of general requirements for justification, say, to general principles allowing for exceptions or ceteris paribus clauses. One may also embrace quasi-particularism as the way to account for knowledge. Quasi-particularism still retains ceteris paribus principles all in believing that thereby it has already taken over the holistic point of view. But the radical proposal is particularism.

Particularism was elaborated for the area of morality, claiming that one should oppose the atomist persistence of a feature’s value over a range of cases, and that one should allow for the change of a feature’s contribution along the rich and intractable pressures of its dynamical holistic environment. Although moral particularism is elaborated for the moral thought, the idea of particularism originated in the area of causality. We accordingly propose to extend particularism to such areas as metaphysics and epistemology. An important device related to particularism is what we call unique and holistic beautiful patterns, which we oppose to generalist patterns. There is a generalist opinion allowing for relevance in several areas to be achieved only upon the basis of generalist patterns. But we believe that relevance comes from particularist beautiful patterns. This stresses the point that the particular does not need to be arbitrary and that it is not arbitrary indeed.

If one takes beautiful patterns as one’s departure, then such features as phenomenology become an important constitutive ingredient of the subjective account of justification or knowledge. However, this should not point in the direction of limiting our approach to the first-person perspective which would perhaps lead us away from the contextualist features that we endorse.(FOOTNOTE 1) Contextualism in epistemology should be compatible with truth-tracking. Moreover, beautiful patterns featuring knowledge should not be arbitrary to any lesser extent than are the moral decisions taken on the basis of considerations in the particular holistic circumstances. The phenomenology of knowing, so to say, was just sorely underestimated because of the blind subscription to knowledge as resulting only from generalist patterns.(FOOTNOTE 2)

2. Elusive knowledge

In his paper “Elusive Knowledge” David Lewis provides a well-taken contextual epistemology. We also think that contextualism is the right way to go and that the epistemic context plays an important role in our endeavors to gain knowledge.

David Lewis is well-known as a contextualist. In his paper “Scorekeeping in the Language Game” he provided a pragmatic contextual variation-based approach, whereby he accounted for multiple normative pressures determining the position and meaning of terms in a conversational sequence. Expressions such as “flat” or “tall” may have different truth-values attached to them depending on the variation in context. Lewis tries to capture the forces that determine the semantic contributions of elements in a context by a series of general accommodation rules.

The paper “Elusive Knowledge” is basically an extension of the scorekeeping approach to the area of epistemology. Lewis appropriates epistemic contextualism and he also formulates a set of rules that account for conditions of knowledge.

As a proponent of common sense, Lewis’ first claim is that we know a lot. But, this claim of knowledge gets shattered once we try to assess it in the framework of epistemological investigation. At this point we meet the skeptic. The tension is eventually resolved by taking into account the difference between strong norms in the context of epistemology and much weaker norm requirements in the context of ordinary circumstances. Of the two evils of contextualism and fallibilism we may somehow embrace the latter.

Here is the definition of knowledge provided by Lewis:

“S knows that p iff

(i) S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-P

(ii) – Psst! – except for those possibilities that we are properly ignoring.”(FOOTNOTE 3)

The evidence in (i) refers to the reasons for accepting knowledge, and p refers to the situations where p does not hold. As for (ii), it sets the scope of possibilities that one can properly ignore according to the context in which one finds oneself. An example figures skeptic situations that may be properly ignored in the ongoing activity of the daily life. We may also properly ignore matrix possibilities because these are worlds far away from our usual situation.

Part (i) of Lewis’ definition of knowledge aims at the evidence concerning the case in question and at its elimination. Part (ii) of this same definition aims at what may be relevant for proper ignoring in a situation. We use both (i) and (ii) in order to confront cases though, and the relation between (i) and (ii) has its own dynamics that determine what to count as knowledge.

It is crucial for such an account of knowledge that we, in some way, delimit what is relevant and should be eliminated and again what is irrelevant and can be properly ignored. This setting of limits is crucially context-dependent. We think that such contextualism offers an important insight into the nature of knowledge. Questions pertaining to knowledge could not be answered irrespective of the context in which they appear.

We also think that the contextualist insight may be pushed a little bit further by the following question: “Is there any general set of conditions that would be appropriate for an account of contextuality?”

We suppose that there is the following presupposition at work in definitions of knowledge: “Knowledge has to be provided by generalist conditions, i.e. features that determine knowledge are statable by the help of general patterns.” General patterns are those where the given features retain the same valence over a number of cases.

There is also the possibility of particularist patterns determining knowledge though, as we have claimed. Knowledge may be dependent upon rich holistic, but relevant circumstances, similarly as it happens with the moral particularism claims as the basis for moral value ascriptions.

Before going on with the specification of rules we should remark that Lewis’ definition of knowledge is revisionist in respect to the standard definition of knowledge in that it does not contain any condition for justification. Therefore, knowledge comes without justification, at least in an explicit sense. We argue though, that justification is implicitly contained in the seven rules of proper ignorance. We think that what is wrong with these rules is that they try to capture relevance (whatever is relevant to be ignored in order that knowledge is attained), which may not even be in principle feasible by tractable generalist means.

The bulk of Lewis’ knowledge proposal rests on proper ignoring. He supplies a list of rules that should be obeyed in order that one would attain knowledge. These rules that are seven in number determine what is relevant for proper ignoring in our search for knowledge (Lewis 1996, 554-560):

The rule of actuality says that whatever is actual cannot be properly ignored in our search for knowledge.

The rule of belief says that we should not ignore something in the case in which we have good reasons to believe it. The rule of actuality matches the truth condition in determining knowledge and the rule of belief somehow matches the belief condition. Together, they offer true belief conditions for relevant knowledge considerations.

The rule of resemblance says that of two very similar possibilities both should be either rejected or considered. Lottery ticket situations where a ticket wins or where a ticket looses resemble each other. And so it is with the Gettier case where somebody looks at the clock that unbeknownst to him stopped at 5pm, and with the resembling situation in which he would take a glance at the same clock at 4:40pm.

The rule of reliability is a positive rule determining what to trust, in opposition to the former rules of actuality, belief and resemblance that determine what is to be ignored. Lewis thinks that such processes and institutions as perception, memory and reliable testimony are reliable in ordinary contexts.

The rules of method pertaining to non-deductive inference figure the representativity of samples and the reliability of the best explanation, i.e. induction and abduction.

The rule of conservatism appreciates the common knowledge of the community to which we happen to belong.

The rule of attention says that once we become attentive to some alternative, we cannot properly ignore it anymore. This is a controversial rule for the reason that once we really become attentive to scepticism, no evidence can be available to demonstrate the truth of the contrary position.

3. No justification and rules

We disagree with Lewis on two points of his account, namely that:

(a) We can talk of knowledge without justification.

(b) There is a set of exceptionless rules determining relevant alternatives.

“Between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism, the former represents the less intrusive madness”, says David Lewis at the beginning of his “Elusive Knowledge”. We agree with this common sense pull-away from skepticism in respect to our ordinary knowledge. But we disagree with some features of Lewis’ contextualist solution to problems in epistemology. The points in question relate to Lewis’ giving up justification as an important aspect of knowledge(FOOTNOTE4) as well as his list of rules that determine relevant alternatives for his conception of knowledge. We think that relevance and salience cannot be captured by general rules.

When Lewis finishes with his description of the “rules of relevance”, he points out something that we think is very important in his account – degrees of knowledge. The more possibilities that we have eliminated by our evidence and the less that we have ignored, the better this will be for our knowledge. A better knowledge gives us more stability while we change the context (Lewis 1996, 562-563). And, if our ignoring was correct (even if we have done lots of it) our knowledge will still be real knowledge in some epistemically safe contexts(FOOTNOTE 5).

We think that Lewis gives up justification much too easily and that we can still make sense of knowledge as justified true belief. The overall argument for this may only become clear once we expose our proposed account of knowledge and justification. But here are some preliminary thoughts. Lewis says that justification is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for having knowledge. In the lottery problem, one has all the justification that one may wish, but one still lacks real knowledge. And in the case of getting knowledge through perception and memory, there is no non-circular argument that would justify our usage of them. Still we think that Lewis needs some notion of justification, even if the justification comes back into his account at the second level or at the meta-level. At least one needs some kind of justification to justify the placement of a borderline between those relevant alternatives which one has to eliminate and between the non-relevant alternatives which one can properly ignore.

And as far as the second point of disagreement is concerned, we repeat that notions of relevance and salience cannot be suitably included into the contextualist approach to epistemology in the form of general rules. Both notions are essentially context-dependent and their normativity is particularistic.(FOOTNOTE 6) We do not put them into the general rules-guided patterns, but make use of particular beautiful patterns as the only candidates for capturing the normative force of the context.

Knowledge and justification. Lewis argues that justification is not the mark of knowledge because it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. The former is exposed by the lottery problem, where an epistemic agent has practically more justification for believing that his ticket will lose as he does for almost every other ordinary belief. But it still intuitively seems to us that he cannot claim to know that his ticket will loose. Justification as the necessary condition fails in the case of our reliance upon perception, memory or testimony, where no non-circular argument can be given for our forming of beliefs and knowledge by those means.(FOOTNOTE 7) As far as the first part of the argument is concerned, we believe that we can propose a contextualist solution to the lottery problem which still relies on justification. Furthermore, we think that Lewis’ own account could not manage without justification, and that justification is captured by his rules from the third up to the seventh rule. In our view, justification (which appears in the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief) amounts to having good reasons for belief together with the additional condition that we form a belief because of these good normative reasons.(FOOTNOTE 8) If both of these conditions are met, we can say that we are being justified in holding some belief that p.

Rules of relevance. Lewis tries to give some general account about which alternatives are relevant and consequently, about which possibilities must be eliminated or properly ignored. These rules do not come in a strict order of priority and conflicts between them are well possible. Furthermore, as Cohen has shown, it is far from clear exactly how to understand those rules, especially in the light of the speaker-sensitive/subject-sensitive distinction (Cohen 1998, 294). Cohen also demonstrates that the list of rules provided by Lewis does not lead to a straight solution for the skeptic, lottery, and Gettier cases. We agree with this criticism. We think that here we meet the consequences of treating relevance by means of exceptionless general rules that delimit the scope of relevant alternatives in Lewis’ conception of knowledge. We observe relevance and salience as altogether contextual, and therefore as basic for contextualism. A really contextualist epistemology should show full respect to the normative power of the context in determining which epistemic possibilities are relevant or how wide our justification should be for claiming that we possess knowledge.