NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance
4 December 2003
FINAL REPORT
Coordinated by the Peace Operations Working Group of the
Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
1
NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance
Table of Contents
Introduction2
Context Setting: the political and security situation in Afghanistan3
A government perspective on PRTs and their implications4
An NGO Perspective on PRTs and their implications6
Discussion Points7
General context setting points7
Resource issues7
Role and structure of PRTs8
NGO involvement with PRTs9
Canadian Priorities for PRTs9
Lessons learned from previous conflicts10
Civil society discussion on possible recommendations and actions11
Problems with current PRT structure and roles11
Resource issues11
Relationship between PRTs and NGOs12
Potential utility of PRTs12
Role and structure of a potential Canadian PRT13
Other recommendations14
Acknowledgments15
Dialogue Participants15
Introduction
In February, 2003, the United States Army initiated the first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Gardez, Afghanistan, followed shortly thereafter by PRTs in Kunduz and Bamyan and a British-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif. New Zealand and German-led models have also since been established. The stated objectives of the PRTs are to advance the central government’s presence throughout Afghanistan and to provide direct support to the reconstruction effort.
Many civil society organizations active in Afghanistan have expressed concern over the establishment of PRTs and the type of work they are carrying out. While it is broadly recognized that PRTs can make a significant contribution to improving security and security sector reform, there is significant unease over the role which PRTs have been playing in providing emergency assistance and engaging in humanitarian-type projects. It is feared that such military-led interventions put humanitarian agencies at risk by blurring the line between military activities and neutral or impartial humanitarian action.
Recently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence sent a joint fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. Part of this mission’s mandate was to make an assessment of PRTs with a view to delineating a Canadian position on their value and potential.
In order to enable Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to examine these issues in greater detail and formulate recommendations related to their own work and to the government, the Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee hosted a one-day government/NGO dialogue on PRTs in Afghanistan and, more broadly, on the militarization of humanitarian assistance. The seminar took place on December 4th, 2003, at Carleton University.
The following report is a summary of the presentations and discussions which took place during the dialogue. In accordance with Chatham House Rules, points raised during the dialogue are not attributed to individuals in this report. The recommendations contained within the report were derived from discussions amongst civil society representatives only. These are also reflected in a separate document, entitled “Key Civil Society Recommendations.”
The Peace Operations Working Group would like to thank the World Federalist Movement-Canada, CARE Canada, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre for their generous financial and in-kind contributions towards this dialogue.
The NGO/Government dialogue was coordinated by Steve Mason, who also wrote the present report. Copies of the package of documents distributed to all dialogue participants can be made available electronically through the World Federalist Movement-Canada.
Context Setting: The Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan
The context in Afghanistan today is completely unlike other post-conflict scenarios, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, or Kosovo – Afghanistan is unique, and the tools used to address it from a humanitarian and reconstruction perspective must also be unique. There are more reasons to be worried about security now than in the days of the Taliban, due to the lack of government control and the degree of lawlessness.
There are two crucial elements hindering development and reconstruction in Afghanistan: the lack of international funding and the lack of security.
Lack of international funding: Afghanistan has been treated less generously than other post-conflict situations. For example, much less money has flowed into Afghanistan than into Iraq, which has fewer people, less pressing need and is more self-sufficient. The lack of funding primarily impacts the ability for reconstruction to take place: of the initial $4.5 billion (US) that was allocated internationally for reconstruction, most of it went to humanitarian assistance instead. Reportedly, less than $0.5 billion (US) went towards reconstruction last year – much less than in Iraq or East Timor. Reconstruction and extension of the transport infrastructure are essential because it is extremely difficult to get supplies to remote regions – there are few passable roads.
Lack of security: NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops are currently confined to Kabul. In the rest of country, coalition forces are present under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and, in many areas, warlords are in control. The best estimate available indicates that over 100,000 people belong to militias, which are fighting each other in the north and west of the country. In the south and east, remnants of the Taliban remain. The lack of security makes it possible for the warlords to maintain and spread their influence and carry out personal agendas, including poppy production.
Poppy production is a major inhibitor to re-establishment of the agriculture sector and reconstruction. Since poppies can grow anywhere, and the value of a crop of poppies is approximately ten times the value of a crop of wheat, farmers with little water or resources grow poppies. The estimated street value in Europe of the heroin that originates in Afghanistan is $100 billion (US).
What is needed is a major international security force that is active throughout the country, and not just in Kabul. There are major reconstruction and economic development needs, but no security in which to meet them. Such a force would not only enable international NGOs to venture outside Kabul, but would also facilitate the impressive work which Afghans are doing by and for themselves.
A Government Perspective on PRTs and their Implications
The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan in October. The rationale for the mission was to acquire a better understanding of PRTs in view of developing an option for Canadian Forces after August 2004, when the Canadian contingent’s NATO mandate comes to an end.
PRTs are a recent phenomenon. Lessons are being learned on how best to organize and deploy them.They have changed considerably over the last year, and will likely continue to change. It is important that PRTs and NGOs find the right balance for the sharing of work. The success of the reconstruction effort and of a viable exit strategy depends considerably on NGO work and the work of government development departments.
PRTs were first launched, as a concept, in November 2002 with the goal of doing reconstruction work as a part of Phase IV of the operations of coalition forces[1]. But because the reconstruction phase has not been fully launched, the objectives of PRTs have become less clear-cut: they now carry out a mix of offensive and reconstruction operations. Although this may seem to be contradictory, both types of operation in fact share the same goal – the creation of a stable government.
There are various PRT models currently being implemented, and a considerable difference between how PRTs are run by the US, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Germany. They vary in both focus and size. The UK model has an emphasis on security, with the desired impact being a large circle of security surrounding a small circle of reconstruction. In the US model, there is an effort to develop an “optimal” PRT by 2005. An optimal PRT has a much stronger government presence than current models.
NATO is also developing a PRT model, and has launched a pilot project in Kunduz, where the Germans are currently operating. Pending resources and mandate, this PRT is intended to be transferred completely to ISAF by June 2004. The lessons learned from this will be applied to other PRTs, and NATO will then look to take on others. The model may change again.
While different PRT models need to be tailored to the needs of different regions, the basic role remains the same: to help stimulate development of security sector reform and to aid in the reconstruction effort. They serve as platforms through which the government can become engaged in a region. The objective is to accomplish this while leaving only a small footprint – PRTs are not to be seen as an army of occupation. Only 60-100 people are typically associated with a PRT.
In the event that Canada decides to become involved in a PRT, it is important to understand the mix of military/civilian components, how NGOs fit in and how PRTs can assist in furthering the peace process.
In a potential Canadian model, it could be envisioned that representatives from a wide variety of government departments and agencies – the RCMP, Canada Customs, Health Canada, Canadian Heritage, for example – would work with the military and with their Afghan government equivalents. It could serve as a platform from which the Afghan government can move out into a region and develop its institutions.
From a military point of view, there is no intention or desire for PRTs to result in the militarization of humanitarian assistance. Any humanitarian assistance projects conducted by military forces are civil/military activities that are designed for force protection and to ensure that the locals and the military are friendly. These are small scale activities only, and the military does not want to be involved in larger scale humanitarian work.
When representatives from DND and DFAIT met with CARE and Oxfam before the fact-finding mission, they were asked why a similar approach to the one taken in Bosnia cannot be taken in Afghanistan. The problem is that NATO has had trouble generating sufficient forces for the mission in Kabul. There are currently only 5,000 troops, and it is not likely that there will be many more in the future. So PRTs may be an effective way to extend ISAF’s reach and results with limited numbers of troops.
When thinking about PRTs, it is important to keep in mind what they are not:
- PRTs have an ambiguous mandate under Operation Enduring Freedom. They are not traditional peacekeeping operations: they do not have a Chapter VI or a Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter. An ISAF-led PRT would have a Security Council mandate, but the UN mandate in Afghanistan is assistance-oriented only (through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)). PRTs have as their fundamental concept the assistance component: to build the capacity of the Afghan government.
- they are not a substitute for the national government. They have a facilitative role, and offer civil/military expertise in a particular region. They are meant to determine what is impeding security and work with the central government to address these specific factors through a combination of incentives and coercion.
- they are not capable of solving all conflicts, but are capable of mitigating some conflicts.
PRTs are capable of mobilizing limited international resources, and making maximal use of these resources.
The international community is attracted to the PRT concept for a number of reasons. First, because there will never be large numbers of forces in Afghanistan, especially compared to Kosovo or Bosnia. Second, because a large force is not universally seen as the best approach for Afghanistan. Third, because aid effectiveness criteria stress putting Afghans up front in the reconstruction effort. PRTs are designed to build capacity, put Afghans up front and draw lessons from them. It may not be working as well as envisioned, and it would be easier if there were larger numbers of troops in the short-term, but PRTs are an innovative solution to try to realize desired objectives with existing resources.
An NGO Perspective on PRTs and their Implications
Afghanistan today is much less safe than under the Taliban regime. The context has changed: westerners are seen as an enemy, Afghans who work with them are seen as collaborators.
Initially after the fall of the Taliban, there was relative calm in Afghanistan and a grace period for reconstruction. This is now over. In the past year, the security situation has worsened from a rate of one violent attack on an aid agency each month to one a day. Twelve aid workers have been killed and dozens wounded. The development costs of insecurity are mounting, and these were not factored into the calculations made at the Tokyo conference on Afghan reconstruction. Aid to over 600,000 Afghans has been delayed or cancelled because of insecurity.
Many people feel disenfranchised by the new government and the way in which local and national government representatives were selected. Militias draw financial support from a variety of sources, including the coalition forces and Pakistan.
The value of the opium trade is significantly greater than the total reconstruction package. To date, the primary response of the international community to the security crisis has been the coalition campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This does not take into account the security threats against ordinary Afghans by militias and warlords. Impunity flourishes in Kabul and the countryside, and justice is not available to most Afghans.
PRTs, as initially conceived, are inadequate for the reconstruction effort, let alone the security needs of Afghans. To date, PRTs are being set up in relatively secure areas, for example Herat. Energy and resources invested in PRT reconstruction projects divert those inputs from much-needed security sector reform.
Despite this, PRTs have had some success. The British-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif has defused a crisis between two northern warlords. This is a good example of what a well-designed ISAF mission should be able to achieve.
A more appropriate name for a PRT would be an “ISAF security support team”(ISST) – this would be clearer in terms of mandate. These teams should be set up in the most insecure parts of the country. They should train and conduct joint operations with the police and the Afghanistan National Army. They should disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former militias and fill the security gap. They should remove heavy weapons from urban areas, especially Kabul. ISSTs should help the Afghan government address the drug problem, which cannot be contained without international assistance. They should also help rehabilitate government buildings, roads and bridges.
ISSTs will need to be properly selected for their mediating, peacebuilding, policing and training skills. The cultural sensitivity and discipline of foreign troops is very important. Sufficient numbers of troops will be needed. One hundred individuals involved in a particular PRT is too few, especially when half are civilians.
In summary:
- The role of the UN is vital in facing the daunting challenges in Afghanistan. It should serve as the coordinating body for all reconstruction and security sector reform operations.
- PRTs are not an adequate or proportionate response to the severity of the current security situation in Afghanistan.
- PRT resources flowing into reconstruction projects are a diversion of resources away from the more crucial element of security sector reform.
- There is continuing confusion with the name and mandate of PRTs. The emphasis on reconstruction in “PRT” implies a competition with aid organizations. ISAF Security Support Team is a preferable name.
- A division between ISAF-run PRTs in the North and coalition-run PRTs in the South can further divide Afghanistan. It is better if all PRTs are under the same mandate – ISAF’s.
Discussion Points
During the discussion period, participants further elaborated on the current context in Afghanistan, issues related to the amount of international resources devoted to the country’s reconstruction, the structure and role of PRTs, the shape of a potential Canadian-led PRT, and the role and work of NGOs in Afghanistan. The key discussion points are summarized below.
General Context-Setting Points
When discussing the situation in Afghanistan, it is important to keep the political context in mind. The Afghan government is not looking at reform and reconstruction from a single viewpoint. There is a real struggle within the cabinet over the future direction of the country. When people refer to extending the authority of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), they are really talking about extending the authority of some key elements within the ATA.