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Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

MISSION REPORT*

washington d.c. and norfolk, VA,

united states

27 – 30 January 2015

May 2015

*This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

I.Introduction

  1. The Defence and Security Committee (DSC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly launched its 2015 programme with a visit to the United States in late January 2015. The Committee made its way through a series of meetings with US Congressional members of the NATO PA delegation, representatives from the US Departments of State and Defense, Washington-based research and policy analysis institutions, US Fleet Forces – Norfolk, and to Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The delegation consisted of legislators representing NATO member states. NATO PA President, Mike Turner (R-OH) and DSC Chairperson, Nicole Ameline (France) led the group through a four-day parliamentary mission at a critical time for the Alliance.
  1. A constant central driver of the Defence Committee’s annual visitsto Washington is to underscore and highlight the importance of the transatlantic bond: it is the most critical element to the Alliance’s well-being at any given time, particularly today during such a transitional and relatively tense period in the Alliance’s history. 2014 rattled all nations of the Alliance: Russian regional aggression changed the boundaries of a European state, challenging European norms of international behaviour since the end of World War II; and, the rapid rise and disruptive capabilities of Daesh[1],threatening to bring down the political order of the modern Middle East and challenge the stability of NATO’s southern flank. The rise of Daeshis also deeply unsettling to all Alliance member states as they saw thousands of their nationals flock to join its ranks. The risk that some of these Europeans and North Americans fighting with Daeshwill return home brings a new, ominous terrorism threat to the core of the Alliance. The two-pronged challenge on NATO’s southern and eastern flanks was thus the centrepiece of the DSC’s meetings, briefings, and discussions throughout the parliamentary mission.
  1. Continued questions of NATO’s readiness and response capabilities, ever more pressing in the face of today’s new challenges, drove the remainder of the programme. From Washington to Norfolk the unsettling tactics of hybrid warfare and the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to confront it were hotly debated. Familiar debates of burden sharing and rising to meet the stated defence spending goals of the Wales Summit took on new energy. It is clear to the DSC that 2015 is the year to make substantial progress toward the implementation of the many important Wales Summit goals. In the face of the distributed threats posed on NATO’s southern and eastern flanks, the ability for efficient and effective collective response is more important than ever.
  1. This report will progress thematically through the central themes of the visit. First it will discuss the international security arena in which the DSC has set its 2015 goals and which helped frame the Committee’s first visit to the United States. It will then move on to discuss Russia’s actions in the Ukraine and the US and Alliance policies to confront Russian aggression. The report will also discuss Washington’s perceptions of the transatlantic link and the persistent dilemmas of burden sharing in the quest to make a truly capable and interoperable system of Alliance forces ready to meet the range of challenges the 21st century security environment. The report will then engage with the dual-pronged challenge of articulating and implementing the RAP. Finally, a discussion of the US-led campaign against Daesh and the status quo of the challenge to NATO’s southern flank will follow.

II.New Challenges to the Transatlantic Security Community – NATO in

2015

  1. 2014 ushered in two significant new challenges to NATO’s transatlantic security community – renewed Russian aggression on the eastern flank, and the rise of a powerful armed group disrupting the political order in the Middle East, attracting fighters from all corners of the globe. By their nature, the threats pose distinct challenges to the Alliance in ways never before seen in its history: Russia remains principally a state-state challenge, while the rise of Daesh is that of a
    non-state armed group. Both have the potential for significant disruption at the local, regional, and international level – the consequences of failure in dealing with both appropriately can cause widespread disruption.
  1. Clearly the shared perception of Europe moving ever closer to being whole, free and at peace in the wake of the Cold War changed dramatically after the events of 2104. European security has taken a decided step backwards in light of Russia’s use of force to change the borders of the Ukraine, flaunting established behavioural and legal norms of the post-WWII and Cold War eras. At the Wales Summit, Allies stood together in their unanimous condemnation of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and aggressive actions in Eastern Ukraine. The return of conventional state-to-state threats into the fold only further complicates a security landscape made increasingly complex by the proliferation of dual-use technologies that enable and multiply the effects of a range of actors.
  1. The rise in number and relative power of armed groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continues to destabilize and breakdown a region comprised of weak states. Riding on a new wave of violent extremism exploiting sectarian divisions, armed groups seek to exploit state weaknesses in any form to further their own agenda. As this committee knows from its recent report on the civil war in Syria (Szewinski, 2014), sectarian fighting in Syria and Iraq has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and fuelled humanitarian and security challenges all over the world, with acts of violence and terror spilling over into European cities. The rise of Daesh from the Syrian conflict has shown the degree to which these armed groups can disrupt at the regional and global level.
  1. Beyond regional threats, NATO continues to face transnational and multi-dimensional threats, such as terrorism, vulnerable energy infrastructure, and cybercrime, which increased in volume and sophistication during 2014. Added to this are the ongoing challenges of the Iranian nuclear question; a rising, militarily capable China; and, an increasingly active northern flank as the Arctic is opening up as an avenue for trade, an area for resource exploitation, and a potential arena for military competition.
  1. In this rapidly evolving global context NATO must to retain its flexibility and credibility. The competition to be a key player (and norm setter) at the international security level is only growing more intense. By 2030, Asia is expected to pass North America and Europe in every power dimension. Furthermore, the Chinese and Russians are currently investing heavily in their militaries while Europeans are struggling to halt the decline in defence spending.
  1. The Alliance is in a time of transition and clear competition in the face of the complex global security environment of the 21st century. The transatlantic link has always been the key to NATO’s transitions, from the end of the Cold War to the post-9/11 era. It must continue to be so post-2014.

III.Evolving US USPolicy Toward the Ukraine – Dealing with Russia

  1. Russian assertiveness reinvigorated the Alliance’s core purpose of collective defence while also leading some members to question whether the Alliance has the will and capability to defend them if they experienced attacks similar to those observed in Ukraine. Russia’s immediately destabilizing tactics (dubbed as part of its overall Hybrid Warfare strategy) challenge current NATO planning, organization, capability, and response, in large part because it is unclear exactly how these attacks can be deterred effectively when Allied governments often convey a clear reluctance to use force.
  1. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to NATO allies through diplomatic, military, and economic means. While military commitments are the easiest to count and measure, increased high-level diplomatic visits to Europe and speeches focused on Europe should not be discounted. Similarly, negotiations to tie the United States and Europe closer together via the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) began in 2013 and have received high-level attention throughout 2014, and seem to be on track as one of the few issues with significant bipartisan support in the United States.
  1. Another highly visible and quantifiable sign of US commitment to the region is the European Reassurance Initiative, funded by the US Congress in December 2014 at $810 million as part of the Department of Defense’s 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations budget. The initiative provides funds to increase the number of US troops posted to Eastern Europe on a temporary basis, increase US participation in NATO exercises, pre-position equipment and improve facilities, and deploy additional U.S. warships to the Baltic and Black Seas. The initiative will also focus on building the partner capacity of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and the Ukraine and aims to train and improve the capabilities of Poland, the Baltic States, and Romani a.

A.Congressional and Official Views

  1. The topic of the evolving US policy toward Ukraine and, by default, Russia was a key issue throughout meetings in Washington.US Senator, Christopher Murphy (D–CT) noted that while President Putin may be playing the long game in his attempts to create frozen conflicts, the
    United States is playing the long game as well with its efforts to foster a Europe that is whole, united, and at peace. Senator Murphy insisted that strategic patience is needed to bring Russia back around to a cooperative position on the continent. The sanctions regime in place, he said, is working and will have compounding effects over time. Senator Murphy also noted that the United States and its Allies should look into stepping up their levels of all types of assistance to Ukraine, which, he noted, would “raise the costs of the war for Russia as we supply more defensive weapons to Kyiv.”
  1. A resounding sentiment throughout the working breakfast with the US Congressional delegation to presentations by State and Defense Department officials was that Washington is viewing developments in European security with renewed interest and that there was clear agreement in Washington about the importance of Europe to US regional and global interests. As Steve Woehrel, a European Affairs specialist at the Congressional Research Services (CRS), stated: “We’ve seen a real bi-partisan convergence of interests over Ukraine and Russia.” The problem for Washington, several experts and officials noted, was to get the European Allies on board for additional sanctions against Russia – “there is a clear uneasiness toward what will be clear additional costs in a time of unsteady economic recovery,” said Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS), Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department.
  1. DAS Rubin noted that the clear message coming out of Washington vis-à-vis the ongoing crisis can be summed up in the following three main points. First, there needs to be an immediate end to the fighting in Eastern Ukraine. Second, that everything that Moscow has noted as being within its interests in the conflict is on the negotiating table. As a result, Moscow needs to do more to bring the rebels around to a ceasefire and to take negotiations seriously. Third, the recognized and established international borders need to be respected and monitored by a neutral international organization. The United States, he continued, was in the process of delivering its latest tranche of $15bn in aid to Ukraine at the time of Rubin’s remarks. As Evelyn Farkas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia noted, all options for assisting Ukraine remain on the table. She noted that the Unites States had pledged $118mn in military assistance to Ukraine to be delivered by March and that Congress was willing to increase this assistance in the near-term. As Russia continues to increase the military capabilities of the rebels, she concluded, it is up to NATO to help fill in the vulnerability gaps that this will create for the Ukrainian forces involved in the fight.

IV.US Resources in Europe

  1. In order to effect its rebalancing policy towards Asia, the United States needed to shift resources and attention away from locations where resources were already engaged. At the time the policy was announced, the war was winding down in Iraq and Allies had agreed to a plan for Security Transition in Afghanistan – thus these were natural locations to draw from. However, the United States also recognized that much of its positioning abroad was derived from its Cold War posture, and threats and opportunities had shifted since the end of the Cold War. Thus the US base posture needed to realign in order to respond to the current threat environment.
  1. This has resulted in the United States consolidating its presence in Europe and asking European Allies to provide more for their own security. In fact, it is clear that the US would rather ‘lead from behind’ when it comes to operations in its Allies’ neighbourhood that do not meet the threshold of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As Daniel H. Else, a Defense Infrastructure Analyst at CRS noted, European Infrastructure Consolidation, as BRAC (Base Closure and Realignment Commission) is known outside of the US, continues apace as it does not run up against same Congressional hurdles that BRAC does. Else noted that the US Department of Defense is planning on an additional 1,200 US military personnel and 1,200 local staff reduction throughout Europe this year. As officials from the US Defense Department told members, such a reallocation and concentration of US assets in Europe would allow for increased flexibility and response capabilities on NATO’s southern and eastern flanks.
  1. As members also learned, the US State Department and the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is launching a two-year pilot program allowing NATO members to acquire and share American military equipment with members of the Alliance on a case-by-case basis. Previously, the US did not allow assets sold abroad to be used or shared by more than one partner. The United States wants to remain relevant for these cost-sharing and pooling initiatives, both to ensure interoperability of Alliance assets and to make sure that the US defence industry remains a major player in the European defence market.

V.Reassurance Measures and Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond

  1. These three initiatives will be vital to increasing the ability of European Allies to contribute substantively to NATO’s aspiration to sustain a higher pace of exercises, operations, and initiatives. The most immediate, and some would say important, new initiative with ramifications for the transatlantic link is the RAP. Approved at the Wales Summit, the RAP is often discussed as the most salient example of the reinvigoration of the transatlantic link. At a minimum, the RAP is the most significant expansion of NATO’s collective defence capabilities since the end of the Cold War. It includes assurance and adaption measures while improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of NATO forces. The measures outlined not only address risks and threats from NATO’s southern and eastern flanks, but also provide building blocks for NATO to respond to future challenges.
  1. The RAP aims to ensure that the Alliance is able to react swiftly to emerging crises with substantial concentrated power. Assurance measures include continuously rotating air, land, and maritime presence and military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance. Adaption measures include enhancing the responsiveness of the NATO Response Force (NRF), including the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a rotating Allied joint force of 4,000-6,000 intended to be capable of deploying in response to challenges within two to five days-notice, particularly along NATO’s periphery. The current Immediate Response Force (IRF), the core of the NRF, is on five to thirty days’ notice. The RAP also includes logistics enhancement, including the prepositioning of equipment and supplies and enhancement of infrastructure that will allow the VJTF to have host-nation support if deployed.
  1. The status of Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland – the only NATO headquarters in a post-Cold War member state – is being raised from lower readiness (180 days’ notice) to high readiness (30 days’ notice). Germany, Denmark, and Poland are providing the additional staff required for this upgrade.
  1. Essentially, NATO is attempting to signal that the Alliance will not leave any of its members exposed to Russian aggression. However, the RAP only directly addresses the traditional military threat – it does not deal with Russian propaganda or co-option of minority communities as witnessed in Ukraine. The RAP also only strengthens the transatlantic link if it is properly resourced. Otherwise, it will very publicly demonstrate the limits of NATO’s capability to garner resources and generate political will and consensus amongst its members.

A.RAP Adaption Measures

  1. The RAP adaptation measures aim to ensure the Alliance capability to address the array of potential future military challenges. These include significantly enhancing the responsiveness of the NRF and establishment a VJTF, a new Allied joint force within the NRF able to deploy within 48hours. As it will be discussed below, many of the tactics of hybrid warfare used by Russia are not immediately identifiable as military. However, the use of unidentified Russian commandos to train, advise, and assist local rebel forces in the Ukraine and seize the Crimea – all done with the backing of sizeable Russian conventional forces positioned near the conflict in southeast Ukraine, along with the repeated rhetorical mention of Russia’s significant nuclear capabilities – gave Allies good reason to build up their military response capabilities were they to be faced with a similar situation in a NATO member state.

B.Upgrading the NRF

  1. NATO Defence Ministers formally endorsed the enhancement of the NRF in February 2015. An enhanced NRF will improve the Alliance’s military posture, capabilities, and readiness levels. If sustained, this could alter the Alliance’s long-term military posture.
  1. NATO member states approved the establishment of the NRF at the 2002 Prague Summit as a highly capable and rapidly deployable multinational force. The NRF could either operate independently or as an initial stabilizing rapid reaction force for out-of-area emergencies or as a first line of defence for the Alliance. The NRF was, unfortunately, under-resourced and poorly utilized. Units assigned to the NRF were used only four times since its 2003 launch, and not at all since 2006.
  1. Currently, the NRF is composed of three elements: a command and control structure