Martyn Hammersley

CULTURE (Working draft)

'Culture' has long been recognised as a problematic term, and there have been many efforts to define it. However, it is frequently used today as if its meaning were clear and uncontested. Furthermore, it often seems to be employed in vague and inconsistent ways.

Some help in clarifying the meaning(s) of ‘culture’, and perhaps even in resolving the conceptual problems associated with it, can be gained by examining its history.Williams (1983:87) traces its origins to the Latin words ‘colere’ and ‘cultura’, a core meaning of which was ‘the tending of natural growth’, and by metaphorical extension this came to refer to the intellectual and moral development of human beings – perhaps with an ambiguity about the extent to which this needed to be actively induced. The notion of ‘cultivation’ is closely related, along with that of Bildung in the German context (Bruford 1975).

In much early usage the meaning of the word substantially overlapped with that of ‘civilisation’, but the latter term was also sometimes used as a contrast: in the nineteenth century there were influential writers who saw ‘culture’ as referring to what was being lost as a result of the advance of ‘industrial civilisation’. This reflected,in part, an opposition between literature and art, on the one hand, and the role of science and technology in underpinning industrialization, on the other. And this was often formulated as acontrast between organic growth and mechanical artificiality. Such a view was central to the thinking of Matthew Arnold – English poet, literary critic, and school inspector – whose work was a particularly important influence on the subsequent development of the concept of culture, and is discussed later.[1] However, within anthropology the terms ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ were treated as virtual synonyms in the nineteenth century – here the focus of investigation was the evolution of society from primitive to advanced stages.

An important tension within the meaning of the term ‘culture’ relates to whether it is singular or plural. In the nineteenth century it tended to be used in a singular form by cultural critics like Arnold, and also by anthropologists, despite the other differences in the meaning they gave to the term. However, even in the eighteenth century, Herder had recogniseda plurality of cultures, and suggested that each must be understood in its own terms. Herder’s ideas were subsequently taken up in the Romantic movement, encouraging an emphasis on the value of ‘folk culture’ and of distinctive national cultures. Another important inheritor of Herder’s ideas was nineteenth-century German historicism (Iggers 1968; Beiser 2011).Even more significant was the ‘Völkerpsychologie’of Steinthal and Lazarus, subsequently developed by Wundt (Kalmar 1987). Building on this, in the early twentieth century, especially under the influence of German anthropology (Stocking 1995; Penny and Bunzl 2003), social and cultural anthropologists in the US and the UK began to frame their discipline as concerned with studying ‘other cultures’, rather than focusing on the evolutionary development of ‘culture’.[2]

The term ‘culture’ was also important in German sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century, notably in the work of Simmel and of both Alfred and Max Weber. In this context one of the primary concerns was the distinctive culture of modernity and its consequences (see Loader 2015). The concept was of less significance in Anglo-American sociology and in the other social sciences in the first half of the twentieth century, but this changed in the second half, when social classes and ethnic groups often came to be seen as displaying distinctive cultures or ‘subcultures’ (Mintz 1956; Cohen 1958; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; CCCS 1972 and 1975; Hebdige 1979), or as representing counter-cultures (Yinger 1960, 1982, Miller and Riessman 1961, Willis 1977). Around the same time, in political science there was a growth of interest in what was referred to as ‘civic culture’ or ‘political culture’, this being treated as a key variable in explaining the stability of governments (see Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). Meanwhile, in the sociology of organizations and management studies, the notion of ‘organisational cultures’ became very widely employed (see Smircich 1983). And this sense of the term, in particular,has come to be part of everyday usage, for example in declarations that the problem with some organization is one of culture, so that ‘culture change’ is required. Finally, from the 1960s onwards, a whole new trans-disciplinary field – Cultural Studies – came to be established, which overlapped with, and rivaled, other social sciences, particularly sociology.[3]

Out of this long and complex history threepartially distinctmeanings of the word ‘culture’ can be identified. The first treats culture as singular. And it refers primarily to ideas, forms of literature, drama, art, and music that are judged to be especially valuable. Frequently, this is because they are seen as encouraging the development of intellectual and moral virtues; as contrasted with those forms regarded as worthless, or even as detrimental to intellectual and moral development. I will call this the aesthetic sense of the term, and I will capitalize its first letter when using the word in this way.

The second influential meaning of ‘culture’ also treats what it refers to as singular, as varying in degree, and as of positive value. However, in this usage, the term covers all aspects of life that are a product of learning and adaptation, rather than of biological inheritance. Different societies, historical and contemporary, are seen as possessing different degrees of culture, or as representing different stages of cultural development, so that they can be ranked in these terms: either in general or in specific aspects, such as in some aspect of technology. So, from this perspective, the culture of any society is, at least potentially, subject to evolution or development over time. Sometimes this is conceived in linear terms, sometimes as cyclical – for example with societies treated as going through phases analogous to childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age.[4] A different kind of sequential scheme is to be found in the work of Hegel and Marx. For them, cultures existing at different times in Europe are simply different aspects of a historical process of human development, each one representing a deformed version of human nature, but at the same time containing elements of its true form, with each being necessary for its eventual realization’.[5]Even Marxists and critical researchers who have abandoned this meta-narrative nonetheless often adopt this sort of developmental conception of culture.

The third meaning of ‘culture’ is that which became central in the discipline of anthropology, and across social science, during the twentieth century and up to the present. Here culture is not treated as singular but as plural. However, as with the second meaning it refers to allof what human beings acquire through living in a particular society – as opposed to what they inherit biologically – rather than being restricted to ideas, art, literature and music.In short it relates to ways of life or modes of behavior in particular contexts, and to ideas only as they relate to these. Furthermore, at face value at least, this usage of the term is descriptive rather than evaluative, in the way that the other two meanings are.[6].

The differences between these three senses of the term ‘culture’ highlight many of the important complexities surrounding usage of this word in social science, andit is therefore worthwhileexamining the sources and character of each of them in more detail, before considering how the concept has been employed within Sociology and also in the field of Cultural Studies. As already noted, the first meaning is closely associated with nineteenth and early twentieth century cultural criticism; the second withthe philosophy of history, early anthropology, and Marxism; and the third with twentieth century social and cultural anthropology, though it has spread to other social sciences as well.

Culture as aesthetic sensibility

Probably the most famous definition of ‘Culture’ in the English-speaking world was provided by Matthew Arnold. He declared that Culture consists of ‘the best that has been known and said in the world’ (1873:preface).[7] The reference here is to literature and ideas, and in particular to those which were characteristic of the classical humanist tradition that developed in Europe after the Middle Ages, drawing on the legacy of ancient Greece and Rome. Arnold treats Culture as a source of knowledge and understanding that is essential to living well: it embodies an ideal of the good life, and indicates how this can be realized in the face of a contingent world – ‘the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’.

Arnold has sometimes been seen as promoting the culture of a dominant elite or class (see, for example, Turner 1990:42 or McGuigan 1992:21). And it is true that something likethe kind of Culture that he championed came to operate in this way in the early twentieth century. However, as will become clear, this does not fit closely with his perspective or intentions. Given that his positionis frequently misrepresented, itrequires attention here.

Arnold emphasizes the value of ideas and attitudes drawn from literature and the humanities as offering a higher form of understanding and appreciation that serves to develop character and virtue. As this indicates, a conception of the cultured person is implied, so that indirectlyCulture relates to all aspects of a person’s life.Indeed, for Arnold, what was important about ‘the best that has been said and thought’ was that it facilitated a process of personal development that could, in principle, lead to what he refers to as ‘spiritual perfection’ (Arnold 1993:65 and passim). He contrasts the value of this with material wealth. So, discussing those whom he refers to as Philistines, Arnold writes: ‘Culture says: “Consider these people, […] their way of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voice; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it?”’. For Arnold, then, the focus of Culture is on the ancient question of what is a good life, and the virtues that contribute to, or are constitutive of, it.

Romanticism, as well as classical humanism, was a key influence on Arnold; in particular, a Romantic understanding of poetry, and of literature more generally, as having the capacity to go beyond the immediate appearance of the world, and therefore beyond the scope of science, lifting us above ‘lower’ desires to higher forms of enjoyment and better forms of human relationship. What was central here was the capacity of imagination to fuse perceptions and thoughts into recognition of a harmonious sense of the whole meaning of life. As Coleridge (1907:6) remarked, imagination can ‘awaken […] the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom, and direct […] it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequences of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand’. There is opposition here both to the world as represented by natural science, which is viewedas ‘inanimate and cold’, and to the method that produces this – on the grounds that it is not true to human life. And behind science, for Arnold and the Romantics, lay the ‘industrial civilisation’ that was transforming English society at the time (see Williams 1958). Thus, in effect, Arnold was putting forward a version of another ancient argument, this time about the need for virtue in citizens if a society and its members are to thrive, in the true sense of realizing human ideals rather than simply increasing material wealth. In this respect, like other influentialfigures at the time, he was reacting against key aspects of the contemporary society and those trends in political and religious thinking associated with them; though not in a simple reactionary fashion.

Thus, many of Arnold’s polemics were against the materialism and empiricism that he saw as increasingly influential at the time – for example in the form of utilitarianism and the ‘philosophical radicalism’ closely associated with it, alongside the growing commercialism of British society. He interpreted these as suggesting that human beings should be conceived as primarily, if not entirely, concerned with doing what they desired, with being happy, valuing whatever pleased them. At the same time, he also stood against religious tendencies of a Puritan kind that were, in his view, aesthetically deaf and blind as well as morally restricted. In both cases he was opposing what he saw as excessively narrow views of what is worthwhile in life, those which downplayed or even denied the value of literature and art, and the qualities that these cultivate.

While Arnold shared the widespread contemporary concern among the middle and upper classes about the growth of the urban industrial working classes, and the anarchy that their empowerment could bring about, he saw this danger as arising primarily from the kind of society that Britain had become: one in which Culture is not accorded its proper role. In effect, feudal habits of deference had been eroded, and while this was not undesirable in itself, there was nothing toreplace theseso as topreserve social unity.Thus, most of his essay on Culture and Anarchy is a reaction against what he sees as the rejection of Culture on utilitarian and/or religious grounds by politicians and intellectuals associated with the rising middle classes. He criticised them for their parochialism and self-satisfaction. At the same time, in his essay on Equality he questioned the level of inequality in the distribution of property in nineteenth century Britain, and also argued that ‘an hereditary aristocracy, whatever its political achievements in the past, was ill-equipped to understand a modern world that was […] inevitably moving towards greater social equality’ (Collini 1993:x and xiii).

As this makes clear, Arnold acted as a cultural critic, in other words as a critic of the culture (or cultures) – in the anthropological sense of the term – that prevailed in Britain at the time he lived.[8]As I noted earlier, his views have often been seen as elitist, and it is certainly true that he believed there was a superior form of cultural sensibility and that people varied considerably in the extent to which they had achieved this. He writes that ‘culture indefatigably tries not to make what each raw person may like the rule by which he fashions himself but to draw ever nearer to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful and becoming and to get the raw person to like that’ (Arnold 1993:64). However, he did not believe that only an elite could achieve spiritual perfection, nor that Culture was currently concentrated in a single social class (he talks of ‘aliens’ within each social class who appreciate Culture); indeed his primary concern was to encourage its pursuit in all social classes. Furthermore, given that Culture had a moral function, providing the joy and consolation required in the face of the trials and disappointments of life, he believed that the state should play a key role in promoting, and spreading access to it – particularly through schooling. He saw this as desirable both because it enabled people to live more fulfilling lives and because it would contribute to social harmony.

Arnold argued that all established practices and beliefs should be scrutinised and judged by the highest standards, this requiring a degree of detachment or disinterestedness. What he meant by this was that things must be seen as they are, in their own terms, rather than according to whether they are ‘consistent with the true tenets of the Protestant religion, or supported a Whig or Tory view of the English constitution, or had an immediate bearing upon the great policy issues of the moment’ (Collini 1993:xvi). It was precisely the tendency to adopt these restricted perspectives that in Arnold’s view ‘narrowed and stultified the intellectual life of Victorian England’.

Arnold’s ideas, and the sources on which he drew, had considerable influence during the later nineteenth century and into the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, as I noted earlier, this idea of Culture served to define the identity of key segments of the upper and middle classes, and of those who aspired to this status. Moreover, to a large extent, it came to be institutionalized: through the education system in the UK, and by other means as well. Collini (1988:3) notes that ‘Arnold’s ideas have been invoked in justification of so many of those institutions which have contributed a distinctive, and often distinctively high, tone to the cultural life of modern Britain, such as the BBC, the British Council, and university departments of English’.[9]

A conception of Culture and its role that is similar, in many respects, to Arnold’s can be found in the work of twentieth century writers and literary critics like T. S. Eliot. I. A. Richards, and F. R. and Q. D, Leavis – though Eliotinitially rejected Romanticism and the work of Arnold in particular (Loring 1935). All of these writers opposed what they saw as the negative spiritual consequences of industrial civilization and of the growing influence of science. At one point Frank Leavis (1930:3) quotes Richards (1926:60-1) to the effect that the critic of literature ‘is as much concerned with the health of the mind as any doctor with the health of the body. […]’. And in Leavis’s work there is an emphasis on the important role to be played by a cultural elite. In fact, he has less confidence than Arnold in the extent to which the bulk of the population of Britain could come to appreciate Culture. For example, in an influential pamphlet we find: