Cross-Strait Political Developments 1
Research into Cross-Strait Political Definition
Shaw Chong Hai[*]
Preface
There are two aspects of elements to be dealt with in the analysis of the definition of cross-strait relations: Firstly, there is not a clear meaning, unlike the respective political definitions of both sides. This is because the definition of cross-strait relations involves both sides’ interpretation. Secondly, the definition requires cross-strait interaction and will of cooperation, rather than evaluating one-sided action and experience.
It is easier to clarify cross-strait “political definition” via “the relation of a spouse,” but “the relation of a spouse” complicates the analysis of the “definition of cross-strait relation.” In addition to the identification of a conjugal relation, it is a necessary to trace back how the historic developments and future trends are defined. For example, if “the relation of a spouse” is used to define “cross-strait relation,” then the initial definition will be reflected as a “divorced state.” After a long period of estrangement, both parties put their hatred aside and meet with each other casually. Both sides then seek “reconciliation.” This is the definition during the second stage. Owing to the lack of mutual trust after a long-lasting separation, it is possible for both sides to “part” with each other as they put forward unacceptable conditions. Ina strict sense, either side has individually taken into consideration a “separation or integration.” This is the definition during the third stage.
“The relation of a spouse” can only be made as a reference for the analysis of the definition of cross-strait relations without academic functions. Hence, another mode of definition shall be required. At any rate, the phased definition of the “the relation of a spouse” may provide a benchmark for this purpose. The author endeavors to define cross-strait relations as three phases.
To achieve a better result in the analysis of cross-strait political definitions, a number of historical events shall be classified according to some standards. Based upon cross-strait historical developments, it is possible to identify political definitions of different meanings initiated by both authorities against each other and they draw a conclusion on cross-strait relations. The analysis of cross-strait relations will help researchers offer a better understanding in this regard; that is to say, only when the issue of “political definition” is determined can we further recognize the practical situation across the strait and grasp the future trend of either authorities or the entire cross-strait relations.
As this paper endeavors to analyze the “political definitions” starting from “historic developments,” it is understood that there are some accidental coincidences between “historic developments” and “political definitions.” In other words, some may be puzzled about the difference between “historical development” and “political definition.” Nevertheless, there are differences between “historic developments” and “political definitions”: “historic developments” involve the description of some phenomenon while “political definition” bears the description of “official statement of facts.” Therefore, “historic developments” and “political definitions” are somewhat related to each other, but no inevitable interaction results.
Historical Interpretation of the Development of Cross-Strait Relations
This section citing the breakup of both sides in 1949 as the calculating basis, gives a brief description of various phases, e.g. initial military confrontation, dispute of lawful governance, relaxation of cross-strait tension and current ideological face-off, and then analyzes the entire process.
Military Confrontation Phase. During this meeting on July 29,1955 the U.S. and China agreed to promote the negotiations from consul to the ambassador level. On July 30 of the same year, Premier Zhou Enlai declared that China would not rule out the possibility of a peaceful liberation of Taiwan apart from resorting to arms. This statement indicated a significant change of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) policy against Taiwan, for Beijing thought that military confrontation was formally brought to an end in 1955.[1]
Dispute of Lawful Governance. As compared with military confrontation, diplomatic contests and conflicts marked another feature of cross-strait historic developments. This phase started from January 1950, when CPC formally submitted a proposal via the former Soviet Union and called for a permanent membership in the Security Council in lieu of the Republic of China.[2] After Beijing’s entry into the U.N., it claimed itself to be a lawful Chinese government and attempted to reduce those countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Taipei formally declared in the “Description of Cross-Strait Relation” in 1994 that it would no longer compete with CPC for “Chinese Representative” in the international forum.[3] However, Taipei did not rule out the possibility of “Two Chinas” or “One China and One Taiwan”, for the diplomatic contest only strived for a diplomatic breakthrough in the international community. To the contrary, the Beijing authority stuck to its position of “Two arch-rivals” policy, also urging other countries with upcoming diplomatic relations with it to recognize or accept the content of “Taiwan is an integral part of China” in their joint communiqués.[4]
Relaxation of Cross-Strait Tension. Since Taipei declared formally in 1987 that Taiwanese citizens with relatives on the mainland were permitted to visit China, cultural links across the strait were resumed rapidly, ranging from private exchanges and economic ties to “cultural links” in a broad sense, e.g. scientific, cultural, and religious exchanges.
However, contact and negotiations, more particularly to some meetings on key issues, were conducive for facilitating the establishment of a coordination mechanism or system across the strait, thus playing a positive role in easing the hostile situation.
Ideological Face-off Stage. In spite of the fact that cross-strait exchanges continued and did not involve into a military confrontation again due to accidental strained situations, unstable cross-strait relations were once again torn into pieces as Lee Teng-Hui clarified his viewpoint in the “Special State-to-State” theory in July 1999. He described the definition of cross-strait relations as a special one between one country and another. However, Beijing finally determined Lee’s position as “Taiwan Independence”.
The Democratic Progressive Party then won the presidential election in May 2000, and the long-ruling Kuomintang was out of office. The elected president Chen Shui-Bian made his promise of the so-called “four no’s” in his inaugural speech. He then turned and claimed his stance of “each side is a country” on August 3, 2000 owing to the deeply rooted ideology of “Taiwan Independence” and his belief of “Taiwan should follow its own path”. In an official statement, Beijing not only criticized Chen Shui-Bian openly, but also defined Taiwanese leaders as “Taiwan Separatists”.[5]
To sum up, this confrontation originated from different attitudes of future trends, rather than ideological differences across the strait. Beijing adhered to the guideline of national reunification and “One Country, Two Systems”, whereas Taipei hoped to have an alternative path other than reunification. Even the U.S. called for bilateral negotiations since cross-strait relations had come to a standstill. In response to possible political dialogue across the strait, Taipei put forward its suggestion of “state-to-state” definition so as to avoid any impairment or localization, but it touched a most sensitive political nerve of Beijing, leading to a serious cross-strait confrontation.
Confrontation: Definition of Cross-Strait Conflicting Relation
Cross-strait political definitions during this period can be demonstrated either by the above-mentioned two periods of military confrontation and dispute of lawful governance in the Paragraph of “Historic Interpretation of Cross-Strait Historic Developments” or by “Deadlock Game” theory and “Separated Country Mode”(initial period of separation) in the Paragraph of “Theoretical Interpretation” of Cross-Strait Historic Developments”.
A Dead Regime VS. Insurgent Group (1949-1978). In fact, Taipei or Beijing seldom discussed or neglected the definition of cross-strait relation in the past, primarily owing to the fact that both sides entirely denied the legitimacy of each other under military confrontation. Even if a definition was involved in the dialogue, either side regarded itself as a lawful representative and the other as an insurgent group or a dead regime.
When the R.O.C. government under the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the configuration of cross-strait separation and military confrontation took shape. But, Beijing declared that “the founding of the People’s Republic of China marked the subversion of the Republic of China”, showing that the Kuomintang government was considered to be a dead regime even though it retreated to Taiwan.[6] On the other side, the Kuomintang government published the “Preliminary Clauses of Counter-Insurgency” on May 10, 1948, whereby CPC was regarded as an insurgency group. This Clause continued to become effective until March 11, 1954, when the second meeting of the 1st session of National Assembly was held. This indirectly showed that Taipei authorities still regarded the CPC regime as an “insurgency group” even though CPC founded its regime on October 1, 1949.
The dispute of lawful governance by both sides of the Strait continued, as evidenced by the contest of a lawful seat in the UN from 1951 to 1971. At that time, Taipei and Beijing often haggled about the permanent membership of the Security Council and did not make compromises with each other over the proposal of two Chinese memberships.[7] Additionally, both sides’ principle of “two arch-rivals” in their foreign policies also showed the implication of mutual refusal. If one country recognized either side of the Taiwan Strait as a legitimate government, it would be demanded to deny the legitimacy of the other side. The reunification mode initiated by both sides was closely related to military forces, fully showing the absoluteness of their positions in lawful governance. Taiwan called for the slogan of “making a counterattack upon the mainlandto recover the territory” for many years whereas the CPC never gave up its allegation of “liberating Taiwan”. This mode indicates that a legitimate Chinese government will never permit another one to take its place by assuming its name. Generally, the only solution is to destroy the other one by military forces.
The CPC government was admitted to the UN and won permanent membership of Chinese delegacy in 1971. American President Nixon then visited China in February 1972 and published the Shanghai Joint Communiqué. In despite these measures that changed the traditional attitude of the international community upon the legitimacy of the Chinese government,[8]the confrontation across the strait was not affected to a great extent, and both sides still adhered to its position of mutual refusal.
Local Government vs. Insurgent Regime 1979-1990. On December 16, 1978, the U.S. formallydeclared to establish diplomatic relations with China from January 1, 1979, and both sides were scheduled to send an ambassador to each other on March 1. This statement further isolated Taipei from the international community, but in fact marked a turning point of CPC’s Taiwan policy. From December of the same year, Beijing authorities gradually changed their traditional means against Taipei through a series of initiatives, showing that its uncompromising attitude of a united front policy has eased up.[9] In terms of the political definition of cross-strait relations, Beijing further made it clear that it was undoubtedly a central government and Taipei was just a government of a special administrative region.
Deng Xiaoping was the first one to define cross-strait relations as that between a central government and a special administrative region government in October 1979 when he gave an interview with the reporter of Asahi Shimbun. He said that the CPC could accept Taiwan as a local government, which was permitted to maintain its army and high autonomy as well as social system, just as KMT permitted CPC to set up a “special region” in north ShanxiProvince during the Second Cooperation of KMT and CPC.[10]
On September 30, 1981, Ye Jianying, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, published the guideline of peaceful reunification, indicating that the CPC further defined Taiwan as a local government of Beijing authorities (Central Government). The following statement was included in the third part of the so-called “Ye’s Nine-Part Agenda”: “After national reunification, Taiwan can enjoy high autonomy and maintain its army as a special administrative region. The Central Government (Beijing) will never intervene in its local affairs.”[11]
The leader of the CPC and Chairman of the Central Advisory Committee, Deng Xiaoping, emphasized CPC’s position upon Taiwan’s local government during his meeting with Prof. Yang Liyu, SetonHallUniversity, on June 26, 1983. The People’s Daily quoted him as saying that the “CPC admits that Taiwan’s local government can formulate its own internal policies.” He also made it clear: “As a local government of a special administrative region, Taiwan can enjoy some unique rights not owned by other autonomous regions, provided that the interests of national reunification are not compromised”.[12]
The CPC henceforth has generally maintained its political definition of Taiwan. When Premier Zhao Ziyang paid an official visit to the U.S. in early-1984, he also stuck to the definition of a special administrative region when giving a lecture of the Taiwan issue to the overseas Chinese community.[13]
Taipeithen appeared to change little of its mainland policy after the U.S. broke off diplomatic ties with it in 1978. When the Preliminary Clause of Mobilization for Counter -Insurgency continued to be in effect, Taipei insisted on regarding the CPC as an insurgent regime with only a modest adjustment of the title, e.g. “CPC” in lieu of so-called “Communist Bandits”.[14] However, the government did not take into consideration the political definition of the CPC while only contending with Beijing for its political definition of Taipei as a “local government”. For example, the Prime Minister of the Executive Yuan, Sun Yunxuan, pointed out in September 1980: The CPC administration has added a precondition in its peace proposal, namely admitting it as a central government. If we make a dialogue with it, we have admitted to ourselves as being a local government.[15] Commenting on the talks between Deng Xiaoping and Yang Liyun, President Chiang Ching-Kuo said in September 1983 that what Deng Xiaoping talked about just attempted to localize the Republic of China.[16] After “One Country, Two Systems” theory initiated by Deng Xiaoping was launched publicly, Taipei lodged a stronger objection to it. For example, the former Premier of the Executive Yuan, Yu Guohua, refuted in July 1985 that all of CPC’s proposals put the Republic of China in an unequal status of a local government.[17]
Exchange: Cross-Strait Relation with Inconsistent Politics and Economy
During the period of mutual exchange and easing tension as specified above in the Paragraph of “Historic Interpretation of Cross-Strait Historic Developments”, both sides developed cross-strait economic and trade cooperation, folk interchanges, and cultural exchanges, thus facilitating the establishment of a contact and negotiation mechanism. This period demonstrated a certain degree of cross-strait political definitions. Certainly, cross-strait negotiation was frustrated or interrupted at intervals despite closer exchanges, showing that politics and economy were inconsistent during this period. The “Prisoners’ Dilemma” theory can be used to analyze the offensive and defensive definitions of cross-strait interaction, while a “middle phase of separation” and “reconciliation phase” included in the “Divided Nation” theory highlighted cross-strait political definitions—not only “first economy, then politics”, but also “inconsistent economy and politics”.
Cross-Strait Economic Definition of Mutual Benefit. Many economists list the advantages and disadvantages when analyzing the impact of cross-strait economic interaction from the point of pure economics. For example, the complementarity and interdependency of cross-strait economic conditions can help achieve “two-win” results; if Taiwan is dependent much upon the mainland market, then how could it manage to adjust itself in the case of any change? These views have provided a benchmark for the definition of cross-strait relations at the economic level, as demonstrated by the viewpoints of some authoritative scholars. With a view to different resource supplies and development processes across the Strait, Prof. Zheng Zhuyuan of the Economics Dept. of Ball State University said: “as Taiwan is concerned, the development of the mainland market can contribute to sustainable growth of its export and economy and help reduce its dependency upon the American market, but also facilitate the remodeling and upgrading of domestic industries. As China is concerned, the influx of capital from HK and Taiwan will promote rapidly the economic development of coastal regions and set an example for state investment. The booming development of three kinds of foreign-invested enterprises will greatly enhance its export capacity and speed up the globalization of the mainland economy.”[18]