Criminal Lawmurphy

Criminal LawMurphy

Coyne1

I. Introduction

Pretrialprocedures
Misdemeanor—charging document is a complaint
Π to show probablecause, obtain a warrant, then arrest. If there is no warrant, Π has to show probable cause in a post-arrest hearing. If there is probable cause, Δ is “bound-over” for trial.
Grandjury—a group of laymen brought together to hear evidence and issue indictments. They have the ability to subpoena witnesses and such, which the prosecutor can’t do.
Information—in lieu of a grand jury, a prosecutor may charge on an information. However, most states still permit a Δ to request a grand jury.
The charge identifies the violation and alleges facts. Δ may plead guilty or not guilty. Guilty is a voluntary admission by Δ of his guilt. Not guilty leads to trial.
Δ may challenge the legalsufficiency of a claim on three grounds:
The crime charged is not a violation of the law in the jurisdiction
Facts alleged, even if true, do not constitute the crime charged
No jury could justifiably find the facts charged based on the evidence offered at the preliminary hearing.
Waivable right to a jurytrial for any crime carrying a sentence >6 months.
6th Amendment gives the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases, and was brought through the 14th Amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana.
BurdenofProof—determines who must prove guilt or innocence.
Innocencepresumed
Burdenofproduction—burden to provide evidence in a prima facie case
Burdenofpersuading fact finder the evidence warrants accepting or rejecting a claim.
Trialprocedure:
Judge and lawyers select a jury
Voir dire—process by which juries are selected
Means “to see, to speak”
Judge re-reads the complaint and determines that Δ does plead guilty
Preliminary motions
Opening statements (Δ may postpone till the closing of Π’s case)
Π calls witnesses, Δ crosses
At close of Π’s case, D may move to dismiss based on no reasonable fact finder could find Δ guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt on the evidence presented.
If vi fails, Δ presents case and witnesses, which Π may cross and give rebuttal evidence.
Δ may present sur-rebuttal evidence to Π’s rebuttal evidence.
Close and rest
Judge (in a bench trial) / jury deliberates. Jury gets pattern instructions from judge.
OUJI—Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions
Jury comes to a verdict, or there’s a mistrial if they’re hung.
Sentencing either by judge or by special sentencing trial.
Appeal—substantiveissues
Charge convicted was not a crime
Not all necessary elements of the crime were alleged
Insufficient evidence
Improper jury instructions
Criminal law derived from
Statute—most is from statute, which courts may interpret broadly but not overrule.
1962 American Law Institute created the Model Penal Code, a comprehensive reformation of the principles of criminal liability from previous codes, scholarly commentary, and decisional law, which has been adopted in most states.
Constitutions—State law cannot violate or contradict the federal constitution. Where it might, courts may strike it down or they may interpret it so that it doesn’t violate anything. DP clause creates the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Precedent—Rule of law paramount, even with dissimilar fact patterns. Staredecisis.
MPC scheme—an offense is committed when an actor completesall the requiredelements, such as actus reus and mens rea. At least one objectiveelement, such as conduct, circumstances, or result required. Objective elements have corresponding culpability requirements.
Principleoflegality—criminally punishable conduct should be specified in advance; no law, no crime.
Strict Liability—liability without fault:
Substantive strict liability—liability without moral fault
Pure strict liability—liability without any culpable mental state as to any of the objective elements of the crime
Impure strict liability—liability without culpable mental state as to one or more objective elements of the crime
MPC--§§ 2.05, 1.04(5), explained p. 188.
Alan Michael’s test for strict liability—SL is only constitutional when intentional conduct covered by the statute could have been made criminal by the legislature. Punishment must be predicated on a voluntary act or omission covered by the statute.
Due Process proscribes SL for certain crimes
Critiques—Packer (p. 199) says SL dilutes criminal sanctions by removing the moral disapproval aspect. Hart doesn’t like how it sanctions the morally blameless (is this merely a cost that must be paid?).
No culpable mental state at all must be shown — it is enough that D performed the act in question, regardless of his mental state.
Purposes of Criminal Law
Punishment—Moral judgment
Deterrence
Specific—Keep that offender from committing another crime
General—Use one person’s actions to convince others not to do the same—death penalty (but that doesn’t really work).
Retribution
lex talionis—eye for an eye
Rehabilitation—Teach prisoners how to work instead of commit crimes
Incapacitation—Keep them from committing crime again
Denunciation—Moral judgment for one from society
Seven conditions in just punishment:
Past
Voluntary
Bad
Conduct
Specified
In Advance
By Statute
Two kinds of laws—malum in se and malum prohibitum.
In se are those crimes that are inherently bad, like murder.
It is dangerous in itself.
Prohibitum are those crimes that are crimes because the legislature says they are, like polygamy.
It is not dangerous in itself, but simply in violation of a public-welfare regulation

II. TheCriminalAct

A criminal act will contain four elements:
Mensrea—“Guilty Mind,” meaning the requisite mental intent that is either expressly written or implied in a criminal statute.
MPC has four kinds (p. 217 CHART):
PurposelyMost Culpable
Knowingly
Recklessly
NegligentlyLeast Culpable
MPC Chart: A person is not guilty unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to each material element of the offense.

Type of Objective element
Circumstance / Result / Conduct
Purposely / He is aware of such / It is his conscious object…to cause / It is his conscious object to
circumstances or hopes they / such a result. / engage in conduct of that nature.
exist.
Knowingly / He is aware that such / He is aware that it is practically / He is aware that his conduct is
circumstances exist. / certain that his conduct will cause / of that nature.
such a result.
Recklessly / He consciously disregards a / He consciously disregards a / Gross deviation from the
substantial and unjustifiable / substantial and unjustifiable risk / standards a law-abiding
risk that the material element / that the material element…will / citizen would adopt in the same
exists. / result from his conduct. / situation.
Negligently / He should be aware of a / He should be aware of a substantial / Ditto.
substantial and unjustifiable / and unjustifiable risk that the
risk that the material element / material element…will result from
exists. / his conduct.

US v. Balint—US 1922—p. 185—Taft says that the person in the best position to find illegal booty may be held criminally liable for selling the booty, even if he didn’t know it was there. Even lacking the element of “scienter,” knowledge, the nature of the evil is great enough that it must be punished.
US v. Dotterweich—US 1943—p. 189—Frankfurter says a company owner who ships adulterated goods may be held liable, even without scienter, because the balance of his personal matter of guilt against the public interest in safety is tipped in the public’s favor. He has the best chance to catch the adulteration, and there is no mens rea required.
US v. Park—US 1975—p. 192—similar to Dotterweich, the Court holds that as consumers are largely without protection, it is up to the sellers to make sure the food they sell is safe. Gives responsibility without awareness. Public interest v. burden on distributors.
Morrissette v. US—US 1952—p. 193—Knowingly—Where a person in good faith mistakenly steals, thinking the property is abandoned, he can’t be held liable because he lacks the requisite mens rea of theft, which is to intentionally deprive another of his rightful property.
Allows a court to interpret a statute that has no express intent to have whatever intent is best suited to the crime committed.
US v. X-Citement Video—US 1994—p. 195—Rhenquist says that where one aspect of mens rea is enumerated in part of a statute, that mens rea may be implied to apply to all aspects of the statute.
Morrissette and X-Citement look at the nature of the evil being questioned; stealing junk v. kiddie porn. Public welfare offense.
US v. Central District of CA—9th 1988—p. 196—A possible defense is that Δ did not know and could not possibly know the age of the child “actor.” (Traci Lords).
US v. Freed—US 1971—p. 197—Courts are more likely to lessen the level of mens rea required where the offense endangers public welfare, like possession of hand grenades.
People v. Dillard—CA Ct App 1984—Strict liability where a person carries a loaded gun in public, thinking it isn’t loaded, because it’s a public safety issue.
Regina v. Faulkner—Ireland 1877—p. 202—Multiple culpable states of mind may be present in a single criminal act.

Actusreus—The voluntary physical act of the crime—attempt, complicity, conspiracy, theft, rape, omissions, etc.
The Requirement of an actus reus—Proctor v State—OK 1918—p. 114—Keeping a place with the intention of selling alcohol—Galbraith says that a crime cannot lie for intent without action.
Prohibiting the act is constitutional; prohibiting the intent is not.
There must be an affirmative act or omission
Omissions—Jones v. US—US 1962—p. 121—failure to act may constitute a breach of alegal duty in following situations:
Where statute imposes a duty of care for another
Where one sustains a certain status relationship to the other
Where one has assumed a contractual relationship to care for the other
Where one has voluntarilyassumedcare for the other, and so secluded that other to prevent aid from others
If the dangeriscreated by the would-be rescuer
Misprisionoffelony—crime not to report knowledge of a crime about to be committed.
Prosecutors are reluctant to use this most of the time, but Michael Fortier was charged with this for failure to disclose McVeigh.
CL—Law imposed a duty on Θ to disclose or report knowledge of a felony ASAP to law enforcement.
Requirement of Voluntariness—People v. Newton—NY 1973—p. 125—Weinstein—The actus reus should be an act of will. Here, a passenger’s unintended and forced arrival in a certain jurisdiction should not subject that person to its laws for his previous actions.
Martin v. State—AL 1944—p.127—Simpson—For a person to be subject to a law prohibiting public drunkenness, he must be in the public voluntarily.
MPC—liability requires a voluntary act. § 2.01 p.128, 132.
People v. Grant—IL 1977—p. 128—Reardon says a person who has a condition that makes him unaware of his apparently voluntary actions may escape liability if he didn’t bring the attack on himself and he was actually unaware of the actions. Automatismcase.
People v. Decina—NY 1956—p. 135—Asks whether the person knew he had a potentially dangerous condition, and then asks whether he should have known.
If you can anticipate your involuntary actions, then you can be liable for them.
The Prohibition of “Status” Crimes—Robinson v. California—US 1962—p. 137—Stewart—A statute that makes addiction a crime is unconstitutional. It doesn’t punish them for doing the drugs; it punishes them for having the status of addict, and are thus prosecutable at any time prior to reformation. Cruel and unusual punishment.
Only the third time punishment had been invalidated for being cruel and unusual until Furman v. Georgia.
Cruel and unusual punishment is evaluated according to evolving standards of common decency.
The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination only applies to testimony, not being forced to show track marks.
Rationales:
Involuntaryconduct cannot be punished
Punishment must be for past, notfuture conduct.
Powell v. Texas—SC 1968—p. 139—Alcoholism is not an excuse for public drunkenness—he was convicted for being drunk, not being a drunk.
Court retreats from idea of addiction as a status, because alcoholism is a kind of addiction. So look to the statute to ultimately determine legality.
Johnson v. State—SC FL 1992—p. 143—Harding—Legislature punishing those who give drugs to others was not intended to punish crackaddictedmothers who give their newborn babies crack before the umbilical cord is cut. The intent of the legislature doesn’t fit this interpretation of the statute.
Legality—Commonwealth v. Keller—PA 1964—p. 148—Gates—Where a crime doesn’t have any statutory basis, but it would be a crime at common law, a state may prosecute based on that. The country is based on common law, and the act violated community standards of decency, morality, and economy.
PA had an “incorporation statute,” which stated that every offense punishable by statute or common law but not specifically enumerated was still a punishable offense.
Keeler v. Superior Court—CA 1970—p. 154—Mosk—Where a man beats his pregnant wife and kills the baby, he is not liable for murder because the statute did not intend in-womb babies as “people.” Therefore, if he was prosecuted under this interpretation, he has Due Process issues because he lacked adequate notice of the illegality of his conduct.
Specificity—City of Chicago v. Morales—US 1999—p. 162—Stevens—Using an unusual definitionof “loiter” in the statute imparts sufficient vagueness to conflict with Due Process. There is no notice, it allows for arbitraryenforcement, destabilizes the social order, and can destroy liberty.
Synchronicity of a and b—The two happen together—1) there must be concurrence between D’s mental state and the act; and (2) there must be concurrence between D’s mental state and the harmful result, if the crime is one defined in terms of bad results.
Causation—The prosecution must show that the defendant’s actus reus “caused” the harmful result, in two different senses: (1) that the act was the “cause in fact” of the harm; and (2) that the act was the “proximate” cause (or the “legal” cause) of the harm.
Two ways in which an act can be the “cause in fact” of harm: (1) by being the “but for” cause of the harm; and (2) by being a “substantial factor” in creating the harm. These categories overlap, but not completely.
It is not enough that D’s act was a “cause in fact” of the harm. The prosecution must also show that the act and harm are sufficiently closely related that the act is a “proximate” or “legal” cause of that harm. This is a policy question: Is the connection between the act and the harm so stretched that it is unfair to hold D liable for that harm?
ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE = MENS REA + ACTUS REUS + ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES + CAUSATION + HARMFUL RESULT – AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

III. TheGuiltyMind

Specific and General Intent
General Intent—intent to do a certain act, which maytransfer to another act. A general intent to do some crime made the actor responsible for all crimes committed. He was responsible for the act and its unintended consequences.
General intent crimes do not contain the elements of mens rea in the statutory definition, so the judge usually has to make the call.
May also refer to the defendant’s blameworthiness.
May also refer to the intended natural and probableconsequences of the crime.
Negligence or recklessness—MPC commentary, p. 281.
State v. Neuzil—IA 1999—p. 223—Stalking offense does not require the specific intent to provoke fear, only the general intent to engage in conduct that has that effect.
Specific Intent—intent to do a certain specific act, which may not transfer to another act. Some acts are not wrong unless committed with a certain intent.
May also refer to the mental element of the crime
Or the unexecuted intent to commit a crime
May refer to the specific intended result of the crime, meaning knowledge or purpose
Purpose
Specific intent crimes:
All offenses explicitly so defined by statute, they have the requisite mens rea defined, which is often purpose.
All attempts
Any other crimes, like burglary and larceny, for which CL defined an intent element.
United States v. Jewell—9th 1976—p. 219—Deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge of a crime is equivalent to knowledge. “Willful blindness” will not excuse.
MPC--§ 2.02(7)—Knowledge is established if the person is aware of a high probability of the existence of a particular fact of a criminal offense, unless he actually believes it does not exist.
Regina v. Prince—Crown Case 1875—p. 223—A guilty mind, required for a crime, may be implied in the act, even if it is not overt.
Idea that even though the conduct was mistaken, the immorality of taking an underage girl from her father is sufficient for a crime.
People v. Ryan—NY 1993—p. 230—proof of mens rea was not adequate where the statute prohibited possession of the hallucinogenicelement, which was not easily determined from the weight of the mushrooms he had. There was no legislativeintent to make the weight of the drugs SL.

B.Mistake of Law or Fact

Look at the effect of the particular mistake on D’s mental state, and examine whether he was thereby prevented from having the mental state required for the crime.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but mistake of fact and ignorance of the deed can, in certain situations.
The fact that D mistakenly believes that no statute makes his conduct a crime does not furnish a defense
With a specific intent aspect of a crime, mistake of fact may be an excuse, if it removes the requisite intent.
Ex: X breaks and enters Y’s home, intending to take something he mistakenly believes is his (even though it really belongs to Y). X will not be guilty of burglary, even though he broke into a dwelling and committed a felony, because he did not intend to commit that felony—he intended to take something that was his.
Governing law is that law which defines an offense. Non-governing law is that law which is imbedded in the meaning of a particular circumstance element, but isn’t the law under which Δ is being charged.
Under MPC § 2.04(3), (NOT adopted in most states!), a belief that conduct is not an offense is a defense when based upon conduct when:
The statute or whatever defines the offense has not yet been published or is unavailable prior to the offense
The actor acts in reasonablereliance on a statute or whatever that is afterward determined to be invalid.
The burden of proof in mistake of law is on the defendant.
United States v. Learned—MI 1870—p. 245—Longyear—Defendant was presumed to know the law and how it applied; just because they thought the law was one way doesn’t make it the right was; no man may construct the law for himself.
People v. Bray—CA 1975—p. 248—Brown—Mistake of non-governing law. Felon in possession of a firearm, who no one really thought was a felon, ignorance of the law of whether he was a felon excuses him of the charge, brought under the law about felons with guns.
United States v. Baker—5th 1986—p. 252—The claim that Δ didn’t know the conduct is criminal is not sufficient to excuse the act. Not knowing the law is not an excuse. There was no suggestion that knowledge that the act was criminal was required.
Hopkins v State—MD 1950—p. 254—Where the state attorney tells someone that his actions will be legal, and they aren’t, ignorance of the law is still not an excuse.
Cheek v. US—US 1991—p. 255—White—Supreme Court decides that some offenses, like complex tax offenses, do require proof of knowledge of governing law.
Mistake of law as an excuse—Long v. State—Del. 1949—p. 264—A man convicted of bigamy after an attorney gave him incorrect advice, he appealed the denial of the existence of the consultation as evidence for the jury. The court awarded a new trial, because a good faith consultation with erroneous advice may be a defense.
He was aware his conduct could constitute a crime, so he took steps to avoid breaking the law, and relied on the advice.
Commonwealth v. Twitchell—MA 1993—p. 269—Wilkins—Christian Scientists who relied on statements quoted from the State Attorney General were still liable for an omission that led to their son’s death, although they claimed it was inadequate notice.
They relied on a statement that said negligent failure to care for a child could be excused, but this was wanton and reckless disregard of the common law duty to provide care for a minor child.
Hendershott v. The People—CO 1982—p. 273—Quinn—Evidence of mental defect may be entered in a case to help disprove the elements of mens rea, because to refuse to allow it is deprivation of the defendant’s right to counter proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a due process issue.
State v. Cameron—NJ 1986—p. 279—Clifford--drunkenness is not an absolute defense, but it may be used for defensive purposes. Evidence of extraordinarily great prostration of a person’s facilities is required. Here, she was sober enough to know what she was doing.
Montana v. Egelhoff—US 1996—p 284—Ginsburg—Plurality opinion that said a Montana statute that prohibited voluntary intoxication as something to take into account when determining mens rea was unconstitutional because it presumed culpability rather than innocence.

IV. Causation by Omission: Duties