MVE6030
The Good Society and Its Educated Citizens
Topic 5 (Lecture 7)
The Ideal Membership of the Good Society:
Citizenship and/or Nationality
(I)
Citizenship:
Membership in Modern Political Communities (i)
A. Citizenship: It refers to the ideal-typical membership endowed with subjects of a sovereign modern state.
1. The conceptions of the modern state:
a. Max Weber’s conception: “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically… the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” (Weber, 1946, p.78)
b. Charles Tilly’s conception: “An organization which control the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its division are formally coordinated with one another.” (Tilly, 1975, p.70)
c. Accordingly, the modern state can be defined as a set of power apparatuses, which can constitute effective rules internally and externally over a definitive territory and the residents within it. Hence, the modern state consists of the following constituent features
i. the definitive territory
ii. the definitive subjects
iii. monopoly of use of physical force, i.e. sovereign power
iv. the establishment of external and internal public authority
2. The conception of citizenship:
a. Reinhard Bendix defines citizenship as individualistic and plebiscitarian membership before the sovereign and nation-wide public authority
b. Its development signifies “the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens”. (Bendix, 1964, p.9)
c. Accordingly, citizenship can be defined as institutionalized relationships between the state and its legitimate subjects, i.e. citizens. These relationships consist of citizens’ definitive rights and obligations towards the modern state.
B. Ronald Dworkin’s liberal conception of citizenship rights:
1. Rights as trumps: Dworkin suggests, “Rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decision that states a goal for the community as a whole.” (Dworkin, 1984, P.153) More recently he underlines, “Political rights are trumps over otherwise adequate justifications for political decision.” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 329) Accordingly, in conceptualizing the idea of political rights of citizens, we are to enquire the question: “What kind of rights do we each as individuals have against our state―against ourselves collectively?” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 328)
2. Two basic principles of legitimacy: Dworkin suggests that a state and its government can impose a collective and coercive decision upon its citizens unless it subscribes to two reigning principles. He states, “No government is legitimate unless it subscribes two reigning principle principles. First, it must show equalut concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to decision for himself how to make something valuable of his life.” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 2)
3. In accordance to these two principles of equal concerns and respects, Dworkin underlines that “governments have a sovereign responsibility to treat each person in their power with equal concerns and respect.” (Dworkin, 2011, P. 321) In light of Dworkin’s conceptions of political rights as trumps of citizens over the sovereignty of the state, the development citizenship rights can be approached in the following two perspectives, namely historical-sociological perspective of T.H. Marshall and Wesley Hohfeld’s jurisprudential (legal-philosophical) perspective.
C. T.H. Marshall’s Thesis of Development of Citizenship Rights
1. Contradictory trajectory of development of capitalism and citizenship
a. Capitalism is an institution based upon the principle of inequality, which is in turn built on uneven distribution of property and/or property right
b. Citizenship is an institution based upon the principle of equality, which is built on equal citizen status and its derivative rights
2. Development of citizenship is construed by Marshall as means of abating social class conflict
3. The historical trajectory of development of citizenship rights
a. Development of civil rights in the 18th century and the constitution of the Court of Justice and the Rule of Law
b. Development of the political rights in the 19th century and the constitution of the parliamentary system and the democratic state
c. Development of the social rights in the 20th century and the constitution of the social service departments and the welfare state
D. Wesley Hohfeld’s Conception of Rights
1. Rights as Liberties
2. Rights as Claims
3. Rights as Powers
4. Rights as Immunities
5. Classification of Citizenship Rights with Hodfeld’s conception
(Janoski, 1998)
E. The theory of citizenship obligations
1. Conception of citizenship obligations: The concept of citizenship obligation can be discerned as the rights of the state in forms of claims or powers to its citizenship. “Citizenship obligations may range from the sometimes vague but other times enforceable requirement to respect another person’s opinion and position in life (i.e. general tolerance) to state-enforced civil obligations including conscription and taxation under the penalty of imprisonments.” (Janoski, 1998, p. 54)
2. Typology of citizenship obligations:
a. “Supportive obligations consist of paying taxes, contributing to insurance-based funds, and working productively.”
b. “Caring obligations to others and to oneself require a person to respect others’ right, care for children and a loving family, and respect oneself by pursuing an education, a career, and adequate medical care.”
c. Service obligations include efficiently using service, and actually contributing services - be it voter registration, health care for the elderly, ‘pro bono’ work in public defense for lawyers, volunteer fire fighting, on youth service.”
d. Protection obligations involve military service, police protection, and conscription to protect the nation by bearing arms or caring for the wounded, and social action to internally protect the integrity of a democratic system through social service, protests, or demonstrations.”
3. Approaches to the justification of citizenship obligations
a. The contractual and instrumental approach: Obligations are conceived as returns to recipience and acceptance of rights
b. The community-based and legitimacy approach: This approach avoids the narrowly instrumental approach to citizenship obligation and asserts that “some obligations do not entail rights” and discerns obligations with the concept of “general exchange, which underlines “people helping people who help other people.” (p. 61) The approach claims that most citizens do not calculate a right-obligation exchange on daily bases but tend to adopt a ‘generalized exchange’ stance, in which “people do not expect immediate and reciprocal returns form the people they help, but they do expect to see their returns materialize over time in building a decent life in a more or less just society.” (p. 61)
c. Limiting obligation approach: This approach sees citizenship obligations claimed or enforced by the state upon its citizens may in conflict individual citizens’ rights. For example individual citizens’ rights to smoke in public venues are in conflict with the rights of the public to be free from environments hazardous to health. Hence, this approach asserts that in order to safeguard the violation of individual citizens’ rights, the state could demand its citizens to oblige only under four conditions: (p. 64)
i. there is a clear danger,
ii. no reasonable exist,
iii. the decisions in favor of society are least intrusive, and
iv. effectors are made to minimize damage or treat the effects of constraining a right.
F. The Theories of Citizen Virtues:
1. Criticism of “vote-centric” democracy:
a. The intrinsic dilemma of liberal democracy: C.B. Macpherson underlines at the opening page of his oft-cited work The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, “If liberal democracy is taken to mean …a society striving to ensure that all its members are equally free to realize their capacities. … ‘Liberal’ can mean freedom of the stronger to do down the weaker by following market rules; or it can mean equal effective freedom of all to use and develop their capacities. The later freedom is inconsistent with the former. …The difficulty is that liberal democracy during most of its life so far …has tried to combine the two meanings.” (Macpherson, 1977, P. 1)
b. The degradation of citizenship: The development of liberal democracies in capitalist societies, especially those in Europe and North America, in the twentieth century witnessed the degradation of the ideal-typical conception of democratic citizen, who is supposed to be rational, reasonable, responsible, and active participants in political decision-making processes in particular and public affairs in general. With the rise of welfare state and politics of seduction, citizens have been indulged and relegated to become clients of the welfare states, consumers of welfare service, desire-seeking free-riders in politics of seduction, and spectators of politics of scandal in mass media.
c. The constitution of the “vote-centric” democracy: “In much of the post-war period, democracy was understood almost exclusively in terms of voting. Citizens were assumed to have set of preferences, fixed prior to and independent of the political process, and the function of voting was simply to provide a fair decision-making procedure or aggregation mechanism for translating these pre-existing preferences into public decisions, either about who to elect or about what law to adopt. But it is increasingly accepted that this ‘aggregative’ or ‘vote-centric’ conception of democracy cannot fulfill norms of democratic legitimacy.” (Kymlicka, 2002, P.290)
2. Theorizing deliberative democracy or “talk-centric” democracy
a. To overcome the shortcomings of “vote-centric” democracy, numbers of social scientists and political philosophers have advocated alternative models of democracy to rectify if not replace the prevailing “vote-centric” democracy. One of these is the deliberative democracy, which aims to bring genuine and engaging talks and deliberations among reasonable citizens back into the decision-making processes in democracy.
b. What is deliberative democracy?
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson define “deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of researching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.” (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, P. 7)
c. From this definition, Gutmann and Thompson underline four essential characteristic of deliberative democracy. These are
i. Reason-giving: “Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to reasons that citizens give in return.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, P. 3) Furthermore, reasons put forth and accepted in the decision-making process of the deliberative democracy are not confined to “procedural” reasons and justifications but also include “substantive” reasons and justification. In this reason-giving and reason-justifying process, it is expected that understanding, reciprocity, and cooperation can be faired among most if not all parties concerns.
ii. Accessible: “A second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the reasons given in this process should be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 4) In order to input reasons and justifications into the democratic deliberation and make them accessible to all citizens, these reasons must be presented in comprehensible forms and the deliberations must take place in public.
iii. Binding: “The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is that its process aims at producing a decision that is binding for some period of time.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, P. 5) Talks taken place in deliberative democracy are essentially different from conventional political debates and arguments, in which engaging parties are simply try to impose their preferences and reasons on their opponents in a winner-take-all manner. The primary aim of talks in the deliberative democracy is consensus building and reciprocity constituting so that conclusion can be researched and decision can be made that will have binding effects on all citizens.
iv. Dynamic: The fourth characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the process of deliberation itself should be dynamic and continuous. “Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future. It keeps open the possibility of a continuing dialogue.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, P. 6)
3. Conception of the virtues of citizens
a. Reconceptualization of citizenship: In view of the shortcomings of the vote-centric democracy and politics of seduction, scholars begin to extend the discourse on citizenship beyond the right-based and obligation-based conceptions. They begin to enquire the necessary skills, performances and dispositions required of citizens in democratic processes. Numbers of scholars have characterized this dimension of democratic citizenship as virtue of citizen or simply civic virtue.
b. William A. Galston underlines that one of the structural tension in liberal democracy is “the tension between virtue and self-interest.” (1991, P. 217) More specifically, it is the tension between two dimension of citizenship in liberalism. One the one hand is the “interest-based” citizenship rights and on the other the virtues required of democratic citizens. Galston has characterized four types of civic virtues which he thinks are instrumental the function of liberal democracy. They are (Galston, 1991, Pp. 221-7)
i. General virtues: They include courage, i.e. “the willingness to fight and even die on behalf of one’s country” (P. 221); law-abidingness; and loyalty, i.e. “the developed capacity to understand, to accept, and to act on the core principles of one’s society” (P. 221).
ii. Virtues of liberal society: They include virtue of independence, i.e. “the disposition to care for, and take responsibility for, oneself and to avoid becoming needlessly dependent on others” (P. 222); and the virtue of tolerance, i.e. “the relativistic belief that every personal choice, every ‘life plan’, is equally good, hence beyond rational scrutiny and criticism.” (P. 222)
iii. Virtues of liberal economy: They include entrepreneurial virtues, i.e. enterprising dispositions such as “imagination, initiative, drive, determination” (P. 223); and organizational virtues of employee, i.e. traits such as “punctuality, reliability, civility toward co-workers, and a willingness to work within established frameworks and tasks.” (P. 223)