Nora Ng
PS311 – Week 9
Context and Interpretation in Political Violence
The use of narrative in the study of political violence -- as seen in the works of S. George Vincentnathan, Paul R. Brass, and Stephen Ellis – permits the articulation of the complex interaction among identity, politics, and political violence. While statistical analysis is great for isolating causal factors, narratives have the advantage in describing and analyzing the unquantifiable, the historical and cultural contexts and processes that profoundly affect the dynamics, outcomes, and interpretations of political violence. Vincentnathan, Brass, and Ellis all use the narrative form to study specific cases: Vincentnathan examines how government policies sparked intercaste conflict in a south Indian village, Brass looks at the political manipulation of the interpretation of Hindu-Muslim conflict, and Ellis touches on the effect of indirect rule on identity and traditional institutions. Although the use of historical and cultural explanations in these three analyses render the causal findings rather case-specific, the mechanisms through which causes become effect are, to various degrees, generalizable to other situations of political violence.
In his article, “Caste Politics, Violence, and the Panchayat in a South Indian Community,” [1] Vincentnathan seeks to explain the expulsion of Dalits (“untouchables”) by Vanniyars (a low but relatively higher caste) from the village of Ennakulam. He finds that this incident of intercaste violence stems from the way caste identity is used and reinforced by government policies, and the resulting intercaste competition for government power and resources. Caste hierarchy in India has political and economic bases, not just the religious. The British colonial administration catalogued and ranked castes in order to rule more effectively. That, and the British employment of high caste individuals to serve in colonial administration solidified caste status and hierarchy. After independence, the Indian government undertook “nation building” and the promotion of individual equality and rights through the advancement of disadvantaged castes (Vincentnathan 502), by means of affirmative action programs for oppressed groups, especially Dalits, in government employment and school admissions. Since wealth isn’t strictly correlated with caste membership, Vanniyars objected to preferential treatment for Dalits. Vanniyars also felt their higher caste status threatened by Dalit economic advancement. The Vanniyar desire to remain socially and economically superior to the Dalit, and the desire of the Dalit to attain equality caused intercaste tension which, combined with conditions specific to Ennakulam (such as the central location of the Dalit quarters within the village, the assertiveness of the Dalits), resulted in violence. The basis on which the government chose to dispense resources is the major reason for this intercaste incident. That the contending groups in this case are castes is specific to India’s history and culture. Had the government chosen to distribute its largess along other lines, one can imagine that violence might erupt between other competing groups, differently defined (provided that the groups are sufficiently organized).
Instead of the cause of political violence, Brass examines the political manipulation of violence via after-the-fact interpretation and contextualization in Theft of an Idol. He observes that violence involving Hindus and Muslims are not always ethnic or communal in nature. However, even incidental conflicts can be transformed into communal incidents if that suits the interests of local politicians and state authorities. Conflicts can be further inflated into “grand communal confrontations” through further reinterpretation by the press and “extralocal” politicians and authorities (Brass 6). Brass asserts that the contextualization of Hindu-Muslim incidents as communal confrontations serves all the dominant ideologies in India, and that persistence of conflicts labeled as communal aid politicians at all levels (local, state, national) in gaining votes, retaining power, and justifying state authority (Brass 6). These conflicts help Muslim separatists and Hindu nationalists mobilize their respective constituents, as well as give secular nationalists support for their plea for a strong, united state. Yet not every Hindu-Muslim incident get reinterpreted and fitted into the communal conflict context. Whether contexualization happens depends on whether there is opportunity for politicians to exploit the incident, to place blame on opponents, either as aggressors or as incompetent governors; it most often occurs during or near elections. Riots and communal conflicts are so much a part of Indian political life that towns may sometimes have “institutionalized riot systems” to maintain communal tension, and to initiate riots when appropriate. Though the cases Brass studies are Indian, the idea that incidents can be reinterpreted and contextualized for wider political purposes is broadly applicable. Local, trivial events can transform into “ideological confrontations between whole communities” wherever there are preexisting frameworks of meaning, opportunities to exploit these events for political purposes, and interested parties that recognize such opportunities (Brass 96).
Stephen Ellis’ Mask of Anarchy, a very scary study of the Liberian civil war, is slightly different from the works above. His aim is to describe and explain the historical and cultural roots of the war. He concentrates on the political and social conditions in Liberia, and puts special analytical emphasis on traditional Liberian religion. Significant, even defining factors of Liberian political and religious development may be unique to Liberia – for example, the status of founders as former American slaves and descendants of slaves, and the introduction of a specific version of the Christian God – and these factors may not have parallels in other countries or societies. As such, Ellis’ conclusions may not be as broadly applicable as those of Vincentnathan and Brass. Though not the main point of his book, he does point out that the form of indirect rule used in Liberia can be found in other Third World countries and is not peculiar to Liberia. Indirect rule is a political system that presents incentives to politically exploit identities, in a way that can possibly cause or contribute to political violence. Knowing the Liberian case can shed light on other cases. Also, the dissolution of Liberia into a horrifying civil war suggests that Liberia may, perhaps, be used as a sort of worst-case scenario of how such a political system might fail – an indirect application of Ellis’ findings.
The system of indirect rule began when Liberia was required to claim specific boundaries as the European imperial powers were cutting up West Africa, in order to ensure recognition as a sovereign state. Monrovia, the capital, found itself with a hinterland to govern. Given the lack of financial resources, Monrovia resorted to a system of local government, in which tribes are organized and governed each by a paramount chief. Paramount chiefs were authorized to collect taxes, mobilize labor, and retain 10% of tax revenue. In return for these very considerable powers, the paramount chief recognized the sovereignty of Monrovia. These new opportunities for power and enrichment made local politics a means of advancement, and competition for chieftaincies sparked “opportunistic factionalism” (Ellis 214). Identities, ethnic or otherwise, became “one of the most vital sites in intense struggles for local control” (Ellis 214). It was in the interest of ambitious politicians to claim that each tribe is culturally and ancestrally distinct, and therefore warranted independent administration. So the number of groups competing for government resources increased. Grievances developed under the system of patronage and clientelism used by the President to reward his own tribe (as consistent with the Liberian norm of personal gain trickling down to one’s own village and people), resulting in a lot of systematic killing of rival tribe members during the civil war.
Indirect rule also led to the corruption of traditional religious authorities. Paramount chiefs joined religious secret societies, and used these societies as a personal political weapon. The secret societies had the role of checking and balancing against other traditional civic authorities, but was co-opted as the “entourage of a local despot” in a system of indirect rule (Ellis 239). Traditional religious authorities lost the ability to regulate power, and thus helped contribute to the confused, even warped, conception of power by Liberians that manifested itself during the civil war.
The Liberian case suggests that a system of indirect rule, depending on its design, may present incentives to exploit and manipulate identities in politically dangerous ways. It also suggests that interaction between state and local authorities need to be carefully managed so that authority and institutions are not negatively affected.
The system of indirect rule isn’t the only reason for the civil war, the causes of which are beyond the scope of this short paper. A narrative framework, however, does give the space and freedom to allow better explanations of the complicated causes and historical/cultural processes that led to a complex phenomenon like the Liberian civil war.
1
[1] Vincentnathan, S. George. “Caste Politics, Violence, and the Panchayat in a South Indian Community”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 38, no. 3, July 1996. 484-509.