Consult Toolboxccgjp

AFFUmich

Consult ToolboxCCGJP

AFF CONSULT TOOLBOX

2AC AT: consult X country [generic]

1AR Ext #1 – Permuation do the counterplan

1AR Ext #4 – Hegemony

1AR Ext #5 – Permutation – Do Plan and Consult

1AR Ext #6 – Delay

1AR Ext #7 – Consult CPs are a Voting Issue

1AR Ext #8 – Permutation plan then CP

1AR Ext #9 – Permutation CP then Plan

1AR Ext #10 – Constitution/Democracy DA

1AR Ext #11 – No Spillover

2AC AT: consult X country [generic]

1. Permute – Do the counterplan –The counterplan isn’t textually competitive which is the most objective method to evaluate competition

2. Permutation – do both – Non-binding consultation can solve the net benefit and our turns

Daily Oklahoman - 6-12-2001

WITH his arrival in Spain this morning, President Bush begins a five-day trip to European countries, many of whose leaders are eager to lecture him on missile defense, global warming and - following the execution of Timothy McVeigh - the death penalty. We hope the president will listen politely but stay the course. The United States always should consult with its allies. But consultation doesn't mean conformity with a raft of liberal-to-socialist views now popular in a number of European capitals. "You can go through the motions of consulting as long as you don't ask and do tell," Kenneth Adelman, a veteran of the Reagan administration, told the New York Times. "You can ask opinions, but the fact is Europeans don't like change and Americans like change."

3. Country/Organization Says No [Insert]

4. Turn – Hegemony

A. Consultation devastates leadership

Charles Krauthammer,The National Interest, Winter, 2003

America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest. Especially on matters of national security, war-making and the deployment of power, America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, yes. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need to do so on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power allows, indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. Countries will cooperate with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, second, out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the u.s.s. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. Today, under the most unilateralist of administrations, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, "this will not stand", and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possible. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question that separates unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if, at the end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-and international-security? The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up-either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.

2AC AT: consult X country [generic]

B. Heg solves global nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

5. Permute – Do the plan and consult

6. Consultation causes delays – language disputes and layers of intra-nation bureaucracy – risks hurting relations

Grieb ‘2 (Kenneth J. Grieb is Professor and Coordinator of International Studies at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. His is a author of several books dealing with Modern Latin American and United States Diplomatic History -- Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy – available via:

International relations involve negotiations between the governments of nation-states,which are conducted by their executive branches under the auspices of their heads of government. Since each state is sovereign, agreement is reached only when the parties involved in an issue reach unanimous agreement among themselves. Those nations that do not agree with the consensus among the participants do not sign the resulting agreement and hence are not bound by its provisions. Diplomatic negotiations are difficult and time-consuming, since all those involved must agree on every aspect and word of the agreement. When the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 amid the tensions following the Second World War, over 1,400 separate votes were required before the full declaration was adopted. Achieving unanimous consensus requires extensive, constant, and precise communications between the heads of government of the nations involved. Such communications are conducted through a variety of representatives. The number and types of such representatives have proliferated throughout history and in particular during the twentieth century, when rapid communications increased the need for speedy and ongoing contacts. The end of colonialism during the second half of the twentieth century meant that many more nations and peoples were involved in global and regional issues.

7. The CP’s Fiat is a Voting Issue –

A. Infinitely regressive – no advocate for consulting on the plan, they have a card about consulting or the net benefit –makes it possible to consult any agent or organization – predictable counterplans have literature that compare the plan to the counterplan

B. Conditional fiat – multiple words of outcomes kills 2AC strategy and allow the neg to change advocacy in the block or 2nr

C. Timeframe fiat – CP fiats the outcome of consultation after consultation takes place – justifies timeframe fiat and terrible CPs like delay

D. CPs that have the possibility of doing the entire plan are bad – crush aff ground, can’t read offense against our own plan, and they’re plan plus

E. International fiat – the CP fiats ______comes to the table – there are 195 countries and countless other international agencies that they can consult, making the research burden impossible for the aff.

8. Permute – Do the plan and then the CP

9. Permute – Do the CP and then the plan

2AC AT: consult X country [generic]

10. Turn – Constitution

A. Allowing foreign entities to dictate American foreign policy would dismantle constitutional balance and democracy

James R. Edwards Jr., Adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute, 2002 [The Washington Times, “Homeland Security in Konts,” Lexis]

In other words, Congress would lose much of its constitutional ability to check the executive branch. And foreign governments, unelected supranational bodies and bureaucrats would be free to dictate to Americans what our laws are. The courts have consistently upheld the right of Congress to determine who to admit, exclude and expel and on what basis. This is a right of sovereignty. And exercising this right belongs to Congress alone among its plenary powers. To pawn off this exclusive congressional power to the executive branch or foreign entities would upset the constitutional balance. It would give noncitizens of the United States the ability to dictate our own laws, even if the Senate had never ratified a related treaty. The Senate should keep the homeland security bill free of these substantive changes in immigration policy. The House should insist that these be dropped from the bill. And the White House should include these in its reasons for a veto.

B. Constitutional violations come first – under any framework

Daryl Levinson, Professor of law at University of Virginia, 2000 [University of Chicago Law Review, Spring, Lexis]

Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do not usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the opposite, constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints that trump even utility-maximizing government action. 69Alternatively, constitutional rights might be understood as serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional violations often exceeds the social benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create long-term costs that outweigh short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to maximize global utility, even though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and rule-utilitarian descriptions imply that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero; that is, society would be better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never violated.

C. Democracy solves everything including extinction

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1995

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associates with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

11. No Spillover – Consultation on the plan will not create consultation on all other future issues

12. Diplomatic Capital –

A. Focus on Nagorno-Karabakh now – Clintons investing energy and putting off other major diplomatic initiatives

Panorama, 6-26-2010

[“Clinton intends to prod Azerbaijan and Armenia to make progress on Nagorno-Karabakh: Crowley,”

The State Department said Friday Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in a trip starting next week and spanning six days. She will try to ease lingering political conflicts in the Caucasus region, Voice of America writes. Officials here are cautioning against expectations of any major U.S. diplomatic initiatives on what will be Clinton's first trip to the Caucasus region as secretary. But they say she intends to try to build on ongoing U.S. efforts to ease regional problems including the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the troubled aftermath of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said Clinton intends to try to prod Azerbaijan and Armenia to make progress on Nagorno-Karabakh and to advance the process of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey. Turkey is not on the secretary's itinerary but a senior official here said it is not a snub and that Clinton, who visited Ankara last year, has a limited "window" and packed agenda for upcoming trip.

2AC AT: consult X country [generic]

B. Diplomatic capital is finite – CP prevents focus on more important issues

Anderson & Grewell, 2001

[Terry and Bishop, “The Greening of Foreign Policy,”

Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues.As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, “Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation.

C. Tensions are on the brink – diplomatic capital key to a resolution

De Waal, 7-5-2010

[Thomas, senior associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment, specializing primarily in the South Caucasus region comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and their breakaway territories, as well as the wider Black Sea region, acknowledged expert on the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus, “A Forever Smoldering Conflict in the Caucasus,”

As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels to Baku and Yerevan on July 4-5, an old issue will again dominate her discussions: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will have a wry smile if he watches the media reports. He was the first leader to fail to solve this conflict in 1988. Since his day, the dispute has escalated into full-scale war and then degraded into a miserable deadlock, but its fundamentals have not changed. For years, the broad international consensus is that the competing Armenian and Azeri claims over Nagorno-Karabakh are still so extreme and contradictory that it did not merit a high-level peace initiative. The perception has been that the conflict — halted by a cease-fire but not resolved — is at least being managed and that the risks of a new war are negligible. But recent developments are pushing Nagorno-Karabakh up the agenda again. First the good news. Since the end of 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev has surprised skeptics by personally working on a peace agreement. It is gruelling work. In Sochi this past January, Medvedev spent most of a day with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and got absolutely nowhere. In St. Petersburg last month, he spent more than two hours with them and made a little more progress. This top-level Russian initiative has not received much attention outside Russia. The default position of many in Washington, for example, is that Moscow wants to “keep the conflict smoldering.” But that does not jibe with the facts. No sane senior politician of Medvedev’s rank would work so hard on this if he did not want genuinely to see success. The Russians have also been scrupulous in involving their co-mediators, inviting the U.S. and French Nagorno-Karabakh envoys to St. Petersburg to join in the discussions with the two presidents. It looks as though Medvedev has made peace in Nagorno-Karabakh a personal project, and his government sees a peaceful initiative with Armenia and Azerbaijan as a good PR response to the damage Russia suffered internationally in Georgia in 2008. This is one area where, at the moment at least, Medvedev and Clinton are pushing in the same direction. The bad news is that this latest push for peace comes at a time when more and more people are talking war. On June 18, only a few hours after the St. Petersburg meeting, one of the worst incidents in years occurred on the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire line. Four Armenian soldiers and one Azeri were killed. The circumstantial evidence points more to this having been an Azeri attack than an Armenian one — the bodies were on the Armenian side of the line — but the true picture will probably never be known. Clashes like this threaten the equilibrium that has held since 1994, when the ceasefire deal ended fighting. They reflect an overall hardening of positions on both sides. Many Armenians talk more openly about history ratifying the victory they won in 1994 in the hope that Nagorno-Karabakh will follow Kosovo down the path of international legitimacy. For its part, oil-rich Azerbaijan now spends more than $2 billion a year on its military and many Azeris adopt a more belligerent tone, calling for a war to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenians. The international mechanism designed to deal with the conflict, the Minsk Process of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is still extremely modest. There are just six European monitors in charge of observing the ceasefire — basically a token presence given that there are more than 20,000 soldiers on each side facing each other along more than 175 kilometers of trenches. The chief work of mediation falls on three Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ambassadors representing France, Russia and the United States, who keep up the tortuous negotiations over a compromise document in a climate of almost total distrust in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Naturally suspicious, neither government offers the offer anything constructive. To be precise, the Armenians offer constructive engagement on small issues such as sharing water over the ceasefire line, but the Azeris reject these gestures, worrying that this is “doing business with the enemy.” The Armenian side rejects all proposals to give up even an inch of Armenian-held land, before pledges on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh are made up front. The Azeris, saying that they are in a state of war, even reject the proposal made by the French, Russia and U.S foreign ministers in Helsinki in 2008 to remove snipers from the front line. The result is that, even when Medvedev is pushing them, the two presidents lack the will to put their signatures on a piece of paper that will set their countries down a path of historic compromise with each other. To do so would unleash a storm of domestic criticism, while the international reward for taking this step is much less certain. So the leaders calculate that they will not pay a high price for doing nothing — and that other bilateral issues, such as Armenian diaspora concerns, gas pipelines and Afghanistan-bound flights over Azerbaijan will keep their relations with Moscow, Washington and Brussels on an even footing. The bloodshed on the ceasefire line should focus minds and be a reminder that a new conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh would be catastrophic for everyone, not just Armenians and Azeris. More positive relationships between Moscow, Washington, Paris and Brussels makes this a good moment to have a conversation about what each of these capitals can offer to underpin a post-conflict settlement in terms of funding and peacekeepers. If the world’s top leaders send a signal to the Armenians and Azeris that they are more serious about a lasting peace, then the local actors may finally have to accept that the day of peaceful reckoning has come.