COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT AND ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVERNANCE: SOME LESSONS FROM THE PHILIPPINES
October 15, 2009
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ACRONYMS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.Introduction
2.Conceptual Framework and Methodology
2.1Conceptual Framework
2.2Methodology
3.Institutional Environment for Accountable Local Governance
3.1 Supply-side Conditions
3.1.1 Fiscal Dimension
3.1.2Administrative Dimension
3.1.3Political Dimension
3.2Demand-side Conditions
3.2.1Association
3.2.2Access to Information
3.2.3Voice, Negotiation and Oversight
4.Accountable Local Governance and CDD Operations
4.1Impact of Local Governance Conditions on CDD Operations
4.1.1The Impact of Supply-side Conditions
4.1.2The Impact of Demand-side Conditions
4.2.Impact of CDD Operations on Local Governance Conditions
4.2.1The Impact on Supply-side Conditions
4.2.2The Impact on Demand-side Conditions
5.Conclusions
5.1Main Findings
5.1.1Opportunities for Enhanced Accountability
5.1.2Challenges to Social Accountability
5.1.3Interactions between Local Governance and CDD Operations
5.2Recommendations
Annex 1: Bibliography
Annex 2: Description of the Case Study Projects
Annex 3: Maps and Key Features of the Case Study Municipalities
Annex 4: Local Governance Conditions: Comparing Enabled and Constrained Environments
Annex 5: Key Financial Data of the Case Study Municipalities
Annex 6: Local Governance Conditions and Their Interactions with CDD Operations
Annex 7: Local Governance Conditions and the Space for Social Accountability
Annex 8: Examples of CSO Engagement in Social Accountability
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AEDAgricultural Enterprise Development
AFPArmed Forces of the Philippines
AIPAnnual Investment Plan
ARCAgrarian Reform Community
ARCDPAgrarian Reform Communities Development Project
ARMMAutonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
ARSPAgrarian Reform Support Program
ATINAccess to Information Network
AUSAIDAustralian Agency for International Development
BACBids and Awards Committee
BBGCBarangay-Bayan Governance Consortium
BDCBarangay Development Council
BDPBarangay Development Plan
BIARSP Belgian Integrated Agrarian Reform Support Program
BJMPBureau of Jail Management and Penology
BRTBarangayRepresentation Team
CBOcommunity-based organization
CDDcommunity-driven development
CIDDSComprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services
COACommission on Audit
CODE-NGO Caucus of Development NGO Networks
COMELECCommission on Elections (Philippines)
CSOcivil society organization
DBCCDevelopment Budget Coordination Committee
DILGDepartment of the Interior and Local Government
DPWHDepartment of Public Works and Highways
DSWDDepartment of Social Welfare and Development
EDFEconomic Development Fund
FGDfocus group discussion
GAAGeneral Appropriations Act
GADgender and development
GFIgovernment financial institution
GPRAGovernment Procurement Reform Act
GSISGovernment Service Insurance System
ICCInvestment Coordination Committee
INFRESInfrastructure for Rural Productivity Enhancement Sector
IRAInternal Revenue Allotment
JICAJapan International Cooperation Agency
KalahiKapit-BisigLabansaKahirapan (“linking arms in the struggle against poverty”)
KARZONEKalahi Agrarian Reform Development Zone
KCPKalahi-CIDDS Project
LCELocal Chief Executive
LDCLocal Development Council
LGCLocal Government Code
LGPFLocal Governance Policy Forum
LGUlocal government unit
LPRAPLocal Poverty Reduction Action Plan
LSBlocal special bodies
LSRlocal sector representation
MAOMunicipal AgriculturalOffice
MAROMunicipal Agrarian Reform Office
MIBFMunicipal-Inter Barangay Forum
MDCMunicipal Development Council
MFCMunicipal Finance Corporation
MHOMunicipal Health Officer
MIBFMunicipal Inter-Barangay Forum
MINCODE Mindanao NGO-PO Network
MOOEMaintenance and Other Operating Expenses
MPDOMunicipal Planning and Development Officer
MSWDOMunicipal Social Welfare and Development Officer
NCRFWNational Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
NEDANational Economic Development Authority
NGOnon-government organization
NIANational Irrigation Authority
NSCBNational Statistics Coordinating Board
ODAOfficial Development Assistance
OSRown-source revenue
PAPprograms, activities, and projects
PATSARRD Philippine-Australia Technical Support on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
PBACPre-Qualifications Bids and Awards Committee
PCNCPhilippine Council for NGO Certification
PDAFPriority Development Assistance Fund
PhPPhilippine peso
PIOpublic information officer
PNPPhilippine National Police
POpeoples’ organization
POCPeace and Order Council
PPDOProvincial Planning and Development Office
PRAPreparatory Recall Assembly
PSAparticipatory situational assessment
RWSARural Waterworks and Sanitation Association
SBSangguniangBayan (municipal legislature)
SEFSpecial Education Fund
ULAPUnion of Local Authorities in the Philippines
UNICEFUnited Nations Children’s Fund
USAIDUnited States Agency for International Development
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Community-driven development (CDD)is associated with community support approaches to the delivery of public goods and services, promoting civil society empowerment strategies, and favoring the mobilization of community-based organizations (CBOs) for collective action and as interlocutors between people and public service providers. Decentralized local governance is the localization of authority in, and accountability for, the use and generation of fiscal resources and the provision of public goods and services. Local governance relates not only to local institutions like local government and local public sector agencies, but also encompasses a variety of civil society institutions such as community-based resource user groups or citizen oversight bodies.
Both these modes of delivering public goods and services hold the promise of making democracy work for the poor by enhancing the means by which those who deliver public goods are held accountable by those who demand them. Indeed, they are complementary approaches. This study proceeds from recognition of the potential complementarities between community-driven development and decentralized local governance, and the need to identify strategies for operational integration. It aims to deepen the understanding of how the institutional environment for local governance interacts with CDD project operations. It gives special emphasis on the issue of accountability, analyzing how CDD operations perform in terms of strengthening the capacity of citizens and civil society to hold local authorities and public service providers accountable, and the capacity of the local government to be held accountable.
The study utilizes a two-pronged approach.First, it assesses the institutional environment for accountability in local governance. Second, it examines the operations of two major World Bank-assisted CDD projects in two municipal case study sites. Given that CDD projects both shape and are shaped by local governance contexts in which they are embedded, the study investigates how CDD operations in the Philippines are affected by and are helping reform local governance conditions. It is from the analysis of this interface between CDD operations and local governance conditions that the study aims to generate policy and operational recommendations to enhance integration between CDD and local governance approaches.
On the supply side, this study analyzes the extent to which the decentralized: (1) fiscal system generates incentives for citizen participation in local governance and for strengthening demand for public accountability; (2) administrative system enables local governments to act on locally produced policies as well as respond to issues affecting local constituencies; and (3) political system provides incentives for elected political leaders to act independently and in line with local interests. On the demand side, this study describes how the legal framework enables or constrains: (1) association and the pursuit of collective goals by civil society organizations (CSOs); (2) voice and the ability of CSOs to articulate preferences related to societal goals; (3) access to information and the extent to which this enables meaningful CSO participation in local governance processes; (4) negotiation and how spaces for local public debate, lobbying and assembly are utilized to influence public policy choices; and (5) oversight by CSOs of policy formulation, budget planning, execution and procurement processes.
Using these conceptual categories, the study addresses the following research questions:
- How does the macro-level institutional environment constrain or enable accountability in local governance?
- How is this institutional environment manifested where CDD projects operate?
- What are the effects of the local governance conditions on CDD operations?
- What impacts do CDD operations have on the local governance context?
- What policy and operational recommendations can be derived from this analysis?
The study was implemented in two phases. Phase 1 analyzed the institutional environment in which local governments and CSOs are embedded and the assessment of the extent to which this environment fosters social accountability. Phase 1 was mainly based on a desk review of local governance policies and relevant literature. Phase 2 focused on the analysis of the enabling environment at the local level as it interacts with CDD operations. Two municipalities were chosen that both had the presence of the two Bank CDD operations but with different local contexts: one with an enabling local environment (Pilar) and one with a constrained environment (Pio Duran). The field research in the case study sites involved project document review, interviews, focus group discussions, and validation sessions with local stakeholders.
Main Findings: Opportunities and Constraints for Enhanced Accountability
The analysis of the institutional environment for accountability in local governance often found an enabling policy and legal framework in principle, but severely limiting constraints in practice.
Local governments have enough administrative autonomy. The Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution provide a clearly elaborated set of rules for discretion to legislate, decide and act on locally-produced policies. Local governments also have power over human resource management including recruitment, hiring, and promotion, and defining the organizational structure of the local bureaucracy.
However, local governments provide little opportunity for enhancing accountability and transparency.The municipal budget proposed by the mayor is subject to the approval of the SangguniangBayan (municipal legislature), but no real deliberations occur in budget hearings, which are usually not open to the public. There is limited effective participation in the preparation and monitoring of the budget, largely because the budget document and other expenditure statements are not disseminated.LGU financial management skills are weak, leadership is lacking, and there is weak oversight by national government agencies. Obstacles to a merit-based system limit the accountability and transparency of the local bureaucracy.
Fiscal decentralization generally enhances the institutional environment for local government accountability. Expenditure assignments are generally consistent with the subsidiarity principle, revenue collection responsibilities support efficiency and administrative feasibility, and central transfers are mostly formula-based unconditional grants. These represent a shift away from a highly-centralized fiscal regime, thus enhancing incentives for citizens to participate in local governance and demand accountability.
Norms related to central-local fiscal transfers shape local governance conditions.Because these transfers tend not to be based on transparent rules, but on the strength of local political ties with the central authorities that dispense them, this has fostered a governance mindset that values the ability of local political leaders to obtain external funds for development projects. The result is that these norms undermine citizen participation in planning and budgeting.
Local governments face tight fiscal conditions. They are characterized by limited own resource generation, limited capacity for capital spending, dependence on central transfers and budget constraints softened by the availability of significant discretionary central transfers.All these serve to delink local spending from local revenue generation and weaken the incentives for citizens to participate in local governance activities. Political accountability is further weakened to the extent that central government transfers to local governments tend to foster loyalty of elected congressmen to the incumbent president.
Accountability is strengthened by the legal political framework. It provides for direct subnational elections from the village to the province, with clear term limits. There is a clear separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches at the national and local levels. Direct democracy is promoted by constitutional provisions for recall, initiative and referendum. At the local level, citizens can propose the enactment, repeal or amendment of an ordinance as well as directly amend, reject or approve an ordinance through referendum.
Political dynamics limit the effectiveness of democratic institutions and decentralized administrative arrangements. The absence of platform-based political parties and the predominance of personalistic political culture tend to weaken political accountability by narrowing the range of constituents to whom politicians are responsive. The situation is exacerbated by strong tendencies for local state capture by historically-entrenched local bosses, which historically form the basis for state formation.
Access to information is buttressed by four elements of the legal policy framework. First, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that all public officials provide information on their policies and procedures. Second, the Supreme Court makes rulings on what constitutes information that are public in nature. Third, administrative orders classify documents as public or instruct public agencies on ways to disclose public information. Finally, the 1991 LGC contains important provisions that compel local government to provide information to the public.
However, practical constraints to access to information are major obstacles to enhancing the space for exacting local government accountability. Constitutional provisions and jurisprudence are not enough to enforce this right. The loosely-worded list of government information exempt from constitutional provisions is a problem.The right to information is not absolute and is subject to the interpretation of what constitutes information that is of public concern. Compliance with LGC provisions compelling local governments to publicly post relevant information is not closely monitored.Just as serious is the absence of a widespread predisposition for citizens to demand information.
The formation of civil society groups is encouraged by strong constitutional provisions for the exercise of civil liberties. Freedom of association and expression, and the right to information, are guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. Enforcing this right to information are rich jurisprudence, a number of executive issuances and a law that obligates public officials to provide information. The exercise of voice, negotiation and oversight by civil society is encouraged at the local level by provisions in the LGC for participation in consultative bodies involved in development, and investment planning and the formulation of sectoral policies.
The Philippinesalso has a fully elaborated legal framework for the establishment of institutions of direct democracy and enhancements to representative institutions. This framework includes: (i) constitutional guarantee of freedom from persecution based on political beliefs and freedom of expression enshrined in a Bill of Rights, (ii) the granting of legislative powers to citizens through LGC provisions for referendum, initiative and recall and a separate law called the Referendum and Initiative Act, and (iii) the establishment of a party list system and local sectoral representation.
The provisions for referendum, recall, the party list system, and local sectoral representation have proven ineffective.Three attempts at implementing initiatives at the national level have failed. There has also been no progress at the local level in terms of referendum and recall. The implementing procedures are cumbersome and initiatives taken in the name of people, NGOs and POs are not genuine.
LGC provisions for civil society participation in local special bodies are largelyineffective.CSO representation is lacking in substance not only due to lack of capacity but also because the exercise of voice is limited to consultation rather than a substantive role in prioritization and decision-making. There are no operational institutional processes where citizens can exercise oversight and negotiation. Thus, there is a disconnect between the capacities built by CDD operations on the demand side and governance processes in which these capacities may be used.
Civil society difficulty in exacting accountability is as also due to their limited technical capacity. CSO engagement with local government in budget monitoring, planning and service delivery is still in its infancy. This partly explains why spaces for civil society participation in local special bodies are not fully exploited.
Main Findings: Interactions between Local Governance and CDD Operations
The case studies confirm the constraints and opportunities created by demand- and supply-side conditions as shaped by macro-level incentives.
Norms related to central-local fiscal transfers shape local governance conditions.Because these transfers tend not to be based on transparent rules but on the strength of local political ties with the central authorities that dispense them, this has fostered a governance mindset that values the ability of local political leaders to obtain external funds for development projects. The result is that these norms undermine citizen participation in planning and budgeting. For example, they put PDAF allocations beyond the ambit of Local Development Councils (LDCs), the body through which the community and CSOscan participate in budget planning and oversight.
The LGC provisions for civil society participation in local special bodies lack effectiveness in substance and in form.In both the enabled and the constrained municipalities, the only difference is that there is nominal representation in at least two local special bodies in the former (i.e., in the LDC and the Local School Board). CSO representation is lacking in substance not only because of the problem of capacity but also because the exercise of voice is limited to consultation rather than a substantive role in prioritization and decision-making. There are no operational institutional processes whereby citizens can exercise oversight and negotiation. Thus, there is an emerging disconnect between the capacities built by CDD operations on the demand side and governance processes in which these capacities may be used.
Despite the constraints imposed by these macro-level conditions, innovations in local governance have been triggered by reformist leaders. While the two case study municipalities are dependent on similar size central transfers for financing much of their expenditures, innovations in cost sharing and enhanced structures of vertical and horizontal accountability are being tested in Pilar but not in Pio Duran. In Pilar, two context-specific factors support this openness to innovation: (i) a local bureaucracy previously exposed to new ideas on cost-sharing and community mobilization through their experience with other donor-assisted projects; and (ii)exposure to provincial government innovations in reducing poverty.