Civil Society, Cooperation and Peace Mobilization in Colombia

CIVIL SOCIETY, COOPERATION AND PEACE MOBILIZATION IN COLOMBIA

Introduction

The political sectors who drafted the 1991 Political Constitution considered it to be a “peace treaty.” The new constitution followed a decade of political violence and armed confrontations the likes of which had not been seen since La Violencia forty years before. However, despite the unprecedented political pluralism that marked the Constituent Assembly, the failure of the negotiations with the non-participating guerrilla groups —the FARC-, and the ELN— and the absence of significant changes in the mechanisms of access to political representation and their functioning, prolonged yet again the political crisis that had been brewing since the end of the 1970s. These mechanisms continued to be tied to clientalism and corruption, but were now accompanied by a great fragmentation of political groupings and an overwhelming influence of drug traffickers at election time (C. Gonzalez 02/08/2000).

Thus, although the new Constitution democratized aspects of public life and opened some new channels of citizen participation, the almost continual crisis of governability and political violence that followed its promulgation made evident the need for another round of negotiations between the government and the guerrilla (Zuluaga, 1999, pp. 321-26). The objective was to find a solution to the armed struggle, and, a new element, to reduce the drug business associated with it. Any negotiation should both restore social conflicts to the political sphere where they belong, rather than seeking a military resolution, and it should do so under mutually agreed new rules of engagement. Thus, the former insurgents would form part of this new order, going beyond a simple social reintegration into the state that they had been fighting (Arnson, 1999, pp. 1-28).

This round of negotiations initiated in 1992, not without setbacks and interruptions, has faced, however, some radically different conditions to those of the prior decade. This work makes references to those that have facilitated cooperation and mobilization in favor of peace. An overview helps to appreciate the growth of this mobilization against the prolongation of the armed conflict. In the 1970s collective action for peace represented 1.6 percent of the civic struggles. This proportion grew to 19 percent during the government of Virgilio Barco (1986-90), although it decreased to 15.8 percent during the Cesar Gaviria’s term in office (1990-94). This was an indirect result of the expectations created by the new constitution and the demobilization of armed actors during the first two years of the Gaviria government. The proportion of mobilizations for peace, for respect for human rights and against the insecurity of the countryside grew as a result of the escalation of the conflict since the end of 1992. During the first year of Ernesto Samper’s mandate (1994-98) they represented 22 percent of the civic protests in urban areas and 28 percent in rural areas (Fundación Social-CINEP, 1996, p. 17). It should be mentioned, however, that some of the participants in these mobilizations were involved more for strategic reasons than with the aim of innovating and learning about nonviolent practices and normative frameworks or working for greater social justice.

There are a number of reasons for the growth in peace mobilizations. One is the greater visibility of the Colombian armed conflict—in United Nations bodies, international human rights organizations, as well as within the governments of the region and of the European Community and the international community, and with international activists in sustainable development and environmental protection. This greater attention has been accompanied by a change in the agendas of the organizations of international financial and technical cooperation, which have increased support to a variety of groups from civil society. The new attitude is in keeping with a strategy of democratization that differs from exclusive reliance on the state or on market mechanisms (Rabotnikof, et al. 1999, 2-9). This international “opening” favored and coincided with a growing social mobilization for a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict, an event that did not occur in the 1980s. At that time, the dominant vision of the conflict both inside Colombia and internationally was one of state security, associated with the prevailing Cold War thinking. That context increased difficulties for and stigmatized any collective action outside the strategic calculations of the key players of the day.

So, the peace mobilizations of diverse social groups in the 1990s have been a milestone, marked not only by their autonomy from political parties, including the armed actors, but also for the agreement to collaborate among sectors that traditionally have been opponents in other arenas or in prior negotiations. How did this cooperation and mobilization arise outside the traditional parties and armed actors? How did they reach agreements for collective action among such diverse sectors in an atmosphere of blatant political suspicion?

"Natural" divisions, the bipartisan regime, and cooperation

The answer to these questions is relevant because the context predicted a behavior that was the opposite of cooperation. In effect, the political society in Colombian public life has been so dominant that some authors refer to the “colonization” of civil society by liberal-conservative political networks (Pecaut, 1999, p. 226). They have clearly had an effect on the different horizontal associations with a capacity for mobilization, but this influence has not been reciprocal in that they have shown little receptivity to the demands of an organized and collective representation. These networks have responded more to individual demands, forming what has been called a “democracy without citizens.” Such a democracy has no idea of common citizenship that can serve as a barrier to discrimination and in defense of basic rights, or, in this case, that can mobilize to mount joint action in search of peace.

Likewise, the convergence between groups close to the two-party structure and sectors supporting an opposition to the two historical parties is also significant. The National Front (1958-74) and its later evolution marked almost a “natural” public division between two party control and critics of the system. The overseeing over associative realms by traditional party networks, in particular the control of organizations with a potential for opposition such as trade unions or community boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal, JAC), was one of the mechanisms to delineate the inclusions/exclusions defined by the two-party political regime (Romero 1999, pp. 1-8). So the opportunities for “win-win” encounters between these two tendencies in civil society, that is to say, interactions mutually beneficial to each side, had been few prior to the beginning of the 1990s. One of these moments was the Constituent Assembly of 1991 (Romero, 1999, pp. 26-31).

Up to the inauguration of the Assembly the usual interaction was a zero sum game in which the gains for one side necessarily represented losses in equal proportions for the other. This form of relation had begun to change at the municipal and regional levels during the civic strikes that marked the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. These strikes protested rate increases for public services, and their limited coverage and deficient quality, issues that, at that time, were the responsibility of the central government. The effects of this administrative centralization generated a unified reaction in the most affected regions, breaking at the local level the barrier to cooperation and alliances between the two traditional parties and their opposition, a gulf that up until then had been almost unbridgeable. The peace process initiated by President Belisario Betancur (1982-86) also contributed to the gradual dissolution of the barrier, above all with the intellectuals. The same trend evidenced itself in the formation of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, CUT, in 1986, where liberals, conservatives, communists and other groups belonging to different currents of the left joined together (Romero 1999, pp. 26-31). Beginning with the Constituent Assembly of 1991, these win-win situations became more frequent.

What were the reasons for the growth of these exchanges that proposed cooperation, learning and innovation? In this paper four factors will be explored:

1- A movement within the churches, the Roman Catholic Church in particular, toward a more actively positive position with respect to a negotiated solution to the armed conflict

2- The direct election of mayors (1987) and governors (1992), which permitted local and regional peace initiatives to develop with some degree of autonomy from the central authorities

3- The decision of networks of activists —comprising groups on the left, ex-guerrillas, women’s organizations, human rights organizations, organizations of the disappeared, journalists and actors, trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, and others, to look for a negotiated solution to the conflict

4- The reaction of individuals and social groups affected by kidnapping and extortion, and those who opted to speak out and mobilize publicly against these acts.

Each of these groups had specific reasons to speak out and to undertake actions supporting a negotiated solution or in opposition to the armed struggle. However, the rejection of the rural and urban “dirty war” and of the military solution as a means to resolve a political conflict was a common denominator (A. Garzon 02/16/2000).

The convergence of these four different threads and their protagonists facilitated rapprochement, debates and collective action for peace. However, the specific circumstance that accelerated events and opened opportunities was the declaration of an “all out war” on the insurgent groups in November 1992. In effect, the Liberal government of Gaviria, through the first civilian defense minister since 1953, promised to bring the subversives to justice within 18 months (Pardo, 1996, pp. 353-87). The presidential prohibition on any contact, mediation or dialogue between the different groups of civil society and the insurgents, or the possibility of establishing regional dialogues with sectors interested in peace, unleashed first, uncertainty and later a great opposition. Some bishops argued for “Colombians' right to peace” and called for civil disobedience to this policy (C. Castellanos, 02/07/2000). This is the context in which the possibilities for a process of convergence, learning and innovation arose.

The "Movement for Life" and discursive renewal

The Jesuits were one of the first groups from civil society to propose the creation of conditions to reach a peace settlement as a primordial objective. Until the middle of 1985 this was a proposition led by groups and individuals within the political society. Conservative President Belisario Betancur gave a substantial push to peace proposals, an effort that contrasted with the adverse position of the two Liberal administrations that preceded him. The Jesuits supported the Betancur peace process although "the overriding objective was to diminish the violence, which had grown to large proportions, over that of peace" (H. Arango 02/18/2000). They sold La Lechuga, a solid gold tabernacle covered in precious stones, which dated from the colonial era, to the Central Bank in 1985 and used the proceeds to organize a fund. The returns to their subsequent investments have financed the Peace Program since its beginnings in 1987.

In its first ten years of operation the program financed close to 1000 projects to strengthen civil society, in particular in conflict zones and poor areas (H. Arango 02/18/00). This intervention included both productive activities and educational projects that worked with poor or marginalized groups. The objective was to strengthen the notion of collectivity and the recognition of subjects with rights. According to its first director, the Jesuit priest Horacio Arango, S.J., the different communities showed a great capacity for responses to specific situations but a great difficulty in articulating proposals for anything larger. On this point, Arango comments, “there was a party-based political hostility, from the left and from the traditional parties, toward this articulation.” This aspect is worth emphasizing, because this excessive factionalism in Colombia public life, the resulting competition for the control of state resources and of the decision-making mechanisms, and the difficulty in cooperation, is the flip side of ongoing harassment from the political sphere to associative autonomy.

One of the initiatives financed by the Peace Program, beginning at the end of the 1980s, was the Movement for Life, the predecessor to one of the main groups that made up REDEPAZ in the 1990s. It was one of the leading organizations of the various demonstrations calling for an end to the armed conflict (A.T. Bernal 02/17/2000). The cooperation between these networks of social and civic activists, the Program for Peace and CINEP —another Jesuit institution— is a noteworthy instance of association. The Movement for Life formed as a result of the dramatic events that surrounded the taking of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 guerrilla movement in November 1985 and the Army reaction. The deaths of approximately 111 persons only 200 meters from the presidential palace, including the majority of the members of the Supreme Court, the guerrilla commandos and employees of the institution caused a great public uproar, especially within the groups interested in the “national dialogue” that the armed insurgency had proposed to Betancur’s government.

One year later, women’s groups that supported a dialogue between the government and the guerrilla, such as Women for Democracy, the Women’s House, and Women of M-19, organized a concert to remember the unfortunate occurrence. It was given the name “Concert with Flowers for Life and Love” and held in front of the ruined building. A manifesto in defense of life and against death was read, and international artists appeared in the event (Bernal). In addition to the women’s groups, the Movement for Life also included journalists, actors and artists, who called themselves “crazy for life.” They carried out a number of playful events in public places in Bogota, defying the strict controls of the authorities and the fear provoked by the warlike political atmosphere. “Collectives for Life” were organized in Pasto, Cali and Medellin, where the participation of women’s groups was equally important. A highly significant event in Bogota was the proliferation of graffiti on the walls and buildings in the center of town and along the main roads, alluding with humor and sarcasm to the violence and to the excesses of the authorities. One of them read "Do..., Re..., Mi... edo".

The movement then turned toward education for peaceful coexistence aimed at youth and children. The experience culminated in the organization of an annual Peace Week, which has been supported by the Peace Program and held without interruption since 1987. During the first event in September 1987, a “Manifesto of Children’s Dreams” was launched that asked children to reflect on the country “that they wanted to see and that they dreamed of." Through workshops in painting and storytelling the children expressed their hopes throughout the week in educational centers. The most often painted figures were “a soldier and a guerrilla fighter shaking hands” (Bernal). This first Peace Week closed with an event attended by approximately 50,000 children, the majority from the public and religious schools, in the main plaza, the institutional and historic center of Bogota. The organization was undertaken by "networks of friends and the tremendous support of parents and the rectors of the schools.” However they faced hostility from political authorities in the capital, who did not approve of the event and ordered the police to clear the plaza, an order that in the end was not carried out, according to Bernal.

Then a “citizens’ consultation for peace” was organized for young people in which they had to answer the question, how do you think that peace can be achieved? In addition to discussion workshops in the schools, other youths traveled through the main centers of the capital interviewing and discussing the subject with their peers. Despite the pedagogic focus and its objective to espouse peaceful coexistence, the hostility of the newly installed Conservative administration of Mayor Andres Pastrana was palpable. Three young people were arrested for disturbing the peace and later liberated through the effects of the Liberal Attorney General of the day, Horacio Serpa. He called the Mayor to remonstrate with him about the arrest, asking, “what kind of gorilla is running the first secretary’s office?” and he then urged the Mayor to liberate the students (Bernal). The response of local authorities to these first peace demonstrations in the 1980s indicates their animosity to anything that did not originate with the two traditional parties, even when the aim was to attain civility and peaceful coexistence.

Although these activities did not get a large media response, they did build a counterpublic or a network of alternative communication and practice. This network, in competition with the official sphere and the radicalized groups, mounted a challenge by setting up an alternative framework for interpreting and making sense of their lived experience of conflict. One of the most significant aspects of these first mobilizations was the linguistic innovation and the intention not to polarize but rather to create symbolic mediations between the parties in conflict. The aim was to join together “the entire country, without exceptions” and so the language used had to reflect this. However, this attempt to “disarm language” did not mean the negation of the conflicts, but rather represented a call to confront them and resolve them in a pacific way (Bernal).