Motivated Reasoning and Political Parties:
Evidence forIncreased Processing in the Face of Party Cues
Michael Bang Petersen
Department of Political Science
Aarhus University
Denmark
Email:
Martin Skov
Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance
Copenhagen University Hospital
Denmark
Email:
Søren Serritzlew
Department of Political Science
Aarhus University
Denmark
Email:
Thomas Ramsøy
Decision Neuroscience Research Group
Copenhagen Business School
Denmark
Email:
Forthcoming in Political Behaviorin 2013
Extant research in political science has demonstrated that citizens’ opinions on policies are influenced by their attachment to the party sponsoring them. At the same time, little evidence exists illuminating the psychological processes through which such party cues are filtered. From the psychological literature on source cues, we derive two possible hypotheses: (1) party cues activate heuristic processing aimed at minimizing the processing effort during opinion formation,and (2) party cues activate group motivational processes that compel citizens to support the position of their party. As part of the latter processes, the presence of party cues would make individuals engage in effortful motivated reasoning to produce arguments for the correctness of their party’s position. Following psychological research, we use response latency to measure processing effort and, in support of the motivated reasoning hypothesis,demonstrate that across student and nationally representative samples, the presence of party cues increases processing effort.
Key words: Public Opinion; Political Parties; Party Cues; Motivated Reasoning; Heuristic Processing
Political parties play an important role in the structuring of mass opinion. Research demonstrates how citizens’ opinions on policies are influenced not only by the content of the specific policies but also by their attachment to the party sponsoring them. Longitudinal studies show that changes in partisan discourse on important issues such as race or abortion shape aggregate mass opinion (Layman and Carsey 1998; Zaller 1992). Similarly, a large number of micro-level studies demonstrate that individuals’ opinions about policy proposals change substantially when they are provided with information about party positions (see, e.g., Cohen 2003; Kam 2005; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Mondak 1993). This does not mean that party sponsorship is the most important, let alone the only, predictor of citizens’ opinion on policies. Bullock (2011) argues that many studies comparing the effect of party cues with policy information tend to underestimate the relative effect of policy information as only sparse information is provided. He also shows in two experiments that with substantial policy information, “party cues are influential” but that policy information generally matters at least as much (2011: 512).Nevertheless, party cues remain an important factor for citizen’s opinions. If citizens like the party advocating the policy, they are more likely to agree with it; if they dislike the party, they are more likely to reject the policy.
Research on this party sponsor effect suggests that it helps citizens form political opinions in the absence of political knowledge and interest (Kam 2005; Zaller 1992). By delegating their decisions to ‘like-minded experts’, citizens reduce the costs of collecting information on, for example, the technical details of the policy and of analysing its effects. In fact, some studies suggest that citizens can often form just as valid an opinion on the basis of their party’s position as on the basis of a more careful assessment of the policy itself (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). At the same time, other studies have argued that this only holds true for policies on which parties hold positions in line with their normal ideological profile. On other policies, reliance on party positions can result in a biased opinion (Rahn 1993; Cohen 2003; Greitemeyer et al. 2009).
Research on the effects of citizens’ reliance on party positions has provided important insights into how citizens are able to navigate in modern politics. At the same time, this research has provided less insight into the psychological processes that these cues rely on and are processed by. Research on the psychology of opinion formation suggests that two different psychological processes may explain citizens’ reliance on a source cue such as a party’s position on a policy. The first process, heuristic processing, minimizes the processing costs involved in opinion formation while the second process, motivated directional reasoning (or for short, motivated reasoning), invest cognitive effort in defending valued pre-commitments such as one’s party identification (e.g., by spending effort to produce convincing arguments for giving into the motivational pull of one’s identification) (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Kunda 1990). While a few studies have suggested that motivated reasoning drives the processing of party cues (Cohen 2003; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; Westen et al. 2006),Bullock (2011: 497) sums up the current state of the literature by arguing that party cues “are widely thought to be processed heuristically”. Yet, until now, studies on party cues in political science have not focused directlyon the psychological processing of party cues and, hence, have failed to discern between the different possibilities.This is unfortunate because the two processes are grounded in different types of motivations and paints very different pictures of citizens’ basic relation to politics. This is particularly evident in the cases where reliance on the party sponsor results in a biased opinion. If party sponsor effects originate in heuristic processing, citizens are basically motivated to hold accurate opinions (Mondak 1993; Lau and Redlawsk 2006), and partisan bias in opinion formation is just an unfortunate by-product of citizens’ lack of political interest. Hence, if citizens became more interested or were provided with more valid but still cost-effective cues, the bias would be reduced. In contrast, if party sponsor effects originate in motivated reasoning, citizens are seen as motivated to be biased, making partisan bias inevitable (Taber and Lodge 2006).
In this article, we utilize research on group psychology and party identification to suggest that citizens engage in motivated reasoning rather than heuristic processing when confronted with novel policy proposals sponsored by different political parties. Empirically, we report the results of two tests designed to discern directly between the two psychological processes in the context of party sponsor effects. We use an experimental design to gauge the psychological dynamics during opinion formation in the face of party cues, which is innovative in terms of both measurement and sampling. To discern between heuristic processing and motivated reasoning, we follow extant research and use response latency (Redlawsk 2002; Cohen 2003; Taber and Lodge 2006). If party cues activate heuristic processing, the presence of party cues should decrease the mental effort and time required to form opinions. If, in contrast, party cues activate motivated reasoning, opinion formation should under specific circumstances become more mentally effortful and, therefore, prolonged (Matz and Wood 2005). In terms of sampling, we collected response latencies across two highly diverse samples. In a laboratory setting, we collected response latencies from a student sample. Outside the laboratory, we used a web survey to collect response latencies from a representative sample. This allowed us to ensure the robustness and generalizability of our results to the actual population of citizens.
Our empirical findings show that the presence of party cues prolongs response times, lending support to the motivated reasoning account rather than the heuristic processing account. This suggests that one reason that citizens rely on party positions is a group-based motivation to appear loyal to the policy line of ‘their’ party. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for understanding citizens’ engagement in party politics.
Party Cues and Modes of Processing
When political parties sponsor a policy, citizens are provided with what is termed a source cuein the psychological literature on persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1981). As mentioned, studies in psychology have identified two modes of psychological processing through which a source cue can be integrated into an assessment of a persuasive statement: heuristic processing and motivated (directional) reasoning.
EaglyandChaiken (1993) define heuristic processing as a mode of processing requiring “less effort and fewer cognitive resources”, where individuals focus “on that subset of the available information that enables them to use simple decision rules (…) to formulate their judgments and decisions”. In the context of political policies, such a decision rule could relate to the party sponsor: If you like the party, support the policy; if you dislike the party, reject the policy. Heuristic processing is a processing strategy designed to achieve an opinion with a satisfactory level of accuracy using a minimal level of cognitive effort. Research has demonstrated that heuristic processing is deployed in situations in which the individual lacks motivation and capacity to perform a more careful assessment of the available information (e.g., Petty et al. 1981; Eagley and Chaiken 1993). Given the high levels of political ignorance in modern electorates (Lau & Redlawsk 2006; Zaller 1992), many researchers have suggested that heuristic processing plays an important role when citizens rely upon party cues (Bullock 2011). For example, party cues have been described as the “‘cheapest’ cue available” (SchafnerandStreb 2002: 560), “the most important saving device” (Squire and Smith 1988: 178) and a means to an “obvious cognitive saving” (Lau andRedlawsk 2001: 953).
Where heuristic processing involves minimal effort to arrive at a correct or accurate opinion, directional motivated reasoning involves the exertion of effort to come up with arguments for why a conclusion that is desired for antecedent reasons is indeed the correct one (Kunda 1990). Here, reasoning effort operates in the service of motivation to search through memory for arguments, beliefs and rules that would support the desired conclusion. In the context of party sponsor effects, motivated reasoning would entail that citizens spend effort to come up with reasons for supporting policies that are sponsored by a party they like. Importantly, motivation is not always expected to be assisted by reasoning. Rather, effortful processing is strategically deployed to reach a desired conclusion in dissonance-provoking situations where an individual holds incongruent beliefs related to the conclusion. If motivated reasoning processes influence the processing of party cues, this implies that reasoning effort should be deployed when individuals are motivated to, for example, support policies that they donot like because they are sponsored by a party that they do like. Expressing support for a policy that is attractive in itselfand sponsored by the favoured party should, in contrast, not require much effort.
Group Psychology and Motivated Processing of Party Cues
While researchers have tended to view party cues as being processed through heuristic processing (cf. Bullock 2011), several political scientists have, at the same time, argued that partisanship reflects a distinct group attachment that is psychologically important to many citizens (Campbell et al. 1960; Lebo and Cassino 2007; Green et al. 2002;Greene 1999). Hence, partisan attachments are – like other group attachments – formed early in life, transmitted across generations, endure over the life-span and in the face of significant changes in the environment, and are (to some extent, at least) independent of other important political predispositions such as core ideological values (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981; Green et al. 2002;Goren 2005). Recent cross-disciplinary studies have provided additional evidence for the deep-seated nature of party attachments. One study, for example, showed that subjects’ testosterone levels were altered as a response to election outcomes wherein their party suffered defeat, in the same way as when they themselves would suffer an actual status loss (Stanton et al. 2009). Other studieshave shown how party cues are processed by brain regions associated with affective processes operating below the level of consciousness (Westen et al. 2004) and that experimental participants, even though substantially influenced by party cues, think of them as the least influential factor when asked directly (Cohen 2003).
If political parties are psychologically represented as groups, the implication is that whenever a liked party takes a position on an issue, it is mentally represented as a claim for support from the group to which one belongs. This would trigger a motivation to provide such support by toeing the party line and, if necessary, invest cognitive effort in coming up with arguments for the correctness of doing so. Hence, the studies on the group psychological basis of party identification provide initial reasons for expecting motivated reasoning processes rather than heuristic processing to be at the heart of the party sponsor effect.
To provide direct tests of this proposed importance of motivated reasoning, we focus on the processing effort underlying opinion formation in the face of party cues. Heuristic processing and motivated reasoning entail opposite effects of the presence of party cues on the level of processing involved in forming opinions. If party cues are processed using heuristic processing, the availability of party cues should minimize the effort invested in processing. In contrast, if party cues tap into the group psychology of citizens, motivated reasoning should in specific circumstances make opinion formation in the face of party cues more effortful. In particular, motivated reasoning is expected to kick in when a motivated individual faces dissonance-provoking situations (Kunda1990). To the extent that political parties tap into group psychological mechanisms, the presence of party cues will elicit dissonance and trigger motivated reasoning in at least two situations: when an individual disagrees with a liked party and when an individual agrees with a liked party on an otherwise disliked policy.
First, citizens who sympathize with a party should feel compelled to meet the party’s claim for support. Therefore, turning the party down should result in dissonance, giving rise to increased processing aimed at resolving the experienced dissonance and to explain away the decision. Hence, we predict that in the face of party cues, disagreeing (relative to agreeing) with a liked party (relative to other parties) should, in general, be associated with increased reasoning effort (the Rejection Hypothesis). From the group perspective, this prediction must, by necessity, be valid as signals of disloyalty should trigger dissonance (Matz and Wood 2005). Still, it might be possible to specify a similar prediction from a heuristic processing perspective. From that perspective, an increased effort among those who disagree with an otherwise liked party may reflect a failure to utilize the party cue rather than reflecting attempts to come up with good arguments for letting down the party (Kam 2005). If the group-oriented interpretation iscorrect, however, it shouldbe possible to demonstrate that the added cognitive effort is directly related to concerns about their standing within the group of party supporters.
The next prediction more directly discerns between the motivated reasoning and the heuristic processing perspective. According to the heuristic processing account, citizens should limit cognitive effort when toeing the party line. In contrast, the motivated reasoning hypothesis implies that under specific circumstances, individuals are willing to exert effort in order to toe the party line. Research on small-group psychology shows that individuals psychologically represent group support as an exchange in which support for the group buys support from the group (Habyarimanaet al. 2007; Yamagishi and Mifune 2008). On this perspective, the costs involved in an act of support become important. As the costs of support increase, the distress associated with granting it should increase as well. In the context of political parties, one important cost of support relates to the extent to which citizens are required to sacrifice other cherished predispositions such as ideological principles in order to toe the party line on a specific issue. For example, to the extent that the Democratic Party adopts a conservative position on an issue, supporters of the Democratic Party are required to sacrifice their liberal principles in order to agree with the party on this issue. When a liked party in this way sponsors a party-inconsistent proposal, two things should happen simultaneously: First, citizens should still, to a significant extent, toe the party line, and studies have indeed demonstrated that party supporters do follow their party even in situations where a party adopts policies that are at odds with its normal ideological profile (Cohen 2003; Greitemeyer at al. 2009; Rahn 1993). Second, from a motivated reasoning perspective, agreeing with a liked party on such proposals should trigger reasoning effort in order to come up with reasons for bearing the high costs of support (Cohen 2003). In fact, when these ideological costs become high enough, it might require more reasoning effort to agree than to disagree with the party. Given this, we predict that, in the face of party cues, agreeing with a liked party should be experienced as effortful when citizens are required to sacrifice ideological principles in order to do so (the Costly SupportHypothesis).
Previous research has demonstrated that the presence of incongruent information in itself induces reasoning effort (Huckfeldt et al. 2005; Redlawsk 2002). When a party adopts a party-inconsistent policy the inconsistency will, in other words, in itself trigger effort.This most likely reflects a form of learning effect where participants try to integrate the new information with their previous understandings. Note, however, how the motivated reasoning perspective moves beyond this observation. The prediction is not simply that the presence of party-inconsistent proposals triggers effort (i.e., that the party inconsistency of the proposal has a major effect on effort) or even that the presence of party-inconsistent proposals from a liked party triggers effort (i.e., a two-way interaction between party inconsistency and party attachment). Rather, the prediction here is that agreeing with highly party-inconsistent proposals from parties is more effortful than disagreeing (which amounts to a three-way interaction between party inconsistency, party attachment and level of agreement on effort). In more simple terms, the motivated reasoning perspective predicts that individuals increase their reasoning effort when they are motivated to abandon ideological beliefs in order to follow their party’s line. In order to signal loyalty to the group, citizens should nonetheless be willing to pay this price and, hence, toe the party line even on party-inconsistent proposals.[1]