Chinese Aid to Africa:
The Question of Conditionality
Lily Baron, The Eurasia Center April 2017
In recent years the international community has become increasingly aware of China’s activities in providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to other countries in the developing world. Although China does not release official numbers as to exactly how much ODA it has given, studies have been able to predict that almost half of this total amount has gone to Africa. While this alone is noteworthy, what is truly worth discussing further is the fact that China’s aid to Africa has been relatively unconditional and almost exclusively focused on infrastructure and industrial development. This has both set China aside from other prolific ODA donors such as countries within the European Union as well as the United States, but has also raised some important questions regarding aid effectiveness and China’s intentions.
While some in the Western world perceive China’s actions as threatening and self-motivated given its focus on resource extraction and the construction of trade partnerships and political alliances, many ODA recipients in Africa welcome this unconditional assistance with open arms. This is due to the fact that Chinese ODA comes with little to no strings attached, meaning recipient countries do not have to jump through any hoops to meet standards that other donors tend to attach to assistance such as requiring impact assessments or ensuring safe working conditions. Unfortunately, this has led to a number of deleterious consequences such as a case in Zambia where fifty people were killed in an explosion that occurred in the Chambishi copper mine in 2005.[1] Although this arguably could have been avoided had working conditions been safer, some politicians such as previous President Michael Sata actually based political campaigns on anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of such instances.
The aforementioned example demonstrates that although the lack of conditionality attached to Chinese ODA is often viewed in a positive light by the recipients who see the benefit of having such freedom, this not always the case for those who have experienced its at times deleterious effects. On a similar note, although China’s relative lack of conditionality can be seen as an asset as far as getting projects off the ground rapidly, questions have also been raised regarding whether or not this has perpetuated the corruption and authoritarianism African governments are notorious for. Although China is keen on maintaining its policy of not attaching many conditions to its ODA, studies have demonstrated that assistance is more effective in promoting inclusive development in democratic governments than in authoritarian regimes.[2]
Interestingly, a fundamental aspect of Chinese ODA is its focus on promoting governmental self-reliance, which corroborates with the country’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” in which most of its foreign policy is generally based on. With that having been said, Chinese foreign aid simultaneously strives to achieve strategic objectives such as the aforementioned resource extraction and formation of trade relations.[3] Specifically, around 61% of China’s concessional loans have been for the development of infrastructure, and an additional 16% to industrial development.[4] This demonstrates that Chinese in Africa is focused on larger projects designed to enhance economic growth, which is something that China arguably has a comparative advantage in due to its domestic experiences regarding its own success story of rapid economic growth.
In this sense, China has been incredibly generous in partaking in South-South development assistance and in sharing its development expertise. However, this begs the question of what China is receiving in return especially given its minimal use of aid conditionality. Many of the deals behind China’s aid projects are designed so that China is responsible for building the infrastructure necessary to extract resources, and African countries are responsible for paying back China in the form of natural resources later down the line. Due to this, there is a widely held assumption that China is almost exclusively partaking in development in Africa due to the continent’s ample natural resource supply and China’s need for such raw materials in order to fund its own development back home.[5]
While this certainly may explain some of China’s incentives for delivering ODA to Africa, it is dubious that this shows the whole picture. The fact that Chinese ODA is relatively unconditional demonstrates that China is truly interested in forming relationships with African countries and not overstepping its boundaries or inflicting undesirable conditions in the process. The result of this has proven to be favorable for China, especially in places like the United Nations. It is no coincidence that the only three African countries to officially recognize Taiwan (Burkina Faso, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland) are three out of the four countries in which China has no diplomatic relations with and has thus not given aid to.[6] This demonstrates that by saying China is involved in giving aid to Africa solely to obtain access to natural resources, one is overlooking some of the more global implications of China’s presence on the continent.
Countries that only recognize China versus those that recognize Taiwan
Graphic from Quora.com
Furthermore, China’s lack of aid conditionality has allowed for development initiatives to be implemented without bureaucratic barriers and in ways that are not inflicting Chinese ideals onto African people in the same way that many Western donors are known for doing. However, this has come at a cost of some projects not being as effective as they could be due to China’s perpetuation of authoritarian regimes, as well as unsafe conditions and the fact that often times the gains from such projects do not trickle down to those who could truly benefit from such economic successes. Although this has come across as taboo to Western donors who tend to strive towards implementing development projects and initiatives in ways that are safe and affect people equally, China seems to have simply implemented projects using its own mandate of self-reliance.
Bibliography
"China's Investments in Africa: What's the Real Story?"Knowledge @ Wharton. University of Pennsylvania, 19 Jan. 2016. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.
Faust, Jörg. "Is the Earth Flat or Is It a Cube? European Foreign Aid, Political Conditionality and Democracy." 24 (2013): 1-4.German Development Institute. German Development Institute, 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
"Foreign Relations of Taiwan."Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 23 Apr. 2017. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.
Holslag, Jonathan. "China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa."African Affairs. Oxford University Press, 10 May 2011. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
Okeowo, Alexis. "China, Zambia, and a Clash in a Coal Mine."The New Yorker. The New Yorker, 16 July 2014. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.
Maliszewska, Maryla, Csilia Lakatos, Israel Osorio-Rodarte, and Delfin Sia Go. "China's Slowdown and Rebalancing: Potential Growth and Poverty Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa."The World Bank. World Bank, 10 May 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
Zhang, Junyi. "Chinese Foreign Assistance, Explained | Brookings Institution."Brookings. Brookings, 01 Aug. 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
[1] Okeowo, Alexis. "China, Zambia, and a Clash in a Coal Mine."The New Yorker. The New Yorker, 16 July 2014. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.
[2] Faust, Jörg. "Is the Earth Flat or Is It a Cube? European Foreign Aid, Political Conditionality and Democracy." 24 (2013): 1-4.German Development Institute. German Development Institute, 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
[3] Zhang, Junyi. "Chinese Foreign Assistance, Explained | Brookings Institution."Brookings. Brookings, 01 Aug. 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
[4] Maliszewska, Maryla, Csilia Lakatos, Israel Osorio-Rodarte, and Delfin Sia Go. "China's Slowdown and Rebalancing: Potential Growth and Poverty Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa."The World Bank. World Bank, 10 May 2016. Web. 25 Apr. 2017.
[5] "China's Investments in Africa: What's the Real Story?"Knowledge @ Wharton. University of Pennsylvania, 19 Jan. 2016. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.
[6] "Foreign Relations of Taiwan."Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 23 Apr. 2017. Web. 26 Apr. 2017.