Chapter 6:Theriseofmodern Metaphysicsandepistemology
CHAPTER 6:THERISEOFMODERN METAPHYSICSANDEPISTEMOLOGY
Main Points
1.HistoricaldevelopmentsaftertheRenaissance,especiallythegrowthofscience,ledtotheshapingofmetaphysicsandepistemology,includingthecommonsenseviewoftodaythatrealityhasadualnatureofphysicalobjectsandmind.
2.Important(andconflicting)metaphysicalperspectives:dualism(whatexistsiseitherphysicalormental,or,inthecaseofhumanbeings,somecombinationofboth);materialismor physicalism(onlythephysicalexists);idealism(onlythementalorspiritualexists);and“alternativeviews”:a“neither-nor”view(whatexistsisultimatelyneithermentalnor physical);a“both-and”view,oftencalleddoubleaspecttheory(whatexistsisultimatelyboth mentalandphysical—thementalandphysicalarejustdifferentwaysoflookingatthesamethings,whichinthemselvesareneutralbetweenthetwocategories).
3.Thoughdualismcontinuestocommandtheassentofcommonsense,increasinglyascientificunderstanding oftheworldhasbroughtmaterialisminto prominence. Along with idealismandalternative views,theoutcomeofthecompetitionwillhaveprofoundimplications forhowthefollowingthreequestionsareanswered:DoesanimmaterialGodexist?Dohumanshavefreewill?Istherelifeafterdeath?
DescartesandDualism
4.RenéDescartesbegan modern philosophyandin metaphysicsemployedskepticismtoarrive (hethought)attruthand knowledge.Ifanythingis beyonddoubt,itcanprovidea criterionoftruthandknowledge.
5.Skepticismasthekeytocertainty.Twofamousconjecturesheemployedwerethedreamconjectureandtheevil demon conjecture.
6.Hecoulddoubtatfirsteverythingexceptthetruth expressedin“cogito,ergosum.”
7.The“clearanddistinct”litmustest.Fromcogito,ergosumDescartesworkedhiswaytotheclearanddistinctcriterionoftruth:anythingthatwasasclearanddistinctashisownexistencewouldpassthe litmustestandwouldalsohaveto becertain.Thisdoubting methodology waslikegeometry,usingas anaxiom“Ithink,thereforeIam” toprovetruewhat atfirstonlyseemedtrue.
8.Usingthe “clearand distinct”criterion,Descartesfoundthat he hadacertain knowledgeofGod’sexistenceand,fromknowledgethatGodwouldnotdeceivehim,Descartesconcludedthathealso hadcertainknowledgethatthereexisted aworldofobjectsoutsidehis mind.
9.Theessentialattributeofmaterialsubstanceisextension(occupancyofspace);theessentialattributeofmindisthought.Mindandmatteraretotallyindependentofeachother.
10.Difficultiesindualismincludereconcilingthebeliefthat materialthingsarecompletelysubjecttophysicallawswiththebeliefthattheimmaterialmindcanmoveone’sbody.
11.SomeofDescartes’followersproposedparallelismasapossiblesolutiontotheproblemofhowanimmaterialmindcan interact witha materialbody.Thementalandphysicalinvolvetwoparallelseriesofeventsthatcoincide,sothatitonlyappearsthat myactofwilling myhandtomoveiscausingmyphysicalhandtomove.Godisthedivinecoordinator.(Avariantcalledoccasionalismsuggeststhat whenI willmyhandtomove,thatistheoccasionGodcausesmyhandto move.)
12.Descartestookanepistemologicaldetourintryingtodiscovermetaphysical truthaboutwhatisthroughepistemological inquiryabout whatcanbeknown.
HobbesandMaterialism
13.ThomasHobbesinhisnaturalphilosophy thoughtthatallthatexistsisbodiesinmotion,thisbeingtruenotonlyofwhatordinarilyisviewedasphysicalbodiesbutalsoofmindandemotion.
14.Thatis,allmentalphenomena derivefromperception, thatis,“sense.”Thus,Hobbesespousedmaterialism.
15.Perception.Allmentalphenomenaarederivedfromperception,whichisitselfnothingbut“matterinmotion.”Motionsoutside uscausemotionswithin us.Hobbestriedtoestablishthateveryaspectofhumanpsychology,includingmemoryandimagination,thought,reasoning,and decisionmaking,areallaproductofperception.
16.Thetheory thatallis matterin motionexpresses ina rudimentary way theviewheldbymanycontemporaryphilosophersandbrainscientiststhateverymentalactivityisabrainprocessofsomekind.
TheAlternativeViewsofConway,Spinoza,andLeibniz
17.TheMetaphysicsofAnneConway.AforerunnerofLeibniz’smonadology,LadyConway’sviewwasthat allthings arereducibletoasinglesubstancethat isitself irreduciblebutthatthereisacontinuumbetween materialandmentalsubstancessothatallcreatedsubstancesare bothmentalandphysicaltosomedegree or other.
18.All“Creatures”(i.e.,created substances)aredependentonGod’sdecisiontocreatethem.Allsuchcreatureshaveanindividualessenceandanessence commontoall.Thelattercametobe knownasderemodality—meaningthataproperty(inthiscase,thepropertyofbeingbothmental andphysical)must be apropertyofanythingthat iscreated byGod. Everything(otherthanGod)isasubstanceandmustofnecessityexistaspartlyphysicalandpartlymental.
19.Conway’sGodisnonmaterial,nonphysical,all-perfect,andexistsoutsidethedimensionoftime.Godistheeternalcreator;theuniversehasalwaysexistedbecauseGodhasalwaysexistedandhehasalwaysbeencreating.PastandfutureareallGod’spresent.
20.Conway’sbook,ThePrinciplesoftheMostAncientandModernPhilosophy,beginswithaseriesofassumptions(inthesamemannerasSpinoza’sEthicsandLeibniz’sMonadology)fromwhicharederivedvariousphilosophicalconclusions.
21.Spinoza.Heregardedthoughtandextensionasdifferentattributesofonebasicsubstanceequated withGod.Alivingpersonisnotthecompositeofmindandmatter,butrathera“modification”oftheonesubstance.The mindandbodyarethesamething, conceptualized fromdifferentviewpoints.Thus,thereisnoproblemexplaininghowthemindinteractswiththebody:they are oneandthesame thing.
22.Spinoza wasapantheist:Godisall.Thereis nopersonal immortalityafterdeath,andfreewillisanillusion.
23.ThoughbothHobbesandSpinozabelievedtherewasonlyonesubstance,Hobbeshadtheproblemofexplainingawaythemental.
24.GottfriedWilhelm,BaronvonLeibniz.LeibnizandNewton,independentlyofeachother,developedthecalculus.
25.ForLeibniz,realityconsistedofmonads,indivisibleunitsofforceorenergyoractivity.Theyareentirelynonphysical.
26.Hismetaphysicalsystemtookadvantageofcertainbasicprinciples.One,theprincipleoftheidentity ofIndiscernibles,saysthatiftwobeingshaveexactlythesamesetofproperties,thenthey areidenticalwithoneanother;theprincipleofsufficientreasonsaysthatthereisasufficientreasonwhythingsareexactlyastheyareandnototherwise.
TheIdealismofLockeandBerkeley
27.JohnLockeandRepresentativeRealism.Locke’sfundamentalthesisisthatallourideascomefromexperienceandthatthehumanmindatbirthisatabularasa(blankslate).
28.Nihil in intellectu quodpriusnonfueritinsensu(“nothingexistsinthemindthatwasnotfirstinthesenses”).
29.Locke’srepresentativerealism—weperceiveobjectsindirectlybyourideasorrepresentationsofthem—isnowthoughttobesomuchcommonsense.
30.GeorgeBerkeley.Ifrepresentativerealismiscorrect,Berkeleyargued,thenwecannotknowthatanyofourideasorperceptionsaccuratelyrepresentthequalitiesofsensiblethingsbecausewecannotcomparethe ideas wehaveofanobject withtheobjectitself.Wedo notexperiencetheobjectitselfbutonlyour perceptionsor ideasof theobject.
31.Theobjectsofhumanknowledgeconsistof“ideas”(1)conveyedtothemindbythesenses,(2)perceived bythe mindwhenthe mindreflects onits ownoperations, or(3)compounded ordividedbythemindwiththehelp of memoryorimagination.Whatexists, therefore,are ideasandthemindsthathavethem.Itiscontradictorytosupposethat material substancesexistoutside themindthatperceivesthem.
32.Ifsecondaryqualities(e.g.,tastes,odors,colors)existonlyinthemind,thensodoprimaryqualities(e.g.,extension,figure,motion),becausetheyareallrelativetotheobserver.
33.Materialthingsasclusters ofideas.Berkeley’s viewisoneversionofidealism.Hemaintainsthatsensiblethingsarenotmaterialthingsthatexistoutsidethemindbutaredirectlyperceived clustersofideaswithinthemind.
34.BerkeleybelievedthattheperceivingmindofGodmakespossiblethecontinuedexistenceofsensiblethingswhenweare notperceivingthem.
35.Berkeley and atheism.Esseestpercipi(“tobeistobeperceived”).
36.Hebelievedthegreatestvirtueofhisidealistsystemwasthatitalonedid notinviteskepticismaboutGod.Iftheexistenceofsensibleobjects wasundeniable,thentheexistenceofthedivinemind,inwhichsensibleobjectsaresustained,wasequallyundeniable.
37.God’sexistence,thoughtBerkeley,isshownbythefactthatsensiblethingscontinuetoexistwhenwedo notperceivethem;andfromthe factthatwe donotourselves causeour ideasofsensiblethings.
38.CommonsenseobjectionsthatBerkeley’sidealismrendersthephysicalworldintangibleorimaginaryarebasedonamisunderstandingofBerkeley.
Boxes
TheScientificRevolution
(Copernicusushersinaneweraofdiscoveryandanewworldview)
ChronologyofPostmedievalHistory
(FromtheRenaissancetotheAgeofTechnology)
Profile:RenéDescartes
(Hefoundedanalyticgeometry anddidwork inoptics)
Descartes’sConjectures
(Descartes’stwoskepticalconjecturesexplained)
OlivaSabucodeNantesandtheBody–SoulConnection
(Theconnectionbetweenbodyandsouloccursthroughoutthebrain)
Profile:AnneFinch,TheViscountessConway
(Shegrewupknowing someofthemostinfluentialEnglishintellectualsofhertime)
Profile:BenedictusdeSpinoza
(Agentleman,hewaswidelymisunderstood)
Newtonians,Metaphysicians,andÉmilieduChâtelet
(TheconflictbetweenNewtonianempiricalscienceandspeculativemetaphysics)
Profile:GeorgeBerkeley
(Hehadanenthusiasmfortarwater)
RationalismandEmpiricism
(Animportantboxonthedifferencebetweenthetwo)
Mind-BodyTheories
(SummarizingtheviewsofDescartes,Hobbes,Berkeley,andSpinozainasimplechart)
Readings
6.1RenéDescartes,fromMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy
TheexcerptcontainsbothofDescartes’sskepticalconjecturesandhisexplanationthatheisathinking thing—amind—a thing that is oneandindivisiblebutisintermingledwithsomethingentirelydifferent,abody—somethingthatisdivisibleandhasparts.
6.2BenedictusdeSpinoza,fromEthics
TheexcerptdemonstratesSpinoza’suseofhis“geometricmethod”in whichmetaphysicalcertainties(“propositions”)arededucedfromagroupof“definitions”andself-evident“axioms.”
6.3GeorgeBerkeley,fromTreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge
Berkeleynotesthattheobjectsofhumanknowledgeareideasandthattheseideascanonlyexistinthemindthatperceivesthem.Hethenobservesthatthereisacontradictionintheviewthatsensibleobjectsexistoutsidethemind.Hegoesontoarguethatallthequalitiesweexperiencewhenweexperienceasensibleobject(notjusttheso-calledsecondaryqualities)areideasthatexistinthe mindandthattheexistence of thingsoutsidethe mindcannot be proven byreason;infact,Berkeleyargues,itisimpossibleeventoconceiveofasensiblethingexistingoutsidethemind.
Philosophers
•George Berkeleywas a British empiricist and idealist who denied the existence of material substance and held that sensible objects exist only in the mind.110
•Anne Conwayargued against parts of the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza. An essentialist who argued that everything other than God has both physical and mental essences—God is totally mental—she had a big influence on Leibniz’s monadology.103
•Oliva Sabuco de Nantesproposed that the connection between body and soul occurs throughout the brain.100
•René Descarteswas the “father” of modern philosophy, a Continental rationalist, and a dualist. He said there are two separate and distinct substances: material substance and mind.96
•Benedictus de Spinozawas a Continental rationalist. He maintained that thought and extension are attributes of a single substance.105
•Émilie du Châteletadapted Leibniz’s metaphysical principles to Newtonian science.108
•Thomas Hobbeswas the first great modern materialist. He held that all that exists is bodies in motion.102
•Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibnizwas a Continental rationalist who held that the ultimate constituents of reality are monads, which are nonmaterial, indivisible units of force.107
•John Lockewas a British empiricist who held that we perceive objects indirectly by means of our perceptions of them, some of which he believed were accurate copies of the real properties of objects.109
Suggested Further Readings
Margaret Atherton, Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). Anthology of excerpts from Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, Damaris Cudworth Masham, Anne Conway, Catharine Trotter Cockburn, and Lady Mary Shepherd.
George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues, Howard Robinson, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Contains a useful introduction.
Christopher Biffle, A Guided Tour of René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000). Accessible translation of Descartes’ Meditations I–VI with a guide to thinking about them critically.
Robert Black, ed., Renaissance Thought: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 2001). Essays by modern writers on Renaissance humanism, philosophy, and political thought.
E. O. Burtt, The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939). A general book on modern philosophy.
Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). An affordable paperback edition of Conway.
John Cottingham, The Rationalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). A brief introduction to the philosophies of the rationalists.
René Descartes, Philosophical Works, in two volumes, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, trans. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968). This is what you need to read Descartes.
Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). A first biography tracing Descartes’ intellectual development and philosophical ideas.
A. C. Grayling, Descartes (New York: Pocket Books, 2005). A readable, lively study of Descartes’ life and thought.
Errol E. Harris, Spinoza’s Philosophy: An Outline(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1992). The title says it all.
S. Lamprecht, ed., Locke Selections (New York: Scribner’s, 1928). If you want to read more than “Selections,” you must turn to his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in two volumes, A. C. Fraser, ed. (New York: Dover, 1959). This (the Fraser edition) is a heavily annotated work.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). An excellent exposition of the metaphysics of Leibniz.
Anthony Savile, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Leibniz and the Monadology (New York: Routledge, 2000). A brief exposition of Leibniz’s idealism.
Tom Sorell, Descartes: A Very Short Introduction (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001). A short but accessible introduction to Descartes’ life and thinking.
Tom Sorell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). A review of Hobbes’s life and the full range of his philosophical concerns.
Richard Tuck, Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002). A quick look at Hobbes’s life and key ideas.
J. O. Urmson and A. J. Ayer, The British Empiricists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). A set of introductory readings on the lives and thoughts of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.
Mary Ellen Waithe, ed., A History of Women Philosophers, vol. 3, Modern Women Philosophers: 1600–1900(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press, 1991). Chapters about thirty-one women philosophers of the period.
J. Wild, ed., Spinoza Selections (New York: Scribner’s, 1930). This volume contains enough original material for the introductory student.
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