Chapter 4Grand Strategy

Armed with some basic concepts in international relations and the associated language, we are prepared to move toward a discussion of national security strategy. National security strategy, grand strategy, is not about winning a war in Iraq or about winning a global war on terrorism. Grand strategy is about assuring the position of the United States in the world, its place in the international system of states, and it is a guide to the exercise of power and influence to attain or maintain the desired position. Grand strategy guides the use of national power—all instruments of national power.

Strategic theories ascribe cause and effect relationships between the uses of power and their consequences. In the following two chapters, we review modern strategic thought, including the several variants of Cold War containment, the strategic alternatives offered after the Cold War, and the pronounced swings in the strategies of post-Cold War administrations. But first, some definitions are in order.

What is a strategy?

A strategy links ends, ways, and means. That is, the ends of a strategy are the objectives or goals to be achieved, the means include the multitude of resources devoted to achievement of those objectives, and the ways are the methods of organizing and employing those resources to achieve national objectives. Ways are the heart of strategy formulation. Aligning and balancing ends, ways, and means is the strategic calculation.

Not every formulation of ends, ways, and means qualifies as a strategy. Stating lofty objectives inadequately supported by resources is not a strategy. It is little more than wishful thinking, a vision. Vision statements are valuable, but they are not strategies. At the other extreme, providing resources for all possible objectives—for example, maintaining large standing military forces capable of responding to all conceivable contingencies—squanders resources. Tough choices must be made to concentrate resources to minimize risks to the most vital interests while accepting some risks elsewhere. If not, the resultant formulation fails to constitute a strategy, and the failure is a formula for exhaustion. It is all too easy to fall victim to one of these two pathologies.

What constitutes a good strategy?

A good strategy guides the use of power as events emerge. Without a good strategy, one can only react to events as they occur, yielding the initiative to the enemy by allowing the enemy to select the time, place, and terms of the competition. Some presidents have possessed an overarching understanding of the geostrategic environment, a view of America’s position in it, and a strategy to guide their behavior. Eisenhower, Nixon, and George H.W. Bush responded to crises in the context of a persistent strategy. Other presidents lacked a governing strategic view and allowed crises to dictate responses. Truman, Carter, and George W. Bush reacted to crises outside the context of declared strategy. Presidents are also differentiated by their ability to recognize and seize strategic opportunities. The Nixon and elder Bush administrations offer notable successes in this area.

Presidents differed in their ability to limit themselves to pursuits they could afford. Large, expanding means do not equate to infinite or even adequate means for all objectives. The condition of undifferentiated threats, an inability to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests, and the threats to them, led to exhaustive responses. Good strategies minimize risks to vital interests and accept some risks elsewhere. Exhaustive responses are all too common, with Truman, Kennedy-Johnson, Reagan, and the younger Bush offering clear examples.

A sustainable strategy is underwritten by public support. Only presidential leadership can build a consensus to commitment. The American public grants the president wide latitude initiating action, but withdraws support without a deliberate and sustained consensus-building effort. But even a concerted effort at consensus building will fail if a strategy is not consistent with the nation’s philosophy. Truman, Johnson, and Bush43 are notable in their failure to build a consensus to commitment to their respective wars. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, although beyond the scope of this work, is notable for his sustained effort at building and maintaining a consensus to commitment.

All instruments of power are brought to bear in a good strategy. There are limits to what can be achieved with any instrument of power, including the hard power provided by the military instrument. Failure to recognize the limits of military power is a dangerous trap. The complementary use of all instruments is more efficient and more effective. Moreover, not all power is in the hands of the United States. There are other forces at work that can be leveraged, for example, rejection of the sense of monolithic communism and recognition of the separate nationalistic impulses that allowed Nixon to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.

In short, a good strategy

pits strength against weakness,
denies the enemy the ability to determine the time, place, and terms of the competition,
distinguishes between vital and peripheral interests,
pursues clear objectives and judiciously applies scarce resources (subordinates means to ends),
employs all instruments of power,
is consistent with national philosophy, and
is relevant to the time, e.g., consistent with contemporary international politics, military developments, available technology, and domestic attitudes.

How is national security strategyexpressed?

There are many ways to express grand strategy, but the four expressions of a nation’s grand strategy below are used in this text:[1]

declaratory policy,
employment policy,
force development policy, and
force deployment policy.

The traditional four expressions are better suited to an era when national security was principally assured by military force. The twenty-first century arguably requires a wider understanding of what constitutes the force or power that can be brought to bear. The four expressions easily extend to include all instruments of power rather than a narrow focus on the military instrument.

Declaratory policy is what we say we will do. The most obvious example of declaratory policy is the president’s national security strategy document required by law since 1987. Other statements of public officials also contribute to our declaratory policy. Declaratory policy is communicated to influence enemies, friends, and neutral observers. Such statements deliberately exaggerate some things and deemphasize others. Policy statements are full of constructive ambiguity—saying just enough to communicate a position without precommitting to a response to an unpredicted stimulus.

Employment policy is what we actually do, specifically as our actions relate to the use of force to achieve our strategic objectives. The overt use of military force is regularly described in the media. But there are other uses of covert military or paramilitary force that go unannounced. Economic sanctions and foreign aid are also examples of “action” policy.

Force development policy dictates what force structure we maintain and what we are developing. It includes, for example, the number of Army divisions and Air Force fighter wings available. It also includes their readiness level, e.g., do they require mobilization and training from the reserve forces, or are they ready for immediate employment? The development of the next generation of weapon systems is also an important expression of a nation’s strategy. Maintaining a nation building capability across the departments and agencies is another example of force or capability development policy.

Force deployment policy dictates where we position the force in peacetime in anticipation. Having a small Army force in South Korea, for example, serves as a trip wire and deterrent against North Korean aggression far out of proportion to its size. And having a Navy carrier battle group persistently patrolling within reach of the Persian Gulf is a powerful statement. Where intelligence collection efforts are focused is another example of deployment policy.

There must be an internal consistency to these four expressions of strategy. Having a force incapable or poorly positioned to support declaratory policy renders declaratory policy incredible. Failing to follow through on declaratory policy renders it incredible as well. The actual use of force demonstrates both the will and the ability that underwrites credibility. Achieving deterrent and other influence objectives through credible declaratory policy is less expensive and more sustainable than force employment as a first resort. Repeating a premise of this text, we must expand beyond a narrow focus on military force and consider all instruments of power.

Declaratory policy generally, and the national security strategy document specifically, sets in motion expensive and laborious processes. If, for example, there is a shift in emphasis from major war to small war, or vice versa, major changes to force development policy will follow. The military departments are required by law to organize, train, and equip the four services for the missions the president assigns to the regional combatant commanders. An armored division, for example, had great value in major land war in Europe but much less value to nation building in Iraq. Major shifts in declaratory policy require new equipment with logistic support, new organizations, new doctrine, and new training programs. Each costs money and each takes time. Employment policy not aligned with declaratory policy, or force development and force deployment policy not keeping pace with employment policy, virtually assures unpreparedness of the military instrument.

How is a grand strategyformulated?

How does one formulate a grand strategy? Three broad approaches are apparent. The well-established majority approach is based on prioritized stateinterests. A recurring and recently resurgent approach is based on addressing internationalissues expected to reduce the sources of conflict. And a third approach is based on acting in accord with principles that reflect nationalvalues. These approaches are not mutually exclusive. The interest-based approach dominates and the other two assert greater influence periodically.

Stephen Cambone describes the two dominant schools: the interests-based and issues-based schools.[2] His analysis was conducted at csis between his service under Bush 41 and Bush 43 while the issues-based approach enjoyed resurgence under Clinton. The principles-based or values-based approach surged under Carter and Bush 43, although it has been apparent throughout American history.

The interests-based approach. The textbook answer to the question—how is a grand strategy formulated—is that ends are determined by examining the interests of the state and identifying threats, both actual and potential, to those interests. Interests are prioritized or simply differentiated as vital or peripheral.[3] The state is highly risk averse with respect to vital interests. Vital interests are non-negotiable and therefore are pursued with all available means including military force. Honest people can and do disagree on which interests are vital.

The interests school sees national security from the perspective of national interests with a focus on the minimization of risks to the United States as a sovereign state in the international system.[4]

Defining vital interests too broadly is the first step to strategic exhaustion. The constraint on available means requires that a strategy concentrate resources to counter threats and to minimize risks to vital interests. Resources are shifted to vital interests and risks are shifted to the less vital. If a strategy—a linkage of ends, ways, and means—cannot secure the state against threats to its vital interests, then ways must be reconsidered, additional means must be allocated, what constitutes vital interests must be redefined, or greater risks must be accepted. To defend everything is to defend nothing, Fredrick the Great reminds us.

The interests-based approach to strategy formulation is consistent with realist thinking. Self interest and the principles of territorial sovereignty, self determination, and non-intervention dominate.

The issues-based approach. A second prominent view is based on issues rather than on interests. American national security is best assured by pursuing international security. And international security is best assured by addressing the root causes of conflict.

The issues school focuses on global problems that impede the achievement of a fair international system based on the improvement of the quality of life of the world’s population. Resolving these issues, its advocates maintain, will address the most obvious sources of human conflict and suffering.[5]

The issues school defines security threats far more broadly than the traditional interests school. For example, the spread of hiv/aids and environmental degradation are readily included as threats to security. Other issues include population growth, access to food and water, migration and displacement, the rights of women and children, trafficking in drugs and people, the proliferation of wmd, and access to commercial, financial, and capital markets. Many security threats are transnational in nature and require international solutions.

The international community, perhaps represented by the un, is a very loose confederation of sovereign states. As such, it is difficult to sustain a consensus to action. Honest people can and do disagree on the issues to address and on their respective importance. The international community establishes norms of behavior between states. It also establishes norms to protect the rights of individuals against the coercive powers of the state. Clearly the major powers have greater influence in establishing international norms, but international norms may not align with American interests or values.

An issues-based strategy formulation process is consistent with idealist, internationalist, institutionalist, and Wilsonian thinking. Such a process rests more on universalism and interventionism and less on self determination; it endorses limited territorial sovereignty.

The principles-based approach. A minority view holds that foreign policy should be constructed by adhering to specific principles rather than calculating outcomes based on interests. The animating principles might be derived from political, economic, or religious ideology. Spreading free market capitalism, spreading democracy, supporting Israel, intervention against genocide, intervention for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and nonintervention are examples of principles to be followed.

The principles school promotes behavior on the international scene in accordance with specific principles. The goodness of policy action is determined by how it adheres to or diverges from the chosen guiding principles rather than on the consequences obtained.

A specific subset of principles-based thinking periodically gains prominence. Its principles are based in religion. Some use values-based to describe this approach, although the same label is used with other meaning. According to this school, American international behavior should be guided not by calculation of worldly consequences but by following certain principles independent of those worldly consequences. The guiding values are determined by reference to a biblical interpretation that is believed to be universally applicable. The threat to national security includes multiculturalism, both domestically and abroad. The relative growth of populations that do not share American values all constitute threats to the American way of life.

The values school seeks to project national values by applying to national security decision making principles derived from biblical interpretation believed by its advocates to be universally applicable.

The political faction encouraging the values-based approach is absolutist. It believes in imposing its version of American values onto the international community rather than yielding to the norms of the international community. American values are universal values. Consistent with vindicationism, this school is willing to export values by aggressive foreign policy including the use of military force. It represents the crusading rather than the pacifist Christian tradition. It is Jacksonian, projecting a way of life, not just continentally, but globally.

Reconciling the Approaches. Adherents to the issues-based and principles-based approaches tend to pursue domestic policies based on issues or principles, respectively, and then project those same issues and principles onto formulation of foreign policy. The interests-based approach, in contrast, does not attempt to project American ways on others, relying instead on exemplarism and self-determination. Where we start with strategy formulation has a lot to do with where we end up.

Interests-based and issues-based approaches hope to achieve consequences (ends) in the secular, temporal, material world. The values-based approach seeks consequences in the hereafter by following religious principles or doctrine based on the biblical interpretation of religious elites. The empirical analysis of cause and effect that underwrites interest- and issues-based strategy formulation does not serve the values-based camp.

A cautionary note is in order. Although the orientations to strategy formulation are widely accepted, the labels are not. Sometimes the term values-based is used to describe both issues- and principles-based formulation as defined above. Sometimes the values referred to are individual liberty and the rule of law rather than religious in origin. Americans can certainly disagree on what constitutes national values. What Cambone calls interest-based, the Princeton Project[6] calls threat-based, and what Cambone calls issues-based, Princeton calls interest-based. Rather than assuming clear meaning from a label built from words like interests, issues, principles, and values, the cautious thinker must ask which interests, which issues, which principles, and whose values.

The diverse American public is galvanized when it comes to vital interests narrowly defined—i.e., national survival and defense of American life, liberty, and property. Presidents will not be forgiven for failing to secure these vital interests. The same diversity provides fickle support for actions to secure the liberties of others or for promoting values not shared abroad or even domestically. Presidents can build domestic coalitions in opposition to their own actions when the connection to American security is tenuous and the costs are high.

All three approaches must secure vital interests. Therefore, the issues-based and principles-based approaches impose costs over and above the interests-based approach. This explains, perhaps, why the interests-based approach remains dominant and persistent while the others exhibit transient prominence.