Chapter 7
The Effectiveness of Signaling and Deterrence
I. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Incident
On May 22, 1995, the White House approved a visa for Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States to attend a reunion at Cornell University, where President Lee received his Ph.D. degree in 1968. The very next day, a Chinese foreign ministry statement charged that this was an extremely serious move by the United States to openly create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” which totally contravened the fundamental principles enshrined in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués. The statement also said this was just the latest step in President Lee’s efforts to create “one China and one Taiwan.”[1]
On June 16, when President Lee Teng-hui returned to Taiwan, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) under the State Council, proclaimed the suspension of the second “Koo-Wang Talks” and China recalled its ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu. In addition, a Xinhua New Agency commentary on June 17 criticized the United States for continuously adjusting its policy toward Taiwan since 1994, eventually reaching so grave a point as to allow President Lee to visit the United States. “Lee’s words and deeds made all too clear to the world his design to create ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’,” the commentary noted.[2] In early 1996, Premier Li Peng claimed that the Taiwan authorities’ fundamental purpose was to separate Taiwan from China and carry out “Taiwan independence.”[3]
In response to President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States, Beijing launched six waves of military exercises aimed at Taiwan from July 1995 to March 1996. Starting on July 21-26, 1995, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a series of missile tests and naval and air exercises in waters near Taiwan. It launched six surface-to-surface missiles approximately 185 km from Taiwan. On August 15-25, the PLA held a second series of military exercises, including guided missile, cannon, and other military tests in the sea 136 km north of Taiwan. In late November, PLA marines and tanks made a beachhead landing exercise backed by fighters and naval vessels.
On March 8-18, 1996, the PLA conducted surface-to-surface missile tests on a target area just off the coast of Taiwan’s two largest port cities. Three missiles were launched on target areas just twenty nautical miles from Keelung, Taiwan’s second busiest seaport, and just outside of Kaohsiung harbor, the third largest container port in the world. On March 12-20, the PLA conducted air and naval exercises with live ammunition in waters near Taiwan. On March 18-25, the PLA conducted a wave of joint ground, naval and air exercises near the Pingtan Island, within ten nautical miles of Taiwan-controlled islands.
Through these actions Beijing intended to signal its disapproval of Taiwan and the United States, and its resolve to deter Taipei and Washington from further acts supporting Taiwan independence. Beijing chose military exercises and missile tests, coupled with rhetorical threats, as a means to convey its determination and resolve. For example, after the first wave of missile tests and military exercises in late July 1995, Beijing’s Xinhua News Agency stated, “If some people were to dare separate Taiwan from Chinese territory, the Chinese people would defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity with blood and lives.”[emphasis added][4]
Thereafter, China’s civilian and military leaders have stated many times, in particular before Taiwan’s December 1995 Legislative Yuan election and March 1996 presidential election, that “The PLA will never sit idly when a single inch of territory is split off China,” and that military exercises show China’s “determination and ability to safeguard [its] sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In addition, Beijing would like to “make the United States realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right track” and deter the United States from interference and attempting to promote “Taiwan independence.”[5]
Beijing also tried to coerce Taipei to change its policy. For example, on September 1, 1995, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian warned, “If the Taiwan authorities cling obstinately to their course of trying to split China, the Chinese government will never sit back and watch.”[6] From late January through February, the PLA amassed more than 150,000 troops in Fujian Province, directly across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing explained, “The most urgent thing for the Taiwan authorities to do is to give up attempts to create ‘two Chinas,’ or ‘one China one Taiwan,’ and abandon their splittist policies.”[7]
Moreover, Beijing tried to influence Taiwan’s December 1995 Legislative Yuan election and March 1996 presidential election by undermining President Lee Teng-hui’s position. For instance, by August 1995, upward of 400 articles in the Chinese press attacked President Lee by name.[8] On March 7, 1996 the PLA fired three M-9 missiles into the waters near Taiwan. That day, Defense Minister Chi Haotian explained, “[W]e have more troops stationed in Fujian because we are facing a grim situation, in which Lee Teng-hui and his gang are vainly attempting to split China.”[9] A March 8 joint editorial in the Renmin Ribao and the Jiefangjun Bao asserted, “The tension that has emerged in the Taiwan Strait is purely due to Lee Teng-hui’s perverse acts of advocating Taiwan independence and going all-out to practice ‘two China’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan.’ The real danger is letting Lee Teng-hui continue to advocate Taiwan independence and undermine the reunification of the motherland. This will bring grave calamities to the 21 million compatriots in Taiwan.”[10]
II. The 1999-2000 Taiwan Strait Incident
On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui stated in an interview with Deutsche Welle that the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan is a “state-to-state or at least a special state-to-state relationship” (two-state theory). On July 15, MAC Chairman Su Chi explained that President Lee wished to debunk Beijing’s “one China” myth.[11]
President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” again incited severe criticism from China. On July 11, China’s TAO spokesman said, “The fact that Lee Teng-hui brazenly twisted cross-Strait relations as ‘state-to-state relations’ once again exposed his consistent malice of splitting China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and his attempt to separate Taiwan from China. His words showed that he is in collaboration with the ‘Taiwan Independence’ splittist force and is moving further ahead in the path toward splitting the motherland.”[12]
On July 14, a commentator’s article in the Renmin Ribao bitterly charged that the secessionist statements made by President Lee Teng-hui “have completely unmasked their longstanding and deliberate attempts to divide China’s territory and sovereignty…. [and] bared his real secessionist intention.”[13] A Renmin Ribao commentary on July 19 contended, “[T]he political essence of Lee Teng-hui’s ‘state-to-state theory’ is the same as Taiwan independence.”[14]
Beijing responded to President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” by canceling Wang Daohan’s scheduled trip to Taiwan while Chinese officials at various levels gave the impression that China was considering some form of military action against Taiwan. According to statistics compiled by Taiwan’s MAC, from July to August 1999, there were 124 headlines about the Taiwan Strait crisis in the Hong Kong media. Due to a big earthquake in Taiwan on September 21, China reduced the tensions across Taiwan Strait by leaking fewer threats from the PLA and other sources. However, the reports of tensions increased after October. In November, there were 43 headlines about the Taiwan Strait crisis in the Hong Kong media. From July 11, 1999, to February 18, 2000, there were 179 reports and commentaries regarding possible Chinese military action against Taiwan.[15]
These reports and commentaries were not necessarily manipulated by Chinese authorities, but the huge volume of reports and commentaries, backed up with Chinese military exercises and deployment, de facto became a part of China’s deterrent effort toward Taiwan. China publicly confirmed on July 15 what international security experts have known for years that it possesses the technology to build a neutron bomb as well as the W-88, the most advanced miniaturized warhead. “Wartime mobilization drills” were held along the coast facing Taiwan on July 17-18. Chinese and Taiwanese fighter jets flew hundreds of sorties between mid-July and early August along the center line of the Taiwan Strait, a line previously given wide berth by both sides. On August 2, China tested its Dongfeng 31 (DF-31) missiles, which has a range of about 5,000 miles and can carry a miniaturized nuclear warhead. On November 23, Chinese media reported the expansion in mid-October of a missile base across from Taiwan where nearly 100 of Beijing’s newest short-range missiles (CSS-7 or M-11) systems were to be deployed. From October 1999 to February 2000, Chinese military conducted five large-scale military exercises.[16] Parenthetically, in that period the United States sought to reassure China that it did not accept President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory.”
Just as in the 1995-96 crisis, Beijing tried to signal its disapproval of Taipei’s policy, to deter Taipei from further acts supporting Taiwan independence, to coerce Taipei to change its policy, and to shape Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential election in Beijing’s favor. On July 15, 1999, a Jiefangjun Bao commentary article warned, “We will never sit idly by and watch any territory severing from our motherland, not even one single inch. The People’s Liberation Army…has the strong determination and sufficient strength to safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity.”[17]
Furthermore, China’s White Paper on Taiwan published on February 21, 2000, explicitly laid out three conditions for the use of force against Taiwan: (1) any major incidents of separation of Taiwan from China, under whatever pretext; (2) invasion and occupation of Taiwan by foreign countries; and (3) the Taiwan authorities indefinite rejection of peaceful resolution to the issue of cross-Strait reunification through negotiations.[18] The third condition represented a new explicit and formal threat and put more psychological pressure on Taipei.
On March 5, two weeks before Taiwan’s presidential election, Premier Zhu Rongji renewed the Chinese threat, warning, “We will not sit idly by and watch any serious separatist activity aimed at undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, such as those advocating the ‘two-state theory’ or ‘the independence of Taiwan’.” In addition, Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, reiterated Beijing’s three conditions for the use of force and warned, “The Chinese PLA completely has the resolve, confidence, ability, and way to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and by no means will tolerate and sit by idly watching any plot to split the motherland succeed…. ‘Taiwan independence’ means a war and splittism will preclude peace.” [emphasis added][19]
On February 25, TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing implicitly warned that there would be a war between Taiwan and China if Chen Shui-bian were elected president.[20] On March 14, four days before Taiwan’s election, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sun Yuxi explicitly warned that China would take firm action if it did not like the outcome of Taiwan’s presidential election, i.e., if Chen Shui-bian were elected president.[21] In a news conference on March 15, Premier Zhu Rongji said, “The Chinese people will definitely safeguard the motherland's reunification and national dignity with their own blood and lives.… At present, Taiwan people are facing an urgent historic moment. They have to decide what path to follow. They absolutely should not act impulsively. Otherwise, it will be too late for regrets…there are only three days left. It is very hard to predict world affairs. Taiwan compatriots, you must be on your guard!” [emphasis added][22]
III. Chinese Calculation of Signaling and Deterrence
Based on the above discussion, Beijing had four common goals in the 1995-96 and 1999-2000 incidents: (1) to signal its disapproval of Taiwan’s policy; (2) to coerce Taiwan’s leaders to readopt “one China” principle or give up further independence activities, i.e., Taiwan’s flexible diplomacy; (3) to deter Taiwan leaders from formally declaring independence; (4) to discourage the Taiwan electorate from voting for candidates who favored independence, i.e., Lee Teng-hui, Peng Ming-min, and Chen Shui-bian. In addition, Beijing also tried to encourage the United Stated to adopt a more public and determined stance against Taiwan independence in the 1995-96 crisis.[23]
Chinese military threats were examples of both coercive and deterrence diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy refers to threats adopted by a sender to persuade a target to stop or reverse an action. Deterrence diplomacy refers to threats imposed by a sender to dissuade a target from undertaking an action deemed detrimental to the sender. Military force was used in an exemplary manner “to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary.”[24] This coercive and deterrence strategy exploited Taiwan’s fear of war through military brinkmanship. To make this strategy credible, Beijing purposely created an atmosphere of secrecy in which the PLA was preparing military maneuvers before and after the announcement of missile tests. In the meantime, news media were mobilized to launch an attack on Taiwan’s independence and to assert Beijing’s resolve to halt the independence momentum.[25] John Garver argues, “Beijing hoped to create a sense of apprehension and fear in the minds of [Taiwanese] people. War and all its suffering was imminent! The Chinese Communists were determined and prepared to attack regardless of costs!”[26]
Even though China’s official newspaper contended that the political essence of “two-state theory” was the same as Taiwanese independence, Beijing never seriously considered the use of force in the 1995-96 or 1999-2000 incidents, nor was there any serious preparations made for war, as discussed on the section of the Taiwan issue in Chapter 6. A TAO official pointed out that the military exercises in 1995-96 and 1999-2000 were intended only to threaten Taiwan.[27] An American studies senior scholar in Shanghai stressed, “The 1995-96 military exercises were mainly to coerce, bully, and deter Taiwan from declaring independence. China never intended to use force.”[28] An American studies scholar in Beijing emphasized, “During the 1995-96, it was China’s instinct to punish Taiwan. In addition, China wished to remind the U.S. and other western countries not to support Taiwan independence. At that time, it was totally impossible for China to attack Taiwan. China even did not think about it because there was no military preparation. China only wanted to bluff Taiwan.”[29] Many prominent Chinese scholars have conveyed the same ideas.[30]