Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris
Orders to abandon negations at Châtillon
It was Alexander, however, who acted decisively and entered Paris as leader of the victorious allied forces on the 31st March.[1]Castlereagh remained at Dijon and wrote to his government about his view of the peace arrangements from there.[2] The allied powers had to agree upon who was suitable to rule France. During these months four options had arisen: Napoleon could remain on the throne but with his Empire reduced, France could be ruled under a regency of Marie Louis, Bernadotte could reign, or Louis XVIII could be resorted.[3] The British government supported the restoration of the Bourbons; Liverpool and Bathurst even met with Louis XVIII, who was exiling in Britain, before returned to France to reclaim the throne.[4] A letter from Castlereagh to Liverpool of 22nd March indicates his doubts about supporting the Bourbon cause strongly.[5]
The despatch includes two memorandums; one written by Baron de Vitrolles, requesting the allies stop negotiations with Napoleon and join him in support of the Bourbon cause in France, and another written by Metternich contesting that the French public had not yet stopped supporting their Emperor.[6]Castlereagh indicates in his letter that he supports Metternich’s observation of the French people, and insists that Britain should wait until the French people themselves consider Napoleon to be the enemy.[7] The foreign minister wanted Britain to be perceived as ‘as the ally and auxiliary of the continental powers’ rather ‘than as charging herself chief’ and imposing Louis XVIII upon the French people.[8]Nicholson attributes Castlereagh’s attitude to the Pitt doctrine, which conceived that public support was required before the restoration of the Bourbons.[9]This perhaps simplifies the complexity of Castlereagh’s anxiety.
It is true that at Chaumont, Castlereagh probably thought Napoleon was the most suitable option because of his continued popularity in France, despite the public outcry this would cause in Britain.[10]Yet Napoleon’s re-proposal, offered by Caulaincourt at Châtillon on 15th March, was absurd in its terms, and from this point onwards Castlereagh knew that the Bourbons were the only suitable option.[11] Castlereagh informs Liverpool in this letter that he is willing to support Vitrolles and the Bourbon Princes financially, but that it must not be seen ‘as a direct grant’ from the British government.[12]At Chaumont, Britain had attained a powerful standing amongst the allies, and Castlereagh may have hesitated for fear of being divisive so soon after this achievement. When Vitrolles arrived at Dijon, Alexander declared that the Bourbons were unfit to rule France.[13] It is likely therefore that Castlereagh would not want to openly champion the Bourbon cause, until it became absolutely clear to Alexander and Metternich that this was the most suitable option. As mentioned Castlereagh wanted to be perceived as ‘auxiliary’ to France, and feared being overly forceful on this issue. In a sense his views did not align with his government at this point, but this would soon change after communication with Bathurst. Thus it is perhaps better to not to attribute Castlereagh’s hesitancy to a strict following of Pitt’s policy, but as unique to the situation in March 1814.
Bathurst wrote on the 22nd March to informCastlereagh of the news that the inhabitants of Bordeaux have ‘assumed the White Cockade’ of the Bourbon House, and also instructs Castlereagh to terminate the negotiations at Châtillon.[14]This knowledge has been obtained in correspondence with Wellington, whose letter of the news is enclosed. Bathurst writes that the general insists ‘the sentiments manifested at Bordeaux to be general throughout that part of the country’, and more significantly that Wellington’s instructions to Marshal Beresford, also enclosed, highlight that British forces offered ‘no encouragement to the people to adopt this proceeding.’[15]This news could offer relief to Castlereagh as it confirmed that Louis XVIII was now the clear choice for the French throne. Indeed he gave a dinner to the allied leaders, including Metternich and Karl von Hardenberg, Prussian foreign minister, to celebrate the restoration of the Bourbons on the 28th March.[16]It would appear that Castlereagh’s views of 22nd March were made without the knowledge of the sentiment in Southern France, even though Bathurst’s letter reports that took place on 12th March in Bordeaux.[17]It was important to relay this information to Castlereagh after the events in Southern France had become publically known.
The news that Bourbon support had swelled in Southern France was published in The Times on 25 March, which stated that two ‘deputies from the Royalists’ had landed in Falmouth to report the news.[18] One of these messengers reportedly proclaimed that ‘Now, the White Flag and the Old British Union are flying amicably together.’[19] The author of the article champions the Bourbon cause and refers to the enemy, Napoleon, as the ‘villain.’[20]A solution, where Napoleon remained on the French throne, had therefore become an impossibility. The British public, as confirmed by this newspaper article, would not tolerate this outcome and this sentiment even extended to attempting to negotiate peace directly with Bonaparte.[21]The sentiment of the public and the government’s frustration explain the instructions given by Bathurst to Castlereagh in the letter of 22ndMarch.
This is one of the only major instances where public sentiment and government news actually affected Castlereagh’s judgement. Castlereagh, as his letter illustrates, knew that Louis XVIII was the inevitable option, but he felt unsure to act with confidence on this issue until he received assurances from Bathurst for this course of action. Significantly Bathurst also states that the cabinet fell that the catastrophe of the Châtillon negotiations can be ‘solely ascribed to the French government’ and orders Castlereagh to break of the negotiations.[22]Wellington’s news from Southern France helped to ease Castlereagh’s worries over the future of the French throne, and meant that he could help to secure the desired outcome for Britain.
Castlereagh role in the Peace of Paris
Castlereagh was not hugely influential at this stage of the continental negotiations.
Alexander was the only senior allied official in Paris between the 1st-6thApril, a crucial period, where the Tsar helped Talleyrand to restore the Bourbon monarchy.[23]With Châtillon abandoned and his views now aligned with that of the British government and public, Castlereagh had no obvious reason to hesitate. Nicholson observes that Sir Charles Stewart, who had accompanied Alexander to Paris, wrote to Liverpool to express his concern for Castlereagh’s absence because of the advantage it gave Russia in the negotiations for the upcoming Paris treaty.[24]
As it transpires Britain did not suffer as a result of this absence.The Peace of Paris, signed on the 30th May, ensured peace with France and cemented the territorial agreements published in the Treaty of Chaumont.[25] Thus Britain had ensured the security of the territories outlined in the memorandum of 26th December, apart from Hannover.[26] Castlereagh’s principal work to achieve the aims of his government had been achieved at Chaumont. As the correspondences illustrate Castlereagh, his government and the British public shared a desire restore the Bourbons when the allies entered Paris on 31 March. Conversely Alexander was not sure of his preferred candidate, and the first week of April was period of tension and uncertainty in Paris.[27] Castlereagh may well have been wary of what the Tsar may do, and Schroeder argues that perhaps this explains his delayed journey to Paris to avoid negotiating directly with Alexander.[28]The sources support this notion, as Castlereagh desire to be seen as an ally and not conqueror of France, unlike Alexander.The foreign secretary had certainly been less influential at Paris than at Chaumont, but his loyalty to the orders of his government was unwavering, and he had still succeeded in fulfilling their aims. Unlike Paris, Castlereagh was to have a more influential role at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, as he attempted to negotiate with Alexander and the other allied ministers, over the settlement of central Europe.
[1] Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 38.
[2] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87-88.
[3]Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.53.
[4] Thompson, Earl Bathurst, pp.73-4
[5]Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.
[6]Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.
[7]Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.
[8]Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.
[9] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87.
[10]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 504.
[11]ibid.
[12]Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.
[13]Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 38.
[14]Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.
[15]Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.
[16] Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 89.
[17]Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.
[18]Times, 25thMarch, 1814.
[19]ibid.
[20]ibid.
[21] Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 47.
[22]Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.
[23]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.
[24]Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.
[25]Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.
[26]Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.
[27]Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 506
[28]ibid.