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[CN]Chapter 5
[CH]Political Change, Political Contention, and New Political Contenders
Chapter 3 discussed how key Latin American elites, namely the latifundistas, the military, and the Church, maintained their political predominance over time. This chapter looks at how new interests enter Latin American political systems and who today’s newcomers are. Chapter 3 was about political stability. Chapter 5 is about political change.
When political science first began systematically studying Latin America about 50 years ago, one of the central concepts was political change. Like so many social-science concepts, political change was never precisely defined, no doubt because political change can take so many forms. Going back and examining the works political scientists were publishing in the 1950s and 1960s, however, shows that they were particularly interested in what appeared to be a promising trend of democratization in much of Latin America. They shared this focus with colleagues who were examining the newly independent states in Africa and Asia. The times were hopeful, and political science, above all in the United States, wanted to analyze how countries built political systems, in Africa and Asia, and how they restructured existing systems, in the case of Latin America.
What all of these researchers shared was the conviction that political change, big or small and wherever it occurred, meant more democracy. There were plausible reasons for this belief. First, as Chapter 7 shows in more detail, there was movement toward democracy in Latin America. Peter Smith, a political scientist whose speciality is Latin America,notes that from the 1930s through the 1950s, mass politics—the meaningful involvement of ordinary citizens—arrived in the region, and nearly half of Latin America’s countries elected their leaders democratically.[1] And the new states of Africa and Asia all began their existenceswith both a strong dedication to self-determination and political machinery that had built and sustained robust democracies inWestern Europe. But what really caught the attention of political science was social mobilization, which was another, broader form of political participation.
That concept refers to “...an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from a traditional to a modern way of life …[and that] tend[s] to influence and sometimes to transform political behaviour.”[2] It directs our attention to how social changes bring new actors with new claims face to face with government. By expanding the population of political actors to include newly emerging and newly empowered groups, the cause of democracy was served. Yet for social mobilization to produce democratic effects, there had to be an already-functioning democracy that could convert numbers into a political asset. If votes did not actually bring power, mobilized citizens would only be frustrated by their largely futile efforts to influence government.
Failing that, the new arrivals would have to fight their way into the system. Sometimes they did so with violence, using revolutions and guerrilla insurgencies as their instruments. Other times they could use the contentious but fundamentally nonviolent mechanism of movement politics. Most important political change has demanded high levels of conflict.
Theabove,of course,are different answers to the question facing us of how new forces enter the political system, make themselves heard, and possibly enter the ranks of the politically powerful—the elite. One useful way to think about this is by using the concept of political opportunity structures (POS). The concept is not new, having been introduced by the political scientist Peter Eisinger in 1973.[3]It refers to the possibilities a political system offers an outsider group to get power and manipulate the system to its benefit. As originally conceived and as it is still most frequently used, the POS describes openings available to those who use political protest. Although we applythe concept to other forms of political action later, the reference to protest is very useful, for it is by using contentious, confrontational, disruptive tactics and strategies that most newcomers get their first whiff of political power. There are good reasons for this.
No political elite, anywhere,has ever gladly welcomed new members. At a minimum, those in the elite do not want to see their power diluted by sharing it. However, elites can also see outsiders who seek entry as illegitimate. Those outsiders could be considered incapable of governing, because they are from the wrong class, ethnic group, religion, gender, or whatever. Alternatively, they could want free elections, decided by universal suffrage, to be the only way to earn the right to govern. Or they could demand that government no longer be the private reserve of existing power holders. They could even want to destroy the current political order entirely.
Yet sometimes those outsiders get in. Writing in the 1960s, the political scientist Charles W. Anderson[4] spoke of power capabilities—political resources that give their holders influence—and these capabilities have to be put to use and shown to be effective before whoever is using them enters the ranks of those who count. In fact, Anderson argues that an outsider “must demonstrate possession of a power capability sufficient to pose a threat existing [elites].”[5]Once they have done that, they become what he calls “power contenders”: individuals and groups recognized as having the resources to influence political outcomes. And if the newcomer agrees to let existing elites preserve some share of the power they already have, admission to this power contenders’ club is then secured.
Andersonnotes two things that are unexceptional and should form part of everyone’s political common sense: outsiders have to show they belong and insiders are more disposed to admit outsiders who accept much of the status quo.The bigger the changes sought, the greater the resistance. That is the difference between reform and revolution. Both still have their place in Latin American politics.
This chapter examines how new political actors have emerged in Latin American politics. A few have been co-opted (that is, given a quota of power to bribe them into good behavior). Most have had to fight for their place in the system. Historically, most of those have involved violence or at least highly confrontational protest. However, as there are now more democracies, it is increasingly possible to struggle for political change within the system.
Analysis begins with the most violent and contentious, revolutions and insurgencies, and moves to movement politics and political protest, before ending with instances of co-optation. In addition to describing how different sectors came to claim a share of political power, the chapter also looks at the political changes that resulted from the admission of new actors.
[A]Contentious Politics and Political Change
Contentious politics involves advancing claims on the state or some nonstate actor to recognize rights, cede privileges, or remove some disability or burden, or some combination of the foregoing.[6] Although contentious politics can take place in and through established state institutions, they are more commonly associated with disruptive, confrontational, conflictive actions, usually involving direct contact between whoever makes the claim and the state or, less frequently, the third or nonstate party referred to above. Further, contentious politics are often linked to political protest and movement politics. Contentious politics thus are identified with politics carried on outside normal channels by political actors who are not part of the established power structure, using unconventional methods, and with objectives that elites may deem illegitimate. Those who use contentious political action to advance their claims may break the law in doing so but they can also carry on their work within legal bounds. Indeed, they can combine legal and illegal action.
Using contentious politics usually implies attempting to offset official or entrenched power. This further implies that entrenched power is used to the detriment of those advancing their claims contentiously. It also suggests that those using these methods insist on making their claims themselves. They may do so because they do not trust others to represent them or because they think it imperative to speak for themselves.
In general, it is reasonable to begin an examination of contentious politics hypothesizing that those making the claim have found the political system impermeable. Permeability refers to the ease with which someone wishing to make a claim on government can get a hearing, build a coalition, and secure the reforms thought necessary.[7] Where a political system is not very permeable, those making claims often have to use forceful, even violent means to get action. All Latin American countries have had quite impermeable politics through much of their histories, and it is only within the last 25 years that many of them have begun to open the channels leading to power.
[B] Violent and Lethal Contention
Chapter 4 introduced the theme of political violence and its place in Latin American history. Although violence in international relations is seen as unexceptional—think of the nineteenth century Prussian soldier and military theorist Karl von Clausewitz’s observation that war is the continuation of politics by other means—in domestic politics, violence seems nearly deviant. A standard introductory political science text will explain that politics is about both conflict and conflict resolution,[8]meaning that people compete for power and dispute how power should be used, but that government offers mechanisms for settling those disputes. These means can be courts, legislative debates, negations, or elections, and all are designed to keep competition for power within commonly agreed-upon rules. Violence should be unnecessary in a democracy’sinternal politics. And you will recall that Bernard Crick’s “political method of rule” excluded violence.[9]
Yet even in democracies there can be political violence. Conflict resolution mechanisms do not always work. It may be because they are too weak, people do not trust the government to act impartially, or the government just decides that it will get more of what it wants through conflict. If political violence can occur in democracies, authoritarian political systems that are unaccountable to their citizens and are generally readier to use force to settle disputes are particularly liable to see violent politics. And where there is a long history of using violence to seek political ends, violence itself can be seen as a normal way to win and wield power.
In such cases, which would include most countries of Latin America through long stretches of their histories, being a political outsider can seem like a life sentence. Since being an outsider can mean having no rights other than those the government decides to give you, and which the government can take away immediately, it is easy to imagine how drastic action lookslike the only way out. The most visible response is revolt, a decision that leads to lethal contention.[10]
[A] Revolutionary Political Change
Revolutions bring new actors and new issues into political life. Sometimes they displace most of the old system and its personnel, other times not. That is, revolutions do not always move a country’s political trajectory far off its previous path. Revolutions can be the work of massive insurrections, guerrilla insurgencies, and even nonviolent, electoral politics.
[B]Revolutionary Insurrections, Guerrilla Insurgencies, and Peaceful Revolutions
Revolution now has two meanings. One is older: the forceful overthrow of a government. The other is newer: any thorough, radical change, especially if quickly accomplished. The former has to involve violence; the latter does not.
Violent revolutions in Latin America have taken two forms. The first and more established is by insurrection. A newer model, from the twentieth century, is built around a guerrilla insurgency. Latin America has also seen several attempts at peaceful revolutions. In fact, in 2009,there are at least three ongoing: in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. All follow the Bolivarian Model that was developed by Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela. This examination begins with the instances of violent political change first and then turns to the nonviolent ones. In each case, the objective is to determine what new actors entered the political system and how effective they proved to be.
Most revolutions can be classed as insurrections. An insurrection does not have to be a spontaneous, popular uprising. Indeed, if it is, it will likely fail. It is, after all, a revolt against established authority and if it is to succeed, it must be well planned and well coordinated. Many if not most instances of revolutionary insurrections turn into protracted conflicts. This was certainly the case of the Mexican Revolution and the revolts that led to the wars of independence.
Some would argue that Latin America’s wars for independence do not merit the name revolution, as the social and economic structures of the new countries differed little from the colonial structures they replaced. However, the simple act of expelling the Spanish colonial rulers meant that the native-born would now exercise power. It may be true that most of the first generation of new rulers was drawn from among the wealthy, but some later caudillo leaders did come from the popular classes. What is important here is that, without the revolt against Spain, the criollo elites had no immediate prospect of governing. Thus violent insurrection brought new actors into a changed political system.
The Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) offers a clearer example.As with the wars of independence, the roots of this revolt were political, centering on the last fraudulent election of a long-time dictator, Porfirio Díaz. However, there was more at stake. Díaz’s regime, the Porfiriato, had brought Mexico stability and prosperity, but it also ceded much of the country to foreign interests, notably those from the United States. Therefore, the Mexican Revolution had a strong nationalist component and brought nationalist politics back to the country’s political agenda. And if the foreigners could be displaced and the dictatorship brought down, there would then be new political and economic opportunities for an increasingly frustrated Mexican middle class.
But it was not only the Mexican middle class that would use the revolution to enter the political system. As the old regime broke down and order gave way to chaos, Mexico’s peasants pushed their claims for land while the working class looked for better wages and the right to organize. Both groups, as well as Mexico’s indigenous people, would receive some political recognition as a result of the revolution. However, they would not emerge as independent actors but rather as sectors of the official party of the revolution, which eventually became the Partido Revolucionario Institucional(PRI).
Other insurrectional revolutions (see Text Box 5.1) produced similar results; that is, they did create new power contenders by allowing some new actors into the system. As well, they restructured the state and redefined its role to better suit the interests of the new arrivals. This is what revolutions do in practice, even when they propose to completely restructure economy, society, and state because there is little else they can do in the short run.
Text Box 5.1. Two Cases of Political Change by Insurrection in Central America
Two Central American cases, one from nineteenth-century Nicaragua and the other from twentieth-century Costa Rica, help exemplify how new actors use violence to enter the political system.
In Nicaragua, the 1893 revolution came after an unprecedented 35 years of stability. However, that stability was based on a careful balancing of the regional interests that had kept the country convulsed in civil war for the first three-plus decades after independence in 1821. Though the resulting political system, called the trentenio because it lasted about 30 years, brought the country peace, prosperity, and the label “la Suiza centroamericana” (“the Switzerland of Central America”), its operation demanded that no new forces become political contenders. As a result, an emergingcafetelero (coffee-growing) elite, concentrated in a part of Nicaragua with little presence in government, became restless. And as the Liberal Party was also marginalized under the trentenio, the cafeteleros had a political vehicle.
To start that vehicle, though, there needed to be the first signs of breakdown in the existing system and then a rising led by Liberal general José Santos Zelaya in 1893. Zelaya won and brought the new elite a government more attuned to their needs. However, it also brought them a dictatorship that endured until 1909.
Costa Rica’s experience started from a similar base but had a very different outcome. From 1906 to 1948, the country was governed by an elite, the Olympians, who maintained a limited democracy that relied heavily on electoral fraud. When the last Olympian, the maverick Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, became president in 1940, he instituted a welfare state that had the support of both the Catholic Church and Costa Rica’s Communists (the Partido Vanguardia Popular). Yet Calderón kept manipulating elections and added harassment of the opposition to his political arsenal.