CDL Core Files Supplement 2015-2016

2015-2016

CDL Core Files Supplement

Researched by Hanna Nasser, Alix Dahl, Roman Motley, and David Song

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance

Core Files Supplement Table of Contents

Stingray Negative - 2NC/1NR Harms Extensions

2NC/1NR Extensions to Harms (Racial Profiling)

2NC/1NR Extensions to Harms (Democracy)

National Security Letters 1AC – Solvency

National Security Letters 1AC – Solvency

National Security Letters Affirmative – 2AC Solvency Extensions

National Security Letters Affirmative – 2AC Solvency Extensions

National Security Letters Negative – 2NC/1NR Extensions

2NC/1NR Extensions – Harms (Racism)

2NC/1NR Extensions – Harms (Privacy)

2NC/1NR Extensions – Solvency

Critical Surveillance Affirmative – Safety Disadvantage 2AC

Critical Surveillance Affirmative – Safety Disadvantage 2AC

Critical Surveillance Neg – 2NC/1NR Extensions

2NC/1NR On-Case Extensions

2NC/1NR On-Case Extensions

2NC/1NR Framework Extensions

2NC/1NR Overview

2NC/1NR Answers to: “We should learn about CPS surveillance”

2NC/1NR Answers to: “US Federal Government Role Playing Bad”

2NC/1NR Extensions – Safety Disadvantage

2NC/1NR Extensions – Safety Disadvantage

Hillary Disadvantage Updates

**Elections Disadvantage Negative (UPDATED)

1NC Hillary Good

**Uniqueness- Hillary Good

Uniqueness- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Bernie Sanders

2NC/1NR- Uniqueness Wall- Hillary Good

**Links- Hillary good

Link Wall- Drone Affirmative

Link Wall- Stingray Affirmative

Link Wall- Security Letters Affirmative

2NC/1NR Answers to: No Link – Surveillance Policy Not Key to Election

2NC/1NR Answer to: No Link – Election Too Far Off

2NC/1NR Answer to: Impact Turn – Iran Deal

**Impacts- Hillary Good

**Elections Disadvantage Affirmative (UPDATED)

**2AC Blocks

2AC Hillary Good- Link Turn Strategy

2AC Hillary Good – Impact Turn Strategy

**A2- Hillary Good- 1AR Extensions

1AR Hillary Good – Non-Unique: Hillary Loses Now (Bernie Sanders)

1AR Hillary Good – Non-Unique: Hillary Loses Now (General Election)

1AR Hillary Good – No Link – Surveillance doesn’t swing votes

1AR Hillary Good – Link Turn – Surveillance reform is popular

1AR Hillary Good – Impact Turn – Iran Deal Bad

Hillary Good – Impact Turn – Other Policies (2AC Options)

Feminist Kritik of Privacy – Negative

1NC Shell

Link-Stingray

Link-National Security Letters

Link – School Surveillance

Link – Drones

2NC/1NR – Answers to “Aff Outweighs, Kritik Can’t Solve”

2NC/1NR – Answers to “No Alternative”

2NC/1NR Root Cause

2NC/1NR Answers to: “Privacy Good Impact Turn”

2NC/1NR Answers to: Permutation

2NC/1NR Impact Extensions

Affirmative Answers to Feminist Privacy Kritik

2AC Answers to Feminist Privacy Kritik

1AR Extensions to Permutation

1AR Extensions to No Alternative

1AR Extensions to Privacy Good - Democracy

Stingray Negative - 2NC/1NR Harms Extensions

2NC/1NR Extensions to Harms (Racial Profiling)

Extend our 1NC Stone evidence – they can’t solve for racial profiling because scientific studies prove that racial profiling will continue to happen subconsciously by law enforcement. Group their responses.
First, they say that surveillance is racist and unjust, but it’s not a problem they can solve for with the plan because they can’t change underlying stereotypes.
Second, racist surveillance by the government and corporations is inevitable and has happened throughout our history – people of color don’t trust or want the privacy rights the affirmative talks about

Cyril ’15 Cyril, Malkia A.- Malkia Amala Cyril is founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities. April 15 2015 “Black America’s State of Surveillance” July 7, 2015

Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance.Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent. The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime.For targeted communities, there is little to no expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us.Instead, we’ve birthed a complex and coded culture—from jazz to spoken dialects—in order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart to public benefits programs and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood.

Third, extend our 1NC Houston Police Department evidence – this is a better source because it’s a police department itself admitting examples of the many ways it currently engages in racial discrimination against minorities unrelated to cell phones.

2NC/1NR Extensions to Harms (Democracy)

Extend our 1NC Zetter evidence – it’s the only evidence that actually describes the technology being used and cites an ACLU technology expert (someone who is an expert in civil liberties), who admits that Stingray devices let go of all data for innocent civilians in a targeted investigation. Group their responses.
First, there’s no risk of a wide loss of privacy if Stingray devices only affect one person at a time who are criminal suspects.
Second, National security is more important to democracy than personal privacy – it’s worth risking our rights to keep us safe

Debatewise No Date(“Privacy vs. Security: Yes Points” Online

The most important job of government is to “secure the general welfare” of its citizens. Security is a common good that is promised to all Americans, and it must outweigh any personal concerns about privacy. The word “privacy” is not found in the USConstitution so it cannot be claimed as a fundamental right.Surveillance is the secret watching of suspects’ private activities. In the past this usually involved following people, or going through their trash. These days it is mostly electronic, with the police and intelligence agencies listening into private phone conversations or reading emails (wiretapping). Surveillance can also involve looking at bank account details to see where money comes and goes. All these are vital tools for tracking the actions of terrorists when they are planning attacks. The government cannot stand by and wait until criminal acts are carried out: it must stop attacks before they happen.

Third, it’s impossible to make policy decisions about abstract principles like democracy - the judge should vote for the team whose policy saves the most amount of lives, this is the most ethical framework for the debate

Cummiskey 1990 David, Professor of Philosophy, Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance

National Security Letters 1AC – Solvency

National Security Letters 1AC – Solvency

Banning national security letters solves immediately – only federal action works

Weigant, 2014(Chris, Huffington Post contributor,

National security letters are nothing short of an abuse of power. Their use has exploded since 9/11, with the total issued now in the hundreds of thousands. National security letters, for those unaware of their definition, are search warrants issued by the executive branch with no signoff from the judicial branch. The F.B.I. can (and does) write out a letter demanding certain information (from an Internet Service Provider, for instance, or a phone company) be turned over to the government. No judge signs off on the order. They cannot be appealed. In fact, up until very recently, they could not even legally be talked about by the recipient. There was a "gag order" clause in the letter which stated that the letter's mere existence was a national secret which could not be disclosed to anyone, forever.

This, quite obviously, gives law enforcement officers absolute power over searching anything they felt like, in the sacred name of national security. With no legal recourse whatsoever. That is tyrannic power, folks. In fact, historically, it is no different than the abuses of King Louis XVI which led to the French Revolution. Back then, such orders were called lettres de cachet. But no matter what language you use, such non-judicial seizure orders issued on the sole say-so of the executive power are laughably unconstitutional today.

I'm not the only one to make this assertion, either. There have been a number of court cases where federal judges have banned national security letters from being issued, on the grounds that they are indeed blatant affronts to the United States Constitution (the First and Fourth Amendments in particular). The last such judgment was handed down last year, in fact. But somehow, no matter how many times the federal government loses such cases in court, national security letters never seem to quite go away. Just last week, the head of the F.B.I. was arguing against the recommendation that a judge sign off on such search warrants -- which would be a moot point unless the feds were still in the habit of issuing such orders, wouldn't it?

Obama's blue-ribbon commission is right. National security letters are nothing short of an abuse of executive power -- one that the Constitution specifically addresses. There's a reason why the Fourth Amendment exists, to put this another way, and a big part of that reason is to forever ban such abuses of power by the executive branch of the government. If the F.B.I. (or any other federal agency) feels it needs to search any records in any national security case, then they should have to present their case to a judge and get it signed off, just like any other court order. Having this check on executive power is a fundamental part of what this country was founded upon.

President Obama should say so, tomorrow. He should announce he is issuing an executive order (or rule change or whatever else is necessary) stating that national security letters will no longer be issued without the signature of a judge on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (who are cleared to handle such national security issues). Even simpler, Obama should just announce a ban on the use of national security letters altogether, and that in their place the F.B.I. and all other federal agencies will be issuing national security search warrants instead. No congressional action should be necessary to achieve this -- Obama should be able to change this with the stroke of a pen.

I've been calling for the end to national security letters for a long time now, beginning back when George W. Bush was in office. It's not a partisan issue, for me. I don't care who is in the Oval Office, such letters are a plain abuse of power and should not be allowed in the United States of America. President Obama was forced into creating a commission to study intelligence gathering. His commission recommended doing away with non-judicial national security letters. Federal judges have pointed out again and again just how blatantly unconstitutional such power is. So there should be nothing stopping Barack Obama -- a former constitutional professor himself -- from announcing tomorrow that national security letters will now all have to be approved by a judge before they can be issued. It is the right thing to do, and the time to make this change is indeed long overdue

National Security Letters Affirmative – 2AC Solvency Extensions

National Security Letters Affirmative – 2AC Solvency Extensions

They say that National Security Letters don’t pose a risk to privacy, but…
1. Their evidence is from the Heritage Foundation, a biased conservative source that has consistently supported civil liberties violations in the war on terror.
2. Extend our 1AC Weigant evidence – National Security letters give the government tyrannical power and only banning them solves, immediately.
3. Trying to reform National Security Letters doesn’t work. We need to ban them because the FBI can’t be trusted to comply with the law

American Bar Association Journal, 2012 (Sept, 1.

There are also demonstrated problems with how the FBI handles data it receives in response to an NSL. Rather than using NSLs as an investigative tool, as Congress clearly intended by only allowing them to be used when the information sought was relevant to an ongoing investigation, the FBI was using NSLs for mass data collection. The Inspector General found FBI agents often carelessly uploaded information produced in response to NSLs into FBI databases without reviewing it to evaluate its importance to the investigation or even to ensure the proper data was received. As a result,information received in error was improperly retained and illegally shared throughout the intelligence community.

The Inspector General detailed several incidents where the FBI collected private information regarding innocent people not relevant to any authorized investigation, entered it into FBI case files, and/or uploaded it into FBI databases—simply because the FBI agents requested records for the wrong telephone numbers or for the wrong time periods. In two other incidents, information for individuals not relevant to FBI investigations was uploaded into FBI databases, even though the FBI case agent had written on the face of the documents: “Individual account records not relevant to this matter. New subscriber not related to subject. Don’t upload.” Similarly, agents consistently failed to report or recognize when they received information from NSL recipients that was beyond the scope of the NSL request. Agents self-reported the overproduction of unauthorized information in only four of the 557 instances the Inspector General identified.