CAS 105 Reason and Political Imagination

CAS 105 Reason and Political Imagination

Fall 2006

Research Paper Final Draft

Paths and Problems: Russia’s Journey in Democratization

Russia’s history has often been characterized as one of strife, turmoil, and despair. In particular, its inability to keep up with the changing technologies and social liberties instituted by the Western world has hindered its power. The political scene has endured the most damage because of the nation’s shortcomings, with its institutions and legal system weakened by authoritarian rulers. Additionally, Russia lacks the will – and perhaps the ability – to defend civil liberties and human rights. This has led to an international belief that the country is inadequate and therefore vulnerable to the autocrats who have shaped Russia’s customs. Ironically, the nation is also considered Eastern Europe’s major representative, conducting diplomatic relations and serving as a Permanent Member of the United Nations’ Security Council. It would be a fallacy to claim Russia an unimportant facet of global politics; it is merely a fragile country, uncertain of its own wants and needs. Essentially, Russia is a political and cultural enigma. While maintaining a secure position internationally, the nation grapples to coincide its potential power with its stumbling attempts at democratization.

Political history in Russia is not singularly-focused but multifaceted in its nature. There are many factors that play into the causes and effects of the nation’s problems. Russia’s predicament can also be attributed to its economy, although no one provocation can be labeled as the major instigator against the democratization efforts. As most things are in Russia, it is the collusion of all haphazard and chaotic problems that culminate in an unstable and uncertain nation. Every issue appears to have a duality of sorts; although Russian rulers are prone to authoritarianism and perhaps even tyranny, the citizenry reinforces this view of rulers because of its own insufficient methods of governing. The will of the people is to be directed, and as a result the Russian people have floundered in this post-Soviet era of attempted democratization. The current political situation in Russia vacillates constantly – democratization makes a mark only to have it erased by a regression to the authoritarian style. The process has only started and yet it has been a struggle for both the government and those who are governed. Because of this, many have criticized and sympathized with the Russian dilemma, offering a plethora of answers to two major questions: “Why Russia?” and “What are the best methods of democratizing Russia?” Russia has stagnated because of its reliance on authoritarianism, which has therefore altered its receptiveness to democratization. As a result, the most efficient way of instituting democracy in Russia is to work up from the roots: Keeping in mind Russia’s history, many of the obstacles to democracy have existed for previous generations, reaching back until czarist times. Russia cannot be forced, especially since its history dictates that the country should be opposing the democratic effort instead of supporting it. The institution of civil liberties and a restructuring of the legislature are particularly efficient ways of gradually removing authoritarianism. What has essentially occurred in Russia is a power vacuum of sorts, but not in the traditional sense. Instead of complete anarchy and chaos, the nation remains in limbo in a pseudo-autocratic regime masquerading in the name of democracy.

Part of the problem exists in ideological lapses and weaknesses. Now that the Soviet Union has been disbanded, Russia no longer has the institutional infrastructure upon which it had previously relied. The executive is not a demagogue any longer and his prearranged goal is to work internationally to bring the country up to the global standard. At the same time, the president cannot depart from the former lens of executive powers and so maintains a fine line between authoritarianism and presidentialism. “Little distinguishes the rival parties from one another,” which only serves to confuse constituents on their options (BBC World News). With laws and regulations placed on candidates and politicians in the post-Soviet era, citizens are no longer sure where politicians stand – especially ones who have had experience with Soviet politics. Chaos has replaced what was essentially a corrupt yet stable regime; before, the Russian people could rely on its hardliners and injustices. With the injustices only partially eradicated, the confusion has expanded and the problems are exacerbated because political and legal transparency has been greatly diminished (Washington Post); the Council on Foreign Relations further reports that “the practices and institutions that have developed [over the past five years] have become far less open, far less transparent, far less pluralist, far less subject to the rule of law, and far less vulnerable to the criticism and counterbalancing of a vigorous opposition or independent media.” Perhaps the political actions were fraudulent and exploitative of the nation, but at the same time they were not masked. The system is rife with corruption, tainting its potential for democratization, and no one has developed a “strategy for economic recovery” (BBC World News). Torture is still used to castigate and to punish, but there is no need for either terror or oppression. Instead, Russia is relying on comfort – tactics tried and true that it believes will be more effective than those of industrialized democracies. Russia will need incentives to move away from the safety net of authoritarianism.

Critics have analyzed Russia’s state of democracy to the point where many have concluded that it has hardly reached democracy. Russia cannot be blamed for its undemocratic behaviors because it has never properly learned them. Culpability is often placed upon the nation’s current president, Vladimir Putin, particularly since his appointment of regional governors. While this may appear undemocratic, Christian Science Monitor believes this to be false; although elected governors existed prior to Russian democracy, they have been self-portrayed as feudalistic politicians with unethical and dishonest motives. These sorts of instances must be taken into account in order to properly evaluate the state of democracy. Russia has long been focused on the “unholy alliance”: power, money, and crime (Christian Science Monitor). The triumvirate has had an unwavering partnership, with politicians and money-mongers striving to gain power via money and crime. Democracy should first deal with ethical issues and power-hungriness before attempting to launch an entire plan for the country. Moreover, the absence of a suitable economic timetable and approach has caused a deficiency in the management of resources and people. Although this has been a historical problem for many nations, it is an immediate change that can go along with infrastructural change as well. This can only be rectified if Russia agrees to work cooperatively with the United States (and other Western democracies) and vice versa. The current situation has both players viewing the relationship rather cynically: a zero-sum game focused on parasitism (Washington Post). Perspectives like this exist only to further the gap between the nations, a gap that has subsisted for years, even centuries. Again, ideology comes into play. While the United States has been a paragon of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties, Russia has been built upon the aforementioned “unholy alliance.” History dictates Russia to be a guarded nation reliant on familiar tactics.

Theorists have discussed Russia at length, dwelling on the many barriers to democratization. According to Daniel Treisman of the University of California Los Angeles International Institute, a fear of the West’s manipulative behaviors can increase authoritarian political behavior, superseding the democratic cause. He also asserts that the appointment of regional governors is not a concern (affirmed by many Russian commentators) because it is commonplace as well in other “well-established and respected democracies,” including Belgium, Portugal, Finland; this also occurs in post-Soviet democracies like Poland and the CzechRepublic. This in and of itself is not an undemocratic issue and should no longer be labeled as such. Other matters, such as censorship, concern for human rights, and the dearth of civil liberties, are important issues. Putin has “effectively seized control of all national television networks,” an action that is typically considered erroneous response to criticism and culture (McFaul). In addition, while institutions of Russian democracy exist, their functioning has been hindered by politicians’ actions. With the assistance of other politicians and government officials, Putin has inhibited democratic capabilities. Russia has moved up the ranks in recent years to become “the third-deadliest place for journalists,” which emphasizes oppressive measures placed upon the right to freedom of speech (Beehner). He also has removed candidates from electoral ballots as well as having undermined independent political parties, both of which are two examples of undemocratic and illiberal behaviors. However, it goes without saying that perhaps there is mean and motive to these actions. It is quite possible in the Russian state that potential electoral candidates are criminals or threats to the nation. Additionally, political parties have relatively little to do with actual political participation. Putin supports an amendment to increase the representation threshold (referring to the parliament’s proportional party list) from 5% to 7%, which would make it harder for smaller parties to gain representation in parliament (Treisman). At the same time, many democratic nations do favor larger parties, thus it seems unfair to singularly mark Putin as undemocratic for the same.

Another factor that has great influence on democratization is the institution of checks and balances. Throughout his presidency, Putin has encouraged judicial dependence on the executive, therefore altering checks and balances in favor of him. Mikhail Tsypkin views this as an “early failure to establish a system of checks and balances,” one that has grown tremendously with concerns of terrorism and security. Distribution of powers is a component of democracy not easily disregarded, in particular presidential democracies like Russia (parliamentary systems such as that of Great Britain do not necessarily follow the same rules of checks and balances with the prime minister selected from the majority party leading the parliament). Legislatures are a key aspect of strong democracies, limiting the executive branch especially, and enforce democratic behaviors (Fish). They are established in order to accurately respond and represent the people’s will; the Russian constituency needs a dedicated legislature to assess what it cannot do on its own. The failure to establish a powerful legislature can result in “a polity where [the people’s] votes do not count (or are not counted properly) and their voices are not heard” (Fish). The stronger the legislature, the more likely civilian-controlled democracy is liked to prevail despite “inherited structural and historical disadvantages” (Fish). Inherently, effective legislatures lead to strong parties, covering the gap between the people and government officials. Democracies exist to represent the will of the people; as a result, some critics believe that legislative bodies best represent the needs and wants of the citizenry.

Because the democratization process is heavily reliant on the United States and its prowess under a democratic regime, it is only instinctual and natural to consider America’s foreign policy. For many expansionist-minded Russian politicians, a “third way” of reforms includes “movement toward a market economy, Western-style institutions, and closer integration with Europe as Russia’s only path to a prosperous future (Bjorkman). Foreign investment is Russia’s major hope for economic growth despite anti-American sentiment and concern for American motives. The United States supports and assists Russia in its post-Soviet endeavors, hoping to delegate and diminish the centralized powers of the executive and to establish democratic institutions. However, post-September 11th, America has withdrawn a great deal of its support, in part because Russia has not supported the United States’ invasion of Iraq. Such biases should not impede assistance, especially because they are focused more on partisan politics more than anything else. Instead of turning Russia away for its political shortcomings and unsuitable policies, America turns heel simply because the other nation does not agree with American political behaviors.

Policy directive for the problem concerning Russia involves a synthesis of institutional alterations, increased diplomatic relations, and gradual deconstruction of authoritarianism. While a strong executive emphasizes the centralization of power in Russia, the other two branches are hardly utilized. In fact, they are mere institutional creations that give the illusion of checks and balances. The legislature must be given greater powers as to increase institutional autonomy (Fish), and the judiciary should be reformed in order to establish rule of law, judicial review, and constitutional review – in action as well as in theory. Also, it is important to note that Russia is semipresidentialist, which means that it combines elements of both parliamentarism and presidentialism; however, in the reality of the Russian system, the legislature maintains a low profile on the periphery (Fish). Russia’s concentration on presidentialism makes the allusion to parliamentarism rather sudden and shocking, but it would be a worthy attempt to work more on parliamentarism for executive reform. It would allow the executive and the legislature to work parallel but would also set up some institutions specialized in parliamentarism such as votes of no confidence and question time which are popular in systems such as that of Great Britain. The shift from semipresidentialism to parliamentarism seems to be a more effective way to transition from authoritarianism to democracy without jarring both the populace and the government.

Furthermore, the United States must adapt to whatever changes Russia makes in order to better receive democracy. Although the government has been perhaps deleteriously involved in light of the War on Terror, America should not abandon what ventures it has first pursued. Diplomatic relations, while at times ineffective, will at least bring forth the concepts and obstacles that must first be dealt with before attempting grander alterations to the Russian regime. Increased diplomacy should not be targeted only at higher-level government officials or merely the president, but also at governors and regional authorities. Democracy is a message that ought to aim for people of all economic backgrounds and cultural experiences. Moreover, the United States should hope to integrate Russia with the West through European allies and entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That will both take the pressure and responsibility off of America and help to facilitate economic growth in Russia. Also, a historically-oppressed constituency such as Russia’s necessitates the formation of civil liberties. It would be a profound error to jump head first into such numerous reforms. Russia’s basic skeleton should be the starting point of any reform – it will take time (thus aiding the gradualness necessary for Russian democratic success) and it will also inherently institute some of the other recommend reforms. These will ideally include increased diplomacy and civil liberties. To start off the process, the people must also be willing to accept these sorts of changes to what they have known. In doing so, the power vacuum can be rectified with the establishment of a strong government spread amongst the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches.

Works Cited

Beehner, Lionel. “Russian Democracy Takes a Hit.” Council on Foreign Relations. 16 October 2006. 17 November 2006 <

Bjorkman, Tom. “Russian Democracy and American Foreign Policy.” Brookings Institution. 2001. 17 November 2006 <

Fish, M. Steven. "Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies." Journal of Democracy17.1 (2006): 5-20. Research Library. ProQuest. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY<

Goldgeier, James and Michael McFaul. “Russia’s No Democracy. So What?” Washington Post. 9 April 2006. 18 November 2006 <

McFaul, Michael. "Russia and the West: A Dangerous Drift." Current History104.684 (2005): 307-312. Research Library. ProQuest. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY<

Rumer, Eugene B. “What democracy can Putin destroy?” Christian Science Monitor. 29 September 2006. 18 November 2006 <

“The doubts over Russia’s democracy.” BBC World News. 3 December 1999. 17 November 2006 <

Treisman, Daniel. “Is Russia’s Experiment with Democracy Over?” UCLA International Institute. 29 October 2004. 17 November 2006 <

Tsypkin, Mikhail. "Russia’s Failure." Journal of Democracy17.3 (2006): 72-85. Research Library. ProQuest. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY <