“Canadian Government Views on next steps towards Nuclear Disarmament”
Discussant Remarks by Paul Meyer, CNANW Seminar, September 25, 2017, Ottawa
First let me express my thanks to Martin and Cory for participating in today’s seminar and providing official views on our topic. I particularly welcome the participation by DND as issues of arms control and disarmament are rightly an element of Canada’s international security policy and the military should be engaged in its development and implementation.
We are in a period in which issues relating to nuclear weapons are regaining saliency and with it the goal of nuclear disarmament that Canada has long upheld. Official text on GAC’s website declares that “Canada is resolved to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT”. This appears to be a lofty commitment, but what within a Government distinguishes a goal to which lip service is paid and one that is the subject of sustained action? The answer I suggest is the priority attached to its realization and the profile it enjoys. Nuclear Disarmament alas doesn’t seem to benefit from either. The nuclear disarmament text of the GAC website dates back to 2014 and hasn’t been updated since. Has nothing happened of interest in the last three years?
At a higher level, one might look to statements by the Foreign Minister for an indication of governmental interest. The June 6th,2017 statement in the House of Commons by Minister Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy priorities doesn’t have a single reference to disarmament of any kind – there are multiple references to NATO, NORAD and the utility of a robust military, but not apparently to diplomatic means of advancing our security goals.
Relying on the limited official statements available, Canada’s strategy for reaching the goal of nuclear weapon elimination is embodied in a “step-by-step” approach for which the conclusion of a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention constitutes the last step. In the near-term, the Government has enumerated three “more practical and realistic options” as its priorities namely NPT universalization, CTBT entry-into-force and negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Now, many would applaud if even zombie-like steps forward were being taken on these files. Regrettably however on most it would seem that matters are essentially stalled. I will comment on all three of these short-term goals identified by GAC, but in addition I want to address three other issues relevant to shaping our policies regarding nuclear weapons. These are NATO doctrine, the actions or inactions of the nuclear-armed states and the challenge posed to the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime by the adoption of the nuclear weapon prohibition treaty (NWPT).
First, NPT universalization. In principle, this would of course be a welcome development, having the four outlier states adhere to the treaty. What has the GOC done in recent years to promote this goal? Surely supporting an exemption for proliferator India from the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 and subsequently facilitating the sale of Canadian uranium to India has not increased incentives for that state to adhere to the NPT. Hasn’t this preferential treatment accorded India only fueled the resentment of Pakistan and contributed to that country’s opposition to the FMCT as well as to nuclear arms racing in South Asia?
Second, CTBT entry into force. Once again, a desirable aim, but some 21 years after its conclusion there are still eight hold-outs whose refusal to sign or ratify prevent the treaty’s official coming into force. What concretely has the GOC done to overcome this impasse? Can we learn of the démarches undertaken in Washington, Beijing, Jerusalem, Cairo and Delhi, to name a few relevant capitals, to press these states to cease blocking the entry into force of this key agreement to prohibit nuclear testing?
Third, initiation of FMCT negotiations. The negotiation of a treaty to cease the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been a long-standing aim of Canada and the international community in general. Canada has exercised leadership on this file in the past, including the development in 1995 by the late Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon of a mandate for FMCT negotiations, one of the few things the Conference on Disarmament was ever able to agree on. Diplomacy is always dynamic and timing is critical – what was agreed at one point can become unacceptable at another. To be effective however, one must keep an eye on the final goal and avoid actions that convey a semblance rather than the substance of progress.
Back in the House, after her June 6 statement the Minister responded to an opposition question about the nuclear weapons ban treaty, by arguing that Canada had achieved “tangible progress” by getting support for the first time at the UNGeneral Assembly on a resolution calling for a FMCT.
Not only was that claim factually wrong (there have been many Canadian-led resolutions adopted at UNGA over the last twenty years calling for a FMCT) it also misrepresented the significance of what in reality is a modest initiative to continue to study elements of an envisioned FMCT, a process that is far removed from having the status of an actual negotiation. The Canadian-led resolution in question established a Preparatory Group that is to consider and recommend elements of a FMCT. It is to undertake this work over the next two years on the basis of a small subset of UN member states, meeting behind closed doors and operating under a consensus rule that will require the agreement of all for any outcome report to emerge. It is hard to see how this group can provide any value added to the work of the previous Group of Governmental Experts on the same subject (and also led by Canada) which was only able to produce a consensus report in 2015 by allowing for the differing views of the representatives on the substance of an FMCT to be expressed.
And frankly these differing views are of a nature that render their reconciliation highly unlikely outside of an actual negotiation that exerts pressure on the participants to compromise. The issue of whether to include past production in the coverage of an FMCT is a prime example, with many arguing that not addressing stocks will only perpetuate a discriminatory asymmetry and advantage on the part of nuclear weapon possessing states going forward.
To make matters worse the Canadian resolution continues to assign the envisioned negotiation of a FMCT to the CD, a dysfunctional body of egregious proportions that hasn’t been able to agree on a program of work for 20 consecutive years, let alone start work on anything.
Whatever worth an FMCT could bring to global nuclear affairs, and its value is now overshadowed by the ban treaty, it will require an actual negotiation to bring it about. Anything less seems a wasteful exercise that provides only a semblance of disarmament activity with scant prospect of making “tangible progress” on this neglected file.
Fourth, let’s consider NATO doctrine and the espousal of nuclear deterrence with its implicit threat to use nuclear weapons under certain unspecified circumstances. It is important to keep in mind that NATO’s nuclear policy is just that, a policy subject to change by the membership at any time. You will look in vain for any reference to nuclear forces in the Washington Treaty creating the alliance. National positions regarding nuclear weapons are as varied as the Alliance members themselves. All three allied Nuclear Weapon States have distinct positions regarding the relationship of their nuclear forces to NATO and notably France does not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group. Among the NATO non-nuclear weapon states there has also been a pattern of distinct national positions, sometimes expressed as dissenting footnotes in Alliance statements or as individual decisions such as Canada’s rejection of a nuclear strike role for its forces in Europe, Norway and Iceland’s ban on nuclear weapons being deployed on their territory, or Greece’s opting out of the nuclear weapon basing arrangements. All of these changes in positions, not to mention the various unilateral moves of the three nuclear allies over the years, have not jeopardized continued membership in NATO by the states concerned. NATO is not a supra-national entity that robs states of their sovereignty.
NATO nuclear policy is also not immutable. It has undergone major alterations over the years. There was a time, when Canada proudly accepted the moniker of being “a nuclear nag” for pressing the Alliance to modernize its policies and devalue the role nuclear weapons play in security doctrine. NATO has pledged to help create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, perhaps Canada and like-minded members could ensure an Allied consideration of how this commitment is to be fulfilled and reflect this in the next iteration of NATO’s Strategic Concept.
Fifth, the elephant in the room it seems in GOC consideration of nuclear issues is the actions of the nuclear-armed states. It is all fine to rail against the provocative behavior of North Korea, but what of the irresponsible actions of nuclear weapon possessing states, including our three allies, all of whom are engaged in major modernization programs for their nuclear forces that belie disarmament affirmations?The refusal of the leading nuclear powers to undertake any de-alerting measures on their deployed strategic forces, or to overcome their differences and revive arms reduction negotiationsendangers global security. When was the last time the GOC took a stance against these threats through either quiet or public diplomacy?
Sixth, the existing nuclear order based on the NPT concluded almost half a century ago is under serious strain, in my view, and has been so for several years. The ban treaty did not come out of the blue. It represented the collective frustration of many non-nuclear weapon states of the failure of the existing NPT-centric regime to deliver on its purposes. The nuclear disarmament commitments, be they in the 2000 RevCon package of the “13 steps” or the 2010 RevCon’s package of 22 ‘action items’ have largely gone unheeded and unfulfilled. The multilateral disarmament machinery has been allowed to rust over and its state of dysfunction tolerated for far too long. One can compare the advent of the ban treaty to the Protestant reformation – the old rituals and indulgences presided over by the high priests of the Nuclear Weapon States have been rejected. The majority of NPT members have chosen a simpler, direct creed of nuclear weapon prohibition and an overt stigmatization of these immoral weapons and all their supporting infrastructure.
This puts the dissenting minority of NPT parties, comprised of the nuclear weapon states and those allies huddling under the figurative nuclear “umbrella”, in an awkward position. There is no longer a common approach to realizing the nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT. This schism will in my view, gradually result in defections from the NPT and an erosion of its authority unless remedial action is undertaken.
Canada finds itself in a difficult spot. To many it will seem to have sacrificed its nuclear disarmament vocation on the altar of a discredited nuclear deterrence doctrine. Simply reaffirming its belief in the value of the “step-by-step” approach will ring hollow as the roadway disintegrates underneath our feet. Arguably Canada should have played its hand more carefully and not simply have gone along with the crude boycott tactics employed against the ban negotiations at American behest. Joining this boycott constituted an undermining of multilateralism and deprived Canada of the opportunity to influence the course and outcome of these negotiations. Canada has participated in many multilateral negotiations the product of which it has decided not to sign on to and it would have been more fitting for Canada as a good multilateral citizen to have been engaged in a duly authorized UN process, rather than turn its back on it.
In the final analysis, Canada’s nuclear disarmament policy will be judged on its results. If it can actually contribute to the realization of long-standing objectives and help reduce the risks of nuclear weapon use it will be considered a success. Given the gravity of what is at stake, we will have to count on our politicians and officials alike to devise and implement policies and programs that truly advance our disarmament goals. In turn, we hope that the Government sustains a regular consultative dialogue with civil society on these serious subjects. Today’s panel is part of such a dialogue and I thank again our guest officials for participating in it.
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