Call Credits and Projects F.R.S.-Fnrs 2011 (Mis)

CALL CREDITS AND PROJECTS F.R.S.-FNRS 2011 (MIS)

Governing global science commons

Incentive Grant for Scientific Research(MIS)

CALL CREDITS AND PROJECTS F.R.S.-FNRS 2011 (MIS)

1)description of the project

2.1 Goals of the research

The rapid advances in technologies and digital networks over the past two decades have significantly altered and improved the ways that scientific information and research materials can be produced, disseminated, managed, and used on the global scale. As a result, research and innovation commons have emerged in almost all scholarly disciplines and knowledge contexts (Reichman and Uhlir 2003; Benkler 2006).

The hypothesis of this project is that building commons of scientific research materials and associated data has become feasible on the global scale in a cost effective manner through adopting a new hybrid approach to the governance of common resources that combines design principles from the digital information commons and the natural resource commons. This project will test this hypothesis in the specific field of the governance of life science research, by focusing on the networks of gene banks and associated genomic databases which have emerged as important global knowledge resources for science and innovation. For this purpose, this project will pursue two specific objectives:

(1)Conduct a comparative institutional assessment of the effectiveness of governance of national, regional and global networks of gene banks, in order to identify design principles for successful governance of networks of gene banks and associated genomic databases;

(2)Analyse and evaluate existing institutional solutions for building global scientific research commons in the life sciences, with the view to propose innovative governance arrangements.

2.2 State of the art

Much thought has recently been given to the positive role of commons in modern economies, in response to what had become conventional wisdom concerning a supposedly ineluctable “tragedy of the commons.” (Harding 1968). The seminal work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues focused on commons-based management of natural resources, as regulated by a clearly defined group of local users (Ostrom 1990). Empirically, the formal proprietary scheme underlying the administration of such resources varied in practice, from a purely private property regime to various forms of collective ownership, including direct state ownership (Ostrom et al. 2002; Platteau 2000). Ostrom’s work accordingly sought to establish the possibility of a sustainable intermediate economic alternative for managing shared resources, situated midway between market regulated exchanges of private entitlements and pure public goods that typically depend on state-based governance of resources.

In the past, it was however difficult to imagine commons-based management and production of goods on a global scale, due to such factors as the costs of exchange and lack of global institutional frameworks (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Arguably, the first major instance of formally managed commons on a transnational scale was the organization of modern scientific research during the seventeenth century in Europe (David 2008). In recent decades, however, digital networks have dramatically expanded the opportunities for building and sustaining different kinds of research commons on a global scale.

In the life sciences in particular, the genomics revolution and the development of new techniques for the handling and long-term maintenance of living biological samples (Cypess 2003; Colwell 2002) has led to a tremendous increase of initiatives for networking gene banks on the global scale (Parry 2004; Ten Kate and Laird 2002) and for digitally integrating the associated genomic databases. However, existing initiatives remain fragmented, incomplete, and limited in scope, with the risk that they may succumb to adverse economic and political pressures over time. Therefore, new governance institutions are needed for organizing the gene bank networks on the global scale (Cook-Deegan and Dedeurwaerdere 2006).

Above all, there is at present a critical lack of linkage between the gene banks on the one hand and the emerging digital infrastructure (Dawyndt, Dedeurwaerdere and Swings 2006). In effect, there remains a troublesome disconnect between the new governance models of the digital information commons and the traditional national organizational frameworks of the gene banks, despite a few remarkable exceptions on the research frontier. What the life sciences need, in our view, is a digitally integrated approach that links the materials and associated genomic databases held in the gene banks, within an appropriately designed legal, institutional, and governance framework. Such a framework should enable participating entities – whether in governmental institutions or at universities – to access materials globally and to mine data and information, empowered by automated knowledge tools operating within the widest possible research space.

2.3 Research project

Systematic research on generic design principles of governance of digital knowledge commons (Benkler 2006, Boyle 2008, Hess and Ostrom 2007, Lessig 2001) has identified a set of design principles of successful governance arrangements. First, this research has shown that, in mixed or complex incentive schemes such as those at stake in a global scientific research commons, participants are driven more by social motivations (especially reputational and reciprocity benefits) and intrinsic motivations (such as the science ethos or personal values related to biodiversity conservation) than by the prospect of direct monetary rewards alone.

The adoption of distributed organizational architectures is a second major institutional feature bearing on the success of commons-based knowledge production in digital networks (Benkler 2006, Lessig 2008). Distributed modular architectures enable many participants to effectively pool their efforts and contributions, notwithstanding the fact that these contributions may vary in quality, focus, timing, and geographical location (Benkler 2002). The latter is typically the case for the genetic-resource collections, where, due to the high costs of conserving the genetic-resources, no single centralized collection can hold all, or even an important subset, of the resources.

This project will explore to what extend these two institutional features of digital knowledge commons also apply to organizing networks of gene banks, always bearing in mind that genetic resource have both a tangible component (as high-quality biological organisms used for research and innovation) and an intangible component (the genetic information as the input to a flow of intangible scientific information). In particular, this project will evaluate if, and to what extent, the design principles of digital information commons have to be modified by introducing stronger boundary rules for quality management of research materials and data, and by organizing a greater implication of the scientific research communities in the governance of common research assets on the global scale.

2.4 Work plan (to be described for the whole duration of the project)

A schematic overview of the work plan is given below in graph 1.

WP1. Comparative institutional analysis of gene bank networks

Work package 1 will conduct a comparative institutional analysis of the effectiveness of globally distributed networks of gene banks of non-human genetic resources. More specifically it will focus on 3 categories of gene banks with sufficiently similar institutional features: microbial genetic resource collections, crop genetic resource collections and animal genetic resource collections.

The methodology of the work under WP1 will build upon the institutional analysis framework already successfully applied for comparative institutional analysis in the field of the natural resource commons (Ostrom 2005) and in our previous research on patterns of exchange in the specific subfield of the microbial collections (Dedeurwaerdere 2010). However, while this previous research on the microbial commons addressed the patterns and modalities of exchanges between individual collections, this project will address institutional integration at a higher level and focus on networks and consortia of gene bank collections and their governance features, and analyse the governance of these networks on the basis of the innovative theoretical hypothesis presented above.

To achieve this objective, the work under WP1 will first map the existing national, regional and global networks of gene banks. Then a comparative institutional analysis of the success and failures of the governance arrangements in these networks will be conducted, by focusing on three sets of core variables: the social norms (social and intrinsic motivations and reciprocity benefits), the organizational architectures (distributed versus vertical integration) and the rules in use (strong boundaries versus partial or total open access). Finally, based on the results of this analysis, design principles for successful governance will be identified.

Major networks of collections that will be part of the population to be surveyed are (because of their innovative nature in global networking):

• In the field of plant genetic resources: the regional networks of ex-situ crop gene-banks, the global crop based networks (Kalaugher and Visser 2002) and the network formed by the new Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centres (
• In the field of microbial genetic resources: the OECD pilot project on Global Biological Resource Network, the European Culture Collection organization and the Asian BRC network.
• In the field of animal genetic resources: the networks for rare breed conservation managed by animal breeding societies

WP2. Implications for the design of innovative governance arrangements

Work package 2 will analyse and evaluate existing institutional solutions for building global scientific research commons, with the view to propose innovative governance arrangements. A review of relevant legislation, both under international law, exemplary resource states, and of available model contracts will provide the basis for the work of WP 2. In a second step, an in depth analysis will be conducted of a set of new prototypes of governance frameworks for digitally integrated networks of collections, which build upon the strengths of the existing institutional infrastructures. Finally, in a third step, the governance prototypes will be evaluated in light of the design principles developed under WP1 and a set of innovative governance architectures proposed, taking into account the specificities of the various life science research communities that access and use genetic resources.

Three main governance options for building digitally integrated networks of collections will be considered under this work package. The first option is a full-fledged intergovernmental organization based on a binding international treaty, much like the existing arrangement under the FAO’s International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The second option, on the opposite, is a purely science-driven, nongovernmental organization, building upon such existing institutions as the World Federation for Culture Collections, the International Union of Microbial Sciences and the relevant scientific societies in microbiology. Finally the third option, in between these two extremes, is a framework agreement between willing governments that would contractually establish a common position, notwithstanding underlying differences of the various national laws. Examples of this third option that will be studied include the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) and, most recently, the International Human Microbiome Consortium (IHMC).

Cited References

• Benkler, Y. 2002.“Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm”.The Yale Law J 112(3).
• Benkler, Y. 2006. The Wealth of Networks. Yale UP.
• Boyle, J. 2008. The Public Domain. Yale UP.
• Colwell, R., 2002. “The future of microbial diversity research”. In J. Staley & A.-L. Reysenbach (Eds.).Biodiversity of Microbial Life. Wiley.
• Cook-Deegan, R., Dedeurwaerdere, T. 2006. “The Science Commons in Life Science Research:Structure, Function, and Value of Access to Genetic Diversity”. Int Soc Science J 188: 299-318.
• Cypess, R. H., 2003. Biological resource centres. ATCC,Manassas, Virginia.
• David, P.A. 2008. “The Historical Origins of 'Open Science': An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution”. Capitalism and Society 3(2), Art. 5.
• Dawyndt, P., Dedeurwaerdere T., Swings, J., 2006. “Exploring and exploiting microbiological commons: contributions of bioinformatics and intellectual property rights in sharing biological information. Introduction to the special issue on the microbiological commons”.Int Soc Science J 188(June): 249–258.
• Dedeurwaerdere, T. 2010."Global microbial commons: institutional challenges for the global exchange and distribution of microorganisms in the life sciences".Research in Microbiology 161(6): 414-421
• Hardin, G. 1968. “The tragedy of the commons”.Science 162(3859): 1243-1248.
• Hess, C., Ostrom, E. 2007. Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. MIT Press.
• Kalaugher, E., Visser, B. 2002. A summary and analysis of existing international plant genetic resources networks. CGRFA Background paper n. 16, 77pp.
• Keohane R.O., Ostrom, E. 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence. Sage.
• Lessig, L., 2001. The Future of Ideas. Random House.
• Lessig, L., 2008. Remix. The Penguin Press.
• Ostrom et al. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. National Academy Press.
• Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge UP
• Ostrom, 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
• Parry, B., 2004. Trading the Genome. Columbia UP.
• Platteau J.-Ph. 2000. Institutions, social norms and economic development. Routledge
• Reichman, J. H., and Uhlir, P. F. 2003. "A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment”.Law& Contemp. Probs. 66: 315.
• Ten Kate K., Laird S.A., 2002. The Commercial Use of Biodiversity. Earthscan.

Graph 1. Overview of the work plan

CALL CREDITS AND PROJECTS F.R.S.-FNRS 2011 (MIS)

2)arguments of the mis project

3.1Why is the project original and innovant?

The main originality of the project is to build a model that combines features of the new digital information commons (such as new modes of organization and the reliance on complex market and non-market incentives), with features of successful governance identified in the extensive research on the natural resource commons (such as the importance of clear boundary rules and monitoring). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that such a hybrid approach will be tested in a systematic manner.

By proposing this model, this project clearly goes beyond the research on open access and public domain knowledge generation within the digital information commons. Indeed, a pure public domain approach has proven insufficient for meeting the quality management requirements within the scientific research commons, both because problems of incoherent knowledge accumulation and unstructured contribution of materials and data to the commons. That’s why this project aims to tackle the challenge of promoting the widest possible access to and reuse of knowledge resources and research materials for science and innovation, while in the same time addressing the need forglobal institutions for monitoring the quality of the research materials and the associated genetic databases held in the gene bank networks, in particular through exploiting the new governance models from the emerging literature on the knowledge commons.

The key innovation of the project is to exploit the proposed hybrid approach in order to address the governance challenges of both the formal and the informal research networks in life science research. Indeed, most of the research on the exchange of biological resource between gene banks has focused on the formal exchange systems, which operate through material transfer agreements. However, much less attention has been given to the informal exchange systems between scientists and gene banks. The main novelty of the research resides in conducting a systematic analysis of the institutional rules and the incentive systems that govern both the formal and the informal networks (such as reputational benefits, rapid publication, low transaction costs, etc.). In particular, by better understanding both the formal and the informal system the aim of the project is to propose governance frameworks that contribute to putting the informal system on a solid legal and institutional basis, while addressing the potential governance failures and complying with new global regulatory constraints.

3.2How will the project lead to the creation of a new unit?

The present research group of the promoter at the host university is constituted by two legal PhD fellows. These fellows are mainly working on the international legal frameworks pertaining to biodiversity and intellectual property, which provides the necessary technical legal background for the envisioned project.On the other hand, the research by the promoter on the methodology of institutionalism in political science, and on theory of the commons and its application to the field of the microbial commons, was accomplished in a network of international collaborations. Two collective volumes (at MIT Press and Oxford University Press) and one authored volume with colleagues from Duke University Law School and the US National Academies (at Cambridge University Press) are the results of these collaborations. Further, in the context of these collaborations, the promoter has hired in the past post-doc research fellows in political science funded through research projects of the host laboratory (CPDR), for conducting research on reflexive governance.

Building upon these results, this project aims at taking a new step in the organization of the research group, by transforming thisgroup into a leading interdisciplinary research unitof excellence for research on the knowledge commons, constituted by researchers from political science, science and technology policy studies and legal scholars.

To achieve this purpose the new research unit will use this project to hire one post-doc fellow in political science with acquired expertise in the field of the commons and one post-doc in science and technology policy studies with acquired expertise in the globalgovernance of scientific research commons. These post-docs will collaborate closely with the existing legal PhD fellows, who are funded by the host university, and who will giveresearch support to the work on the large scale comparative institutional assessments and the literature review on the existing options for governance global science commons.

Synergies will also be built with other more focused thematic projects, introduced by the promoter, mainly the legal work package of the project MICRO B3 (FP7-OCEAN-2011, starting date 1st January 2012) and the proposal on global intellectual property strategies for genetic-resource commons introduced at the European Research Council (ERC Starting grant, results not yet known). These projects are of a more specificthematic nature and the aim of the MIS project is precisely to provide a broader umbrella framework to address cross-cutting questions on global governance which are common to these and other specific fields of research on global knowledge commons.