California Southern Law School

Fineman’s Criminal Law Outline

August through December 2005

Week One – 09/01/05 – Pages 1 – 119

Chapter 1 – Criminalization, Definition and Classification

Section 1. Nature and Purposes of the Criminal Law

Kansas v. Crane

151 L Ed. 2d 856 (2002)

Issue: Civil vs. criminal confinement and substantive due process requirements

In re Winship

26 L Ed. 2d 368 (1970)

Issue: Juveniles and proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement for guilt

Section 2. Moral and Constitutional Limits on the Criminal Sanction

(A) Legality

Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County

470 P. 2d 617 (1970)

Rule: A fetus must be viable and actually in the process of being born to qualify as a human being for homicide purposes.

City of Chicago v. Morales

144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999)

Issue: A penal law which is vague and allows it impossible for people to know when they are, or aren’t, breaking the law will be deemed unconstitutional.

(B) Conduct Versus Status

Robinson v. California

8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)

Issue: A person being continually guilty of “addiction” where or not they used drugs in the state and will be continually guilty of being an addict until they reform – yo-yo affect really.

(C) Liberty

(1)  Liberty Protected by the Specific Constitutional Provisions

RAV v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota

120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992)

Rule: A statute which regulate content on its face may be employed where it is necessary to serve the asserted compelling state interest.

First Amendment => Prohibits Congress from enacting any law respecting an establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging freedom of speech or the press, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to petition for a redress of grievances.

(2)  Unenumerated Rights

Lawrence v. Texas

156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003)

Rule: Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.

(D) Equity

United States v. Armstrong

134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996)

Issue: This is about the ordinary equal protection standards required, as opposed to a selective-prosecution claim.

(E) Proportionality

Ewing v. California

155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003)

Issue: Three strikes law and cruel and unusual punishment

Section 3. Classification

Gregg v. Georgia

428 U.S. 153 (1976)

Rule: The death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation/ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The death penalty may be imposed under a statute which provides specific safeguards to insure that defendants will not be sentenced to death capriciously and arbitrarily.

First degree murder => The willful killing of another person with deliberation and premeditation; first-degree murder also encompasses those situations in which a person is killed within the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, specified felonies.

United States v. Moreland

258 US 433 (1922)

Rule: In federal cases, a crime is properly classified as “infamous” for Fifth Amendment purposes whenever imprisonment at hard labor is within the scope of possible punishments for it.

Fifth Amendment => Provides that no person shall be compelled to serve as a witness against himself, or be subject to trial for the same offense twice, or be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

Farrakhan v. Washington

338 F. 3d 1009 (2003)

Issue: Felony disenfranchisement and the Voting Rights Act

Week Two – 09/08/05 – Pages 120 - 172

Chapter 2 – Offenses Against the Person

Section 1. Homicide

Patterson v. New York

53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977)

Rule: So long as the state must establish that the defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt it may constitutionally require him to bear the burden of proving insanity. - Defendant must prove his defenses.

Burden of proof => The duty of a party to introduce evidence to support a fact that is in dispute in an action.

Voluntary manslaughter => The killing of another person without premeditation, deliberation or malice aforethought, but committed while in the “heat of passion” or upon some adequate provocation, thereby reducing thee charge from murder to manslaughter.

Errington v. Others’ Case

168 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1838)

Rule: Where unlawful death is caused by recklessness rather than express malice, it is murder if malice aforethought may be implied by the intent to do serious bodily injury, but manslaughter if the intent is mere sport.

Malice => The intention to commit an unlawful act without justification or excuse.

Murder => Unlawful killing of another person either with deliberation and premeditation or by conduct demonstrating a reckless disregard for human life.

R. v. Vickers

2 All. E.R. 741 (1957)

Rule: Murder will be implied if the victim was killed by a voluntary act of the accused done with the intention either to killer to do some grievous bodily harm.

Constructive malice => The intention to commit an unlawful act as implied from the commission of wrongful actions.

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin

142 A. 213 (1923)

Rule: Where unlawful death is caused by recklessness rather than express malice, it is murder if malice aforethought may be implied by wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, or a mind regardless of social duty, but it is manslaughter if mere criminal negligence.

Recklessness => The conscious disregard of substantial and justifiable risk.

King v. State

505 So. 2d 403 (1987)

Rule: A murder conviction does not require the specific intent of killing any particular victim.

Specific intent => The intent to commit a specific unlawful act which is a required element for criminal liability for certain crimes.

State v. Hokenson

527 P. 2d 487 (1974)

Rule: Liability will be imposed under the felony-murder doctrine whenever the conduct causing the death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.

People v. Patterson

262 Cal. 3d 615 (1989)

Rule: Violation of a law prohibiting the selling of cocaine may lead to felony-murder liability if selling cocaine carries a high probability of resulting death.

State v. Mayle

357 S.E. 2d 219 (1987)

Rule: A person may be convicted of first-degree murder if a co-perpetrator of a felony commits a homicide.

People v. Hansen

36 Cal. App. 2d 609 (1994)

Rule: The offense of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony, and does not merge with a resulting homicide for purposes of the felony murder rule.

Second-degree murder => The unlawful killing of another person, without premeditation, and characterized by either an intent to kill or by a reckless disregard for human life.

Commonwealth v. Drum

58 Pa. 9 (1868)

Rule: First-degree murder is the willful, premeditated and deliberate, unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought express or implied.

Premeditation => The contemplation of undertaking an activity prior to action; any length of time is sufficient.

People v. Perez

831 P. 2d 1159 (1992)

Rule: Premeditation depends on the extent of the reflection and can occur during a brief period of time.

Collins v. Collins

127 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1994)

Rule: The law must allow every safeguard of due process guarantee in such heavy sentencing as the death penalty.

09/15/05 – Pages 172 - 226

Comber v. United States

584 A. 2d 26 (1990)

Rule: A misdemeanor will be dangerous under the circumstances if the manner of its commission entails a reasonably foreseeable risk of appreciable physical injury.

State v. Guebara

696 P 2d 381 (1985)

Rule: Innate peculiarities of a defendant may not be considered in deciding whether a basis for a manslaughter instruction exists.

People v. Chevalier

544 N.E. 2d 942 (1989)

Rule: To warrant voluntary manslaughter consideration, sufficient provocation and sudden and intense passion resulting from it must be shown.

People v. Troila

571 N. E. 2d 391 (1991)

Rule: Voluntary manslaughter is “a killing from a sudden transport of passion or heat of passion, upon a reasonable provocation and without malice, or upon sudden combat.”

People v. Borchers

325 P 2d 97 (1958)

Rule: Passion sufficient to establish reasonable provocation for manslaughter may be found to have built up through a series of events over a considerable period of time.

Adequate provocation => Provocation such that would cause an ordinary reasonable man to set aside his judgment; a defense to a claim of premeditation.

State v. Dunlap

715 P 2d 822 (1986)

Rule: A homicide may be manslaughter if done while the perpetrator is under the influence of an extreme disturbance for which there is a subjectively reasonable explanation.

Model Penal Code

Murray v. State

855 P 2d 350 (1993)

Rule: The difference between the minimally required mens rea of recklessness for manslaughter and criminal negligence for negligent homicide is whether the defendant was aware, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk the result would happen, or was unaware but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk the result would happen.

Mens rea => Criminal intent

Negligent homicide => The negligent killing of another person.

People v. Rodriguez

8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960)

Rule: The standard for criminal negligence is whether a person of ordinary prudence would foresee that the act would create a high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm.

State v. Bier

591 P 2d 1115 (1979)

Rule: A person is guilty of negligent homicide when his conduct constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person standard of care.

People v. Watkins

586 P 2d 43 (1978)

Rule: A person who kills in the good-faith, but unreasonable belief that his actions were justified cannot be punished for any greater charge than negligent homicide.

Self-defense => The right to protect an individual’s person, family or property against attempted injury by another.

Harris v. State

189 S.E. 680 (1937)

Rule: Malice is conclusively presumed where the actor voluntarily shoots at and kills the victim.

State v. Sety

590 P 2d 470 (1979)

Rule: Any circumstances of substantial mitigation is sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter.

People v. Ochoa

864 P 2d 103 (1993)

Rule: Gross negligence is an objective test and may be shown from all of the solvent circumstances, to determine if the defendants acted with a conscious disregard of the consequences rather than mere inadvertence of conduct.

Gross negligence => The intentional failure to perform a duty with reckless disregard of the consequences.

California Penal Code

Week Three – 09/22/05 – Pages 226 – 278

Section 2. Assault and Battery

State v. Jimerson

618 P 2d 1027 (1980)

Rule: An assault is an attempt with unlawful force to inflict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to carry out the attempt.

Criminal assault => The intentional placing of another in fear of immediate bodily injury; criminal assault does not require that the victim suffer apprehension so long as the defendant has an intent to injure and commits an act in furtherance of that intent.

United States v. Bell

505 F 2d 539 (1974)

Rule: There are two types of assault in criminal law: 1.) an attempt to commit a battery, and 2.) an act putting another in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Apprehension on the part of the victim is not an essential element of the first type of assault.

United States v. Jacobs

632 F 2d 695 (1980)

Rule: An assault has not been committed if the victim is placed in apprehension of harm after the bodily injury has been inflicted.

Apprehension => Fear; anticipation of harm or injury.

State v. Capwell

627 P 2d 905 (1981)

Rule: In Oregon, assault in 4th degree requires proof of suffering substantial pain or physical impairment.

People v. Santiago

2003 WL 21507176

Rule: Where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that a domestic abuser has procured his victim’s unavailability as a result of a pattern of longstanding abuse, the prosecution is allowed to present evidence of the victim’s prior out-of-court statements and grand jury testimony.

Commonwealth v. Matsos

657 N.E. 2d 467 (1995)

Rule: Crime of stalking closely approximates the Common Law definition of assault crime, and may be found where the defendant makes a threat placing another in imminent fear of death or bodily injury, or in reasonable apprehension that force may be used.

Section 3. Other Offenses Against the person

(A)  Abduction

(B)  Abortion

(C)  Rape

Commonwealth v. Mlinarich

542 A 2d 1335 (1988)

Rule: Rape is when a person engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse by forcible compulsion or by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.

Commonwealth v. Berkowitz

641 A 2d 1161 (1994)

Rule: 1.) when an individual does not threaten the complainant or restrict the complainant’s hands, and then has sexual intercourse with the complainant’s objections, there is insufficient forcible compulsion or the threat thereof to support a rape charge, and 2.) the purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a sexual assault trial from becoming an attack on the victim’s reputation for chastity, and 3.) where an alleged victim of indecent assault repeatedly says “No” to sexual intercourse, a jury may reasonably infer that the victim did not consent to the indecent contact, thereby supporting a charge of indecent assault.

California Penal Code

People v. Galvarino-Gonzalez

2003 WL 21214264

Rule: A cumulative effect of an accused’s persistent touching, false imprisonment, domination, and physical overpowering of an objecting mentally disabled victim constitutes force sufficient for conviction of forcible rape.

Week Four – 09/29/05 – Pages 278 – 333

People v. Iniguez

872 P 2d 1183 (1994)

Rule: Substantial evidence of fear can be resistance, as well as “frozen fright” in rape.

Jones v. State

589 N.E. 2d 241 (1992)

Rule: Where sexual intercourse is obtained by repeated requests, and no other menacing actions, there is no substantial evidence that sexual intercourse was had by force or imminent threat of force sufficient to support a rape charge.

Commonwealth v. Lopez

745 N.E. 2d 961 (2001)

Rule: A rape defendant’s honest and reasonable belief as to the victim’s consent cannot serve as a defense to the crime of rape.