THE MILITARY JUDICIALSYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK - FOLLOWUP REPORT

Information Sheet: Update May 1990

Intifada Fatalities...... 4

B'Tselem's Findings...... 6

The IDF's Response...... 8

Followup Investigation...... 12

Conclusions...... 15

Edited by Daphna Golan

English by Elliot Appel, Jessica Bonn, Isabel Kershner, and Lynn Schler

ISSN 0792-4003

B'Tselem would like to thank Caroline Borup-Jorgensen for editing the English Internet version of the report.

B'Tselem, the IsraeliInformationCenter for Human Rights in the OccupiedTerritories, was founded in February 1989 by a group of lawyers, intellectuals,journalists, and Members of Knesset.

The objective of B'Tselem is to document and to bring to the attention of policymakers and the general public, violations of human rights in the territories.

INTIFADA FATALITIES TOTALS

646 Palestinian residents of the territories have been killed byIsraeli security forces between the beginning of the Intifada andthe end of April 1990. Of these:

*Shooting deaths (including plastic and "rubber" bullets): 613

*Non-shooting deaths (beatings, burns and other): 33

*Children: 146

Aged 12 and younger: 42

Aged 13 to 16: 104

More than 77 additional people died a short time afterexposure to tear gas, of whom some 30 were infants. From amedical standpoint it is difficult to determine whether tear gaswas the sole and direct cause of death.

An additional 29 Palestinians have been killed, apparently byIsraeli civilians, and 6 apparently by collaborators.

During this period, 10 IDF soldiers and 9 Israeli civilianswere killed by Palestinians in the territories. 3 of them wereinfants.

According to the Associated Press, 209 Palestinians suspectedof collaborating with the Israeli authorities have been killed.

During this period, according to the IDF Spokesperson, 23Israeli civilians and 4 soldiers were killed within the Green Lineby Palestinian residents of the territories. At least 5Palestinian residents of the territories have been killed byIsraeli civilians.

B'Tselem's data are based on fieldwork, independentinvestigations, and official Israeli sources, as well as on thedata of Palestinian sources, especially human rights groups suchas PHRIC and al-Haq.

FATALITIES IN APRIL 1990 - ANALYSIS

In the month of April, 1990, according to B'Tselem's figures,9 Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli security forces. 3 ofthem were in the West Bank, and 6 in the Gaza Strip.

One additional Palestinian was killed falling from a roofwhile attempting to escape from security forces. Another wasapparently shot dead by a collaborator.

Of those Palestinians shot dead by security forces, 4, orapproximately half of the total fatalities were children. One ofthese children was 11 years old, and the other three were betweenages 13 and 16.

According to the Associated Press, 8 Palestinians suspectedof collaborating with the Israeli authorities were killed.

B'Tselem would like to emphasize that despite the decline inPalestinian fatalities in the occupied territories in recentmonths, dozens of Palestinian residents of the territories havebeen killed, many of them children, and hundreds injured. Thissituation is intolerable, and it is incumbent upon the authoritiesto do their utmost to remedy it.

FOLLOWUP REPORT

In November 1989 B'Tselem published a report on the militaryjudicial system in the West Bank. With the help of seven Israeliattorneys, we followed the judicial process over a period of eightmonths, from the moment of the West Bank residents' detentionright through to the ruling in the military courts. Sincepublication of the report, B'Tselem has continued monitoring thejudicial system and has visited courts in Ramallah, Nablus andHebron. In this Information Sheet we will review the primaryconclusions of the November 1989 report, as well as the changesobserved in the course of our visits to the courts. We will alsopresent the IDF Spokesperson's response to B'Tselem's report asreceived by our office in March 1990.

CONCLUSIONS OF B'TSELEM'S REPORT (NOVEMBER 1989)

The report based itself on the law in force in territories, asenacted by the military legislator, and examined whether thoseminimal rights guaranteed by military law are actually upheld.

Our conclusions found two failings in particular. The firstis the considerable injustice caused on a routine basis by anoverwhelming propensity towards inefficiency, indifference, andneglect, which degrade not only defendants and their attorneys,but also the judges, prosecutors, and soldiers working within thejudicial system. The second issue we raised was the existence ofmilitary procedures which violate the law.

In this atmosphere of neglect, commotion, and utter chaos,hundreds of people are sentenced to months and years in prison. The neglect and inefficiency are very evident - for example, alltrials are scheduled for the morning but nobody present knows inwhat order they are to take place. The attorneys at the Ramallahcourt had no room in which to wait or meet their clients, so their discussions were held inside the courtroom itself, givingthe place a marketplace atmosphere.

From observations carried out principally at the Ramallahmilitary court, it was apparent that a considerable proportion ofcases are delayed. This results either from defendants not beingbrought to court from their place of incarceration, or from theprosecution being unable to find the relevant files on thedefendants or to produce witnesses for the prosecution. In asituation where the vast majority of defendants are detainedthrough the end of proceedings, the repeated postponement ofhearings constitutes a violation of justice. It undermines aperson's basic right not to be punished by prolonged detentionuntil his guilt is firmly established through proper legalprocedings. The means of pre-trial punishment at the disposal ofthe prosecution place unwarranted pressure on defendants.

In these circumstances, the court changes from an arbiter ofguilt and innocence to a tribunal whose primary purpose is to fixthe date for terminating punishments of no predetermined length,served prior to any formal conviction.

We also identified a number of procedures which have becomeingrained in army practice and which contravene the law:

* The army's obligation to inform family members of the arrestand location of suspects is not fulfilled, even though thelaw stipulates that this is to be done. Nor are attorneys notified about the arrest or location of their clients, andlists giving details of detainees are not posted at thecivil administration offices as required by law.

*Prisoners are transferred from one prison facility to anotherwithout the transfer being documented and withoutnotification of their place of incarceration being passed totheir attorneys or their families.

*A prisoner's right to meet with his attorney at the time ofarrest is not infringed, since attorneys are not allowed intotemporary holding facilities.

*The principal that court hearings should be open to thepublic is not adhered to in the case of hearings on extentionof detention. A suspect's right to representation isviolated, since most extensions of detention take placewithout the presence of an attorney.

Moreover, we pointed out that the principle of judicialindependence is severely undermined by the fact that judges andprosecutors serve under the same military commander and depend onthe same authority for their advancement. Judicial independencewas an issue in several cases, particularly where relationsbetween judges on reserve duty and judges in the standing army areconcerned.

Our survey revealed that the judicial system operatesunjustly and at times in direct contravention of those samemilitary laws it is charged with upholding. The basic rightswhich the orders of the military commander accord to the residentsof the territories are also not upheld.

THE IDF'S RESPONSE

In the response, the IDF Spokesperson chose to deal exclusivelywith the conclusions drawn from our observations at Ramallahmilitary court. The response did not touch on the issues of armyregulations relating to detention, notification of families, orattorneys' visits to prisons. His detailed letter does not arguewith the conclusions of B'Tselem's report; rather it stresses thatthe instances of injustice and severe damage to the judicialapparatus stem from the grave problems the courts have faced sincethe beginning of the uprising. The IDF Spokesperson detailsmeasures taken by the army to cope with these difficulties, andimprovements made between November 1989, when the report waswritten, and now. The salient points of the response arereproduced below:

The courts' workload since the beginning of the uprising:

A.The main problem facing the military courts in the Judea andSamaria and Gaza Strip regions is the considerable increasein the number of indictments reaching the courts.

In 1987 some 1,300 indictments on disturbing the peace wereissued in courts in the Judea and Samaria and Gaza Stripregions.

B.In the two years between December 9, 1987 and December 1,1989, 13,089 indictments on disturbing the peace were issuedin the military courts (the total number of defendantsincluded in these indictments reached 17,851 persons!).

This is an increase of hundreds of percent during a period inwhich the number of hostile terrorist activity cases have byno means decreased, nor have cases defined as 'externalcases' (various criminal offenses, traffic offenses, customsand income tax evasion etc.).

Solutions

Opening new courts:

Because of the heavy workload described above, it was necessary tobuild new courts. Thus an additional court-room was added inRamallah, and two court-rooms and an independent facility wereadded in Jenin. A permanent legal facility has been opened inHebron, and three new court-rooms have been added to the twoexisting ones in Gaza.

The appointment of judges from the standing army to the courts:

A.Until the end of 1987, two standing judges served in theJudea and Samaria region, and a third one was stationed inthe court in the Gaza Strip region. A significant proportionof the judicial burden rested on the shoulders of reserveduty judges. Although the reservists did a perfectlyadequate job, it was preferable for judges from the standingarmy to fill the role. This was because of both theirgreater output and a desire to instill some stability intothe judicial apparatus and uniformity into sentencing.

B.Additional standing judges have gradually been appointed,some of whom were recruited from the reserve forces. Today,eight standing judges work in the military courts (six in theJudea and Samaria region and two in Gaza). This policy hasquickly proven effective in quickening the pace of hearingsand improving the quality of the judicial process.

C.In an effort to bolster standing judges, additional reservejudges have been appointed to facilitate various judicialprocedures, and to help deal with prosecution and policerequests to extend periods of detention of those suspected ofor charged with offenses.

Non-production of defendants at trials:

A.Defendants summoned by the military courts are scatteredamong 23 IDF and Prisons Service detention facilities. As aresult of the increase in the number of summonses andhearings, frequently the system fails to produce defendantsat the courts.

B.Clearly this phenomenon has severely interfered with thecarrying out of justice and the holding of trials within areasonable period of time. This problem derives mainly froma lack of central control over the summons system, such thatat times the appearance or non-appearance of a defendant wasa matter of pure luck. Note also that the non-appearance ofone or several defendants standing on a particular chargeprevented the trial from taking place.

C.Non-production of defendants at trials has been discussed inthe upper echelons of the military. The main focus was thatnon-production of defendants constitutes contempt of courtand seriously undermines the status of the institution.

Solutions

Production of defendants at trials:

A.There has been a real turn-around in this sphere as wellfollowing the establishment of a control center to deal withthis problem in Central Command, and the involvement ofSouthern Command. There has been a distinct improvement inthe number of defendants produced at trials. Furthermore,things have improved since detainees from the Judea andSamaria region are no longer held in the Ketziot detentionfacility until the end of proceedings against them.

B.In the month of January 1990 an average of 87% of alldefendants summoned to the military courts were present. Inthe Nablus and Hebron courts over 90% of defendants werepresent for their trials.

C.Of course the aim should be to produce every defendant incustody summoned for his trial, but it would be difficult toachieve a 100% success rate. In some cases it is notpossible to locate a defendant because of mistakes made inregistering his personal details. It is worth mentioning inthis connection that there is now an arrangement wherebycourt officers will personally visit prison installations toidentify detainees who may not have been summoned to courtfor a long time.

Non-appearance of witnesses at court

A.A substantial amount of evidence is required for any judicialprocedure, compelling the courts to summon witnesses for theprosecution to deliver evidence in court. The followingcategories of people are called as witnesses:

Regular or reserve soldiers who arrested people disturbingthe peace at the time of the offense or shortly thereafter;police and army investigators who collected testimony fromthe defendants or who participated in the investigation;incriminating witnesses involved in the same offense orstanding on other charges.

B.In the majority of cases the defendants summoned were sentback without the witnesses showing up in court. Whenwitnesses did appear, it often turned out that the defendanthad not been brought to court, so the witness was sent away.

C.Holding proper evidentiary trials demands a swift,fundamental solution to the problem of the non-appearance ofwitnesses. The solution outlined below comprises on the onehand of greater use of punitive measures against witnesseswho fail to present themselves at court, and on the otherhand taking steps to ensure a reasonably easy and safe wayfor witnesses to get to court.

Solutions

Witnesses getting to court:

A.For understandable reasons, prosecution witnesses are farfrom delighted at the prospect of coming to courts in theterritories in order to give evidence. Road travel is notsecure and the witnesses fear both for their personal safetyand for the loss of days from work. Here we are talkingmainly about the witnesses who have served in the field asregular or reserve soldiers.

B.In the past there were cases in which witnesses arrived butthe hearing did not take place for lack of a defendant, andthis factor has also contributed to the poor attendance ofwitnesses.

C.Since there is no way around the requirement to presentevidence, the appearance of witnesses is an absolutenecessity and there is no room for compromise on this matter.Therefore it was decided that reserve soldiers should besummoned by order at one day's notice by an officer of thecommand, in addition to the court administration issuing itsown summons.

D.To facilitate the orderly appearance of witnesses, rentedvehicles, a driver and a security guard have been assigned topick up witnesses from a meeting point and transport them tocourt. Thus it has been ensured that witnesses will reachthe courts safely and without fear. Furthermore, courtofficers have been delegated to contact witnesses bytelephone ascertain their appearance. In the worst cases,when witnesses have refused point-blank to attend court totestify, court orders have been brought against them.

E.The percentage of prosecution witnesses appearing in courthas grown significantly. In January 1990, for example, theaverage appearance at Gaza courts was 55%, whereas theaverage now is more than 60%; in Hebron, it is more than 76%.To a similar extent, there has been a distinct improvement inthe appearance of other categories of witnesses such aspolice, General Security Service (Shin Bet), and customspersonnel, among others.

F.Obviously, we must not be complacent where this matter isconcerned, and the courts' aim is to ensure full attendanceof every witness summoned. At the same time, however, takinginto account the special circumstances under which courts inthe territories have been operating during the uprising, wemay point with great satisfaction to the achievementsattained so far.

FINDINGS OF B'TSELEM'S FOLLOWUP REPORT (NOVEMBER 1989-APRIL 1990)

What has changed?

B'Tselem closely monitored the changes and improvements which havetaken place in the military courts on the West Bank, and observedtrials in Ramallah, Hebron, and Nablus. The conclusions of ourfollow-up deal chiefly with improvements and changes that havetaken place concerning the attendance of witnesses and defendantsin court. According to the IDF Spokesperson's statistics, 88.15%of defendants and 55.75% of witnesses appeared at regulartrials in January 1990. This is indeed a significant increasein the percentage of attendance at court since the publication ofB'Tselem's report in November 1989.

The improvement in the bringing of detainees in custody tocourt and the appearance of prosecution witnesses facilitates aspeedy end to the proceedings and shortens the period of pre-trialincarceration of the detainees. The judicial system manages to"get through" more files than it did before and therefore lightensthe heavy workload imposed upon it. The two chief ways the armyhas found to make the judicial system more efficient are openingadditional courts, and holding quick trials by means of the"expedited procedure."

A.Opening additional courts in Jenin and Hebron:

The opening of new courts has eased the pressure on thecourts at Ramallah and Nablus. However, while in Israel adefendant has the right to stand trial in his area ofresidence or in the place where the offense took place, inthe territories defendants are tried at the court closest tothe prison in which they are being detained. So defendantswho are detained in Megiddo prison will be tried in Jenin andthose detained at Hebron prison will be tried at the Hebroncourt.

Security considerations determine the placement ofdetainees in the different prison installations, and notplace of residence. As Colonel Shoham, who is responsiblefor the West Bank courts, testified, the opening of newcourts was designed to facilitate the army's transportationarrangements and to shorten the distance from prison tocourt.

The new system was introduced without any considerationfor the families of the detainees or their attorneys, who areforced to travel to courts far away. In the long term thenew system could turn out to be awkward for the army too, asthe army often transfers prisoners from one prison toanother.

B.Expedited trials:

Expedited trials were also introduced to help shorten thejudicial process, to shorten the period of detention untilthe completion of proceedings, and to bring the defendants totrial while the prosecution witnesses (usually reservesoldiers) are still at hand.