Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific

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REMARKS

Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific:

The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power

Michael D. Swaine

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

GWUCommunitarianism Conference

October 5, 2015

Want to do two things in my remarks---based on a recent essay appearing in the journal Foreign Affairs (with the full version on the Carnegie website):

1)First, briefly outline the dimensions of the long-term strategic problem facing the Asia-Pacific region.

2)Second, provide a general description of the type of new security environment that represents in my view the best means of dealing with this strategic problem.

--BTW, I am writing a second essay on a possible roadmap for creating that environment, which centers on a real (and stable) balance of power

3)Third, in the process, identify the challenges / problems confronting my analysis and recommendations.

--In that regard, I claim no unique insight or unassailable correctness for my argument. I realize that it presents a path forward that will be extremely difficult to follow, for both the U.S. and China.

--But I believe the alternatives are likely to prove worse.

My intention in presenting this analysis is to hopefully provide support for a deeper discussion, in both capitals, of the worsening problem.

Overview:

The argument consists of ten basic points:

First, Beijing and Washington hold fundamentally different notions about the best means of preserving stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific over the long term:

-The US favors continued American maritime predominance and overall U.S. leadership. This includes the clear capacity to prevail in any potential conflict with China on issues that count, up to China’s 12 nm territorial limits.

-Beijing favors something approaching a more genuine balance of power in which China enjoys a more secure region along its maritime periphery and is able to reject or resist any efforts to threaten its vital interests.

Second, These different perspectives largely did not matter until China began to acquire the interests and outlook of a maritime power in the Western Pacific, and the capability to protect those interests.

-The result is that, for China to achieve its aims in this vital region, America must limit its own aims and capacities. At the same time, China must also avoid attempting become the next dominant power in maritime Asia.

Third, an apparently growing number of analysts in both nations increasingly argue for more directly assertive military and political efforts to counter the perceived intention of the other side to either 1) displace America as the regional maritime hegemon (in the US view); or 2) limit China’s emergence as a major or dominant power in the Western Pacific and perhaps beyond (in the Chinese view).

-This results in increasing calls for the U.S. to double down in defense spending and deployments and foreign policy initiatives, to stay well ahead of China, or for China to largely drop its supposedly accommodative stance toward the U.S. and become far more assertive in protecting and advancing its interests in the W. Pacific.

-Although these views do not yet drive / dominate national policies, their influence is increasing.

Fourth, those who call for continued unambiguous American predominance or a far more assertive China often base their arguments of the necessity for such action on faulty theoretical and historical factors or a misreading of current evidence.

-Rising powers are not destined to seek hard-power dominance at all costs; and China is not historically predisposed to dominate the Asia-Pacific; the historical record provides a much more nuanced and mixed set of potential lessons in these areas

-No hard and convincing evidence exists to support the notion that China at present holds a strategy for regional dominance

-Washington’s Asia policy is not driven by a perceived need to undermine the PRC regime and keep China weak and hapless.

Fifth, looking forward, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the Western Pacific forms the only basis for long-term regional stability and prosperity is a dangerous and increasingly obsolete concept, for several reasons

-As long as China continues to grow and develop overseas interests, it will increasingly resist U.S. efforts to sustain predominance, viewing it as a direct threat to its own security.

-It is far from clear that U.S. military predominance within the first and second island chains can be sustained on a consistent basis over the long term, just as it is virtually impossible that China could establish its own predominance in that area. Changing relative economic capabilities, military capital stocks, and advances in military technologies all call this into question

-Several recent studies have strongly suggested the difficulty of maintaining U.S. predominance: two Carnegie studies and a more recent RAND study that looks in great detail into several plausible conflict contingencies

Sixth, while a Chinese economic collapse would make moot the above analysis, such a collapse is unlikely, and delaying any policy adjustments to the current shifting power distribution in Asia in anticipation of such a collapse will only make it more difficult to make effective adjustments in the future, given both the long lead times required to make adjustments, and the fact that mutual suspicions will likely have deepened by then, thus preventing the mutual accommodation necessary.

Seventh, given the above, the best optimal outcome for both nations is the development of a stable balance of power in the W. Pacific in which the most vital interests of both sides are protected and neither side enjoys the clear capacity to dominate the other militarily within at least the first island chain.

-Such a balance will require both greater CBMs and mutual assurances and restraints, as well as efforts to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources of future U.S.-China crises in the W. Pacific: including on the Korean Peninsula, and regarding Taiwan, military ISR and other activities, and maritime territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS;

-Need to reduce the propensity to “test resolve” or overreact to challenges that can accompany balance of power environments

-This would amount to the creation of a de facto buffer zonealong China’s maritime periphery, involving its neutralization as a location from which to project either U.S. or Chinese power

Eighth, to work over time, such a buffer zone will likely require: a) a unified, nonaligned (or only loosely aligned) and hence largely neutralized Koran Peninsula; b) a demilitarized Taiwan Strait environment; c) a more stable and predictable set of understandings regarding the ECS and SCS maritime territorial situation; d) a mutual denial” military operational concept within at least the first (and possibly the second) island chain (i.e., about 500-1500 nm from China’s coastline); and e) more credible policies and assurances in support of a mutual deterrence nuclear force posture;

-While doubtless very difficult to achieve, such changes would be possible if viewed as the price that both sides would need to pay to avert an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable security competition that neither side can win;

Ninth, many obstacles lies in the way of achieving a stable balance of power, including:

• A U.S refusal or inability to seriously contemplate an alternative to predominance, for historical, bureaucratic and conceptual reasons

• U.S. decision makers resist any real change in the security environment and policies involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime territorial disputes, fearing destabilizing allied reactions (ranging from remilitarization and nuclearization to movement toward China), and generally uncertain outcomes

• Also, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan reinforce these fears by arguing against such changes, in part to maintain American

• The PRC regime is both excessively vulnerable to ultra-nationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limits on its sovereign rights and its rising political, economic and military abilities, especially in Asia; less willing to accept mutual restraints

Tenth, the above problems suggest that no Grand Bargain is likely to cover all these issues; understandings can only occur gradually, in stages, over a long period;

-The first step is for Washington, Beijing, and other major Asian powers to accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than marginal adjustments and limited CBMs

-This recognition involves not only an acceptance of current and future power trends but also an acknowledgement of the likely fact that “muddling through” and efforts to sustain or create U.S. or Chinese predominance respectively will produce more problems than transitioning to a balance of power

-But even under the best of conditions, this type of major adjustment will require courageous and far-sighted leadership, some risk taking, and a sustained level of highly effective diplomacy.

Issues and Problems: fall into two general areas

First: Intentions and capabilities:

-Is the U.S. as committed to maintaining dominance and China as content to avoid such dominance, as indicated? I think the evidence is pretty clear, but others might disagree.

-Will the U.S. genuinely face such restraints on its ability to stay sufficiently ahead of China in the first and second island chains to justify contemplation of a transition to a stable balance of power? Involves assessments of relative economic, military, and technological growth trends: a very hard and non-scientific endeavor

-Will China continue to grow, and its domestic situation remain sufficiently stable, at levels that permit a continued expansion of its offshore military capabilities? Carnegie studies concluded that it will, but others no doubt disagree.

Second: the willingness to accept the need for significant policy change in critical areas

-For the US: it is hard to begin adjustments to a relative loss of predominance in advance of any unambiguous indication of such loss; the view: “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it” prevails;

-ALSO, belief that any adjustments will send signals of weakness and loss of resolve that will rattle allies and embolden China; uncertainty is a major factor

-No easy answer to this concern; requires very clear and convincing assessments of trajectories of changing relative power, PLUS effective diplomacy with friends and allies, PLUS a convincing ability to resist Chinese efforts to “take advantage”

-For China: it is very difficult to both a) reject a possible future drive for a sustained advantage regarding Korea, Taiwan, or other vital issues AND b) to place strong limits on internal ultra-nationalist forces by reducing the regime’s reliance on and manipulation of such forces

-This will require a more confident (especially domestically) and less risk averse Chinese leadership that is able to redefine the role of nationalism in the regime’s legitimacy and continues to see the dangers, even for a much stronger China, of attempting to take advantage of the changing balance.

No easy task. But the most important challenge is for both sides, and others states, to accept that the consequences of attempting to preserve the SQ power distribution or muddle through to some unknown future will ultimately prove even more dangerous and risky.