BERA 2001 Uncertainty, higher education and the precautionary principle
Uncertainty in higher education: what happens when we apply the precautionary principle to academia?
Dominic Wood
Paper presented at the British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, University of Leeds, 13-15 September 2001
Correspondence to Dominic Wood, Canterbury Christ Church University College, Canterbury CT1 1QU
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Abstract
The paper reports on work almost completed as part of a chapter in a PhD thesis exploring the contradictory tensions between environmental imperatives and liberal educational principles within a higher education setting. It is a philosophical inquiry into the way in which knowledge has become problematic from an environmental perspective and the implications that this has for higher education. The paper approaches this matter by referring to the concept of the precautionary principle, which argues for a shifting of the ‘burden of proof’ in science and is given an educational expression in the view that sees uncertainty as a positive feature of academic life. The paper examines different interpretations of uncertainty and, in particular, contrasts the celebration of uncertainty as a means of coping with the problematic nature of knowledge with Socrates’ argument that we should see uncertainty as an expression of our ‘intellectual invalidity’, which we must strive to overcome. The paper suggests that uncertainty should represent the boundary between what we know and don’t know, rather than being a characteristic of all knowledge.
Key words: higher education; uncertainty; precautionary principle
Introduction
This paper considers the influence that green thought has upon the idea of higher education, focusing in particular on how the logic of the precautionary principle informs academic concerns with intellectual uncertainty. On the one hand the precautionary principle is understood here as a conservative approach towards establishing the extent to which we make knowledge claims. That is to say that we remain uncertain about what we consider to be knowledge for longer and demand greater evidence before we say that we are certain about anything. On the other hand, the precautionary principle is understood to be a barrier to advancing knowledge in the sense that certainty is demanded as a precondition for action. With the former understanding experimentation is required to gather more evidence and increase our certainty, however, with the latter interpretation, experimentation is curtailed since the consequences of such activities are unknown. Here the precautionary principle is used analogously to highlight the difference between embracing uncertainty as an organising principle within higher education, as opposed to treating it as a hurdle that must be continually confronted in order for knowledge to be progressed. Finally, a case is made for higher education to be a place in which certainty and uncertainty alike should be critically challenged.
The precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle has been developed as a way of dealing with the kinds of risks and uncertainties that have emerged from scientific discoveries about environmental issues. The principle originated in West Germany in 1976 as the ‘Vorsorgeprinzip’ (see Boehmer-Christiansen 1994), however, it was not until the late 1980s that the precautionary principle was adopted more widely. A number of policy initiatives have helped to establish the precautionary principle as a key aspect of environmental policy in the UK, Europe and internationally.
O’Riordan and Cameron (1994 p.17) identify six characteristic notions that are applied through the precautionary principle:
1) that natural processes should be granted intrinsic rights;
2) that precaution should be applied most by those who have the greatest ability to do so, i.e. “those who have created a large ecological burden already”;
3) the assumption that prevention is better than cure and, that it is better to take preventative action “in advance of scientific proof” than it is to clear up the mess at a later stage;
4) the ability of natural systems to self-reproduce needs to be recognised and protected;
5) a concern “that the selected degree of restraint is not unduly costly”; and,
6) that there should be a ‘duty of care’, amounting to a shift in the ‘burden of proof’ upon “those who propose change”.
There are two key arguments that underpin these characteristic notions identified by O’Riordan and Cameron outlined above. Firstly, there is an emphasis upon future concerns and, a consideration of the impact that human activities will have for generations to come. Beck (1992) argues that a significant feature of dealing with risks is that we are attempting to make predictions about the future and it is this that dominates our thinking, not our knowledge of what has happened before. He says “The center of risk consciousness lies not in the present, but in the future” and that consequently “the past loses the power to determine the present”. He continues by arguing that our actions in the present are dominated by the desire to “take precautions against the problems and crises of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow” (Beck 1992 p.34).
A second argument underpinning the precautionary principle comes from the focus upon the irreversibility of many detrimental changes in the environment that occur as a result of human activity in the present. This is emphasised as being sufficient reason to adopt a cautious approach with regards environmental change. In this respect, scientific uncertainty about the effects that an action will have upon the environment is weighed against the potentiality of an irreversible environmental loss to favour precaution.
On the one hand the precautionary principle amounts to little more than the adoption of a conservative and common sense approach to environmental maters (Warren 1993). Wynne (1994) suggests that this is the case as far as the underlying assumptions informing the UK Government’s adoption of the precautionary principle are concerned. He argues that the primacy of scientific evidence in determining policy is not challenged, rather a decision is suspended until enough scientific evidence has been gathered. There is no suggestion that this might not occur and in this sense, “scientific uncertainty” is treated as “a temporary matter of imprecision which will be eradicated when enough research has been devoted to the questions” (Wynne 1994 p.180). It is in relation to this assumption that Wynne (1994) refers to the UK Government understanding of the precautionary principle in terms of the ‘regulatory threshold’ for making decisions about environmental matters being shifted against the potential polluter.
Other interpretations of the principle argue that it should be used to prohibit any form of environmental change without prior and conclusive proof that this will not cause irreparable damage. This interpretation was illustrated, for example, by Greenpeace’s intervention in the disposal of the Brent Spar oilrig. Greenpeace engaged in open, public, scientific debate about the merits of dumping, or not dumping the oilrig in the North Sea up until the point where the scientific argument seemed to support the view that the oilrig should be dumped. At this point, Greenpeace adopted a difference stance, rejecting the weight of scientific evidence and justifying their position against the dumping on moral grounds, invoking the precautionary principle in their defence.
Huxman and Sumner (1999) conducted interviews with members of Greenpeace on this matter, noting that although interviewees generally justified Greenpeace’s stance, one interviewee admitted that doing so was not so simple. The problem with using the precautionary principle in this case was that taken as an isolated incident, the disposal of the Brent Spar should not have been too contentious. However, Greenpeace invoked the precautionary principle by appealing to the precedence set by its disposal (Huxman & Sumner 1999). The important point here is that this approach signifies a departure from understanding the precautionary principle as a cautious approach to scientific decision making about environmental matters. By using the Brent Spar as a ‘precedent and symbol’, Greenpeace’s approach is founded less upon what we know scientifically speaking to be true about the world. It represents, instead, a belief or moral statement about the way the world should be, irrespective of how it is and, it is in this sense that the Brent Spar incident can be portrayed as “a potent symbol of a clash between competing world views” (Huxman & Sumner 1999 p.350).
Greenpeace’s approach to the precautionary principle here expresses a willingness to use an intuitive caution in place of the riskiness of science. This is expressed by O’Riordan and Jordan (1995 p.1) in the way that they support the precautionary principle because it “provides an intuitively simple guide to humans on how to intervene in environmental systems in a manner that is less damaging". They argue that in understanding the precautionary principle as an intuitive guide, it is important to recognise that this involves more than the introduction of caution and care into conventional scientific methods. They stress this point saying “Even by playing safe, the scientific approach may, quite unintentionally, create a sense of false security over the freedom we have to play with the Earth” (O’Riordan & Jordan 1995 p.1).
There is a case to be made for utilising the precautionary principle in relation to environmental issues. It makes sense to adopt a cautious approach, however, without undermining science in the way that Greenpeace’s approach to the precautionary principle does. Porritt’s (2000 p.63) identification of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as “a model for handling other global environmental impacts” is probably a fair one. He notes “the impeccable credentials of the IPCC process” (p.72) and argues that this, more than pressure from environmental protestors, has led multinational companies such as BP Amoco and Shell “to accept the ‘best-bet’, precautionary approach of the IPCC” (p.73).
However, Porritt (2000) goes on to refer to “the pursuit of truth” as being “an academic self-indulgence” (p.71) and, argues that “the notion of value-free science” is “naïve” (p.72). Whilst these views are perhaps apt within the context of policymaking however, in terms of how the relationship between environmental concerns and science should be considered within a higher education context we need to take a different stance. The precautionary principle may be appropriate in the context of environmental policy, however, within higher education there needs to be a more critical stance taken.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is also considered here as it is used in two ways. The first understanding of uncertainty is that it is an inherent quality of all knowledge, as opposed to a second understanding in which uncertainty expresses the gap between reality and our perception of it. The difference between these understandings relates to the question of whether uncertainty is understood in terms of what we can know, or what we do know. Whilst both interpretations of uncertainty agree that reality is unknowable, the latter assumes that we can increase certainty, whereas as the former doesn’t.
This distinction can be illustrated with reference to Stone’s (1995) embracing of uncertainty as a positive expression of academic ‘tentativeness’ and ‘humility’. In this sense her uncertainty sounds very similar to basic scientific propositions of the provisional and tentative character of scientific inquiry. Likewise, Stone’s (1995) use of the term ‘humility’ could be mistaken for the approach adopted by Socrates’ emphasis upon the need to be humble when dealing with knowledge and, in this sense to approach ‘certainty’ with caution. Socrates suggests that the antidote to becoming misologic is to “recognize that we ourselves are still intellectual invalids” (Plato 1993 p.152). From this perspective, it is fine to be critical and to challenge what we think we know because we recognise that knowledge is difficult and we should therefore expect to be wrong more often than not. For Socrates, however, this does not mean that we turn uncertainty into a certainty and abandon the project of developing knowledge altogether.
It is important to stress here that the uncertainty referred to by Stone (1995) amounts to much more than an expression of a healthy form of scepticism, demanding that we provide evidence and argumentation to justify our knowledge claims, found within the nature of scientific inquiry. Siegel (1995) correctly notes, that Stone confuses certainty with knowledge and, in this sense, is presenting a critique that has long been recognised and accommodated within philosophy of science; the view that knowledge is, from a scientific perspective, always tentative and provisional.
Stone (1995) is, however, making a different point from that made from a scientific perspective, which defines ‘tentative’ and ‘provisional’ in opposition to dogma and prejudice, maintaining the notion that a scientific argument is always open and contestable. From this perspective, the notion of uncertainty is used as a means of ensuring that we remain open to the possibility that we might be wrong, even when we are as certain as we can be as to the truthfulness of a knowledge statement. In other words, such uncertainty does not equate to doubt in the sense that we are not sure, but to the fact that we are always willing to listen to alternative propositions and to review new evidence. This is in contrast to Stone’s (1995) use of the term ‘uncertainty’, which becomes an enduring feature of our intellectual capacity to know anything: everything becomes uncertain and unknowable. In this sense there is no question of degree; we cannot be more or less certain about a fact, each statement of fact is as uncertain as the next. On the other hand, the terms ‘tentative’ and ‘provisional’ are used to describe the logic of science where there is explicit reference to a logical framework through which levels of certainty increase according to the number of observations and experiments that fail to disprove an original statement of fact.
Stone’s (1995) uncertainty ceases to represent the boundary between what we know and what we do not know, and it becomes instead a feature of both. As to our ability to know anything, Stone (1995) turns our doubts from being an expression of intellectual invalidity in the way Socrates expresses it, into a positive attribute of human frailty. In this sense, one would assume that whilst she would agree with Socrates in recognising that we are ‘intellectually invalid’, she would not agree with him that, therefore, “we must brace ourselves and do our best to become healthy” (Plato 1993 p.152). From Stone’s (1995) use of ‘uncertainty’, we can assume that being an ‘intellectual invalid’ is a healthy state to be in already.