Basics of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

Background and concept

Civil-military coordination is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.

Engaging military support in humanitarian action is not a new endeavour. In today’s security environment, however, it seems that the military are ever more involved in the ”direct” provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where they have no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a last resort, for safety and access to populations in need. This may lead to the serious risk of compromising UNICEF’s actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the trends toward integrated UN presences in conflict settings, as well as the greater propensity of some governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid in counter- insurgency warfare, the situation calls for enhanced understanding between military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

The nature of civil-military coordination differs whether it occurs in the context of natural disasters or conflict. In reality, the lines are not so clear, especially given that the natural disasters to which UNICEF responds often occur in contexts of chronic fragility and/or conflict. Where a state exists with capabilities to fulfil its obligations as a duty bearer to affected populations, its military often plays a key role in delivering relief. In such contexts, humanitarian agencies will have to work closely with armed forces, and will often be highly dependent on the use of the military’s logistical resources. However, when responding to either a natural disaster taking place amidst a complex emergency and/or in contexts of armed conflict, humanitarian action must be delivered in a manner that clearly distinguishes it from armed forces. Central questions for policy makers and programmes are:

  • How can a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants be maintained and humanitarian operating space be preserved?
  • How can humanitarianism be shielded from being abused as a justification for military action?
  • What information should/should not be shared between the military and the humanitarians?
  • How do civil-military relations affect the perception, safety and security of humanitarian staff?
  • How can we ensure that humanitarian action is not instrumentalized for political or security objectives?

For UNICEF, interaction with armed forces is more than coordination; UNICEF has a history of strong engagement with armed forces in order to strengthen protection of civilians in armed conflict. UNICEF engages with armed forces on several issues, including humanitarian access, child recruitment, child detention, explosive remnants of war education, sexual violence and exploitation, as well as safe schools and hospitals.

Military and civil defence assets (MCDA): MCDA comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for international humanitarianassistance.

It is strongly recommended to approach the use of MCDA in a harmonized way across UN and other humanitarian organizations. The matter normally needs to be discussed at the HCT and pros and consweighed with a risk management mindset. The Humanitarian Coordinator shall have a central role in opting for use of MCDA.

These questions can help guide decisions on whether or not to use MCDA:

• Is the military force capable of the task?

• Can they be committed for the duration?

• Can they be deployed without weapons?

• Can they establish neutrality and/or impartiality?

• Can they be placed under direction of a civilian actor?

• Are they the only or the most appropriate option?

• What are the consequences for other humanitarian actors?

The following operational principles ensure that when MCDA are used they are in concert with thecore humanitarian and UN principles as well as international humanitarian law.

  • Complementarity: MCDA are means of last resort in responding to a humanitarianemergency. UNICEF will not request these assets unless they are urgentlyneeded and civilian assets are not reasonably available.
  • Civilian control: Safety of MCDA is, and will remain, an MCDA command responsibility.However, to be effective, control and coordination of the overall humanitarian effort is a functionrequiring professional humanitarian staff. This is, and will remain, a civilian responsibility.MCDA employed in the support of UN humanitarian activities will be underthe supervision and control of a responsible civilian authority, such as the UNHumanitarian Coordinator.
  • At no cost: MCDA, like all UN humanitarian assistance, is provided at no cost to the affectedpopulation or the receiving state. Sending states should avoid reducing other planned andprogrammed assistance, such as development, to recover the cost of MCDA or other reliefsupport.

Use of armed escorts:

Given the serious implications of proximity and perceptions of association with armed forces, use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys is a matter of last resort. Extreme precautionary measures need to be taken into account and any decision on taking armed escorts needs to be taken under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. Use of armed escorts can put the humanitarian convoy at an even higher risk of being targeted, create more dependency and may prove non-sustainable. It is only advised for critical programmes for a limited period of time.

Several alternatives shall be explored before a decision is made to use armed escorts. These alternatives shall include: cultivating greater community acceptance, conducting humanitarian negotiations (use of humanitarian pause, humanitarian corridors, days of tranquility and the like), use of remote management/programming, use of low-profile delivery methods, modifying the programme design and taking an area security approach instead of using mobile or static armed escorts.

For situation-specific guidance on civil-military coordination, contact Mohammad Fayyazi in EMOPS.

For more detailed guidance:

(1) Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil DefenceAssets in Disaster Relief ‘Oslo Guidelines’ (2007)

(2) Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil DefenceAssets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in ComplexEmergencies – ‘MCDA Guidelines’ (2003)

(3) IASC non-binding guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013)

(4) IASC Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (2008)