Authors: Robert M Hathaway

Volume: 30

Issue: 1

Pagination: 7-14

ISSN: 0196125X

Subject Terms: Sanctions

International relations-US

Nuclear tests

Arms control

Geographic Names: United States

India

Pakistan

Abstract:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end

of 1999 US lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of

non-proliferation policy. Lawmakers' refusal to impose sanctions against India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests is examined.

Full Text:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the end

of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of

nonproliferation policy.

May 1998 was not a good month for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. On

May 11 and 13, India detonated five nuclear devices, its first nuclear

tests in nearly a quarter century Not to be outdone, its bitter rival

Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests of its own toward the end of the month.

These

sudden developments, long feared but nonetheless catching American

officials

and intelligence analysts by surprise, effectively blew U.S. policy

toward

the South Asian subcontinent to smithereens and laid down a direct

challenge

to the global non-proliferation regime.

Within the U.S. Congress, non-proliferation advocates like

Representative

Edward Markey (D-MA) and India-bashers such as Representative Dan

Burton

(R-IN) voiced outrage and called for the immediate triggering of

sanctions

under Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, universally known as

the Glenn amendment. New Delhi's actions were "reckless, shameful and

irresponsible,"

Markey insisted. Burton urged his House colleagues to "stop

subsidizing

India's nuclear progress" by cutting U.S. economic assistance to New

Delhi.

"India took a terrible, terrible step yesterday," Senator Tom Harkin

(D-IA)

told the Senate the day after India's first round of tests.

Paraphrasing

Franklin Roosevelt, the Iowa Democrat declared that "yesterday is a

day

that will live in infamy for the Nation of India."'

Of greater interest was the response of those who earlier had been

among

India's most vocal supporters. Representative Frank Pallone (D-Nj),

perhaps

New Delhi's leading champion on Capitol Hill, expressed regret at the

tests

but insisted they should not derail the U.S.-India relationship. But

other

lawmakers usually sympathetic to India were less supportive. Many of

the

leading members of the House's India caucus remained noticeably

silent,

and some privately suggested that the caucus publicly condemn India.

Several

legislators, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO),

canceled

plans to visit India. "In light of the nuclear tests," a Gephardt

spokesman

explained, "we did not want there to be the appearance of business as

usual.

The situation was exacerbated 17 days later, when Pakistan conducted

its

own tests. Aside from the expected condemnations of Pakistan and

criticism

of the Clinton administration for allowing events to get so out of

hand,

a number of members voiced anxiety that South Asian tensions could

spiral

out of control. "This is the most serious situation since the Cuban

missile

crisis," Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, a judgment seconded by

Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) .3

Only days after the tests, President Bill Clinton responded as he was

legally

obligated under the Glenn amendment, slapping wide-ranging economic

and

military sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet no sooner had

Washington

taken this stand on behalf of global non-proliferation norms than it

began

to walk back from its position. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congress

swung

from applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not

only

the Glenn amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments,

which

mandate further penalties for states engaged in certain nuclear

activity.

(For more information on this legislation, see text box on p. 11.)

Earlier

convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance as an object lesson

for

other nuclear threshold states, by the end of 1999 U.S. lawmakers had

completely

turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.

Congressional anger over the South Asian tests had given way to

acceptance,

even understanding. Congress, it would appear, had abandoned 25 years

non-proliferation activity.

The U.S. Congress was trying to achieve multiple objectives that were

not

entirely compatible. Concerned about proliferation and wanting a voice

in foreign policy that would compete with the execufive branch, it had

mandated the sanctions. But when faced with post-Cold War national

interests,

the growing influence of the domestic South Asian-American community

and

an increasing interest in the subcontinent by U.S. business, the

legislators

moved non-proliferation to the back burner and renounced with dizzying

speed the sanctions on India and Pakistan they had so recently

supported.

The impact of these steps on the non-proliferation regime is not yet

clear.

But what is apparent is that Congress' love-hate relationship with

sanctions

as a tool of foreign policy is far from over.

The Retreat

Discomfort with the Glenn amendment sanctions surfaced shortly after

they

were imposed on Pakistan and served to trigger a broader discussion of

the utility of sanctions in general. It was time "to engage in a

serious

debate on the merits of using unilateral economic sanctions to achieve

foreign policy goals," Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) declared.

Observing

that the threat of sanctions had deterred neither India nor Pakistan

from

testing, he worried that U.S. sanctions could destabilize a Pakistan

already

burdened with enormous economic and political problems. "An unstable

Pakistan

with nuclear weapons," he added, "is not in our interests."4

Other comments focused more narrowly on U.S. economic interests.

"Pakistan

is not a trading partner we can afford to lose," cautioned the

chairman

of the House Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith (ROR), reflecting

sentiment

especially pronounced in wheat-growing areas of the Pacific Northwest.

"There is no leverage in cutting off our sales," complained Senator

Mitch

McConnell (R-KY). "It does not make a difference on the dinner table

Islamabad, but it sure will in Topeka."5

Recognizing this widespread dissatisfaction with sanctions, the Senate

leadership created a special 18-member task force, headed by McConnell

and Joseph Biden (D-DE), to examine both the way the India and

Pakistan

sanctions were working, and the larger question of how effective

sanctions

are in influencing the behavior of other nations. "There's a feeling

both sides of the aisle that perhaps the proclivity to place economic

sanctions

on countries around the world and with not a clear way of ending those

has become a problem," explained Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) in

what

was clearly an understatement. 6

It did not take long for this uneasiness over the Glenn amendment

sanctions

to translate into congressional action. The initial breach in the

sanctions

regime came in early July, less than two months after the first Indian

test. The impetus behind this move was readily apparent. Pakistan was

the

leading foreign buyer of U.S. white wheat, and the third largest

overseas

purchaser of all U.S. wheat. But unless Congress acted to permit

export

financing, U.S. farmers would be unable to participate in winter wheat

auctions in Pakistan, scheduled for mid-July.

"We are six days away from a disaster," warned Senator Ron Wyden (D-

OR)

in early July. "Farmers around the country are staring an economic

train

wreck in the eye."' The full Senate apparently agreed, rushing through

legislation without the normal committee review and voting 98-0 to

give

both India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from Glenn amendment

restrictions

on Department of Agriculture financing for the purchase of

agricultural

commodities from U.S. farmers.' The Senate bill originally contained

authority

for the president to waive other sanctions as well, but a filibuster

threat

by Senator John Glenn (DOH), author of the Glenn amendment and perhaps

the Senate's leading non-proliferation expert, succeeded in getting

this

provision dropped.

Action in the House was equally swift and revealing of congressional

priorities.

Representatives Robert Livingston (R-LA) and David Obey (D-WI), the

chairman

and ranking minority member, respectively, of the House Appropriations

Committee, urged a more considered approach, but not even these senior

power brokers could slow the stampede. This legislation, its

supporters

argued, did not indicate any lessening of the U.S. commitment to

nonproliferation.

To the contrary, by crafting a more focused sanctions policy, it would

help secure the domestic base for maintaining sanctions.

Such elaborate rationalizations could not hide the actual intent of

most

members, however. Hardly a word about nonproliferation figured in the

House

debate. No one displayed anger at India or Pakistan for violating

long-standing

international norms against testing. Instead, the debate was all about

helping the U.S. farmer, about not losing markets or penalizing

American

wheat growers. The House's leading non-proliferation proponents were

noticeably

absent during the debate. Not surprisingly, the House followed the

Senate's

lead and adopted the measure in time for American farmers to take part

in the Pakistani wheat auction.9

This modest step was quickly followed by others. The day after the

House's

approval of the wheat relief bill, the Senate, with the blessing of

the

administration, adopted the Brownback amendment. The Brownback

amendment-named

for its author, Kansas Republican Sam Brownback, chairman of the

Senate

subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian affairs-provided the

president

with the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn,

Symington

and Pressler amendment sanctions, except for those pertaining to

military

assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.

Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Foreign Relations

Committee,

complained that the Senate had "rushed forward, willy nilly," without

adequate

review or committee hearings, but chose not to block passage.10 Glenn,

who might have been expected to protest this gutting of his namesake

legislation,

was conveniently away from Washington training for the space shuttle

flight

he was to make later in the year. Recalling Glenn's absence sometime

afterward,

one insider conceded that while not deliberately planned, Senate

action

on the legislation at the very moment its primary opponent was

preoccupied

with other matters was more than simply a happy coincidence.

The Brownback amendment (formally known as the India-Pakistan Relief

Act

of 1998) was incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations

bill

and signed into law in October 1998. Following its adoption, President

Clinton quickly restored funding for U.S. military training programs

India and Pakistan, as well as government-backed financing and credit

guarantees

for U.S. firms doing business there. Clinton also lifted restrictions

U.S. commercial loans and credits to both countries and announced that

Washington would support a pending Pakistani request before the

International

Monetary Fund. Encouraged by the absence of opposition to these steps,

Clinton then moved to eliminate another long-standing irritant in the

U.S.-Pakistani

relationship by agreeing to pay Islamabad $325 million in cash and

$140

million in goods as compensation for 28 F-16 aircraft that Pakistan

had

earlier bought, but whose delivery had been prevented by the 1990

triggering

of the Pressler amendment. Once more, Capitol Hill acquiesced

virtually

without dissent.

In October 1999, Congress took a further step by adopting, as part of

the

defense appropriations bill, another, more sweeping Brownback

amendment-sometimes

called Brownback II. This measure gave the president permanent

authority

to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of

the

Glenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive the

Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibited

almost

all U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990.

Finally,

the legislation stated that the "broad application" of export controls

on Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companies

suspected

of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs (the

so-called

"entities list") was "inconsistent" with U.S. national security

interests.

Instead, the lawmakers urged the executive branch to apply U.S. export

controls only to those agencies and companies that made "direct and

material

contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and

only

to those items that can contribute to such programs."

Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy.

The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctions

imposed

upon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. More

remarkably

yet, Congress abandoned even those sanctions it had placed upon

Pakistan

prior to Islamabad's tests. Seventeen months after its nuclear

detonations,

Pakistan found itself far better off vis-a-vis American nuclear

non-proliferation

law than it had been at any time since 1990. Finally, with its

statement

on export controls, the U.S. Congress appeared to condemn rigorous

steps

to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that might be used in

the

nuclear weapons or missile programs of India or Pakistan, and

implicitly

authorized the export of materials that might indirectly assist those

programs.

It was a stunning retreat from Capitol Hill's decades-long reliance on

punitive measures to block the spread of weapons of mass

destruction.11

Never happy about being forced in 1990 to trigger the Pressler

amendment,

the executive branch saw Brownback II as the achievement of a long-

desired

objective. Administration officials were pleased with the measure in

another

respect as well. An earlier draft of the legislation would have

suspended

for five years the Glenn, Symington and Pressler sanctions, whereas

Brownback

II, as finally adopted, gave the president the latitude to lift the

sanctions

only when and if he saw fit. This flexibility, the State Department

believed,

would strengthen the president's hand in subsequent negotiations with

India

and Pakistan.

The timing of these proceedings also merits mention. A House-Senate

conference

committee adopted the defense appropriations bill containing Brownback

II on October 11, 1999. The following day the Pakistani military

dismissed

the civilian government in Islamabad and seized power. On October 13

and

14, the House and Senate respectively took up the defense bill. Both

houses

adopted the measure by substantial majorities. The military coup in

Pakistan

was all but ignored during debate over the bill, with only one member

either house troubling to go to the floor to express skepticism about

the

wisdom of a wholesale abandonment of sanctions against Pakistan at the

very moment the Pakistani military was throwing out a democratically

elected

government. True, Brownback 11 was but one small provision in a huge

bill

appropriating over one-quarter of a trillion dollars. Nonetheless,

this

silence about contemporaneous events in Islamabad suggests just how

far

Congress had traveled since the South Asian tests 17 months earlier.

South Asia in the Congressional Mindset

All in all, it had been a remarkable year and a half. The United

States

had imposed extensive sanctions and then just as quickly lifted not

only

Glenn amendment sanctions, but Symington and Pressler amendment

restrictions

as well. Initially expressing concern for the global non-proliferation

regime, Congress, in less than 18 months, had moved to the position

that

it should not jeopardize other interests in pursuit of unobtainable

non-proliferation

objectives. How does one explain this dramatic transformation in

congressional

attitudes and actions?

The Indian-American community

Part of the explanation is political. As the 1990s unfolded, South

Asia,

and India in particular, gained increasing prominence on the

congressional

agenda. This new politically inspired concern for the region partly

reflected

changes in the Asian-American community. As recently as 1980, there

were

only 387,000 IndianAmericans in the United States. But the next two

decades

saw a dramatic increase in the size of this community. By 1997, this

number

had more than tripled, to 1,215,000. (The total U.S. population during

the same period grew by 17.8 percent.) By the later date, the Indian-

American

community comprised the third largest Asian-American population in the

country, surpassed only by Chinese- and Filipino-Americans.

Numbers tell only part of the story. The Indian-American community is

also

highly educated and prosperous. Fiftyeight percent of the adult

community

has at least a bachelor's degree. A larger percentage of the Indian-

American

work force holds a managerial or professional position than any other

group

in the country, with especially high representation among well-paid

doctors,

engineers, scientists, architects and computer professionals. As a

result,

the Indian-American per capita income exceeds that of every other

group

in the country, including whites.12

[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: A Nebraska wheat farmer harvests his

field

in summer. U.S. wheat farmers would have faced significant economic

consequences

had Congress not waived the nuclear testing-related sanctions imposed

Pakistan, which is the third-largest importer of U.S. wheat.

Until recently, this wealth and status had not translated into

political

clout, but that is rapidly changing. Since the community is widely and

relatively evenly distributed throughout all parts of the country, few

congressional districts are without at least a handful of Indian-