Australia and the Asia-Pacific R. James Ferguson © 2006

Lecture 7:

Asia-Pacific Patterns of Transnational Transition:

Foci of Instability and Underdevelopment

Topics: -

1. Transnational Linkages

2. Case Study: The Illicit Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’

3. Vietnam: National and Regional Gaps in Environmental Protection

4. Conclusion: The Case for Layered Cooperation

5. Bibliography and Further Resources

1. Transnational Linkages

Today, we will study the day-to-day problems that impact on the sense of well-being of people in the Indo-Pacific region and challenge the regional system. Some of these are routine national problems, but in many cases they flow beyond the control of individual states or societies. Problems of infrastructure development, international disease vectors, poverty, environmental disasters, crime and smuggling, economic and political instability are of immediate significance for national and regional planning. These issues are of immediate concern to all countries which are still in the 'developmental stage', i.e. going through rapid modernisation and industrialisation, as well as to developed economies that sit within a wider region of uneven development, e.g. Singapore alongside Indonesia. We will look at several examples which show how these 'low level' internal challenges have become a major problem for several nations in the region, but also strong grounds for international cooperation. We can see these problems, for example, and in the problem of the drug trade in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (referring to the mountainous terrain between Myanmar, Thailand and Laos (sometimes now dubbed a quadrangle, including southern inland Chinese provinces), the only partly controlled flow of labour and migration in the region, and sustained environment damage in a country such as Vietnam.

As we have seen (lecture 2), this has already become a major focus of Australian regional concerns: -

With the advance of globalisation, communications, transport, financial transactions and even criminal activity have become more transnational than ever before. Threats to peace and security are generated by much more than disputes between nation states and are not readily confined by state borders. Transnational terrorism, threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increased intra-state conflict and the weakening of states by poor governance demonstrate this. We need an effective international system, including a reformed United Nations, which can help deliver timely outcomes in the face of these contemporary threats. While recent developments in international law, including the conclusion of treaties covering terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, go some of the way, international law must continue to evolve to remain relevant in the face of states under stress, terrorist groups acting outside any international norms and the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among state and nonstate actors. (Downer 2005, p7)

ASEAN, too, though basically an inter-state dialogue process, has also become aware of the crucial turbulence that can be generated by transnational groups and transboundary problems that make non-interference possible only if levels of regional cooperation remain high (see below; see lecture 6). One of the clearest examples of this is the impact of drug flows out of Myanmar into adjacent states and thence in the wider 'global' market.

2. The Illicit Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’

The Golden Triangle refers to the region where the borders of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Laos meet. It could now be dubbed the Golden Quadrangle, since south-west China also abuts this region, and the drug trade flows through it into Chinese provinces such as Yunnan. There is a direct connection between military conflict, regional instability, and drug production, with illegal drugs providing a main funding mechanism for insurgent or military regimes in Afghanistan, Columbia and Myanmar (see Steinberg 2000). It has also been suggested that arms traffickers in the Golden Triangle may also have supplied arms to regional terrorist groups as well, and that funds are transferred from drug operations to terrorist groups (Xinhua 2002a; New Straits Times 2002). This emphasises an international problem for the region, compounded by the oppression of the Burmese regime against the National League for Democracy, whose general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi makes international headlines regularly as a detained political leader demanding improved human and political rights for Burma. The SPDC's (State Peace and Development Council) poor human rights record and its greed for power have helped cause 'the narcotics explosion in northeastern Burma after 1988' (Lintner 1994, p305).

There is no immediate prospect that the military-authoritarian government will quickly chart a path towards a liberal democratic system, in spite of calls by ASEAN for some reform, and some efforts by SPDC leaders to seem more accommodating to international demands, e.g. PM (Lt-General) Khin Nyunt’s holding of a constitutional convention from May 2004 (see Khosla 1998; Strategic Comments 2003; Strategic Comments 2001; see lecture 6). The regime did not allow Suu Kyi to attend the convention, in spite of Thailand’s expectation that this would be the case, and the National Convention has spoken of reform based on a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ (Lyall 2004). Even though some dissidents were released through late 2004, and Constitutional Convention continued in early 2005 without the involvement of either opposition or the main ethnic groups. The country has been able to maintain a flow of foreign currency (over $1 billion in tourist investment since 1988, Zhou 2005) largely through promoting tourism activity even as hardliners remained in power: -

Myanmar's hoteliers and airline operators spent much of 2004 touring major Asian cities. This latest push to attract visitors is not a sign of reform but a fundraiser for the SPDC. Many members of the legitimately elected NLD, including its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, remain in custody or under house arrest. In October 2004, the junta forced reformist Prime Minister Khin Nyunt to resign for "health reasons" and placed him under house arrest for alleged corruption. His successor, Lieutenant General Soe Win, is a hardliner who has been linked to violence against Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. (Zhou 2005; NLD = National League for Democracy)

Today, the SPDC is led by Chairman and Senior General Than Shwe, an expert in psychological warfare who is also Defence Minister (BBC 2006b) In general, through dialogue with Thailand, ASEAN, PRC and to a lesser extent India, Myanmar has been able to improve its international relations environment, in spite of strong criticism from the UK and the US. Through minor reform, regional cooperation, and some gradual emergence of civil society groups among ethnic communities (see South 2004) the SPDC has been able to ward off strong external interventions. However, it has a long way to go before meeting implicit regional governance norms: -

Myanmar's international relations strategy could therefore be seen as an amalgam of both the realist "balance of power" and constructivist "security through cooperative partnerships with regional neighbours" paradigms. Both approaches however are focused on state and regime security. The challenge for Myanmar will be to integrate the socioeconomic and political changes needed to enhance human security with the traditional indigenous approaches to state and regime security. To put the dilemma another way, the challenge will be for the state to acknowledge that its own future security is predicated on its capacity to deliver the reforms necessary for implementation of human security - a commitment to the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards; a commitment to transparency and participative practices in governance; a commitment to pluralistic democratic norms. Unless the issues fundamental to human security are successfully integrated into state/regime security, Myanmar's international relations strategy - winning friends and influencing regional governments - will be unable to deliver on its expectations. (James 2004)

Through late 2005-mid 2006 Myanmar has engaged in another round of conflict with the Karen ethnic group, which has been seeking greater autonomy, with the Karen National Union (KNU) rebel group viewed as rebels by the Burmese government. The conflict pushed dislocated an extra 10,000 Karen during this period, with up to 140,000 refugees from different parts of Burma now housed in 9 camps in Thailand. Human rights groups have signalled wide spread human rights abuses as Karen are forced from their villages (BBC 2006a). Though a UN envoy was allowed to visit the country in mid-2006, this has not led to changes in the country's closed political system, which at present seems unlikely to evolve towards a more open democratic system, in spite of Burma's claims that it is following a multi-step roadmap towards democracy (Reuters 2006).

Myanmar was the name given to the country by the military regime when it felt that Burma (the English pronunciation of the colloquial ‘Bama’) emphasised too strongly the dominance of the largest ethnic group in the country, the ‘Burmese’ (Lintner 1999, p15). Myanmar is a federal state, and has some 100 smaller ethnic groups that comprise 32-40% of the population, with the Shan (a ‘Tai’ people related to the modern Thais) being the second largest group with 7% of the total population (Lintner 1999, p15). Somewhat different official figures suggest a breakdown of ‘Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5%’ (UNDCP 2002).

Myanmar (Burma): Political Divisions

(Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)

In part, Burma represents a regional problem due to its extended borders (e.g. with Thailand and China), and to its inclusion of a wide range of diverse ethnic groups within its national framework. On this basis, Thailand, ASEAN, PRC and India have expressed special interest in Burma, based up stability issue and transnational flows out of the country. Thailand and ASEAN have been concerned about labour and undocumented labour flows, PRC has a strong trade flow with Burma but is also troubled by drug flows into its South-western province, and Indian has sought to some degree to balance the strong Chinese presence in the country (see lecture 6).

The borders problem derived from the traditional development of civilisation in Southeast Asia. Geographically, Indochina is dominated by the orientation of the Mekong, Red, Salween and Irrawaddy Rivers in a basically north-south orientation, with the structure of the peninsula forcing the use of rivers and coastlines to facilitate trade and communications. In Southeast Asia today the major states have developed along river basins or with access to the sea, and in many cases minorities have inhabited higher and less productive land, often along borders. Minority groups, ethnic groups, and oppositional groups are often forced up into the mountainous and forested inland terrain which lies along many of the borders of the region. These borders are very 'porous' (as in the Thai-Cambodian and the Burma-Chinese border), and problematic in that highland and forest territories are often occupied by minority peoples, who straddle key border areas. The Meo, the Karen (for the impact of the refugee experience and Christianity on the Karen’s sense of nation, see Rajah 2002), the Karennis, Pa-os, Kachins (who had a powerful military organisation and have opposed opium growing), Lahu, Wa, and the Montagnard peoples do not readily fit into one state region and remain remote from central state control. These porous borders intensify the problems of gun and drug smuggling, the issue of cross-border 'rebel' groups, and refugee exodus, which can constitute a major security problem for these nations (Harris 1993, p23; Loescher 1992). As of mid-2000, for example, some 90,000 people remained in refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, most of them having fled from the repressive military regime which still used forced corvee ('slave') labour, especially in the border Shan and Karen areas, in the 1980s (Economist 2000). Through 2002-2003, due to conflicts with the Myanmar government, some 100,000 Karen were pushed across the Thai border (see Checchi et al. 2003), with these numbers being increased again through 2005-2006 towards 140,000. The Karen and the Mon are two minorities that are generally not involved in ‘narcotics business’ (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p14).

The power of the ancient political kingdoms was based mainly on the lowlands of Southeast Asia, with remote hill peoples being much more difficult to control (Wolters 1982, p32). It is no accident that during the main period of communist insurgencies (approx 1950-1980), most insurgent groups used remote border regions for their activities, e.g. the communist parties of Malaysia, Thailand and Burma. Likewise, weaker ethnic groups were often forced up into mountain terrain, e.g. the Karen people of Myanmar were forced up into mountainous territory during 1970-1976, and suffered further major offensives against them in 1989 (Lintner 1994, p239; Boyd 1989). Through the early 1990s some 75,000 Karen have been forced to flee into Thailand, where they are found in refugee camps along the border, with further forced migration through 2001-2006 (Checchi et al. 2003; Corben 1995).

Ethnic Groups within Burma (Courtesy PCL Map Library)

These themes of porous borders, and lack of direct control of ethnic minorities, were complicated by the threat posed by communism to the post-War governments of Southeast Asia. These governments, especially in Myanmar and Thailand, were often willing to use rebel minority groups, including opium warlords, to help patrol their borders, provide intelligence information, and contain communist infiltration. This was a conscious policy used by both the Thai and Burmese governments in the 1960s and 1970s. Even academic institutions had their role to play. In the 1960s, the anti-communist organisation, SEATO (formed in 1955, dissolved in 1977), sponsored the creation of 'the Hill Tribe Research Centre at Chiang Mai University, where well-qualified scholars, sometimes unwittingly, provided the Thai and US security agencies with useful research on the hill peoples of the Golden Triangle' (Lintner 1994, p240).

This anti-communist aspect is seen most clearly in the fact that with the defeat of the Kuomintang (Nationalist, KMT) forces in the Chinese Civil war in 1949, various KMT groups and their leaders (including Generals Li and Duan) fled into the northern sections of Thailand and Burma. From this position, they hoped to continue waging their war against communists, sometimes in raids launched into Yunnan province, and with aid supplied by the CIA during the 1950s (Lintner 1993a, p56). It is also possible that the CIA supported drug production through the 1970s to fund anti-communist groups along the Thai and Burmese border (Takano 2002, p7). However, after Taiwan cut off economic aid in the early 1960s, the KMT groups had to rely on the only cash resource with which to buy arms and keep their struggle going - the opium and heroin trade. Likewise, insurgent groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, though opposed to opium in principle, in the long run also had to become involved in the opium trade.